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Tinted  and  laid  paper,  8vo,  ^2.50  per  vol.  (except  vol.  cn  Comte.) 

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Considerations  on  Representative  Government.  1 vol. 
Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton’s  Philosophy. 
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0 

MEMORIAL  VOLUME, 

John  Stuart  Mill : His  Life  and  Works. 

Twelve  sketches,  as  follows : His  Life,  by  J.  R.  Fox  Bourne ; His 
Career  in  the  India  House,  by  W.  T.  Thornton ; His  Moral  Character, 
by  Herbert  Spencer ; His  Botanical  Studies,  by  Henry  Turner ; His 
Place  as  a Critic,  by  W.  Minto ; His  Work  in  Philosophy,  by  J.  H. 
Levy ; His  Studies  in  Morals  and  Jurisprudence,  by  W.  A.  Hunter ; 
His  Work  in  Political  Economy,  by  J.  E.  Cairnes;  His  Influence  at 
the  Universities,  by  Henry  Fawcett ; His  Influence  as  a Practical 
Politician,  by  Mrs.  Fawcett ; His  Relation  to  Positiwsm,  by  Frederic 
Harrison ; His  Position  as  a Philosopher,  by  W.  A.  Hunter.  16mo, 
price,  $1.00. 

HENRY  HOLT  & CO.,  Publis^Kers,  N.  Y. 


6/P7~ 


ST03. 


ON  LIBERTY 


/ 


ON  LIBERTY 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN 


BY 

JOHN  STHAET  MILL 


NEW  YOEK 

HENEY  HOLT  AND  COMPANY 
1879 


the  beloved  and  deplored  memory  of 
her  who  was  the  inspirer,  and  in  part  the 
author,  of  all  that  is  best  in  my  writings  — 
the  friend  and  wife  whose  exalted  sense  of 
truth  and  right  was  my  strongest  incitement, 
and  whose  approbation  was  my  chief  reward 
— I dedicate  this  volume.  Like  all  that  I 
have  written  for  many  years,  it  belongs  as 
much  to  her  as  to  me ; but  the  work  as  it 
stands  has  had,  in  a very  insufficient  degree, 
the  inestimable  advantage  of  her  revision 
some  of  the  most  important  portions  having 
been  reserved  for  a more  careful  reexamina- 
tion, which  they  are  now  never  destined  to 
receive.  Were  I but  capable  of  interpreting 
to  the  world  one  half  the  great  thoughts  and 
noble  feelings  which  are  buried  in  her  grave, 
I should  be  the  medium  of  a greater  benefit 
to  it,  than  is  ever  likely  to  arise  from  any- 
thing that  I can  write,  unprompted  and  un- 
assisted  by  her  all  but  unrivalled  wisdom. 


The  grand,  leading  pnnciple,  towards  which  every  argument 
unfolded  in  these  pages  directly  converges,  is  the  absolute  and 
essential  importance  of  human  development  in  its  richest  dive> 
sity. — Wilhelm  von  Humboldt:  Sphere  and  Duties  of  Govern^ 
tr£r4. 


> , ■ • • 


■ . ■•  V ‘ i-W'  ■ 

• . . ,f.  r 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAai 

INTRODUCTORY 9 

CHAPTER  H. 

OP  THE  LIBERTY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  DISCUSSION  33 

CHAPTER  III. 

OF  INDIVIDUALITY,  AS  ONE  OF  THE  ELEMENTS 

OF  WELL-BEING 100 

CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  THE  LIMITS  TO  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  SOCIETY 

OVER  THE  INDIVIDUAL 183 

CHAPTER  V. 

APPLICATIONS  •••  •#•••«  •166 


ON  LIBERTY. 


CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

rpHE  subject  of  this  Essay  is  not  the  so* 
J-  called  Liberty  of  the  Will,  so  unfortunately 
opposed  to  the  misnamed  doctrine  of  Philo- 
sophical Necessity  ; but  Civil,  or  Social  Lib- 
erty : the  nature  and  limits  of  the  power  which 
can  be  legitimately  exercised  by  society  over 
the  individual.  A question  seldom  stated,  and 
hardly  ever  discussed,  in  general  terms,  but 
which  profoundly  influences  the  practical  con- 
troversies of  the  age  by  its  latent  presence,  and 
is  likely  soon  to  make  itself  recognized  as  the 
vital  question  of  the  future.  It  is  so  far  from 
being  new,  that,  in  a certain  sense,  it  has  di- 
vided mankind,  almost  from  the  remotest  ages, 
but  in  the  stage  of  progress  into  which  the 
more  civilized  portions  of  the  species  have 
now  entered,  it  presents  itself  under  new  con- 
ditions, and  requires  a different  and  more  fun- 
damental treatment. 

The  struggle  between  Liberty  and  Author- 
ity is  the  most  conspicuous  feature  in  the  por- 
tions of  history  with  which  we  are  earliest 

1* 


10 


ON  LIBERTY. 


familiar,  particularly  in  that  of  Greece,  Rome^ 
and  England.  But  in  old  times  this  contest 
was  between  subjects,  or  some  classes  of  sub- 
jects, and  the  government.  By  liberty,  was 
meant  protection  against  the  tyranny  of  the 
political  rulers.  The  rulers  were  conceived 
(except  in  some  of  the  popular  governments 
of  Greece)  as  in  a necessarily  antagonistic  po- 
sition to  the  people  whom  they  ruled.  They 
consisted  of  a governing  One,  or  a governing 
tribe  or  caste,  who  derived  their  authority  from 
inheritance  or  conquest ; who,  at  all  events,  did 
not  hold  it  at  the  pleasure  of  the  governed,  and 
whose  supremacy  men  did  not  venture,  per- 
haps did  not  desire,  to  contest,  whatever  pre- 
cautions might  be  taken  against  its  oppres- 
sive exercise.  Their  power  was  regarded  as 
necessary,  but  also  as  highly  dangerous  ; as 
a weapon  which  they  would  attempt  to  use 
against  their  subjects,  no  less  than  against  ex- 
ternal enemies.  To  prevent  the  weaker  mem- 
bers of  the  community  from  being  preyed  upon 
by  innumerable  vultures,  it  was  needful  that 
there  should  be  an  animal  of  prey  stronger 
than  the  rest,  commissioned  to  keep  them 
down.  But  as  the  king  of  the  vultures  would 
be  no  less  bent  upon  preying  on  the  flock  than 
any  of  the  minor  harpies,  it  was  indispensable 
to  be  in  a perpetual  attitude  of  defence  against 
his  beak  and  claws.  The  aim,  therefore,  of 
patriots,  was  to  set  limits  to  the  power  which 
the  ruler  should  be  suffered  to  exercise  over 


ON  LIBERTY. 


11 


the  community ; and  this  limitation  was  what 
tliey  meant  by  liberty.  It  was  attempted  in 
two  ways.  First,  by  obtaining  a recognition 
of  certain  immunities,  called  political  liberties 
or  rights,  which  it  was  to  be  regarded  as  a 
breach  of  duty  in  the  ruler  to  infringe,  and 
which,  if  he  did  infringe,  specific  resistance,  or 
general  rebellion,  was  held  to  be  justifiable.  A 
second,  and  generally  a later  expedient,  was 
the  establishment  of  constitutional  checks  ; by 
which  the  consent  of  the  community,  or  of  a 
body  of  some  sort  supposed  to  represent  its 
interests,  was  made  a necessary  condition  to 
some  of  the  more  important  acts  of  the  gov- 
erning power.  To  the  first  of  these  modes  of 
limitation,  the  ruling  power,  in  most  European 
countries,  was  compelled,  more  or  less,  to  sub- 
mit. It  was  not  so  with  the  second ; and  to 
attain  this,  or  when  already  in  some  degree 
possessed,  to  attain  it  more  completely,  be- 
came everywhere  the  principal  object  of  the 
lovers  of  liberty.  And  so  long  as  mankind 
were  content  to  combat  one  enemy  by  an 
other,  and  to  be  ruled  by  a master,  on  condi- 
tion of  being  guaranteed  more  or  less  effica- 
ciously against  his  tyranny,  they  did  not  caiTy 
their  aspirations  beyond  this  point. 

A time,  however,  came,  in  the  progress  of 
human  affairs,  when  men  ceased  to  think  it  a 
necessity  of  nature  that  their  governors  should 
be  an  independent  power,  opposed  in  interest 
to  themselves.  It  appeared  to  them  much  beb 


12 


ON  LIBERTY. 


ter  that  the  various  magistrates  of  the  State 
should  be  their  tenants  or  delegates,  revoca- 
ble at  their  pleasure.  In  that  way  alone,  it 
seemed,  could  they  have  complete  security  that 
the  powers  of  government  would  never  be 
abused  to  their  disadvantage.  By  degrees, 
this  new  demand  for  elective  and  temporary 
rulers  became  the  prominent  object  of  the  ex- 
ertions of  the  popular  party,  wherever  any  such 
party  existed;  and  superseded,  to  a considera- 
ble extent,  the  previous  efforts  to  limit  the 
power  of  rulers.  As  the  struggle  proceeded 
for  making  the  ruling  power  emanate  from  the 
periodical  choice  of  the  ruled,  some  persons 
began  to  think  that  too  much  importance  had 
been  attached  to  the  limitation  of  the  power 
itself.  That  (it  might  seem)  was  a resource 
against  rulers  whose  interests  were  habitually 
opposed  to  those  of  the  people.  What  was 
now  wanted  was,  that  the  rulers  should  be 
identified  with  the  people ; that  their  interest 
and  will  should  be  the  interest  and  will  of  the 
nation.  The  nation  did  not  need  to  be  pro- 
tected against  its  own  will.  There  was  no 
fear  of  its  tyrannizing  over  itself.  Let  the 
rulers  be  effectually  responsible  to  it,  promptly 
removable  by  it,  and  it  could  afford  to  trust 
them  with  power  of  which  it  could  itself  dic- 
tate the  use  to  be  made.  Their  power  was 
but  the  nation’s  own  power,  concentrated,  and 
in  a form  convenient  for  exercise.  This  mode 
of  thought,  or  rather  perhaps  of  feeling,  was 


ON  LIBERTY. 


13 


tommon  among  the  last  generation  of  Euro- 
pean liberalism,  in  the  Continental  section  of 
which,  it  still  apparently  predominates.  Those 
who  admit  any  limit  to  what  a government 
may  do,  except  in  the  case  of  such  govern- 
ments as  they  think  ought  not  to  exist,  stand 
out  as  brilliant  exceptions  among  the  political 
thinkers  of  the  Continent.  A similar  tone  of 
sentiment  might  by  this  time  have  been  preva- 
lent in  our  own  country,  if  the  circumstances 
which  for  a time  encouraged  it  had  continued 
unaltered. 

But,  in  political  and  philosophical  theories, 
as  well  as  in  persons,  success  discloses  faults 
and  infirmities  which  failure  might  have  con- 
cealed from  observation.  The  notion,  that  the 
people  have  no  need  to  limit  their  power  over 
themselves,  might  seem  axiomatic,  when  pop- 
ular government  was  a thing  only  dreamed 
about,  or  read  of  as  having  existed  at  some 
distant  period  of  the  past.  Neither  was  that 
notion  necessarily  disturbed  by  such  temporary 
aberrations  as  those  of  the  French  Revolution, 
the  worst  of  which  were  the  vrork  of  an  usurp- 
ing few,  and  which,  in  any  case,  belonged,  not 
to  the  permanent  working  of  popular  institu- 
tions, but  to  a sudden  and  convulsive  outbreak 
against  monarchical  and  aristocratic  despot- 
ism. In  time,  however,  a democratic  republic 
came  to  occupy  a large  portion  of  the  earth’s 
surface,  and  made  itself  felt  as  one  of  the 
most  powerful  members  of  the  community  of 


14 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


nations ; and  elective  and  responsible  govern- 
ment became  subject  to  the  observations  and 
criticisms  which  wait  upon  a great  existing 
fact.  It  was  now  perceived  that  such  phrases 
as  ‘‘self-government,”  and  “the  power  of  the 
people  over  themselves,”  do  not  express  the 
true  state  of  the  case.  The  “ people  ” who 
exercise  the  power,  are  not  always  the  same 
people  with  those  over  whom  it  is  exercised , 
and  the  “ self-government  ” spoken  of,  is  not 
the  government  of  each  by  himself,  but  of  each 
by  all  the  rest.  The  will  of  the  people,  more- 
over, practically  means,  the  will  of  the  most 
numerous  or  the  most  active  part  of  the  peo- 
ple ; the  majority,  or  those  who  succeed  in 
making  themselves  accepted  as  the  majority : 
the  people,  consequently,  may  desire  to  oppress 
a part  of  their  number ; and  precautions  are  as 
much  needed  against  this,  as  against  any  other 
abuse  of  power.  The  limitation,  therefore, 
of  the  power  of  government  over  individuals, 
loses  none  of  its  importance  when  the  holders 
of  power  are  regularly  accountable  to  the  com- 
munity, that  is,  to  the  strongest  party  therein. 
This  view  of  things,  recommending  itself 
equally  to  the  intelligence  of  thinkers  and  to 
the  inclination  of  those  important  classes  in 
European  society  to  whose  real  or  supposed 
interests  democracy  is  adverse,  has  had  no  dif- 
ficulty in  establishing  itself ; and  in  political 
speculations  “ the  tyranny  of  the  majority”  is 
now  generally  included  among  the  evils  against 
which  society  requires  to  be  on  its  guard. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


15 


Like  other  tyrannies,  the  tyranny  of  the  ma- 
jority was  at  first,  and  is  still  vulgarly,  held  in 
dread,  chiefly  as  operating  through  the  acts  of 
the  public  authorities.  But  reflecting  persons 
perceived  that  when  society  is  itself  the  tyrant 
— society  collectively,  over  the  separate  indi- 
viduals who  compose  it  — its  means  of  tyran- 
nizing are  not  restricted  to  the  acts  which  it 
may  do  by  the  hands  of  its  political  function- 
aries. Society  can  and  does  execute  its  own 
mandates  : and  if  it  issues  wrong  mandates 
instead  of  right,  or  any  mandates  at  all  in 
things  with  which  it  ought  not  to  meddle,  it 
practises  a social  tyranny  more  formidable  than 
many  kinds  of  political  oppression,  since,  though 
not  usually  upheld  by  such  extreme  penalties, 
it  leaves  fewer  means  of  escape,  penetrating 
much  more  deeply  into  the  details  of  life,  and 
enslaving  the  soul  itself.  Protection,  therefore, 
against  the  tyranny  of  the  magistrate  is  not 
enough  ; there  needs  protection  also  against  the 
tyranny  of  the  prevailing  opinion  and  feeling; 
against  the  tendency  of  society  to  impose,  by 
other  means  than  civil  penalties,  its  own  ideas 
and  practices  as  rules  of  conduct  on  those  who 
dissent  from  them  ; to  fetter  the  development, 
and,  if  possible,  prevent  the  formation,  of  any 
individuality  not  in  harmony  with  its  ways,  and 
compel  all  characters  to  fashion  themselves 
upon  the  model  of  its  own.  There  is  a limit 
to  the  legitimate  interference  of  collective  opin- 
ion with  individual  independence  ; and  to  find 


C iCi--  f*  t,  n h 


16 


ON  LIBERTY. 


that  limit,  and  maintain  it  against  encroach- 
ment, is  as  indispensable  to  a good  condition 
of  human  affairs,  as  protection  against  political 
despotism. 

But  though  this  proposition  is  not  likely  tc 
be  contested  in  general  terms,  the  practical 
question,  where  to  place  the  limit  — how  to 
make  the  fitting  adjustment  between  individ- 
ual independence  and  social  control — is  a sub- 
ject on  which  nearly  everything  remains  to  be 
done.  All  that  makes  existence  valuable  to 
any  one,  depends  on  the  enforcement  of  re- 
straints upon  the  actions  of  other  people. 
Some  rules  of  conduct,  therefore,  must  be 
imposed,  by  law  in  the  first  place,  and  by 
opinion  on  many  things  which  are  not  fit 
subjects  for  the  operation  of  law.  What  these 
rules  should  be,  is  the  principal  question  in 
human  affairs  ; but  if  w^e  except  a few  of  the 
most  obvious  cases,  it  is  one  of  those  which 
least  progress  has  been  made  in  resolving.  No 
two  ages,  and  scarcely  any  two  countries,  have 
decided  it  alike ; and  the  decision  of  one  age 
or  country  is  a wonder  to  another.  Yet  the 
people  of  any  given  age  and  country  no  more 
suspect  any  difficulty  in  it,  than  if  it  were  a 
subject  on  which  mankind  had  always  been 
agreed.  The  rules  which  obtain  among  them- 
selves appear  to  them  self-evident  and  self-jus- 
tifying. This  all  but  universal  illusion  is  one 
of  the  examples  of  the  magical  influence  of 
custom,  which  is  not  only,  as  the  proverb  says, 


ON  LIBERTY. 


17 


a second  nature,  but  is  continually  mistaken 
for  the  first.  The  effect  of  custom,  in  prevent- 
ing any  misgiving  respecting  the  rules  of  con- 
duct which  mankind  impose  on  one  another,  is 
all  the  more  complete  because  the  subject  is 
one  on  which  it  is  not  generally  considered  ne- 
cessary that  reasons  should  be  given,  either  by 
one  person  to  others,  or  by  each  to  himself.  Peo- 
ple are  accustomed  to  believe,  and  have  been 
encouraged  in  the  belief  by  some  who  aspire 
to  the  character  of  philosophers,  that  their  feel- 
ings, on  subjects  of  this  nature,  are  better  than 
reasons,  and  render  reasons  unnecessary.  The 
practical  principle  which  guides  them  to  their 
opinions  on  the  regulation  of  human  conduct, 
is  the  feeling  in  each  person’s  mind  that  every- 
body should  be  required  to  act  as  he,  and  those 
with  whom  he  sympathizes,  would  like  them  to 
act.  No  one,  indeed,  acknowledges  to  himself 
that  his  standard  of  judgment  is  his  own  liking ; 
but  an  opinion  on  a point  of  conduct,  not  sup- 
ported by  reasons,  can  only  count  as  one  person’s 
preference  ; and  if  the  reasons,  when  given,  are  a 
mere  appeal  to  a similar  preference  felt  by  other 
people,  it  is  still  only  many  people’s  liking  in- 
stead of  one.  To  an  ordinary  man,  however, 
his  own  preference,  thus  supported,  is  not  only 
a perfectly  satisfactory  reason,  but  the  only  one 
he  generally  has  for  any  of  his  notions  of  mo- 
rality, taste,  or  propriety,  which  are  not  express- 
ly written  in  his  religious  creed  ; and  his  chief 
guide  in  the  interpretation  even  of  that.  Men’s 


18 


ON  LIBERTY. 


opinions,  accordingly,  on  what  is  laudable  oi 
b.aineable,  are  affected  by  all  the  multifarious 
causes  which  influence  their  wishes  in  regard 
to  the  conduct  of  others,  and  which  are  as  nm 
merous  as  those  which  determine  their  wishes 
on  any  other  subject.  Sometimes  their  reason 
— at  other  times  their  prejudices  or  supersti- 
lions  : often  their  social  affections,  not  seldom 
their  antisocial  ones,  their  envy  or  jealousy, 
their  arrogance  or  contemptuousness  : but 

most  commonly,  their  desires  or  fears  for  them- 
selves—their  legitimate  or  illegitimate  self-in- 
terest. Wherever  there  is  an  ascendant  class, 
a large  portion  of  the  morality  of  the  country 
emanates  from  its  class  interests,  and  its  feel- 
ings of  class  superiority.  The  morality  be- 
tween Spartans  and  Helots,  between  planters 
and  negroes,  between  princes  and  subjects,  be- 
tween nobles  and  roturiers,  between  men  and 
women,  has  been  for  the  most  part  the  creation 
of  these  class  interests  and  feelings  : and  the 
sentiments  thus  generated,  react  in  turn  upon 
the  moral  feelings  of  the  members  of  the  as- 
cendant class,  in  their  relations  among  them- 
selves. Where,  on  the  other  hand,  a class,  for- 
merly ascendant,  has  lost  its  ascendency,  or 
where  its  ascendency  is  unpopular,  the  prevail- 
ing moral  sentiments  frequently  bear  the  im- 
press of  an  impatient  dislike  of  superiority 
Another  grand  determining  principle  of  the 
rules  of  conduct,  both  in  act  and  forbearance 
which  have  been  enforced  by  law  or  opinion,  haa 


ON  LIBEETY. 


19 


been  the  servility  of  mankind  towards  the  sup 
posed  preferences  or  aversions  of  their  tempr 
ral  masters,  or  of  their  gods.  This  servility 
though  essentially  selfish,  is  not  hypocrisy ; it 
gives  rise  to  perfectly  genuine  sentiments  of 
abhorrence;  it  made  men  burn  magicians  and 
heretics.  Among  so  many  baser  influences, 
the  general  and  obvious  interests  of  society 
have  of  course  had  a share,  and  a large  one,  in 
the  direction  of  the  moral  sentiments  : less, 
however,  as  a matter  of  reason,  and  on  their 
own  account,  than  as  a consequence  of  the 
sympathies  and  antipathies  which  grew  out  of 
them : and  sympathies  and  antipathies  which 
had  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  interests  of 
society,  have  made  themselves  felt  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  moralities  with  quite  as  great  force. 

The  likings  and  dislikings  of  society,  or 
of  some  powerful  portion  of  it,  are  thus  the 
main  thing  which  has  practically  determined 
the  rules  laid  down  for  general  observance,  un- 
der the  penalties  of  law  or  opinion.  And  in 
general,  those  who  have  been  in  advance  of 
society  in  thought  and  feeling,  have  left  this 
condition  of  things  unassailed  in  principle, 
however  they  may  have  come  into  conflict 
with  it  in  some  of  its  details.  They  have 
occupied  themselves  rather  in  inquiring  what 
things  society  ought  to  like  or  dislike,  than  in 
questioning  whether  its  likings  or  dislikings 
should  be  a law  to  individuals.  They  pre- 
ferred endeavoring  to  alter  the  feelings  of  man* 


20 


ON  LIBERTY. 


kind  on  the  particular  points  on  which  thej 
were  themselves  heretical,  rather  than  make 
common  cause  in  defence  of  freedom,  with 
heretics  generally.  The  only  case  in  which 
the  higher  ground  has  been  taken  on  principle 
and  maintained  with  consistency,  by  any  but 
an  individual  here  and  there,  is  that  of  relig- 
ious belief:  a case  instructive  in  many  ways, 
and  not  least  so  as  forming  a most  striking 
instance  of  the  fallibility  of  what  is  called  the 
moral  sense : for  the  odium  theologicum^  in  a 
sincere  bigot,  is  one  of  the  most  unequivocal 
cases  of  moral  feeling.  Those  who  first  broke 
the  yoke  of  what  called  itself  the  Universal 
Church,  were  in  general  as  little  willing  to 
permit  difference  of  religious  opinion  as  that 
church  itself.  But  when  the  heat  of  the  con- 
flict was  over,  without  giving  a complete  vic- 
tory to  any  party,  and  each  church  or  sect  was 
reduced  to  limit  its  hopes  to  retaining  posses- 
sion of  the  ground  it  already  occupied  ; mi- 
norities, seeing  that  they  had  no  chance  of 
becoming  majorities,  were  under  the  necessity 
of  pleading  to  those  whom  they  could  not  con- 
vert, for  permission  to  differ.  It  is  accordingly 
on  this  battle-field,  almost  solely,  that  the  rights 
of  the  individual  against  society  have  been  as- 
serted on  broad  grounds  of  principle,  and  the 
claim  of  society  to  exercise  authority  over 
dissentients  openly  controverted.  The  grea1 
writers  to  whom  the  world  owes  what  relig- 
ious liberty  it  possesses,  have  mostly  asserted 


ON  LIBERTY. 


2i 


freedom  of  conscience  as  an  indefeasible  rij^;ht, 
and  denied  absolutely  that  a human  being  is 
accountable  to  others  for  his  religious  balief 
Yet  so  natural  to  mankind  is  intoleran  ;e  in 
whatever  they  really  care  about,  that  reli  ^ious 
freedom  has  hardly  anywhere  been  prac^'ically 
realized,  except  where  religious  indifference, 
which  dislikes  to  have  its  peace  disturbed  by 
theological  quarrels,  has  added  its  weight  to 
the  scale.  In  the  minds  of  almost  all  rebgious 
persons,  even  in  the  most  tolerant  countries, 
the  duty  of  toleration  is  admitted  with  tacit 
reserves.  One  person  will  bear  with  dissent 
in  matters  of  church  government,  but  not  of 
dogma ; another  can  tolerate  everybody,  short 
of  a Papist  or  an  Unitarian  ; another,  every 
one  who  believes  in  revealed  religion  ; a few 
extend  their  charity  a little  further,  but  stop 
at  the  belief  in  a God  and  in  a future  state. 
Wherever  the  sentiment  of  the  majority  is  still 
genuine  and  intense,  it  is  found  to  have  abated 
little  of  its  claim  to  be  obeyed. 

In  England,  from  the  peculiar  circumstances 
oZ  our  political  history,  though  the  yoke  of  opin- 
ion is  perhaps  heavier,  that  of  law  is  lighter, 
than  in  most  other  countries  of  Europe  ; and 
there  is  considerable  jealousy  of  direct  interfer- 
ence, by  the  legislative  or  the  executive  power 
with  private  conduct ; not  so  much  from  any 
just  regard  for  the  independence  of  the  indi- 
vidual, as  from  the  still  subsisting  habit  of 
looking  on  the  government  as  representing  an 


22 


ON  LIBERTY. 


opposite  interest  to  the  public.  The  majority 
have  not  yet  learnt  to  feel  the  power  of  the 
government  their  power,  or  its  opinions  their 
opinions.  When  they  do  so,  individual  liberty 
will  probably  be  as  much  exposed  to  invasion 
from  the  government,  as  it  already  is  from  pub- 
lic opinion.  But,  as  yet,  there  is  a consider- 
able amount  of  feeling  ready  to  be  called  forth 
against  any  attempt  of  the  law  to  control  indi 
viduals  in  things  in  which  they  have  not  hith- 
erto been  accustomed  to  be  controlled  by  it ; 
and  this  with  very  little  discrimination  as  to 
whether  the  matter  is,  or  is  not,  within  the 
legitimate  sphere  of  legal  control ; insomuch 
that  the  feeling,  highly  salutary  on  the  whole, 
is  perhaps  quite  as  often  misplaced  as  well 
grounded  in  the  particular  instances  of  its  appli- 
cation. There  is,  in  fact,  no  recognized  principle 
by  which  the  propriety  or  impropriety  of  govern- 
ment interference  is  customarily  tested.  People 
decide  according  to  their  personal  preferences. 
Some,  whenever  they  see  any  good  to  be  done, 
or  evil  to  be  remedied,  would  willingly  insti- 
gate the  government  to  undertake  the  busi- 
ness ; while  others  prefer  to  bear  almost  any 
amount  of  social  evil,  rather  than  add  one  to 
the  departments  of  human  interests  amena- 
ble to  governmental  control.  And  men  range 
themselves  on  one  or  the  other  side  in  any  par- 
ticular case,  according  to  this  general  direction 
of  their  sentiments ; or  according  to  the  degree 
of  interest  which  they  feel  in  the  particular 


ON  LIBERTY. 


23 


filing  which  it  is  proposed  that  the  government 
Bhould  do  ; or  according  to  the  belief  they  en- 
tertain that  the  government  would,  or  would 
not,  do  it  in  the  manner  they  prefer ; but  very 
rarely  on  account  of  any  opinion  to  which  they 
consistently  adhere,  as  to  what  things  are  fit  to 
be  done  by  a government.  And  it  seems  to 
me  that,  in  consequence  of  this  absence  of  rule 
or  principle,  one  side  is  at  present  as  often 
wrong  as  the  other ; the  interference  of  gov- 
ernment is,  with  about  equal  frequency,  im- 
properly invoked  and  improperly  condemned. 

The  object  of  this  Essay  is  to  assert  one 
very  simple  principle,  as  entitled  to  govern 
absolutely  the  dealings  of  society  with  the 
individual  in  the  way  of  compulsion  and  con- 
trol, whether  the  means  used  be  physical  force 
in  the  form  of  legal  penalties,  or  the  moral 
coercion  of  public  opinion.  That  principle  is, 
that  the  sole  end  for  which  mankind  are  war- 
ranted, individually  or  collectively,  in  interfer- 
ing with  the  liberty  of  action  of  any  of  their 
number,  is  self-protection.  That  the  only  pur- 
pose for  which  power  can  ^be  rightfully  exer- 
cised over  any  member  of  a civilized  commu- 
nity, against  his  will,  is  to  prevent  harm  to 
others.  His  own  good,  either  physical  or  moral, 
is  not  a sufficient  warrant.  He  cannot  right- 
fully be  compelled  to  do  or  forbear  because  it 
will  be  better  for  him  to  do  so,  because  it  will 
make  him  happier,  because,  in  the  opinions  of 
others,  to  do  so  would  be  wise,  or  even  right 


24 


ON  LIBERTY. 


These  are  good  reasons  for  remonstrating  with 
him,  or  reasoning  with  him,  or  persuading  him 
or  entreating  him,  but  not  for  compelling  him,  or 
visiting  him  with  any  evil,  in  case  he  do  other 
wise.  To  justify  that,  the  conduct  from  which 
it  is  desired  to  deter  him  must  be  calculated  to 
produce  evil  to  some  one  else.  The  only  part 
of  the  conduct  of  any  one,  for  which  he  is  j 
amenable  to  society,  is  that  which  concerns  \ 
others.  In  the  part  which  merely  concerns  j 
himself,  his  independence  is,  of  right,  absolute.  ^ 
Over  himself,  over  his  own  body  and  mind,  the 
individual  is  sovereign. 

It  is,  perhaps,  hardly  necessary  to  say  that 
this  doctrine  is  meant  to  apply  only  to  human 
beings  in  the  maturity  of  their  faculties.  We 
are  not  speaking  of  children,  or  of  young  per- 
sons below  the  age  which  the  law  may  fix  as 
that  of  manhood  or  womanhood.  Those  who 
are  still  in  a state  to  require  being  taken  care 
of  by  others,  must  be  protected  against  their 
own  actions  as  well  as  against  external  injury. 
For  the  same  reason,  we  may  leave  out  of  con- 
sideration those  backward  states  of  society  in 
which  the  race  itself  may  be  considered  a«  in 
its  nonage.  The  early  difficulties  in  the  way 
of  spontaneous  progress  are  so  great,  that  there 
is  seldom  any  choice  of  means  for  overcoming 
them  ; and  a ruler  full  of  the  spirit  of  improve- 
ment is  warranted  in  the  use  of  any  expedients 
that  will  attain  an  end,  perhaps  otherwise  un- 
attainable. Despotism  is  a legitimate  mode  of 


ON  LIBERTY. 


25 


government  in  dealing  with  barbarians,  pro- 
vided the  end  be  their  improvement,  and  the 
means  justified  by  actually  effecting  that  end. 
Liberty,  as  a principle,  has  no  application  to 
any  state  of  things  anterior  to  the  time  when 
mankind  have  become  capable  of  being  im- 
proved by  free  and  equal  discussion.  Until 
then,  there  is  nothing  for  them  but  implicit 
obedience  to  an  Akbar  or  a Charlemagne,  if 
they  are  so  fortunate  as  to  find  one.  But  as 
soon  as  mankind  have  attained  the  capacity 
of  being  guided  to  their  own  improvement  by 
conviction  or  persuasion  (a  period  long  since 
reached  in  all  nations  with  whom  we  need 
here  concern  ourselves),  compulsion,  either  in 
the  direct  form  or  in  that  of  pains  and  penal- 
ties for  non-compliance,  is  no  longer  admis- 
sible as  a means  to  their  own  good,  and  justifi- 
able only  for  the  security  of  others. 

It  is  proper  to  state  that  I forego  any  ad- 
vantage which  could  be  derived  to  my  argu- 
ment from  the  idea  of  abstract  right,  as  a thing 
independent  of  utility.  I regard  utility  as  the 
ultimate  appeal  on  all  ethical  questions ; but 
it  must  be  utility  in  the  largest  sense,  ground- 
ed on  the  permanent  interests  of  man  as  a 
progressive  being.  Those  interests,  I contend, 
authorize  the  subjection  of  individual  sponta- 
neity to  external  control,  only  in  respect  to 
those  actions  of  each,  which  concern  the  inter- 
est of  other  people.  If  any  one  does  an  act 

hurtful  to  others,  there  is  a primd  facie  case  for 
2 


26 


ON  LIBERTY. 


punishing  him,  by  law,  or,  where  legal  penal- 
ties are  not  safely  applicable,  by  general  disap* 
probation.  There  are  also  many  positive  acts 
for  the  benefit  of  others,  which  he  may  right- 
fully be  compelled  to  perform  ; such  as,  to  give 
evidence  in  a court  of  justice ; to  bear  his  fair 
share  in  the  common  defence,  or  in  any  otner 
joint  work  necessary  to  the  interest  of  the 
society  of  which  he  enjoys  the  protection ; 
and  to  perform  certain  acts  of  individual  be- 
neficence, such  as  saving  a fellow  creature’s 
life,  or  interposing  to  protect  the  defenceless 
against  ill-usage,  things  which  whenever  it  is 
obviously  a man’s  duty  to  do,  he  may  right- 
fully be  made  responsible  to  society  for  not 
doing  A person  may  cause  evil  to  others  not 
only  by  his  actions  but  by  his  inaction,  and  in 
either  case  he  is  justly  accountable  to  them  for 
the  injury.  The  latter  case,  it  is  true,  requires 
a much  more  cautious  exercise  of  compulsion 
than  the  former.  To  make  any  one  answer- 
able  for  doing  evil  to  others,  is  the  rule  ; tc 
make  him  answerable  for  not  preventing  evil, 
is,  comparatively  speaking,  the  exception.  Yet 
there  are  many  cases  clear  enough  and  grave 
enough  to  justify  that  exception.  In  all  things 
which  regard  the  external  relations  of  the  indi- 
vidual, he  is  de  jure  amenable  to  those  whose 
interests  are  concerned,  and  if  need  be,  to 
society  as  their  protector.  There  are  often 
good  reasons  for  not  holding  him  to  the  re 
sponsibility  ; but  these  reasons  must  arise  from 


ON  LIBERTY. 


27 


the  special  expediencies  of  the  case  : either 

because  it  is  a kind  of  case  in  which  he  is  on 
the  whole  likely  to  act  better,  when  left  to  his 
own  discretion,  than  when  controlled  in  any 
way  in  which  society  have  it  in  their  power  to 
control  him ; or  because  the  attempt  to  exer- 
cise control  would  produce  other  evils,  greater 
than  those  which  it  would  prevent.  When 
such  reasons  as  these  preclude  the  enforcement 
of  responsibility,  the  conscience  of  the  agent 
himself  should  step  into  the  vacant  judgment- 
seat,  and  protect  those  interests  of  others  which 
have  no  external  protection  ; judging  himself 
all  the  more  rigidly,  because  the  case  does  not 
admit  of  his  being  made  accountable  to  the 
judgment  of  his  fellow-creatures. 

But  there  is  a sphere  of  action  in  which  so- 
ciety, as  distinguished  from  the  individual,  has, 
if  any,  only  an  indirect  interest ; comprehend- 
ing all  that  portion  of  a person’s  life  and  con- 
duct which  affects  only  himself,  or,  if  it  also 
affects  others,  only  with  their  free,  voluntary, 
and  undeceived  consent  and  participation. 
When  I say  only  himself,  I mean  directly,  and 
in  the  first  instance  : for  whatever  affects  him- 
self, may  affect  others  through  himself ; and 
the  objection  which  may  be  grounded  on  this 
contingency,  will  receive  consideration  in  the 
sequel.  This,  then,  is  the  appropriate  region 
of  human  liberty.  It  comprises,  first,  the  in- 
ward domain  of  consciousness  ; demanding 
liberty  of  conscience,  in  the  most  comprehen- 


28 


ON  LIBERTY. 


sive  sense ; liberty  of  thought  and  feeling ; ab- 
solute freedom  of  opinion  and  sentiment  on 
all  subjects,  practical  or  speculative,  scientific, 
moral,  or  theological.  The  liberty  of  express- 
ing and  publishing  opinions  may  seem  to  fall 
under  a different  principle,  since  it  belongs  to 
that  part  of  the  conduct  of  an  individual  which 
concerns  other  people  ; but,  being  almost  of  as 
much  importance  as  the  liberty  of  thought  it- 
self, and  resting  in  great  part  on  the  same  rea- 
sons, is  practically  inseparable  from  it.  Sec- 
ondly, the  principle  requires  liberty  of  tastes 
and  pursuits  ; of  framing  the  plan  of  our  life 
to  suit  our  own  character  ; of  doing  as  we  like, 
subject  to  such  consequences  as  may  follow; 
without  impediment  from  our  fellow-creatures, 
so  long  as  what  we  do  does  not  harm  them, 
even  though  they  should  think  our  conduct 
foolish,  perverse,  or  wrong.  Thirdly,  from  this 
liberty  of  each  individual,  follows  the  liberty, 
within  the  same  limits,  of  combination  among 
individuals  ; freedom  to  unite,  for  any  purpose 
not  involving  harm  to  others  : the  persons  com- 
bining being  supposed  to  be  of  full  age,  and 
not  forced  or  deceived. 

No  society  in  which  these  liberties  are  not, 
on  the  whole,  respected,  is  free,  whatever  may 
be  its  form  of  government ; and  none  is  com- 
pletely free  in  which  they  do  not  exist  abso- 
lute and  unqualified.  The  only  freedom  which 
deserves  the  name,  is  that  of  pursuing  our  own 
good  in  our  own  way,  so  long  as  we  do  not 


ON  LIBERTY. 


29 


attempt  to  deprive  others  of  theirs,  or  impede 
their  efforts  to  obtain  it.  Each  is  the  proper 
guardian  of  his  own  health,  whether  bodily,  or 
mental  and  spiritual.  Mankind  are  greater 
gainers  by  suffering  each  other  to  live  as  seems 
good  to  themselves,  than  by  compelling  each 
to  live  as  seems  good  to  the  rest. 

Though  this  doctrine  is  anything  but  new, 
and,  to  some  persons,  may  have  the  air  of  a 
truism,  there  is  no  doctrine  which  stands  more 
directly  opposed  to  the  general  tendency  of 
existing  opinion  and  practice.  Society  has 
expended  fully  as  much  effort  in  the  attempt 
(according  to  its  lights)  to  compel  people  to 
conform  to  its  notions  of  personal,  as  of  so- 
cial excellence.  The  ancient  commonwealths 
thought  themselves  entitled  to  practise,  and 
the  ancient  philosophers  countenanced,  the 
regulation  of  every  part  of  private  conduct  by 
public  authority,  on  the  ground  that  the  State 
had  a deep  interest  in  the  whole  bodily  and 
mental  discipline  of  every  one  of  its  citizens ; 
a mode  of  thinking  which  may  have  been  ad- 
missible in  small  republics  surrounded  by  pow- 
erful enemies,  in  constant  peril  of  being  sub- 
verted by  foreign  attack  or  internal  common 
tion,  and  to  which  even  a short  interval  of 
relaxed  energy  and  self-command  might  so 
easily  be  fatal,  that  they  could  not  afford  to 
wait  for  the  salutary  permanent  effects  of  free- 
dom. In  the  modern  world,  the  greater  size 
of  political  communities,  and  above  all,  the 


30 


ON  LIBERTY. 


separation  between  the  spiritual  and  temporal 
authority  (which  placed  the  direction  of  men’s 
consciences  in  other  hands  than  those  which 
controlled  their  worldly  affairs),  prevented  so 
great  an  interference  by  law  in  the  details 
of  private  life;  bat  the  engines  of  moral  re- 
pression have  been  wielded  more  strenuously 
against  divergence  from  the  reigning  opinion 
in  self-regarding,  than  even  in  social  matters; 
religion,  the  most  powerful  of  the  elements 
which  have  entered  into  the  formation  of  moral 
feeling,  having  almost  always  been  governed 
either  by  the  ambition  of  a hierarchy,  seeking 
control  over  every  department  of  human  con- 
duct, or  by  the  spirit  of  Puritanism.  And 
some  of  those  modern  reformers  who  have 
placed  themselves  in  strongest  opposition  to 
the  religions  of  the  past,  have  been  noway 
behind  either  churches  or  sects  in  their  asser- 
tion of  the  right  of  spiritual  domination : M. 
Comte,  in  particular,  whose  social  system, 
as  unfolded  in  his  Traite  de  Politique  Post* 
tive-,  aims  at  establishing  (though  by  moral 
more  than  by  legal  appliances)  a despotism 
of  society  over  the  individual,  surpassing  any- 
thing contemplated  in  the  political  ideal  of 
the  most  rigid  disciplinarian  among  the  an- 
cient philosophers. 

Apart  from  the  peculiar  tenets  of  individual 
thinkers,  there  is  also  in  the  world  at  large  an 
increasing  inclination  to  stretch  unduly  the 
powers  of  society  over  the  individual,  both  by 


ON  LIBERTY. 


31 


the  force  of  opinion  and  even  by  that  of  legis- 
lation : and  as  the  tendency  of  all  the  changes 
taking  place  in  the  world  is  to  strengthen  so- 
ciety, and  diminish  the  power  of  the  individual, 
this  encroachment  is  not  one  of  the  evils  which 
tend  spontaneously  to  disappear,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  to  grow  more  and  more  formidable. 
The  disposition  of  mankind,  whether  as  rulers 
or  as  fellow-citizens,  to  impose  their  own  opin- 
ions and  inclinations  as  a rule  of  conduct  on 
others,  is  so  energetically  supported  by  some 
of  the  best  and  by  some  of  the  worst  feelings 
incident  to  human  nature,  that  it  is  hardly  ever 
kept  under  restraint  by  anything  but  want  of 
power;  and  as  the  power  is  not  declining,  but 
growing,  unless  a strong  barrier  of  moral  con- 
viction can  be  raised  against  the  mischief,  we 
must  expect,  in  the  present  circumstances  of 
the  world,  to  see  it  increase. 

It  will  be  convenient  for  the  argument,  if, 
instead  of  at  once  entering  upon  the  general 
thesis,  we  confine  ourselves  in  the  first  instance 
to  a single  branch  of  it,  on  which  the  principle 
here  stated  is,  if  not  fully,  yet  to  a certain 
point,  recognized  by  the  current  opinions. 
This  one  branch  is  the  Liberty  of  Thought : 
from  which  it  is  impossible  to  separate  the 
cognate  liberty  of  speaking  and  of  writing. 
Although  these  liberties,  to  some  considerable 
amount,  form  part  of  the  political  morality  of 
all  countries  which  profess  religious  toleration 
and  free  institutions,  the  grounds,  both  philo- 


32 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


sophical  and  practical,  on  which  they  rest,  are 
perhaps  not  so  familiar  to  the  general  mind, 
nor  so  thoroughly  appreciated  by  many  even 
of  the  leaders  of  opinion,  as  might  have  been 
expected.  Those  grounds,  when  rightly  under- 
stood, are  of  much  wider  application  than  to 
only  one  division  of  the  subject,  and  a thorough 
consideration  of  this  part  of  the  question  will 
be  found  the  best  introduction  to  the  remain- 
der. Those  to  whom  nothing  which  I am 
about  to  say  will  be  new,  may  therefore,  I 
hope,  excuse  me,  if  on  a subject  which  for  now 
three  centuries  has  been  so  often  discussed,  1 
venture  on  one  discussion  more.  / 


CHAPTER  II. 


OF  THE  LIBERTY  OF  THOUGHT  AND  DISCUSSION. 

'HE  time,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  is  gone  by 


when  any  defence  would  be  necessary  of 
the  “ liberty  of  the  press  ” as  one  of  the  secu- 
rities agg,inst  corrupt  or  tyrannical  government. 
No  argument,  we  may  suppose,  can  now  be 
needed,  against  permitting  a legislature  or  an 
executive,  not  identified  in  interest  with  the 
people,  to  prescribe  opinions  to  them,  and  de- 
termine what  doctrines  or  what  arguments 
they  shall  be  allowed  to  hear.  This  aspect  of 
the  question,  besides,  has  been  so  often  and  so 
triumphantly  enforced  by  preceding  writers, 
that  it  needs  not  be  specially  insisted  on  in 
this  place.  Though  the  law  of  England,  on 
the  subject  of  the  press,  is  as  servile  to  this 
day  as  it  was  in  the  time  of  the  Tudors,  there 
is  little  danger  of  its  being  actually  put  in 
force  against  political  discussion,  except  during 
some  temporary  panic,  when  fear  of  insurrec- 
tion drives  ministers  and  judges  from  their  pro* 
priety ; * and,  speaking  generally,  it  is  not,  in 

* These  words  had  scarcely  been  written,  when,  as  if  to  give 
them  an  emphatic  contradiction,  occurred  the  Government  Prp-ss 
2* 


34 


ON  LIBERTY. 


constitutional  countries,  to  be  apprehended* 
that  the  government,  whether  completely  re- 
sponsible to  the  people  or  not,  will  often  at- 
tempt to  control  the  expression  of  opinion, 
except  when  in  doing  so  it  makes  itself  the 
organ  of  the  general  intolerance  of  the  public. 
Let  us  suppose,  therefore,  that  the  government 
is  entirely  at  one  with  the  people,  and  never 
thinks  of  exerting  any  power  of  coercion  un- 
less in  agreement  with  what  it  conceives  to  be 

Prosecutions  of  1858.  That  ill-judged  interference  with  the  lib- 
erty ot  public  discussion  has  not,  however,  induced  me  to  alter  a 
single  word  in  the  text,  nor  has  it  at  all  weakened  my  conviction 
that,  moments  of  panic  excepted,  the  era  of  pains  and  penalties 
for  political  discussion  has,  in  our  own  country,  passed  away.  For, 
in  the  first  place,  the  prosecutions  were  not  persisted  in;  and,  in 
the  second,  they  were  never,  properly  speaking,  political  prosecu- 
tions. The  offence  charged  was  not  that  of  criticizing  institutions, 
or  the  acts  or  persons  of  rulers,  but  of  circulating  what  was  deem- 
ed an  immoral  doctrine,  the  lawfulness  of  Tyrannicide. 

If  the  arguments  of  the  present  chapter  are  of  any  validity, 
there  ought  to  exist  the  fullest  liberty  of  professing  and  discussing, 
as  a matter  of  ethical  conviction,  any  doctrine,  however  immoral  it 
may  be  considered.  It  would,  therefore,  be  irrelevant  and  out  of 
place  to  examine  here,  whether  the  doctrine  of  Tyrannicide  de- 
serves that  title.  I shall  content  myself  with  saying,  that  the  sub- 
ject has  been  at  all  times  one  of  the  open  questions  of  morals;  that 
the  act  of  a private  citizen  in  striking  down  a criminal,  who,  by 
raising  himself  above  the  law,  has  placed  himself  be}"ond  the 
reach  of  legal  punishment  or  control,  has  been  accounted  by  whole 
nations,  and  by  some  of  the  best  and  wisest  of  men,  not  a crime., 
but  an  act  of  exalted  virtue;  and  that,  right  or  wrong,  it  is  not  of 
the  nature  of  assassination,  but  of  civil  war.  As  such,  I hold  that 
the  instigation  to  it,  in  a specific  case,  may  be  a proper  subject  of 
punishment,  but  only  if  an  overt  act  has  followed,  and  at  least  a 
probable  connection  can  be  established  between  the  act  and  the  in- 
stigation. Even  then,  it  is  not  a foreign  government,  but  the  very 
government  assailed,  which  alone,  in  the  exercise  of  self-defencq 
can  legitimately  punish  attacks  directed  against  its  own  existence. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


35 


their  voice.  But  I deny  the  right  of  the  people 
to  exercise  such  coercion,  either  by  themselves 
or  by  their  government.  The  power  itself  is 
illegitimate.  The  best  government  has  no 
more  title  to  it  than  the  worst.  It  is  as  nox- 
ious, or  more  noxious,  when  exerted  in  accord- 
ance with  public  opinion,  than  when  in  oppo- 
sition to  it.  If  all  mankind  minus  one,  were 
of  one  opinion,  and  only  one  person  were  of 
the  contrary  opinion,  mankind  would  be  no 
more  justified  in  silencing  that  one  person, 
than  he,  if  he  had  the  power,  would  be  justi- 
fied in  silencing  mankind.  Were  an  opinion  a 
personal  possession  of  no  value  except  to  the 
owner;  if  to  be  obstructed  in  the  enjoyment 
of  it  were  simply  a private  injury,  it  would 
make  some  difference  whether  the  injury  was 
inflicted  only  on  a few  persons  or  on  many. 
But  the  peculiar  evil  of  silencing  the  expres- 
sion of  an  opinion  is,  that  it  is  robbing  the 
human  race ; posterity  as  well  as  the  existing 
generation  ; those  who  dissent  from  the  opin- 
ion, still  more  than  those  who  hold  it.  If  the 
opinion  is  right,  they  are  deprived  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  exchanging  error  for  truth : if  wrong, 
they  lose,  what  is  almost  as  great  a benefit, 
the  clearer  perception  and  livelier  impression 
of  truth,  produced  by  its  collision  with  error. 

It  is  necessary  to  consider  separately  these 
two  hypotheses,  each  of  which  has  a distinct 
branch  of  the  argument  corresponding  to  it. 
We  can  never  be  sure  that  the  opinion  we  are 


36 


ON  LIBERTY. 


endeavoring  to  stifle  is  a false  opinion  ; and  if 
we  were  sure,  stifling  it  would  be  an  evil  still 

First : the  opinion  which  it  is  attempted  tc 
suppress  by  authority  may  possibly  be  true, 
Those  who  desire  to  suppress  it,  of  course 
deny  its  truth  ; but  they  are  not  infallible. 
They  have  no  authority  to  decide  the  question 
for  all  mankind,  and  exclude  every  other  per- 
son from  the  means  of  judging.  To  refuse  a 
hearing  to  an  opinion,  because  they  are  sure 
that  it  is  false,  is  to  assume  that  their  certainty 
is  the  same  thing  as  absolute  certainty.  All 
silencing  of  discussion  is  an  assumption  of 
infallibility.  Its  condemnation  may  be  allow- 
ed to  rest  on  this  common  argument,  not  the 
worse  for  being  common. 

Unfortunately  for  the  good  sense  of  man- 
kind, the  fact  of  their  fallibility  is  far  from 
carrying  the  weight  in  their  practical  judg- 
ment, which  is  always  allowed  to  it  in  theory; 
for  while  every  one  well  knows  himself  to  be 
fallible,  few  think  it  necessary  to  take  any 
precautions  against  their  own  fallibility,  oi 
admit  the  supposition  that  any  opinion,  of 
which  they  feel  very  certain,  may  be  one  of 
the  examples  of  the  error  to  which  they  ac- 
knowledge themselves  to  be  liable.  Absolute 
princes,  or  others  who  are  accustomed  to  un- 
limited deference,  usually  feel  this  complete 
confidence  in  their  own  opinions  on  nearly  all 
subjects.  People  more  happily  situated,  whp 


ON  LTBEIiTY. 


37 


sometimes  hear  their  opinions  disputed,  and 
are  not  wholly  unused  to  be  set  right  when 
they  are  wrong,  place  the  same  unbounded 
reliance  only  on  such  of  their  opinions  as  are 
shared  by  all  who  surround  them,  or  to  whom 
they  habitually  defer : for  in  proportion  to  a 
man’s  want  of  confidence  in  his  own  solitary 
judgment,  does  he  usually  repose,  with  im- 
plicit trust,  on  the  infallibilty  of  “ the  world  ” 
in  general.  And  the  world,  to  each  individual, 
means  the  part  of  it  with  which  he  comes  in 
contact ; his  party,  his  sect,  his  church,  his 
class  of  society  : the  man  may  be  called,  by 
comparison,  almost  liberal  and  large-minded 
to  whom  it  means  anything  so  comprehensive 
as  his  own  country  or  his  own  age.  Nor  is 
his  faith  in  this  collective  authority  at  al 
shaken  by  his  being  aware  that  other  ages, 
countries,  sects,  churches,  classes,  and  parties 
have  thought,  and  even  now  think,  the  exact 
reverse.  He  devolves  upon  his  own  world  the 
responsibility  of  being  in  the  right  against  the 
dissentient  worlds  of  other  people  ; and  it  never 
troubles  him  that  mere  accident  has  decided 
which  of  these  numerous  worlds  is  the  object 
of  his  reliance,  and  that  the  same  causes  which 
make  him  a Churchman  in  London,  would 
have  made  him  a Buddhist  or  a Confucian 
in  Pekin.  Yet  it  is  as  evident  in  itself,  as  any 
amount  of  argument  can  make  it,  that  ages 
are  no  more  infallible  than  individuals ; every 
age  having  held  many  opinions  which  subse- 


38 


ON  LIBERTY. 


quent  ages  have  deemed  not  only  false  but 
absurd  ; and  it  is  as  certain  that  many  opin- 
ions, now  general,  will  be  rejected  by  futur 
ages,  as  it  is  that  many,  once  general,  are  re- 
jected by  the  present. 

The  objection  likely  to  be  made  to  this  argu- 
ment, would  probably  take  some  such  form  as 
the  following.  There  is  no  greater  assump- 
tion of  infallibility  in  forbidding  the  propaga- 
tion of  error,  than  in  any  other  thing  which  is 
done  by  public  authority  on  its  own  judgment 
and  responsibility.  Judgment  is  given  to  men 
that  they  may  use  it.  Because  it  may  be  used 
erroneously,  are  men  to  be  told  that  they  ought 
not  to  use  it  at  all  ? To  prohibit  what  they 
think  pernicious,  is  not  claiming  exemption 
from  error,  but  fulfilling  the  duty  incumbent 
on  them,  although  fallible,  of  acting  on  their 
conscientious  conviction.  If  we  were  never  to 
act  on  our  opinions,  because  those  opinions 
may  be  wrong,  we  should  leave  all  our  inter- 
ests uncared  for,  and  all  our  duties  unperform- 
ed. An  objection  which  applies  to  all  conduct, 
can  be  no  valid  objection  to  any  conduct  in 
particular.  It  is  the  duty  of  governments,  and 
of  individuals,  to  form  the  truest  opinions  they 
can ; to  form  them  carefully,  and  never  impose 
them  upon  others  unless  they  are  quite  sure 
of  being  right.  But  when  they  are  sure  (such 
reasoners  may  say),  it  is  not  conscientiousness 
but  cowardice  to  shrink  from  acting  on  their 
opinions,  and  allow  doctrines  which  they  hon 


ON  LIBERTY. 


39 


estly  think  dangerous  to  the  welfare  of  man- 
kind, either  in  this  life  or  in  another,  to  be 
scattered  abroad  without  restraint,  because 
other  people,  in  less  enlightened  times,  have 
persecuted  opinions  now  believed  to  be  true. 
Let  us  take  care,  it  may  be  said,  not  to  make 
the  same  mistake : but  governments  and  na 
tions  have  made  mistakes  in  other  things, 
which  are  not  denied  to  be  fit  subjects  for  the 
exercise  of  authority  : they  have  laid  on  bad 
taxes,  made  unjust  wars.  Ought  we  therefore 
to  lay  on  no  taxes,  and,  under  whatever  pro- 
vocation, make  no  wars?  Men,  and  govern- 
ments, must  act  to  the  best  of  their  ability. 
There  is  no  such  thing  as  absolute  certainty, 
but  there  is  assurance  sufficient  for  the  pur 
poses  of  human  life.  We  may,  and  must, 
assume  our  opinion  to  be  true  for  the  guidance 
of  our  own  conduct:  and  it  is  assuming  no 
more  when  we  forbid  bad  men  to  pervert 
society  by  the  propagation  of  opinions  which 
we  regard  as  false  and  pernicious. 

I answer,  that  it  is  assuming  very  much 
more.  There  is  the  greatest  difference  be- 
tween presuming  an  opinion  to  be  true,  be- 
cause, with  every  opportunity  for  contesting 
it,  it  has  not  been  refuted,  and  assuming  its 
truth  for  the  purpose  of  not  permitting  its 
refutation.  Complete  liberty  of  contradicting 
and  disproving  our  opinion,  is  the  very  con- 
dition which  justifies  us  in  assuming  its  truth 
for  purposes  of  action ; and  on  no  other  terms 


40 


ON  LIBERTY. 


can  a being  with  human  faculties  have  any 
rational  assurance  of  being  right. 

When  we  consider  either  the  history  of  opin- 
ion, or  the  ordinary  conduct  of  human  life,  to 
what  is  it  to  be  ascribed  that  the  one  and  the 
other  are  no  worse  than  they  are  ? Not  cer- 
tainly to  the  inherent  force  of  the  human  un- 
derstanding; for,  on  any  matter  not  self-evi- 
dent, there  are  ninety-nine  persons  totally  in*- 
capable  of  judging  of  it,  for  one  who  is  capa- 
ble ; and  the  capacity  of  the  hundredth  person 
is  only  comparative;  for  the  majority  of  the 
eminent  men  of  every  past  generation  held 
many  opinions  now  known  to  be  erroneous, 
and  did  or  approved  numerous  things  which 
no  one  will  now  justify.  Why  is  it,  then,  that 
there  is  on  the  whole  a preponderance  among 
mankind  of  rational  opinions  and  lational  con- 
duct ? If  there  really  is  this  preponderance  — 
which  there  must  be,  unless  human  affairs  are, 
and  have  always  been,  in  an  almost  desperate 
state  — it  is  owing  to  a quality  of  the  human 
mind,  the  source  of  everything  respectable  in 
man  either  as  an  intellectual  or  as  a moral  be- 
ing, namely,  that  his  errors  are  corrigible.  He 
is  capable  of  rectifying  his  mistakes,  by  discus- 
sion and  experience.  Not  by  experience  alone 
There  must  be  discussion,  to  show  how  expe 
rience  is  to  be  interpreted.  Wrong  opinions 
and  practices  gradually  yield  to  fact  and  ar- 
gument : but  facts  and  arguments,  to  produce 
any  effect  on  the  mind,  musfc  be  brought  before 


ON  LIBEETY. 


41 


it.  Very  few  facts  are  able  to  tell  their  own 
story,  without  comments  to  bring  out  theii 
meaning.  The  whole  strength  and  value,  then, 
of  human  judgment,  depending  on  the  one 
property,  that  it  can  be  set  right  when  it  is 
wrong,  reliance  can  be  placed  on  it  only  when 
the  means  of  setting  it  right  are  kept  constantly 
at  hand.  In  the  case  of  any  person  whose 
judgment  is  really  deserving  of  confidence,  how 
has  it  become  so  ? Because  he  has  kept  his 
mind  open  to  criticism  of  his  opinions  and  con- 
duct. Because  it  has  been  his  practice  to  lis- 
ten to  all  that  could  be  said  against  him ; to 
profit  by  as  much  of  it  as  was  just,  and  ex- 
pound to  himself,  and  upon  occasion  to  others, 
the  fallacy  of  what  was  fallacious.  Because 
he  has  felt,  that  the  only  way  in  which  a hu- 
man being  can  make  some  approach  to  know- 
ing the  whole  of  a subject,  is  by  hearing  what 
can  be  said  about  it  by  persons  of  every  va- 
riety of  opinion,  and  studying  all  modes  in 
which  it  can  be  looked  at  by  every  character 
of  mind.  No  wise  man  ever  acquired  his  wis- 
dom in  any  mode  but  this ; nor  is  it  in  the  na- 
ture of  human  intellect  to  become  wise  in  any 
other  manner.  The  steady  habit  of  correcting 
and  completing  his  own  opinion  by  collating  it 
with  those  of  others,  so  far  from  causing  doubt 
and  hesitation  in  carrying  it  into  practice,  is 
the  only  stable  foundation  for  a just  reliance  on 
it:  for,  being  cognizant  of  all  that  can,  at  least 
obviously,  be  said  against  him,  and  having 


42 


ON  LIBERTY. 


taken  up  his  position  against  all  gainsayers 
knowing  that  he  has  sought  for  objec- 
tions and  difficulties,  instead  of  avoiding  thenic 
and  has  shut  out  no  light  which  can  be  thrown 
upon  the  subject  from  any  quarter  — he  has  a 
right  to  think  his  judgment  better  than  that  of 
any  person,  or  any  multitude,  who  have  not 
gone  through  a similar  process. 

It  is  not  too  much  to  require  that  what  the 
wisest  of  mankind,  those  who  are  best  entitled 
to  trust  their  own  judgment,  find  necessary  to 
warrant  their  relying  on  it,  should  be  submit- 
ted to  by  that  miscellaneous  collection  of  a few 
wise  and  many  foolish  individuals,  called  the 
public.  The  most  intolerant  of  churches,  the 
Roman  Catholic  Church,  even  at  the  canoni- 
sation of  a saint,  admits,  and  listens  patiently 
i;o,  a devil’s  advocate.”  The  holiest  of  men, 
it  appears,  cannot  be  admitted  to  posthumous 
honors,  until  all  that  the  devil  could  say  against 
him  is  known  and  weighed.  If  even  the  New- 
tonian philosophy  were  not  permitted  to  be 
questioned,  mankind  could  not  feel  as  com- 
plete assurance  of  its  truth  as  they  now  do. 
The  beliefs  which  we  have  most  warrant  for, 
have  no  safeguard  to  rest  on,  but  a standing 
invitation  to  the  whole  world  to  prove  them 
unfounded.  If  the  challenge  is  not  acc(?pted, 
or  is  accepted  and  the  attempt  fails,  we  are 
far  enough  from  certainty  still ; but  we  have 
done  the  best  that  the  existing  state  of  human 
reason  admits  of ; we  have  neglected  nothing 


ON  LIBERTY. 


43 


that  could  give  the  truth  a chance  of  reaching 
us ; if  the  lists  are  kept  open,  we  may  hope 
that  if  there  be  a better  truth,  it  will  be  found 
when  the  human  mind  is  capable  of  receiving 
it ; and  in  the  mean  time  we  may  rely  on  hav- 
ing attained  such  approach  to  truth,  as  is  pos- 
sible in  our  own  day.  This  is  the  amount  of 
certainty  attainable  by  a fallible  being,  and  this 
the  sole  way  of  attaining  it. 

Strange  it  is,  that  men  should  admit  the 
validity  of  the  arguments  for  free  discussion, 
but  object  to  their  being  ‘‘  pushed  to  an  ex- 
treme not  seeing  that  unless  the  reasons  are 
good  for  an  extreme  case,  they  are  not  good 
for  any  case.  Strange  that  they  should  imag 
ine  that  they  are  not  assuming  infallibility, 
when  they  acknowledge  that  there  should  be 
free  discussion  on  all  subjects  which  can  pos- 
sibly be  doubtful^  but  think  that  some  particu- 
lar principle  or  doctrine  should  be  forbidden  to 
be  questioned  because  it  is  so  certain^  that  is, 
because  they  are  certain  that  it  is  certain.  To 
call  any  proposition  certain,  while  there  is  any 
one  who  would  deny  its  certainty  if  permitted, 
but  who  is  not  permitted,  is  to  assume  that  we 
ourselves,  and  those  who  agree  with  us,  are 
the  judges  of  certainty,  and  judges  without 
hearing  the  other  side. 

In  the  present  age  — which  has  been  de- 
scribed as  “ destitute  of  faith,  but  terrified  at 
scepticism,”  — in  which  people  feel  sure,  not 
so  much  that  their  opinions  are  true,  as  thal 


44 


ON  LIBERTY. 


they  should  not  know  what  to  do  without 
them  — the  claims  of  an  opinion  to  be  pro- 
jected from  public  attack  are  rested  not  so 
much  on  its  truth,  as  on  its  importance  to  so- 
ciety. There  are,  it  is  alleged,  certain  beliefs, 
so  useful,  not  to  say  indispensable  to  well- 
being, that  it  is  as  much  the  duty  of  govern- 
ments to  uphold  those  beliefs,  as  to  protect 
any  other  of  the  interests  of  society.  In  a 
case  of  such  necessity,  and  so  directly  in  the 
line  of  their  duty,  something  less  than  infalli- 
bility may,  it  is  maintained,  warrant,  and  even 
bind,  governments,  to  act  on  their  own  opin- 
ion, confirmed  by  the  general  opinion  of  man- 
kind. It  is  also  often  argued,  and  still  oftener 
thought,  that  none  but  bad  men  would  desire 
to  weaken  these  salutary  beliefs ; and  there  can 
be  nothing  wrong,  it  is  thought,  in  restraining 
bad  men,  and  prohibiting  what  only  such  men 
would  wish  to  practise.  This  mode  of  think- 
ing makes  the  justification  of  restraints  on  dis» 
cussion  not  a question  of  the  truth  of  doctrines, 
but  of  their  usefulness;  and  flatters  itself  by 
that  means  to  escape  the  responsibility  of  claim- 
ing to  be  an  infallible  judge  of  opinions.  But 
<^hose  who  thus  satisfy  themselves,  do  not  per- 
ceive that  the  assumption  of  infallibility  is 
merely  shifted  from  one  point  to  another.  The 
usefulness  of  an  opinion  is  itself  matter  of 
opinion  : as  disputable,  as  open  to  discussion 
and  requiring  discussion  as  much,  as  the  opin- 
*on  itself.  There  is  the  same  need  of  an  in- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


45 


fallible  judge  of  opinions  to  decide  an  opinion 
to  be  noxious,  as  to  decide  it  to  be  false,  un 
ess  the  opinion  condemned  has  full  opportu- 
nity of  defending  itself.  And  it  will  not  do  to 
say  that  the  heretic  may  be  allowed  to  main- 
tain the  utility  or  harmlessness  of  his  opinion, 
though  forbidden  to  maintain  its  truth.  The 
truth  of  an  opinion  is  part  of  its  utility.  If 
we  would  know  whether  or  not  it  is  desirable 
that  a proposition  should  be  believed,  is  it  pos- 
sible to  exclude  the  consideration  of  whether 
or  not  it  is  true  ? In  the  opinion,  not  of  bad 
men,  but  of  the  best  men,  no  belief  which  is 
contrary  to  truth  can  be  really  useful : and  can 
you  prevent  such  men  from  urging  that  plea, 
when  they  are  charged  with  culpability  for  de- 
nying some  doctrine  which  they  are  told  is 
useful,  but  which  they  believe  to  be  false  ? 
Those  who  are  on  the  side  of  received  opin- 
ions, never  fail  to  take  all  possible  advantage 
of  this  plea ; you  do  not  find  them  handling 
the  question  of  utility  as  if  it  could  be  com- 
pletely abstracted  from  that  of  truth  : on  the 
contrary,  it  is,  above  all,  because  their  doctrine 
is  ‘‘the  truth,”  that  the  knowledge  or  the  be- 
lief of  it  is  held  to  be  so  indispensable.  There 
can  be  no  fair  discussion  of  the  question  of 
usefulness,  when  an  argument  so  vital  may  be 
employed  on  one  side,  but  not  on  the  other. 
And  in  point  of  fact,  when  law  or  public  feel- 
ing do  not  permit  the  truth  of  an  opinion  to 
be  disputed,  they  are  just  as  little  tolerant  of  a 


46 


ON  LIBERTY. 


denial  of  its  usefulness.  The  utmost  they  al- 
low is  an  extenuation  of  its  absolute  necessity, 
or  of  the  positive  guilt  of  rejecting  it. 

In  order  more  fully  to  illustrate  the  mischief 
ol  denying  a hearing  to  opinions  because  we, 
in  our  own  judgment,  have  condemned  them, 
it  will  be  desirable  to  fix  down  the  discussion 
to  a concrete  case  ; and  I choose,  by  prefer- 
ence, the  cases  which  are  least  favorable  to  me 
— in  which  the  argument  against  freedom  of 
opinion,  both  on  the  score  of  truth  and  on  that 
of  utility,  is  considered  the  strongest.  Let  the 
opinions  impugned  be  the  belief  in  a God  and 
in  a future  state,  or  any  of  the  commonly  re- 
ceived doctrines  of  morality.  To  fight  the 
battle  on  such  ground,  gives  a great  advantage 
to  an  unfair  antagonist ; since  he  will  be  sure 
to  say  (and  many  who  have  no  desire  to  be 
unfair  will  say  it  internally).  Are  these  the  doc- 
trines which  you  do  not  deem  sufficiently  cer- 
tain to  be  taken  under  the  protection  of  law  ? 
Is  the  belief  in  a God  one  of  the  opinions,  to 
feel  sure  of  which,  you  hold  to  be  assuming 
infallibility  ? But  I must  be  permitted  to  ob- 
serve, that  it  is  not  the  feeling  sure  of  a doc- 
trine (be  it  what  it  may)  which  I call  an  as 
sumption  of  infallibility.  It  is  the  undertaking 
to  decide  that  question  for  others^  without  al- 
lowing them  to  hear  what  can  be  said  on  the 
contrary  side.  And  I denounce  and  reprobate 
this  pretension  not  the  less,  if  put  forth  on  the 
side  of  my  most  solemn  convictions.  How 


ON  LIBERTY. 


47 


ever  positive  any  one’s  persuasion  may  be,  not 
only  of  the  falsity,  but  of  the  pernicious  con- 
sequences— not  only  of  the  pernicious  conse- 
quences, but  (to  adopt  expressions  which  I al- 
together condemn)  the  immorality  and  impiety 
of  an  opinion  ; yet  if,  in  pursuance  of  that 
private  judgment,  though  backed  by  the  pub- 
lic judgment  of  his  country  or  his  cotempora- 
ries, he  prevents  the  opinion  from  being  heard 
in  its  defence,  he  assumes  infallibility.  And 
so  far  from  the  assumption  being  less  objec- 
tionable or  less  dangerous  because  the  opinion 
is  called  immoral  or  impious,  this  is  the  case 
of  all  others  in  which  it  is  most  fatal.  These 
are  exactly  the  occasions  on  which  the  men  of 
one  generation  commit  those  dreadful  mistakes, 
which  excite  the  astonishment  and  horror  of 
posterity.  It  is  among  such  that  we  find  the 
instances  memorable  in  history,  when  the  arm 
of  the  law  has  been  employed  to  root  out  the 
best  men  and  the  noblest  doctrines  ; with  de- 
plorable success  as  to  the  men,  though  some 
of  the  doctrines  have  survived  to  be  (as  if  in 
mockery)  invoked,  in  defence  of  similar  con- 
duct towards  those  who  dissent  from  them^  or 
from  Iheir  received  interpretation. 

Mankind  can  hardly  be  too  often  reminded, 
that  there  was  once  a man  named  Socrates,  be* 
tween  whom  and  the  legal  authorities  and  pub- 
lic opinion  of  his  time,  there  took  place  a mem- 
orable collision.  Born  in  an  age  and  country 
abounding  in  individual  greatness,  this  man 


48 


ON  LIBEETY. 


has  been  handed  down  to  us  by  those  who  best 
knew  both  him  and  the  age,  as  the  most  vir- 
tuous man  in  it ; while  we  know  him  as  the 
head  and  prototype  of  all  subsequent  teachers 
of  virtue,  the  source  equally  of  the  lofty  inspi- 
ration of  Plato  and  the  judicious  utilitarianism 
of  Aristotle,  “ i mmstri  di  color  che  sanno^'^  the 
two  headsprings  of  ethical  as  of  all  other  phi- 
losophy. This  acknowledged  master  of  all  the 
eminent  thinkers  who  have  since  lived — wnose 
fame,  still  growing  after  more  than  two  thou- 
sand years,  all  out  outweighs  the  whole  re- 
mainder of  the  names  which  make  his  native 
city  illustrious  was  put  to  death  by  his 
countrymen,  after  a judicial  conviction,  foi 
impiety  and  immorality.  Impiety,  in  denying 
the  gods  recognized  by  the  State  ; indeed  his 
accuser  asserted  (see  the  “ Apologia’’)  that  he 
believed  in  no  gods  at  all.  Immorality,  in 
being,  by  his  doctrines  and  instructions,  a 
“ corruptor  of  youth.”  Of  these  charges  the 
tribunal,  there  is  every  ground  for  believing, 
honestly  found  him  guilty,  and  condemned  the 
man  who  probably  of  all  then  born  had  de- 
served best  of  mankind,  to  be  put  to  death  as 
a criminal. 

To  pass  from  this  to  the  only  other  instance 
of  judicial  iniquity,  the  mention  of  which,  after 
the  condemnation  of  Socrates,  would  not  be 
an  anti-climax  : the  event  which  took  place  on 
Calvary  rather  more  than  eighteen  hundred 
years  ago.  The  man  who  left  on  the  memory 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


49 


ot  those  who  witnessed  his  life  and  conversa- 
tion, such  an  impression  of  his  moral  grandeur, 
that  eighteen  subsequent  centuries  have  done 
homage  to  him  as  the  Almighty  in  person,  was 
ignominiously  put  to  death,  as  what  ? As  a 
blasphemer.  Men  did  not  merely  mistake  their 
benefactor ; they  mistook  him  for  the  exact 
contrary  of  what  he  was,  and  treated  him  as 
that  prodigy  of  impiety,  which  they  themselves 
are  now  held  to  be,  for  their  treatment  of  him. 
The  feelings  with  which  mankind  now  regard 
these  lamentable  transactions,  especially  the 
later  of  the  two,  render  them  extremely  un 
just  in  their  judgment  of  the  unhappy  actors 
These  were,  to  all  appearance,  not  bad  men'  — 
lot  worse  than  men  commonly  are,  but  rather 
the  contrary;  men  who  possessed  in  a full,  or 
somewhat  more  than  a full  measure,  the  relig 
ious,  moral,  and  patriotic  feelings  of  their  time 
and  people  : the  very  kind  of  men  who,  in  all 
times,  our  own  included,  have  every  chance  of 
passing  through  life  blameless  and  respected. 
The  high-priest  who  rent  his  garments  when 
the  words  were  pronounced,  which,  according 
to  all  the  ideas  of  his  country,  constituted  the 
blackest  guilt,  was  in  all  probability  quite  as 
sincere  in  his  horror  and  indignation,  as  the 
generality  of  respectable  and  pious  men  now 
are  in  the  religious  and  moral  sentiments  they 
profess  ; and  most  of  those  who  now  shudder 
at  his  conduct,  if  they  had  lived  in  his  time, 

and  been  born  Jews,  would  have  acted  pre- 
3 


50 


ON  LIBERTY. 


cisely  as  he  did.  Orthodox  Christians  who  are 
tempted  to  think  that  those  who  stoned  to  death 
the  first  martyrs  must  have  been  worse  men 
than  they  themselves  are,  ought  to  remember 
that  one  of  those  persecutors  was  Saint  Paul 
Let  us  add  one  more  example,  the  most 
striking  of  all,  if  the  impressiveness  of  an 
error  is  measured  by  the  wisdom  and  virtue  of 
him  who  falls  into  it.  If  ever  any  one,  pos- 
sessed of  power,  had  grounds  for  thinking  him- 
self the  best  and  most  enlightened  among  his 
cotemporaries,  it  was  the  Emperor  Marcus 
Aurelius.  Absolute  monarch  of  the  whole  civil- 
ized world,  he  preserved  through  life  not  only 
the ‘most  unblemished  justice,  but  what  was 
less  to  be  expected  from  his  Stoical  breeding, 
the  tenderest  heart.  The  few  failings  which 
are  attributed  to  him,  were  all  on  the  side  of 
indulgence : while  his  writings,  the  highest 
ethical  product  of  the  ancient  mind,  differ 
scarcely  perceptibly,  if  they  differ  at  all,  from 
the  most  characteristic  teachings  of  Christ. 
This  man,  a better  Christian  in  all  but  the 
dogmatic  sense  of  the  word,  than  almost  any 
of  the  ostensibly  Christian  sovereigns  who  have 
since  reigned,  persecuted  Christianity.  Placed 
at  the  summit  of  all  the  previous  attainments 
of  humanity,  with  an  open,  unfettered  intellect, 
and  a character  which  led  him  of  himself  to 
embody  in  his  moral  writings  the  Christian 
ideal,  he  yet  failed  to  see  that  Christianity  was 
to  be  a good  and  not  an  evil  to  the  world,  with 


ON  LIBERTY. 


51 


his  duties  fco  which  he  was  so  deeply  pene- 
trated. Existing  society  he  knew  to  be  in  a 
deplorable  state.  But  such  as  it  was,  he  saw 
or  thought  he  saw,  that  it  was  held  together 
and  prevented  from  being  worse,  by  belief  and 
reverence  of  the  received  divinities.  As  a rulei 
of  mankind,  he  deemed  it  his  duty  not  to  suffer 
society  to  fall  in  pieces;  and  saw  not  how,  if 
Hs  existing  ties  were  removed,  any  others  could 
be  formed  which  could  again  knit  it  together. 
The  new  religion  openly  aimed  at  dissolving 
these  ties  : unless,  therefore,  it  was  his  duty  to 
adopt  that  religion,  it  seemed  to  be  his  duty  to 
put  it  down.  Inasmuch  then  as  the  theology 
of  Christianity  did  not  appear  to  him  true  or 
of  divine  origin;  inasmuch  as  this  strange  his- 
tory of  a crucified  God  was  not  credible  to 
him,  and  a system  which  purported  to  rest  en- 
tirely upon  a foundation  to  him  so  wholly  un- 
believable, could  not  be  foreseen  by  him  to  be 
that  renovating  agency  which,  after  all  abate- 
ments, it  has  in  fact  proved  to  be  ; the  gentlest 
and  most  amiable  of  philosophers  and  rulers, 
under  a solemn  sense  of  duty,  authorized  the 
persecution  of  Christianity.  To  my  mind  this 
is  one  of  the  most  tragical  facts  in  all  history. 
It  is  a bitter  thought,  how  different  a thing  the 
Christianity  of  the  world  might  have  been,  if 
the  Christian  faith  had  been  adopted  as  the 
religion  of  the  empire  under  the  auspices  of 
Marcus  Aurelius  instead  of  those  of  Constan- 
tine. But  it  would  be  equally  unjust  to  him 


52 


ON  LIBERTY. 


and  false  to  truth,  to  deny,  that  no  one  plea 
which  can  be  urged  for  punishing  anti-Chris- 
tian teaching,  was  wanting  to  Marcus  Aurelius 
for  punishing,  as  he  did,  the  propagation  of 
Christianity.  No  Christian  more  firmly  be- 
lieves that  Atheism  is  false,  and  tends  to  the 
dissolution  of  society,  than  Marcus  Aurelius 
believed  the  same  things  of  Christianity ; he 
who,  of  all  men  then  living,  might  have  been 
thought  the  most  capable  of  appreciating  it. 
Unless  any  one  who  approves  of  punishment 
for  the  promulgation  of  opinions,  flatters  him- 
self that  he  is  a wiser  and  better  man  than 
Marcus  Aurelius  — more  deeply  versed  in  the 
wisdom  of  his  time,  more  elevated  in  his  intel- 
lect above  it  — more  earnest  in  his  search  for 
truth,  or  more  single-minded  in  his  devotion  to 
it  when  found;  — let  him  abstain  from  that 
assumption  of  the  joint  infallibility  of  himself 
and  the  multitude,  which  the  great  Antoninus 
made  with  so  unfortunate  a result. 

Aware  of  the  impossibility  of  defending  the 
use  of  punishment  for  restraining  irreligious 
opinions,  by  any  argument  which  will  not  jus- 
tify Marcus  Antoninus,  the  enemies  of  religious 
freedom,  when  hard  pressed,  occasionally  ac- 
cept this  consequence,  and  say,  with  Dr.  John- 
son, that  the  persecutors  of  Christianity  were 
in  the  right ; that  persecution  is  an  ordeal 
through  which  truth  ought  to  pass,  and  always 
passes  successfully,  legal  penalties  being,  in  the 
end,  powerless  against  truth,  though  sometime? 


ON  LIBERTY. 


53 


beneficially  effective  against  mischievous  errors, 
This  is  a form  of  the  argument  for  religious 
intolerance,  sufficiently  remarkable  not  to  be 
passed  without  notice. 

A theory  which  maintains  that  truth  may 
justifiably  be  persecuted  because  persecution 
cannot  poi^sibly  do  it  any  harm,  cannot  be 
charged  with  being  intentionally  hostile  to  the 
reception  of  new  truths ; but  we  cannot  com- 
mend the  generosity  of  its  dealing  with  the 
persons  to  whom  mankind  are  indebted  for 
them.  To  discover  to  the  world  something 
which  deeply  concerns  it,  and  of  which  it  was 
previously  ignorant ; to  prove  to  it  that  it  had 
been  mistaken  on  some  vital  point  of  temporal 
(,r  spiritual  interest,  is  as  important  a service  as 
a human  being  can  render  to  his  fellow-crea- 
tures, and  in  certain  cases,  as  in  those  of  the 
early  Christians  and  of  the  Reformers,  those 
who  think  with  Dr.  Johnson  believe  it  to  have 
been  the  most  precious  gift  w^hich  could  be  be- 
stowed on  mankind.  That  the  authors  of  such 
splendid  benefits  should  be  requited  by  martyr- 
dom ; that  their  reward  should  be  to  be  dealt 
with  as  the  vilest  of  criminals,  is  not,  upon  this 
theory,  a deplorable  error  and  misfortune,  for 
which  humanity  should  mourn  in  sackcloth 
%nd  ashes,  but  the  normal  and  justifiable  state 
of  things.  The  propounder  of  a new  truth 
according  to  this  doctrine,  should  stand,  as 
stood,  in  the  legislation  of  the  Locrians,  the 
proposer  of  a new  law,  with  a halter  round  his 


54 


ON  LIBERTY. 


neck,  to  be  instantly  tightened  if  the  public  as- 
sembly did  not,  on  hearing  his  reasons,  then 
and  there  adopt  his  proposition.  People  who 
defend  this  mode  of  treating  benefactors,  can- 
not be  supposed  to  set  much  value  on  the  ben- 
efit; and  I believe  this  view  of  the  subject  is 
mostly  confined  to  the  sort  of  persons  who 
think  that  new  truths  may  have  been  desirable 
once,  but  that  we  have  had  enough  of  them 
now. 

But,  indeed,  the  dictum  that  truth  always 
triumphs  over  persecution,  is  one  of  those  pleas- 
ant falsehoods  which  men  repeat  after  one 
another  till  they  pass  into  commonplaces,  but 
which  all  experience  refutes.  History  teems 
with  instances  of  truth  put  down  by  persecu- 
tion. If  not  suppressed  forever,  it  may  bo 
thrown  back  for  centuries.  To  speak  only  of 
religious  opinions:  the  Reformation  broke  out 
at -least  twenty  times  before  Luther,  and  was 
put  down.  Arnold  of  Brescia  was  put  down 
Fra  Dolcino  was  put  down.  Savonarola  was 
put  down..  The  Albigeois  were  put  down. 
The  Vaudois  were  put  down.  The  Lollards 
were  put  down.  The  Hussites  were  put  down. 
Even  after  the  era  of  Luther,  wherever  perse- 
cution was  persisted  in,  it  was  successful.  In 
Spain,  Italy,  Flanders,  the  Austrian  empire? 
Protestanism  was  rooted  out and,  most  likely, 
would  have  been  so  in  England,  had  Queen 
Mary  lived,  or  Queen  Elizabeth  died.  Perse- 
cution has  always  succeeded,  save  where  the 


ON  LIBERTY. 


52 


heretics  were  too  strong  a party  to  be  effectu- 
ally persecuted.  No  reasonable  person  can 
doubt  that  Christianity  might  have  been  ex- 
tirpated in  the  Roman  empire.  It  spread,  and 
became  predominant,  because  the  persecutions 
were  only  occasional,  lasting  but  a short  time, 
and  separated  by  long  intervals  of  almost  un- 
disturbed propagandism.  It  is  a piece  of  idle 
sentimentality  that  truth,  merely  as  truth,  has 
any  inherent  power  denied  to  error,  of  prevail- 
ing against  the  dungeon  and  the  stake.  Men 
are  not  more  zealous  for  truth  than  they  often 
are  for  error,  and  a sufficient  application  of 
legal  or  even  of  social  penalties  will  generally 
succeed  in  stopping  the  propagation  of  either. 
The  real  advantage  which  truth  has,  consists 
in  this,  that  when  an  opinion  is  true,  it  may 
be  extinguished  once,  twice,  or  many  times, 
but  in  the  course  of  ages  there  will  generally 
be  found  persons  to  rediscover  it,  until  some 
one  of  its  reappearances  falls  on  a time  when 
from  favorable  circumstances  it  escapes  perse- 
cution until  it  has  made  such  head  as  to  with- 
stand all  subsequent  attempts  to  suppress  it. 

It  wDl  be  said,  that  we  do  not  now  put  to 
death  t^'e  introducers  of  new  opinions  : we  are 
not  like  our  fathers  who  slew  the  prophets,  we 
even  build  sepulchres  to  them.  It  is  true  we 
no  longer  put  heretics  to  death  ; and  the 
amount  of  penal  infliction  which  modern  feel- 
ing wmuld  probably  tolerate,  even  against  the 
most  obnoxious  opinions,  is  not  sufficient  to 


56 


ON  LIBERTY. 


extirpate  them.  But  let  us  not  flatter  ourselves 
that  we  are  yet  free  from  the  stain  even  of  legal 
persecution.  Penalties  for  opinioa,  or  at  least 
for  its  expression,  still  exist  by  law  ; and  their 
enforcement  is  not,  even  in  these  times,  so  un- 
exampled as  to  make  it  at  all  incredible  that 
they  may  some  day  be  revived  in  full  force.  In 
the  year  1857,  at  the  summer  assizes  of  the 
county  of  Cornwall,  an  unfortunate  man,*  said 
to  be  of  unexceptionable  conduct  in  all  rela- 
tions of  life,  was  sentenced  to  twenty-one 
months  imprisonment,  for  uttering,  and  writing 
on  a gate,  some  offensive  words  concerning 
Christianity.  Within  a month  of  the  same 
time,  at  the  Old  Bailey,  two  persons,  on  two 
separate  occasions,!  were  rejected  as  jurymen, 
and  one  of  them  grossly  insulted  by  the  judge 
and  by  one  of  the  counsel,  because  they  hon- 
estly declared  that  they  had  no  theological  be- 
lief ; and  a third,  a foreigner, J for  the  same 
reason,  was  denied  justice  against  a thief. 
This  refusal  of  redress  took  place  in  virtue  of 
the  legal  doctrine,  that  no  person  can  be  al- 
lowed to  give  evidence  in  a court  of  justice, 
who  does  not  profess  belief  in  a God  (any  god 
is  sufficient)  and  in  a future  state  ; which  is 
equivalent  to  declaring  such  persons  to  be  out- 

* Thomas  Pooley,  Bodmin  Assizes,  Jiih^  31, 1857.  In  Decembei 
lollowing,  he  received  a free  pardon  from  the  Crown. 

•t  George  Jacob  Holyoake,  August  17,  1857 ; Edward  Truelove, 
?uly,  1857. 

X Baron  de  Gleichen,  Marlborough  Street  Police  Court,  August 
4,  1857. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


57 


(awsj  excluded  from  the  protection  of  the  tri- 
bunals ; who  may  not  only  be  robbed  or  as- 
saulted with  impunity,  if  no  one  but  them- 
selves, or  persons  of  similar  opinions,  be  present, 
but  any  one  else  may  be  robbed  or  assaulted 
with  impunity,  if  the  proof  of  the  fact  depends 
on  their  evidence.  The  assumption  on  which 
this  is  grounded,  is  that  the  oath  is  worthless, 
of  a person  who  does  not  believe  in  a future 
state;  a proposition  which  betokens  much  ig- 
norance of  history  in  those  who  assent  to  it 
(since  it  is  historically  true  that  a large  propor- 
tion of  infidels  in  all  ages  have  been  persons 
of  distinguished  integrity  and  honor)  ; and 
would  be  maintained  by  no  one  who  had  the 
smallest  conception  how  many  of  the  persons 
in  greatest  repute  with  the  world,  both  for  vir- 
tues and  for  attainments,  are  well  known,  at 
least  to  their  intimates,  to  be  unbelievers.  The 
rule,  besides,  is  suicidal,  and  cuts  away  its  own 
foundation.  Under  pretence  that  atheists  must 
be  liars,  it  admits  the  testimony  of  all  atheists 
who  are  willing  to  lie,  and  rejects  only  those 
who  brave  the  obloquy  of  publicly  confessing 
a detested  creed  rather  than  affirm  a falsehood. 
A rule  thus  self-convicted  of  absurdity  so  far 
as  regards  its  professed  purpose,  can  be  kept  in 
force  only  as  a badge  of  hatred,  a relic  of  per- 
secution ; a persecution,  too,  having  the  pecu- 
liarity, that  the  qualification  for  undergoing  it, 
is  the  being  clearly  proved  not  to  deserve  it. 
The  rule,  and  the  theory  it  implies,  are  hardly 


58 


ON  LIBERTY. 


less  insulting  to  believers  than  to  infidels.  Fo^ 
if  he  who  does  not  believe  in  a future  state 
necessarily  lies,  it  follows  that  they  who  do  be- 
lieve are  only  prevented  from  lying,  if  prevent- 
ed they  are,  by  the  fear  of  hell.  We  will  not 
do  the  authors  and  abettors  of  the  rule  the  in- 
jury of  supposing,  that  the  conception  which 
they  have  formed  of  Christian  virtue  is  drawli 
from  their  own  consciousness. 

These,  indeed,  are  but  rags  and  remnants  of 
persecution,  and  may  be  thought  to  be  not  so 
much  an  indication  of  the  wish  to  persecute, 
as  an  example  of  that  very  frequent  infirmity 
of  English  minds,  which  makes  them  take  a 
preposterous  pleasure  in  the  assertion  of  a bad 
principle,  when  they  are  no  longer  bad  enough 
to  desire  to  carry  it  really  into  practice.  But 
unhappily  there  is  no  security  in  the  state  of 
the  public  mind,  that  the  suspension  of  worse 
forms  of  legal  persecution,  which  has  lasted 
for  about  the  space  of  a generation,  will  con- 
tinue. In  this  age  the  quiet  surface  of  routine 
is  as  often  ruffled  by  attempts  to  resuscitate 
past  evils,  as  to  introduce  new  benefits.  What 
is  boasted  of  at  the  present  time  as  the  revival 
of  religion,  is  always,  in  narrow  and  unculti- 
vated minds,  at  least  as  much  the  revival  of 
bigotry ; and  where  there  is  the  strong  perma- 
nent leaven  of  intolerance  in  the  feelings  of  a 
people,  which  at  all  times  abides  in  the  middle 
classes  of  this  country,  it  needs  but  little  to 
provoke  them  into  actively  persecuting  those 


ON  LIBERTY. 


59 


vv^hom  they  have  never  ceased  to  think  propei 
objects  of  persecution.*  For  it  is  this  — it  is 
the  opinions  men  entertain,  and  the  feelings 
they  cherish,  respecting  those  who  disown  the 
beliefs  they  deem  important,  which  makes  this 
30untry  not  a place  of  mental  freedom.  For  a 
long  time  past,  the  chief  mischief  of  the  legal 
penalties  is  that  they  strengthen  the  social 
stigma.  It  is  that  stigma  which  is  really  effec- 
tive, and  so  effective  is  it,  that  the  profession 
of  opinions  which  are  under  the  ban  of  society 

* Ample  warning  may  be  drawn  fi'om  the  large  infuvsiun  of  the 
passions  of  a persecutor,  which  mingled  with  the  general  display 
of  the  worst  parts  of  our  national  character  on  the  occasion  of  the 
Sepoy  insurrection.  The  ravings  of  fanatics  or  charlatans  from 
the  palpit  may  be  unworthy  of  notice;  but  the  heads  of  the  Evan- 
gelical party  have  announced  as  their  principle,  for  the  govern- 
ment of  Hindoos  and  Mahomedans,  that  no  schools  be  supported 
by  public  money  in  which  the  Bible  is  not  taught,  and  by  neces- 
sary consequence  that  no  public  employment  be  given  to  any  but 
raa,-  of  pretended  Christians.  An  Under-Secretary  of  State,  in  & 
speech  delivered  to  his  constituents  on  the  12th  of  November,  1857, 
is  reported  to  have  said:  “ Toleration  of  their  faith”  (the  faith  of  a 
hundred  millions  of  British  subjects),  “ the  superstition  which  they 
called  religion,  b}^  the  British  Government,  had  had  the  effect  of 
retarding  the  ascendency  of  the  British  name,  and  preventing  the 
salutary  growth  of  Christianity.  . . . Toleration  was  the  great 
corner-stone  of  the  religious  liberties  of  this  country;  but  do  not 
let  them  abuse  that  precious  word  toleration.  As  he  understood 
it,  it  meant  the  complete  liberty  to  all,  freedom  of  worship,  among 
Christians^  who  worshipped  upon  the  same  foundation.  It  meant 
lo/eration  of  all  sects  and  denorainatiuns  of  Christians  who  believed 
in  the  one  mediation."’'  I desire  to  call  attention  to  the  fact,  that  a 
man  who  has  been  deemed  fit  to  fill  a high  office  in  the  gov- 
ernment of  this  country,  under  a liberal  Ministry,  maintains  the 
doctrine  that  all  who  do  not  believe  in  the  divinity  of  Christ  arc 
beyond  the  pale  of  toleration.  Who,  after  this  imbecile  display 
can  indulge  the  illusion  that  religious  persecution  has  passed  away 
never  to  return  ? 


60 


ON  LIBERTY. 


IS  much  less  common  in  England,  than  is,  ir. 
many  other  countries,  the  avowal  of  those 
which  incur  risk  of  judicial  punishment.  In 
respect  to  all  persons  but  those  whose  pecu- 
niary circumstances  make  them  independent 
of  the  good  will  of  other  people,  opinion,  on 
this  subject,  is  as  efficacious  as  law ; men 
might  as  well  be  imprisoned,  as  excluded  from 
the  means  of  earning  their  bread.  Those 
whose  bread  is  already  secured,  and  who  de- 
sire no  favors  from  men  in  power,  or  from 
bodies  of  men,  or  from  the  public,  have  noth- 
ing to  fear  from  the  open  avowal  of  any  opin- 
.ons,  but  to  be  ill-thought  of  and  ill-spoken  of, 
and  this  it  ought  not  to  require  a very  heroic 
mould  to  enable  them  to  bear.  There  is  no 
room  for  any  appeal  ad  misericordiam  in  be- 
half of  such  persons.  But  though  we  do  not 
now  inflict  so  much  evil  on  those  who  think 
differently  from  us,  as  it  was  formerly  our  cus- 
tom to  do,  it  may  be  that  we  do  ourselves  as 
much  evil  as  ever  by  our  treatment  of  them. 
Socrates  was  put  to  death,  but  the  Socratic 
philosophy  rose  like  the  sun  in  heaven,  and 
spread  its  illumination  over  the  whole  intellec- 
tual firmament.  Christians  were  cast  to  the 
lions,  but  the  Christian  Church  grew  up  a 
stately  and  spreading  tree,  overtopping  the 
older  and  less  vigorous  growths,  and  stifling 
them  by  its  shade.  Our  merely  social  intoler- 
ance, kills  no  one,  roots  out  no  opinions,  but 
induces  men  to  disguise  the''n,  or  to  abstain 


ON  IIBERTY. 


61 


from  any  active  effort  for  their  diffusion.  Witf 
us,  heretical  opinions  do  not  perceptibly  gain, 
or  even  lose,  ground  in  each  decade  or  genera 
tion  ; they  never  blaze  out  far  and  wide,  but 
continue  to  smoulder  in  the  narrow  circles  ol 
thinking  and  studious  persons  among  whom 
they  originate,  without  ever  lighting  up  the 
general  affairs  of  mankind  with  either  a true 
or  a deceptive  light.  And  thus  is  kept  up  a 
state  of  things  very  satisfactory  to  some 
minds,  because,  without  the  unpleasant  proc- 
ess of  fining  or  imprisoning  anybody,  it  main- 
tains all  prevailing  opinions  outwardly  undis- 
turbed, while  it  does  not  absolutely  interdict 
the  exercise  of  reason  by  dissentients  afflicted 
with  the  malady  of  thought.  A convenient 
plan  for  having  peace  in  the  intellectual  world, 
and  keeping  all  things  going  on  therein  very 
much  as  they  do  already.  But  the  price  paid 
for  this  sort  of  intellectual  pacification,  is  the 
sacrifice  of  the  entire  moral  courage  of  the  hu- 
man mind.  A state  of  things  in  which  a large 
portion  of  the  most  active  and  inquiring  intel- 
lects find  it  advisable  to  keep  the  genuine  prin- 
ciples and  grounds  of  their  convictions  within 
their  own  breasts,  and  attempt,  in  what  they 
address  to  the  public,  to  fit  as  much  as  they 
can  of  their  own  conclusions  to  premises 
which  they  have  internally  renounced,  cannot 
send  forth  the  open,  fearless  characters,  and 
logical,  consistent  intellects  who  once  adorned 
the  thinking  world.  The  sort  of  men  who  can 


62 


ON  LIBEETT. 


be  looked  for  under  it,  are  either  mere  conform- 
ers  to  commonplace,  or  time-servers  for  truth 
whose  arguments  on  all  great  subjects  are 
meant  for  their  hearers,  and  are  not  those 
which  have  convinced  themselves.  Those 
who  avoid  this  alternative,  do  so  by  narrow- 
ing their  thoughts  and  interest  to  things  which 
can  be  spoken  of  without  venturing  within 
the  region  of  principles,  that  is,  to  small  prac- 
tical matters,  which  would  come  right  of  them- 
selves, if  but  the  minds  of  mankind  were 
strengthened  and  enlarged,  and  which  will 
never  be  made  effectually  right  until  then ; 
while  that  which  would  strengthen  and  en- 
large men’s  minds,  free  and  daring  specula- 
tion on  the  highest  subjects,  is  abandoned. 

Those  in  whose  eyes  this  reticence  on  the 
part  of  heretics  is  no  evil,  should  consider  in 
the  first  place,  that  in  consequence  of  it  there 
is  never  any  fair  and  thorough  discussion  of 
heretical  opinions  ; and  that  such  of  them  as 
could  not  stand  such  a discussion,  though  they 
may  be  prevented  from  spreading,  do  not  dis- 
appear. But  it  is  not  the  minds  of  heretics 
that  are  deteriorated  most,  by  the  ban  placed 
on  all  inquiry  which  does  not  end  in  the  ortho- 
dox conclusions.  The  greatest  harm  done  is 
fo  those  who  are  not  heretics,  and  whose  whole 
mental  development  is  cramped,  and  their  rea- 
son cowed,  by  the  fear  of  heresy.  Who  can 
compute  what  the  world  loses  in  the  multitude 
of  promising  intellects  combined  with  timid 


ON  LIBERTY. 


63 


chaiacters,  who  dare  not  follow  out  any  bold^ 
vigorous,  independent  train  of  thought,  lest  it 
should  land  them  in  something  which  would 
admit  of  being  considered  irreligious  or  im 
moral?  Among  them  we  may  occasionally 
see  some  man  of  deep  conscientiousness,  and 
subtile  and  refined  understanding,  who  spends 
a life  in  sophisticating  with  an  intellect  which 
he  cannot  silence,  and  exhausts  the  resources 
of  ingenuity  in  attempting  to  reconcile  the 
promptings  of  his  conscience  and  reason  with 
orthodoxy,  which  yet  he  does  not,  perhaps,  to 
the  end  succeed  in  doing.  No  one  can  be  a 
great  thinker  who  does  not  recognize,  that  as  a 
thinker  it  is  his  first  duty  to  follow  his  intellect 
to  whatever  conclusions  it  may  lead.  Truth 
gains  more  even  by  the  errors  of  one  who,  with 
due  study  and  preparation,  thinks  for  himself, 
than  by  the  true  opinions  of  those  who  only 
hold  them  because  they  do  not  suffer  them- 
selves to  think.  Not  that  it  is  solely,  or  chief- 
ly, to  form  great  thinkers,  that  freedom  of 
thinking  is  required.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  as 
much,  and  even  more  indispensable,  to  enable 
average  human  beings  to  attain  the  mental 
stature  which  they  are  capable  of.  There  have 
been,  and  may  again  be,  great  individual  think 
ers,  in  a general  atmosphere  of  mental  slavery. 
But  there  never  has  been,  nor  ever  will  be,  in 
that  atmosphere,  an  intellectually  active  peo- 
ple. Where  any  people  has  made  a temporary 
approach  to  such  a character,  it  has  been  be- 


64 


ON  LIBERTY. 


cause  the  dread  of  heterodox  speculation  was 
for  a time  suspended.  Where  there  is  a tacit 
convention  that  principles  are  not  to  be  dis- 
puted ; where  the  discussion  of  the  greatest 
questions  which  can  occupy  humanity  is  con- 
sidered to  be  closed,  we  cannot  hope  to  find 
that  generally  high  scale  of  mental  activity 
which  has  made  some  periods  of  history  so 
remarkable.  Never  when  controversy  avoided 
the  subjects  which  are  large  and  important 
enough  to  kindle  enthusiasm,  was  the  mind  of 
a people  stirred  up  from  its  foundations,  and 
the  impulse  given  which  raised  even  persons 
of  the  most  ordinary  intellect  to  something  of 
the  dignity  of  thinking  beings.  Of  such  we 
have  had  an  example  in  the  condition  of  Eu- 
rope during  the  times  immediately  following 
the  Reformation  ; another,  though  limited  to 
the  Continent  and  to  a more  cultivated  class, 
in  the  speculative  movement  of  the  latter  half 
of  the  eighteenth  century ; and  a third,  of  still 
briefer  duration,  in  the  intellectual  fermenta- 
tion of  Germany  during  the  Goethian  and 
Fichtean  period.  These  periods  differed  wide 
ly  in  the  particular  opinions  which  they  devel 
oped  ; but  were  alike  in  this,  that  during  all 
three  the  yoke  of  authority  was  broken.  In 
each,  an  old  mental  despotism  had  been  throwii 
off,  and  no  new  one  had  yet  taken  its  place. 
The  impulse  given  at  these  three  periods  has 
made  Europe  what  it  now  is.  Every  single 
improvement  which  has  taken  place  either  in 


ON  LIBERTY. 


65 


the  human  mind  or  in  institutions,  may  be 
traced  distinctly  to  one  or  other  of  them.  Ap- 
pearances have  for  some  time  indicated  that 
all  three  impulses  are  well-nigh  spent ; and  we 
can  expect  no  fresh  start,  until  we  again  assert 
our  mental  freedom. 

Let  us  now  pass  to  the  second  division  of 
the  argument,  and  dismissing  the  supposition 
that  any  of  the  received  opinions  may  be  false, 
let  us  assume  them  to  be  true,  and  examine 
into  the  worth  of  the  manner  in  which  they 
are  likely  to  be  held,  when  their  truth  is  not 
freely  and  openly  canvassed.  However  un- 
willingly a person  who  has  a strong  opinion 
may  admit  the  possibility  that  his  opinion  may 
be  false,  he  ought  to  be  moved  by  the  consid- 
eration that  however  true  it  may  be,  if  it  is  not 
fully,  frequently,  and  fearlessly  discussed,  it  will 
be  held  as  a dead  dogma,  not  a living  truth. 

There  is  a class  of  persons  (happily  not  quite 
so  numerous  as  formerly)  who  think  it  enough 
if  a person  assents  undoubtingly  to  what  they 
think  true,  though  he  has  no  knowledge  what 
ever  of  the  grounds  of  the  opinion,  and  could 
not  make  a tenable  defence  of  it  against  the 
most  superficial  objections.  Such  persons,  if 
they  can  once  get  their  creed  taught  from  au- 
thority, naturally  think  that  no  good,  and  some 
harm,  comes  of  its  being  allowed  to  be  ques- 
tioned. Where  their  influence  prevails,  they 
make  it  nearly  impossible  for  the  received  opin- 
ion  to  be  rejected  wisely  and  considerately^ 


66 


ON  LIBERTY. 


though  it  may  still  be  rejected  rashly  and  ig 
norantly ; for  to  shut  out  discussion  entirely  is 
seldom  possible,  and  when  it  once  gets  in,  be- 
liefs not  grounded  on  conviction  are  apt  to  give 
way  before  the  slightest  semblance  of  an  argu- 
ment. Waiving,  however,  this  possibility  — 
assuming  that  the  true  opinion  abides  in  the 
mind,  but  abides  as  a prejudice,  a belief  inde- 
pendent of,  and  proof  against,  argument  — this 
is  not  the  way  in  which  truth  ought  to  be  held 
by  a rational  being.  This  is  not  knowing  the 
truth.  Truth,  thus  held,  is  but  one  superstition 
the  more,  accidentally  clinging  to  the  words 
which  enunciate  a truth. 

If  the  intellect  and  judgment  of  mankind 
ought  to  be  cultivated,  a thing  which  Protes- 
tants at  least  do  not  deny,  on  what  can  these 
faculties  be  more  appropriately  exercised  by 
any  one,  than  on  the  things  which  concern 
him  so  much  that  it  is  considered  necessary 
for  him  to  hold  opinions  on  them  ? If  the  cul- 
tivation of  the  understanding  consists  in  one 
thing  more  than  in  another,  it  is  surely  in  learn- 
ing the  grounds  of  one’s  own  opinions.  What- 
ever people  believe,  on  subjects  on  which  it  is 
of  the  first  importance  to  believe  rightly,  they 
ought  to  be  able  to  defend  against  at  least  the 
common  objections.  But,  some  one  may  say, 
Let  them  be  taught  the  grounds  of  their 
opinions.  It  does  not  follow  that  opinions 
must  be  merely  parroted  because  they  are 
never  heard  controverted.  Persons  who  learn 


ON  LIBERTY. 


67 


geometry  do  not  simply  commit  the  theorems 
to  memory,  but  understand  and  learn  likewise 
the  demonstrations ; and  it  would  be  absurd  to 
say  that  they  remain  ignorant  of  the  grounds 
of  geometrical  truths,  because  they  never  hear 
any  one  deny,  and  attempt  to  disprove  them.’’ 
Undoubtedly  : and  such  teaching  suffices  on  a 
subject  like  mathematics,  where  there  is  noth- 
ing at  all  to  be  said  on  the  wrong  side  of  the 
question.  The  peculiarity  of  the  evidence  of 
mathematical  truths  is,  that  all  the  argument 
is  on  one  side.  There  are  no  objections,  and 
no  answers  to  objections.  But  on  every  sub- 
ject on  which  difference  of  opinion  is  possi- 
ble, the  truth  depends  on  a balance  to  be 
struck  between  two  sets  of  conflicting  reasons. 
Even  in  natural  philosophy,  there  is  always 
some  other  explanation  possible  of  the  same 
facts  ; some  geocentric  theory  instead  of  helio- 
centric, some  phlogiston  instead  of  oxygen  ; 
and  it  has  to  be  shown  why  that  other  theory 
cannot  be  the  true  one  : and  until  this  is  shown, 
and  until  we  know  how  it  is  shown,  we  do  not 
understand  the  grounds  of  our  opinion.  But 
when  we  turn  to  subjects  infinitely  more  com- 
plicated, to  morals,  religion,  politics,  social  re- 
lations, and  the  business  of  life,  three-fourths 
of  the  arguments  for  every  disputed  opinion 
consist  in  dispelling  the  appearances  which 
favor  some  opinion  different  from  it.  The 
greatest  orator,  save  one,  of  antiquity,  has 
'eft  it  on  record  that  he  always  studied  his 


68 


ON  LIBERTY. 


adversary’s  case  with  as  great,  if  not  with  still 
greater,  intensity  than  even  his  own.  Whai 
Cicero  practised  as  the  means  of  forensic  sue 
cess,  requires  to  be  imitated  by  all  who  study 
any  subject  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  He 
who  knows  only  his  own  side  of  the  case, 
knows  little  of  that.  His  reasons  may  be  good; 
and  no  one  may  have  been  able  to  refute  them. 
Bat  if  he  is  equally  unable  to  refute  the  rea- 
sons on  the  opposite  side  ; if  he  does  not  sc 
much  as  know  what  they  are,  he  has  no  ground 
for  preferring  either  opinion.  The  rational  po- 
sition for  him  would  be  suspension  of  judg- 
ment, and  unless  he  contents  himself  with 
that,  he  is  either  led  by  authority,  or  adopts, 
like  the  generality  of  the  world,  the  side  to 
which  he  feels  most  inclination.  Nor  is  it 
enough  that  he  should  hear  the  arguments  of 
adversaries  from  his  own  teachers,  presented 
as  they  state  them,  and  accompanied  by  what 
they  offer  as  refutations.  That  is  not  the  way 
to  do  justice  to  the  arguments,  or  bring  them 
into  real  contact  with  his  own  mind.  He 
must  be  able  to  hear  them  from  persons  who 
actually  believe  them;  who  defend  them  in 
earnest,  and  do  their  very  utmost  for  them. 
He  must  know  them  in  their  most  plausible 
and  persuasive  form  ; he  must  feel  the  whole 
force  of  the  difficulty  which  the  true  view  of 
the  subject  has  to  encounter  and  dispose  of; 
else  he  will  never  really  possess  himself  of  the 
portion  of  truth  which  meets  and  removes  that 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


69 


difficulty.  Ninety-nine  in  a hundred  of  whai 
are  called  educated  men  are  in  this  condition 
even  of  those  who  can  argue  fluently  for  theii 
opinions.  Their  conclusion  may  be  true,  but 
it  might  be  false  for  anything  they  know  : they 
have  never  thrown  themselves  into  the  mental 
position  of  those  who  think  differently  from 
them,  and  considered  what  such  persons  may 
have  to  say  ; and  consequently  they  do  not,  in 
any  proper  sense  of  the  word,  know  the  doc- 
trine which  they  themselves  profess.  They  do 
not  know  those  parts  of  it  which  explain  and 
justify  the  remainder;  the  considerations  which 
show  that  a fact  which  seemingly  conflicts  with 
another  is  reconcilable  with  it,  or  that,  of  two 
apparently  strong  reasons,  one  and  not  the 
other  ought  to  be  preferred.  All  that  part  of 
the  truth  which  turns  the  scale,  and  decides 
the  judgment  of  a completely  informed  mind, 
they  are  strangers  to  ; nor  is  it  ever  really 
known,  but  to  those  who  have  attended  equal- 
ly and  impartially  to  both  sides,  and  endeav- 
ored to  see  the  reasons  of  both  in  the  strongest 
light.  So  essential  is  this  discipline  to  a real 
understanding  of  moral  and  human  subjects, 
that  if  opponents  of  all  important  truths  do 
not  exist,  it  is  indispensable  to  imagine  them, 
and  supply  them  with  the  strongest  arguments 
which  the  most  skilful  devil’s  advocate  can 
conjure  up. 

To  abate  the  force  of  these  considerations, 
Qii  enemy  of  free  discussion  may  be  supp(ised 


70 


ON  LIBERTY. 


to  say,  that  there  is  no  necessity  for  mankind 
in  general  to  know  and  understand  all  that  can 
be  said  against  or  for  their  opinions  by  philoso- 
phers and  theologians.  That  it  is  not  needful 
for  common  men  to  be  able  to  expose  all  the 
misstatements  or  fallacies  of  an  ingenious  op- 
ponent. That  it  is  enough  if  there  is  always 
somebody  capable  of  answering  them,  so  that 
nothing  likely  to  mislead  uninstructed  persons 
remains  unrefuted.  That  simple  minds,  hav- 
ing been  taught  the  obvious  grounds  of  the 
truths  inculcated  on  them,  may  trust  to  au- 
thority for  the  rest,  and  being  aware  that  they 
have  neither  knowledge  nor  talent  to  resolve 
every  difficulty  which  can  be  raised,  may  re- 
pose in  the  assurance  that  all  those  which 
have  been  raised  have  been  or  can  be  an- 
swered, by  those  who  are  specially  trained 
to  the  task. 

Conceding  to  this  view  of  the  subject  the 
utmost  that  can  be  claimed  for  it  by  those 
most  easily  satisfied  with  the  amount  of  un- 
derstanding of  truth  which  ought  to  accom- 
pany the  belief  of  it ; even  so,  the  argument 
for  free  discussion  is  no  way  weakened.  For 
even  this  doctrine  acknowledges  that  mankind 
ought  to  have  a rational  assurance  that  all 
objections  have  been  satisfactorily  answered  ; 
and  how  are  they  to  be  answered  if  that  which 
requires  to  be  answered  is  not  spoken?  or  how 
can  the  answer  be  known  to  be  satisfactory, 
if  the  objectors  have  no  opportunity  of  show- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


71 


uig  that  it  is  unsatisfactory  ? If  not  the  pub- 
lic, at  least  the  philosophers  and  theologians 
who  are  to  resolve  the  difficulties,  must  makf 
themselves  familiar  with  those  difficulties  in 
their  most  puzzling  form ; and  this  cannot  be 
accomplished  unless  they  are  freely  stated,  and 
placed  in  the  most  advantageous  light  which 
they  admit  of.  The  Catholic  Church  has  its 
own  way  of  dealing  with  this  embarrassing 
problem.  It  makes  a broad  separation  be- 
tween those  who  can  be  permitted  to  receive  its 
doctrines  on  conviction,  and  those  who  must 
accept  them  on  trust.  Neither,  indeed,  are  al- 
lowed any  choice  as  to  what  they  will  accept ; 
but  the  clergy,  such  at  least  as  can  be  fully 
confided  in,  may  admissibly  and  meritoriously 
make  themselves  acquainted  with  the  argu- 
ments of  opponents,  in  order  to  answer  them, 
and  may,  therefore,  read  heretical  books  ; the 
laity,  not  unless  by  special  permission,  hard  to 
be  obtained.  This  discipline  recognizes  a 
knowledge  of  the  enemy’s  case  as  beneficial 
to  the  teachers,  but  finds  means,  consistent 
with  this,  of  denying  it  to  the  rest  of  the 
world : thus  giving  to  the  elite  more  mental 
culture,  though  not  more  mental  freedom,  than 
it  allows  to  the  mass.  By  this  device  it  suc- 
ceeds in  obtaining  the  kind  of  mental  supe- 
riority which  its  purposes  require ; for  though 
culture  without  freedom  never  made  a large 
and  liberal  mind,  it  can  make  a clever  nisi 
prius  advocate  of  a cause.  But  in  countries 


ON  LIBERTY. 


72 

professing  Protestantism,  this  resource  is  de- 
nied ; since  Protestants  hold,  at  least  in  theory, 
that  the  responsibility  for  the  choice  of  a relig- 
ion must  be  borne  by  each  for  himself,  and 
cannot  be  thrown  off  upon  teachers.  Besides, 
in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  it  is  practi- 
cally impossible  that  writings  which  are  read 
by  the  instructed  can  be  kept  from  the  unin- 
structed. If  the  teachers  of  mankind  are  to 
be  cognizant  of  all  that  they  ought  to  know, 
everything  must  be  free  to  be  written  and  pub- 
lished without  restraint. 

If,  however,  the  mischievous  operation  of 
the  absence  of  free  discussion,  when  the  re- 
ceived opinions  are  true,  were  confined  to 
leaving  men  ignorant  of  the  grounds  of  those 
opinions,  it  might  be  thought  that  this,  if  an 
intellectual,  is  no  moral  evil,  and  does  not 
affect  the  worth  of  the  opinions,  regarded  in 
their  influence  on  the  character.  The  fact, 
however,  is,  that  not  only  the  grounds  of  the 
opinion  are  forgotten  in  the  absence  of  discus- 
sion, but  too  often  the  meaning  of  the  opinion 
itself.  The  words  which  convey  it,  cease  to 
suggest  ideas,  or  suggest  only  a small  portion 
of  those  they  were  originally  employed  to 
communicate.  Instead  of  a vivid  conception 
and  a living  belief,  there  remain  only  a few 
)hrases  retained  by  rote  ; or,  if  any  part,  the 
shell  and  husk  only  of  the  meaning  is  retained, 
the  finer  essence  being  lost.  The  great  chapter 
in  human  history  which  this  fact  occupies  and 


ON  LIBERTY. 


73 


fills,  cannot  be  too  earnestly  studied  and  medi- 
tated on. 

It  is  illustrated  in  the  experience  of  . almost 
all  ethical  doctrines  and  religious  creeds.  They 
are  all  full  of  meaning  and  vitality  to  those 
who  originate  them,  and  to  the  direct  disciples 
of  the  originators.  Their  meaning  continues 
to  be  felt  in  undiminished  strength,  and  is  per- 
haps brought  out  into  even  fuller  conscious- 
ness, so  long  as  the  struggle  lasts  to  give  the 
doctrine  or  creed  an  ascendency  over  other 
creeds.  At  last  it  either  prevails,  and  becomes 
the  general  opinion,  or  its  progress  stops ; it 
keeps  possession  of  the  ground  it  has  gained, 
but  ceases  to  spread  further.  When  either  of 
these  results  has  become  apparent,  controversy 
on  the  subject  flags,  and  gradually  dies  away. 
The  doctrine  has  taken  its  place,  if  not  as  a 
received  opinion,  as  one  of  the  admitted  sects 
or  divisions  of  opinion  : those  who  hold  it  have 
generally  inherited,  not  adopted  it ; and  con- 
version from  one  of  these  doctrines  to  another, 
being  now  an  exceptional  fact,  occupies  little 
place  in  the  thoughts  of  their  professors.  In- 
stead of  being,  as  at  first,  constantly  on  the 
alert  either  to  defend  themselves  against  the 
world,  or  to  bring  the  world  over  to  them,  they 
have  subsided  into  acquiescence,  and  neither 
listen,  when  they  can  help  it,  to  arguments 
against  their  creed,  nor  trouble  dissentients 
(if  there  be  such)  with  arguments  in  its  favor. 
From  this  time  may  usually  be  dated  the  de- 
4 


74: 


ON  LIBERTY. 


dine  in  the  living  power  of  the  doctrine.  We 
often  hear  the  teachers  of  all  creeds  lamenting 
the  difficulty  of  keeping  up  in  the  minds  of 
believers  a lively  apprehension  of  the  truth 
which  they  nominally  recognize,  so  that  it 
may  penetrate  the  feelings,  and  acquire  a real 
mastery  over  the  conduct.  No  such  difficulty 
is  complained  of  while  the  creed  is  still  fighting 
for  its  existence  : even  the  weaker  combatants 
then  know  and  feel  what  they  are  fighting  for, 
and  the  difference  between  it  and  other  doc- 
trines ; and  in  that  period  of  every  creed’s  ex- 
istence, not  a few  persons  may  be  found,  who 
have  realized  its  fundamental  principles  in  all 
the  forms  of  thought,  have  weighed  and  con- 
sidered them  in  all  their  important  bearings, 
and  have  experienced  the  full  effect  on  the 
character,  which  belief  in  that  creed  ought  to 
produce  in  a mind  thoroughly  imbued  with  it. 
But  when  it  has  come  to  be  an  hereditary 
creed,  and  to  be  received  passively,  not  active- 
ly— when  the  mind  is  no  longer  compelled,  in 
the  same  degree  as  at  first,  to  exercise  its  vital 
powers  on  the  questions  which  its  belief  pre- 
sents to  it,  there  is  a progressive  tendency  to 
forget  all  of  the  belief  except  the  formularies, 
or  to  give  it  a dull  and  torpid  assent,  as  if 
accepting  it  on  trust  dispensed  with  the  neces- 
sity of  realizing  it  in  consciousness,  or  testing 
it  by  personal  experience  ; until  it  almost 
ceases  to  connect  itself  at  all  with  the  inner 
life  of  the  human  being.  Then  are  seen  the 


ON  LIBERTY. 


75 


cases,  so  frequent  in  this  age  of  the  world  as 
almost  to  form  the  majority,  in  which  the  creed 
remains  as  it  were  outside  the  mind,  encrust- 
ing and  petrifying  it  against  all  other  in- 
fluences addressed  to  the  higher  parts  of  our 
nature  ; manifesting  its  power  by  not  suffer- 
ing any  fresh  and  living  conviction  to  get  in, 
but  itself  doing  nothing  for  the  mind  or  heart, 
except  standing  sentinel  over  them  to  keep 
them  vacant. 

To  what  an  extent  doctrines  intrinsically  fit- 
ted to  make  the  deepest  impression  upon  the 
mind  may  remain  in  it  as  dead  beliefs,  with- 
out being  ever  realized  in  the  imagination,  the 
feelings,  or  the  understanding,  is  exemplified 
by  the  manner  in  which  the  majority  of  be- 
lievers hold  the  doctrines  of  Christianity.  By 
Christianity  I here  mean  what  is  accounted 
such  by  all  churches  and  sects  — the  maxims 
and  precepts  contained  in  the  New  Testament. 
These  are  considered  sacred,  and  accepted  as 
laws,  by  all  professing  Christians.  Yet  it  is 
scarcely  too  much  to  say  that  not  one  Chris- 
tian in  a thousand  guides  or  tests  his  individ- 
ual conduct  by  reference  to  those  laws.  The 
standard  to  which  he  does  refer  it,  is  the  cus- 
tom of  his  nation,  his  class,  or  his  religious 
profession.  He  has  thus,  on  the  one  hand,  a 
collection  of  ethical  maxims,  which  he  believes 
to  have  been  vouchsafed  to  him  by  infallible 
wisdom  as  rules  for  his  government ; and  on 
the  other,  a set  of  every-day  judgments  and 


76 


ON  LIBEETY. 


practices,  which  go  a certain  length  with  some 
of  those  maxims,  not  so  great  a length  with 
others,  stand  in  direct  opposition  to  some,  and 
are,  on  the  whole,  a compromise  between  the 
Christian  creed  and  the  interests  and  sugges- 
tions of  worldly  life.  To  the  first  of  these 
standards  he  gives  his  homage  ; to  the  other 
his  real  allegiance.  All  Christians  believe  that 
the  blessed  are  the  poor  and  humble,  and  those 
who  are  ill-used  by  the  world ; that  it  is  easier 
for  a camel  to  pass  through  the  eye  of  a needle 
than  for  a rich  man  to  enter  the  kingdom  of 
heaven ; that  they  should  judge  not,  lest  they 
be  judged  ; that  they  should  swear  not  at  all  * 
that  they  should  love  their  neighbor  as  them- 
selves ; that  if  one  take  their  cloak,  they  should 
give  him  their  coat  also  ; that  they  should  take 
no  thought  for  the  morrow  ; that  if  they  would 
be  perfect,  they  should  sell  all  that  they  have 
and  give  it  to  the  poor.  They  are  not  insin- 
cere when  they  say  that  they  believe  these 
things.  They  do  believe  them,  as  people  be- 
lieve what  they  have  always  heard  lauded  and 
never  discussed.  But  in  the  sense  of  that  liv- 
ing belief  which  regulates  conduct,  they  be- 
lieve these  doctrines  just  up  to  the  point  to 
which  it  is  usual  to  act  upon  them.  The  doc- 
trines in  their  integrity  are  serviceable  to  pelt  ‘ 
adversaries  with  ; and  it  is  understood  that  they 
are  to  be  put  forward  (when  possible)  as  the 
reasons  for  whatever  people  do  that  they  think 
laudable.  But  any  one  who  reminded  them 


ON  LIBERTY. 


77 


that  the  maxims  require  an  infinity  of  things 
which  they  never  even  think  of  doing,  would 
gain  nothing  but  to  be  classed  among  those 
very  unpopular  characters  who  affect  to  be  bet- 
ter than  other  people.  The  doctrines  have  no 
hold  on  ordinary  believers  — are  not  a power 
in  their  minds.  They  have  an  habitual  respect 
for  the  sound  of  them,  but  no  feeling  which 
spreads  from  the  words  to  the  things  signified, 
and  forces  the  mind  to  take  them  in,  and  make 
them  conform  to  the  formula.  Whenever  con- 
duct is  concerned,  they  look  round  for  Mr.  A 
and  B to  direct  them  how  far  to  go  in  obeying 
Christ. 

Now  we  may  be  well  assured  that  the  case 
was  not  thus,  but  far  otherwise,  with  the  early 
Christians.  Had  it  been  thus,  Christianity 
never  would  have  expanded  from  an  obscure 
sect  of  the  despised  Hebrews  into  the  religion 
of  the  Roman  empire.  When  their  enemies 
said,  See  how  these  Christians  love  one  an- 
other ’’  (a  remark  not  likely  to  be  made  by  any- 
body now),  they  assuredly  had  a much  livelier 
feeling  of  the  meaning  of  their  creed  than  they 
have  ever  had  since.  And  to  this  cause,  prob- 
ably, it  is  chiefly  owing  that  Christianity  now 
makes  so  little  progress  in  extending  its  do- 
main, and  after  eighteen  centuries,  is  still  near- 
ly confined  to  Europeans  and  the  descendants 
of  Europeans.  Even  with  the  strictly  religious, 
who  are  much  in  earnest  about  their  doctrines, 
and  attach  a greater  amount  of  meaning  to 


78 


ON  LIBERTY, 


many  of  them  than  people  in  general,  it  com 
monly  happens  that  the  part  which  is  thus 
comparatively  active  in  their  minds  is  that 
which  was  made  by  Calvin,  or  Knox,  or  some 
such  person  much  nearer  in  character  to  them- 
selves. The  sayings  of  Christ  coexist  pas- 
sively in  their  minds,  producing  hardly  any 
3ffect  beyond  what  is  caused  by  mere  listen* 
ng  to  words  so  amiable  and  bland.  There 
are  many  reasons,  doubtless,  why  doctrines 
which  are  the  badge  of  a sect  retain  more  of 
their  vitality  than  those  common  to  all  recog- 
nized sects,  and  why  more  pains  are  taken  by 
teachers  to  keep  their  meaning  ali\e;  but  one 
reason  certainly  is,  that  the  peculiar  doctrines 
are  more  questioned,  and  have  to  be  oftener 
defended  against  open  gainsayers.  Both  teach- 
ers and  learners  go  to  sleep  at  their  post,  as 
soon  as  there  is  no  enemy  in  the  field. 

The  same  thing  holds  true,  generally  speak- 
ing, of  all  traditional  doctrines  — those  of  pru- 
dence and  knowledge  of  life,  as  well  as  of 
morals  or  religion.  All  languages  and  litera- 
tures are  full  of  general  observations  on  life, 
both  as  to  what  it  is,  and  how  to  conduct  one- 
self in  it;  observations  which  everybody  knows, 
which  everybody  repeats,  or  hears  with  acqui- 
escence, which  are  received  as  truisms,  yet  of 
which  most  people  first  truly  learn  the  mean- 
ing, when  experience,  generally  of  a painful 
kind,  has  made  it  a reality  to  them.  How 
often,  when  smarting  under  some  unforeseen 


ON  LIBERTY. 


79 


misfortune  or  disappointment,  does  a person 
call  to  mind  some  proverb  or  common  saying, 
familiar  to  him  all  his  life,  the  meaning  of 
which,  if  he  had  ever  before  felt  it  as  he  does 
now,  would  have  saved  him  from  the  calamity. 
There  are  indeed  reasons  for  this,  other  than 
the  absence  of  discussion : there  are  many 
O’uths  of  which  the  full  meaning  cannot  be  real 
ized,  until  personal  experience  has  brought  it 
home.  But  much  more  of  the  meaning  even 
of  these  would  have  been  understood,  and  what 
was  understood  would  have  been  far  more  deep- 
ly impressed  on  the  mind,  if  the  man  had  been 
accustomed  to  hear  it  argued  pro  and  con  by 
people  who  did  understand  it.  The  fatal  ten- 
dency of  mankind  to  leave  off  thinking  about 
a thing  when  it  is  no  longer  doubtful,  is  the 
cause  of  half  their  errors.  A cotemporary  au- 
thor has  well  spoken  of  “ the  deep  slumber  of 
a decided  opinion.” 

But  what!  (it  may  be  asked)  Is  the  absence 
of  unanimity  an  indispensable  condition  of 
true  knowledge  ? Is  it  necessary  that  some 
part  of  mankind  should  persist  in  error,  to  en- 
able any  to  realize  the  truth  ? Does  a belief 
cease  to  be  real  and  vital  as  soon  as  it  is  gen- 
erally received  — and  is  a proposition  never 
thoroughly  understood  and  felt  unless  some 
doubt  of  it  remains  ? As  soon  as  mankind 
have  unanimously  accepted  a truth,  does  the 
truth  perish  within  them  ? The  highest  aim 
and  best  result  of  improved  intelligence,  it  has 


80 


ON  LIBERTY. 


hitherto  been  thought,  is  to  unite  mankirn’ 
more  and  more  in  the  acknowledgment  of  all 
important  truths : and  does  the  intelligence 
only  last  as  long  as  it  has  not  achieved  its 
object?  Do  the  fruits  of  conquest  perish  bj 
the  very  completeness  of  the  victory  ? 

I affirm  no  such  thing.  As  mankind  im- 
prove, the  number  of  doctrines  which  are  no 
longer  disputed  or  doubted  will  be  constantly 
on  the  increase : and  the  well-being  of  man- 
kind may  almost  be  measured  by  the  number 
and  gravity  of  the  truths  which  have  reached 
the  point  of  being  uncontested.  The  cessa- 
tion. on  one  question  after  another,  of  serious 
controversy,  is  one  of  the  necessary  incidents 
of  the  consolidation  of  opinion ; a consolida- 
tion as  salutary  in  the  case  of  true  opinions,  as 
it  is  dangerous  and  noxious  when  the  opinions 
are  erroneous.  But  though  this  gradual  nar- 
rowing of  the  bounds  of  diversity  of  opinion 
is  necessary  in  both  senses  of  the  term,  being 
at  once  inevitable  and  indispensable,  we  are 
not  therefore  obliged  to  conclude  that  all  its 
consequences  must  be  beneficial.  The  loss  of 
so  important  an  aid  to  the  intelligent  and  liv- 
ing apprehension  of  a truth,  as  is  afforded  by 
the  necessity  of  explaining  it  to,  or  defending 
it  against,  opponents,  though  not  sufficient  to 
outweigh,  is  no  trifling  drawback  from,  the 
benefit  of  its  universal  recognition.  Where 
this  advantage  can  no  longer  be  had,  I confess 
I should  like  to  see  the  teachers  of  mankind 


ON  LIBERTY. 


81 


endeavoring  to  provide  a substitute  for  it ; 
some  contrivance  for  making  the  difficulties 
of  the  question  as  present  to  the  learner’s  con- 
sciousness, as  if  they  were  pressed  upon  him 
by  a dissentient  champion,  eager  for  his  con- 
version. 

But  instead  of  seeking  contrivances  for  this 
purpose,  they  have  lost  those  they  formerly  had 
The  Socratic  dialectics,  so  magnificently  ex- 
emplified in  the  dialogues  of  Plato,  were  a 
contrivance  of  this  description.  They  were 
essentially  a negative  discussion  of  the  great 
questions  of  philosophy  and  life,  directed  with 
consummate  skill  to  the  purpose  of  convincing 
any  one  who  had  merely  adopted  the  common- 
places of  received  opinion,  that  he  did  not  un- 
derstand the  subject  — that  he  as  yet  attached 
no  definite  meaning  to  the  doctrines  he  pro- 
fessed; in  order  that,  becoming  aware  of  his 
ignorance,  he  might  be  put  in  the  way  to  at- 
tain a stable  belief,  resting  on  a clear  appre- 
hension both  of  the  meaning  of  doctrines  and 
of  their  evidence.  The  school  disputations  of 
the  Middle  Ages  had  a somewhat  similar  object. 
They  were  intended  to  make  sure  that  the  pu- 
pil understood  his  own  opinion,  and  (by  neces- 
sary correlation)  the  opinion  opposed  to  it,  and 
could  enforce  the  grounds  of  the  one  and  con- 
fute those  of  the  other.  These  last-mentioned 
contests  had  indeed  the  incurable  defect,  that 
the  premises  appealed  to  were  taken  from  au 
thority,  not  from  reason ; and,  as  a discipline 
4* 


82 


ON  LIBERTY. 


to  the  mind,  they  were  in  every  respect  inferioi 
to  the  powerful  dialectics  which  formed  the 
intellects  of  the  “ Socratici  viri : ” but  the 
modern  mind  owes  far  more  to  both  than  it 
is  generally  willing  to  admit,  and  the  present 
modes  of  education  contain  nothing  which  in 
the  smallest  degree  supplies  the  place  either  of 
the  one  or  of  the  other.  A person  who  derives 
all  his  instruction  from  teachers  or  books,  even 
if  he  escape  the  besetting  temptation  of  con- 
tenting himself  with  cram,  is  under  no  compul- 
sion to  hear  both  sides ; accordingly  it  is  far 
from  a frequent  accomplishment,  even  among 
thinkers,  to  know  both  sides  ; and  the  weakest 
part  of  what  everybody  says  in  defence  of  his 
opinion,  is  what  he  intends  as  a reply  to  antag- 
onists. It  is  the  fashion  of  the  present  time  to 
disparage  negative  logic  — that  which  points 
out  weaknesses  in  theory  or  errors  in  practice, 
without  establishing  positive  truths.  Such 
negative  criticism  would  indeed  be  poor  enough 
as  an  ultimate  result  ; but  as  a means  to  at- 
taining any  positive  knowledge  or  conviction 
worthy  the  name,  it  cannot  be  valued  too 
highly  ; and  until  people  are  again  systemati- 
cally trained  to  it,  there  will  be  few  great  think- 
ers, and  a low  general  average  of  intellect,  in 
any  but  the  mathematical  and  physical  depart- 
ments of  speculation.  On  any  other  subject 
no  one’s  opinions  deserve  the  name  of  knowl- 
edge, except  so  far  as  he  has  either  had  forced 
upon  him  by  others,  or  gone  through  of  him 


ON  LIBERTY. 


83 


self,  the  same  mental  process  which  would 
have  been  required  of  him  in  carrying  on  an 
active  controversy  with  opponents.  That, 
therefore,  which  when  absent,  it  is  so  indis- 
pensable, but  so  difficult,  to  create,  how  worse 
than  absurd  is  it  to  forego,  when  spontaneously 
offering  itself!  If  there  are  any  persons  who 
contest  a received  opinion,  or  who  will  do  so 
if  law  or  opinion  will  let  them,  let  us  thank 
them  for  it,  open  our  minds  to  listen  to  them, 
and  rejoice  that  there  is  some  one  to  do  for  us 
what  we  otherwise  ought,  if  we  have  any  re- 
gard for  either  the  certainty  or  the  vitality  of 
our  convictions,  to  do  with  much  greater  labor 
for  ourselves. 

It  still  remains  to  speak  of  one  of  the  prin- 
cipal causes  which  make  diversity  of  opinion 
advantageous,  and  will  continue  to  do  so  until 
mankind  shall  have  entered  a stage  of  intel- 
lectual advancement  which  at  present  seems 
at  an  incalculable  distance.  We  have  hitherto 
considered  only  two  possibilities:  that  the  re- 
ceived opinion  may  be  false,  and  some  other 
opinion,  consequently,  true ; or  that,  the  re- 
ceived opinion  being  true,  a conflict  with  the 
opposite  error  is  essential  to  a clear  apprehen- 
sion and  deep  feeling  of  its  truth.  But  there 
is  a commoner  case  than  either  of  these ; wher 
the  conflicting  doctrines,  instead  of  being  one 
true  and  the  other  false,  share  the  truth  between 
them;  and  the  nonconforming  opinion  is  need- 


84 


ON  LIBERTY. 


ed  to  supply  the  remainder  of  the  truth,  of 
which  the  received  doctrine  embodies  only  a 
part.  Popular  opinions,  on  subjects  not  pal- 
pable to  sense,  are  often  true,  but  seldom  or 
never  the  whole  truth.  They  are  a part  of  the 
truth;  sometimes  a greater,  sometimes  a smaller 
part,  but  exaggerated,  distorted,  and  disjoined 
from  the  truths  by  which  they  ought  to  be  ac- 
companied and  limited.  Heretical  opinions, 
on  the  other  hand,  are  generally  some  of  these 
suppressed  and  neglected  truths,  bursting  the 
bonds  which  kept  them  down,  and  either  seek- 
ing reconciliation  with  the  truth  contained  in 
the  common  opinion,  or  fronting  it  as  enemies, 
and  setting  themselves  up,  with  similar  exclu- 
siveness, as  the  whole  truth.  The  latter  case 
is  hitherto  the  most  frequent,  as,  in  the  human 
mind,  one-sidedness  has  always  been  the  rule, 
and  many-sidedness  the  exception.  Hence, 
even  in  revolutions  of  opinion,  one  part  of  the 
truth  usually  sets  while  another  rises.  Even 
progress,  which  ought  to  superadd,  for  the  most 
part  only  substitutes  one  partial  and  incom- 
plete truth  for  another;  improvement  consist- 
ing chiefly  in  this,  that  the  new  fragment  of 
truth  is  more  wanted,  more  adapted  to  the 
needs  of  the  time,  than  that  which  it  displaces. 
Such  being  the  paj'tial  character  of  prevailing 
opinions,  even  when  resting  on  a true  founda- 
tion ; every  opinion  which  embodies  somewhat 
of  the  portion  of  truth  which  the  common 
opinion  omits,  ought  to  be  considered  precious, 


ON  LIBERTY. 


8£ 


with  whatever  amount  of  error  and  confusion 
that  truth  may  be  blended.  No  sober  judge 
of  human  affairs  will  feel  bound  to  be  indig- 
nant because  those  who  force  on  our  notice 
truths  which  we  should  otherwise  have  over- 
looked, overlook  some  of  those  which  we  see. 
Rather,  he  will  think  that  so  long  as  popular 
truth  is  one-sided,  it  is  more  desirable  than 
otherwise  that  unpopular  truth  should  have 
one-sided  asserters  too ; such  being  usually  the 
most  energetic,  and  the  most  likely  to  compel 
reluctant  attention  to  the  fragment  of  wisdom 
which  they  proclaim  as  if  it  were  the  whole. 

Thus,  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  nearly 
all  the  instructed,  and  all  those  of  the  unin- 
structed who  were  led  by  them,  were  lost  in 
admiration  of  what  is  called  civilization,  and 
of  the  marvels  of  modern  science,  literature, 
and  philosophy,  and  while  greatly  overrating 
the  amount  of  unlikeness  between  the  men  of 
modern  and  those  of  ancient  times,  indulged 
the  belief  that  the  whole  of  the  difference  was 
in  their  own  favor ; with  what  a salutary  shock 
did  the  paradoxes  of  Rousseau  explode  like 
bombshells  in  the  midst,  dislocating  the  com- 
pact mass  of  one-sided  opinion,  and  forcing  its 
elements  to  recombine  in  a better  form  and 
with  additional  ingredients.  Not  that  the  cur- 
rent opinions  were  on  the  whole  farther  from 
the  truth  than  Rousseau’s  were ; on  the  con- 
trary, they  were  nearer  to  it;  they  contained 
more  of  positive  truth,  and  very  much  less  of 


86 


ON  LIBERTY. 


error.  Nevertheless  there  lay  in  Rousseau’s 
doctrine,  and  has  floated  down  the  stream  of 
opinion  along  with  it,  a considerable  amount 
of  exactly  those  truths  which  the  popular  opin- 
ion wanted ; and  these  are  the  deposit  which 
was  left  behind  when  the  flood  subsided.  The 
superior  worth  of  simplicity  of  life,  the  ener- 
vating and  demoralizing  effect  of  the  tram- 
mels and  hypocrisies  of  artificial  society,  are 
ideas  which  have  never  been  entirely  absent 
from  cultivated  minds  since  Rousseau  wrote  ; 
and  they  will  in  time  produce  their  due  effect, 
though  at  present  needing  to  be  asserted  as 
much  as  ever,  and  to  be  asserted  by  deeds,  for 
words,  on  this  subject,  have  nearly  exhausted 
their  power. 

In  politics,  again,  it  is  almost  a common- 
place,  that  a party  of  order  or  stability,  and  a 
party  of  progress  or  reform,  are  both  necessary 
elements  of  a healthy  state  of  political  life; 
until  the  one  or  the  other  shall  have  so  en- 
larged its  mental  grasp  as  to  be  a party  equally 
of  order  and  of  progress,  knowing  and  distin- 
guishing what  is  fit  to  be  preserved  from  what 
ought  to  be  swept  away.  Each  of  these  modes 
of  thinking  derives  its  utility  from  the  deficien- 
cies of  the  other ; but  it  is  in  a great  measure 
the  opposition  of  the  other  that  keeps  each 
within  the  limits  of  reason  and  sanity.  Unless 
opinions  favorable  to  democracy  and  to  aristoc- 
racy, to  property  and  to  equality,  to  coopera- 
tion and  to  competition,  to  luxury  and  to  ab- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


87 


Btinence,  to  sociality  and  individuality,  to  lib- 
erty and  discipline,  and  all  the  other  standing 
antagonisms  of  practical  life,  are  expressed 
with  equal  freedom,  and  enforced  and  defended 
with  equal  talent  and  energy,  there  is  no  chance 
of  both  elements  obtaining  their  due ; one  scale 
is  sure  to  go  up,  and  the  other  down.  Truth, 
in  the  great  practical  concerns  of  life,  is  so 
much  a question  of  the  reconciling  and  com- 
bining of  opposites,  that  very  few  have  minds 
sufficiently  capacious  and  impartial  to  make 
the  adjustment  with  an  approach  to  correct- 
ness, and  it  has  to  be  made  by  the  rough  proc- 
ess of  a struggle  between  combatants  fighting 
under  hostile  banners.  On  any  of  the  great 
open  questions  just  enumerated,  if  either  of 
the  two  opinions  has  a better  claim  than  the 
other,  not  merely  to  be  tolerated,  but  to  be 
encouraged  and  countenanced,  it  is  the  one 
which  happens  at  the  particular  time  and 
place  to  be  in  a minority.  That  is  the  opinion 
which,  for  the  time  being,  represents  the  ne- 
glected interests,  the  side  of  human  well-being 
which  is  in  danger  of  obtaining  less  than  its 
share.  I am  aware  that  there  is  not,  in  this 
country,  any  intolerance  of  differences  of  opin- 
ion on  most  of  these  topics.  They  are  ad- 
duced to  show,  by  admitted  and  multiplied 
examples,  the  universality  of  the  fact,  that 
only  through  diversity  of  opinion  is  there,  in 
the  existing  state  of  human  intellect,  a chance 
af  fair  play  to  all  sides  of  the  truth.  When 


88 


ON  LIBERTY. 


there  are  persons  to  be  found,  wno  form  an 
exception  to  the  apparent  unanimity  of  the 
world  on  any  subject,  even  if  the  world  is  in 
the  right,  it  is  always  probable  that  dissentients 
have  something  worth  hearing  to  say  for  them- 
selves, and  that  truth  would  lose  something  bj 
their  silence. 

It  may  be  objected,  But  some  received  prin- 
ciples, especially  on  the  highest  and  most  vital 
subjects,  are  more  than  half-truths.  The  Chris- 
tian morality,  for  instance,  is  the  whole  truth  on 
that  subject,  and  if  any  one  teaches  a morality 
which  varies  from  it,  he  is  wholly  in  error.” 
As  this  is  of  all  cases  the  most  important  in 
practice,  none  can  be  fitter  to  test  the  general 
maxim.  But  before  pronouncing  what  Chris- 
tian morality  is  or  is  not,  it  would  be  desirable 
to  decide  what  is  meant  by  Christian  morality. 
If  it  means  the  morality  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment, I wonder  that  any  one  who  derives  his 
knowledge  of  this  from  the  book  itself,  can 
suppose  that  it  was  announced,  or  intended,  as 
a complete  doctrine  of  morals.  The  Gospel 
always  refers  to  a preexisting  morality,  and 
confines  its  precepts  to  the  particulars  in  which 
that  morality  was  to  be  corrected,  or  superseded 
by  a wider  and  higher ; expressing  itself,  more- 
over, in  terms  most  general,  often  impossible 
to  be  interpreted  literally,  and  possessing  rath- 
j?r  the  impressiveness  of  poetry  or  eloquence 
than  the  precision  of  legislation.  To  extract 
from  it  a body  of  ethical  doctrine,  has  never 


ON  LIBERTY. 


89 


been  possible  without  eking  it  out  from  the 
Old  Testament,  that  is,  from  a system  elabo« 
rate  indeed,  but  in  many  respects  barbarous, 
and  intended  only  for  a barbarous  people.  St. 
Paul,  a declared  enemy  to  this  Judaical  mode 
of  interpreting  the  doctrine  and  filling  up 
the  scheme  of  his  Master,  equally  assumes 
a preexisting  morality,  namely,  that  of  the 
Greeks  and  Romans ; and  his  advice  to  Chris- 
tians is  in  a great  measure  a system  of  accom- 
modation to  that ; even  to  the  extent  of  giving 
an  apparent  sanction  to  slavery.  What  is 
called  Christian,  but  should  rather  be  termea 
theological,  morality,  was  not  the  work  of 
Christ  or  the  Apostles,  but  is  of  much  latei 
origin,  having  been  gradually  built  up  by  the 
Catholic  Church  of  the  first  five  centuries,  and 
though  not  implicitly  adopted  by  moderns  and 
Protestants,  has  been  much  less  modified  by 
them  than  might  have  been  expected.  For  the 
most  part,  indeed,  they  have  contented  them- 
selves with  cutting  off  the  additions  which  had 
been  made  to  it  in  the  Middle  Ages,  each  sect 
supplying  the  place  by  fresh  additions,  adapt- 
ed to  its  own  character  and  tendencies.  That 
mankind  owe  a great  debt  to  this  morality,  and 
to  its  early  teachers,  I should  be  the  last  person 
to  deny ; but  I do  not  scruple  to  say  of  it,  that 
it  is,  in  many  important  points,  incomplete  and 
one-sided,  and  that  unless  ideas  and  feelings, 
not  sanctioned  by  it,  had  contributed  to  the 
formation  of  European  life  and  character,  hu* 


90 


ON  LIBERTY. 


man  affairs  would  have  been  in  a worse  con- 
dition than  they  now  are.  Christian  morality 
(so  called)  has  all  the  characters  of  a reaction 
it  is,  in  great  part,  a protest  against  Paganism, 
its  ideal  is  negative  rather  than  positive ; pas- 
sive rather  than  active ; Innocence  rather  than 
Nobleness  ; Abstinence  from  Evil,  rather  than 
energetic  Pursuit  of  Good  : in  its  precepts  (as 
has  been  well  said)  “thou  shalt  not”  predomi- 
nates unduly  over  “thou  shalt.”  In  its  hor- 
ror of  sensuality,  it  made  an  idol  of  asceticism, 
which  has  been  gradually  compromised  away 
into  one  of  legality.  It  holds  out  the  hope  of 
heaven  and  the  threat  of  hell,  as  the  appointed 
and  appropriate  motives  to  a virtuous  life  : in 
this  falling  far  below  the  best  of  the  ancients, 
and  doing  what  lies  in  it  to  give  to  human 
morality  an  essentially  selfish  character,  by  dis- 
connecting each  man’s  feelings  of  duty  from 
the  interests  of  his  fellow-creatures,  except  so 
far  as  a self-interested  inducement  is  offered  to 
him  for  consulting  them.  It  is  essentially  a doc- 
trine of  passive  obedience  ; it  inculcates  sub- 
mission to  all  authorities  found  established; 
who  indeed  are  not  to  be  actively  obeyed 
when  they  command  what  religion  forbids,  but 
who  are  not  to  be  resisted,  far  less  rebelled 
against,  for  any  amount  of  wrong  to  ourselves. 
And  while,  in  the  morality  of  the  best  Pagan 
nations,  duty  to  the  State  holds  even  a dispro- 
portionate place,  infringing  on  the  just  liberty 
of  the  individual  ; in  purely  Christian  ethics, 


ON  LIBERTY- 


91 


that  grand  department  of  duty  is  scarcely  no- 
ticed or  acknowledged.  It  is  in  the  Koran, 
not  the  New  Testament,  that  we  read  the 
maxim  — ‘‘  A ruler  who  appoints  any  man  to 
an  office,  when  there  is  in  his  dominions  an 
other  man  better  qualified  for  it,  sins  against 
God  and  against  the  State.”  What  little  recog- 
nition the  idea  of  obligation  to  the  public  ob- 
tains in  modern  morality,  is  derived  from  Greek 
and  Roman  sources,  not  from  Christian;  as,  even 
in  the  morality  of  private  life,  whatever  exists 
of  magnanimity,  high-mindedness,  personal  dig- 
nity, even  the  sense  of  honor,  is  derived  from 
the  purely  human,  not  the  religious  part  of  our 
education,  and  never  could  have  grown  out  of 
a standard  of  ethics  in  which  the  only  worth, 
professedly  recognized,  is  that  of  obedience- 
I am  as  far  as  any  one  from  pretending  that 
these  defects  are  necessarily  inherent  in  the 
Christian  ethics,  in  every  manner  in  which  it 
can  be  conceived,  or  that  the  many  requisites 
of  a complete  moral  doctrine  which  it  does  not 
contain,  do  not  admit  of  being  reconciled  with 
it.  Far  less  would  I insinuate  this  of  the  doc- 
trines and  precepts  of  Christ  himself.  I be- 
lieve that  the  sayings  of  Christ  are  all,  that  I 
can  see  any  evidence  of  their  having  been  in- 
tended to  be ; that  they  are  irreconcilable  with 
nothing  which  a comprehensive  morality  re- 
quires ; that  everything  wffiich  is  excellent  in 
ethics  may  be  brought  within  them,  with  no 
greater  violence  to  their  language  than  ha? 


92 


ON  LIBERTY. 


been  done  to*  it  by  all  who  have  attempted  to 
deduce  from  them  any  practical  system  of  con- 
duct whatever.  But  it  is  quite  consistent  with 
this,  to  believe  that  they  contain,  and  were 
meant  to  contain,  only  a part  of  the  truth; 
that  many  essential  elements  of  the  highest 
morality  are  among  the  things  which  are  not 
provided  for,  nor  intended  to  be  provided  for 
in  the  recorded  deliverances  of  the  Founder 
of  Christianity,  and  which  have  been  entirely 
thrown  aside  in  the  system  of  ethics  erected 
on  the  basis  of  those  deliverances  by  the  Chris- 
tian Church.  And  this  being  so,  I think  it  a 
great  error  to  persist  in  attempting  to  find  in 
the  Christian  doctrine  that  complete  rule  for 
our  guidance,  which  its  author  intended  it  to 
sanction  and  enforce,  but  only  partially  to  pro- 
vide. I believe,  too,  that  this  narrow  theory 
is  becoming  a grave  practical  evil,  detracting 
greatly  from  the  value  of  the  moral  training 
and  instruction,  which  so  many  well-meaning 
persons  are  now  at  length  exerting  themselves 
to  promote.  I much  fear  that  by  attempting 
to  form  the  mind  and  feelings  on  an  exclu- 
sively religious  type,  and  discarding  those  sec- 
ular standards  (as  for  want  of  a better  name 
they  may  be  called)  which  heretofore  coexisted 
\^'ith  and  supplemented  the  Christian  ethics, 
receiving  some  of  its  spirit,  and  infusing  into 
it  some  of  theirs,  there  will  result,  and  is  even 
now  resulting,  a low,  abject,  servile  type  of 
character,  which,  submit  itself  as  it  may  ta 


ON  LIBERTY. 


93 


what  it  deems  the  Supreme  Will,  is  incapa- 
ble of  rising  to  or  sympathizing  in  the  concep 
tion  of  Supreme  Goodness.  I believe  that 
other  ethics  than  any  which  can  be  evolved 
from  exclusively  Christian  sources,  must  exist 
side  by  side  with  Christian  ethics  to  produce 
the  moral  regeneration  of  mankind  ; and  that 
the  Christian  system  is  no  exception  to  the 
rule,  that  in  an  imperfect  state  of  the  human 
mind,  the  interests  of  truth  require  a diversity 
of  opinions.  It  is  not  necessary  that  in  ceas- 
ing to  ignore  the  moral  truths  not  contained 
in  Christianity,  men  should  ignore  any  of 
those  which  it  does  contain.  Such  prejudice, 
or  oversight,  when  it  occurs,  is  altogether  an 
evil ; but  it  is  one  from  which  we  cannot  hope 
to  be  always  exempt,  and  must  be  regarded 
as  the  price  paid  for  an  inestimable  good.  The 
exclusive  pretension  made  by  a part  of  the 
truth  to  be  the  whole,  must  and  ought  to  be 
protested  against,  and  if  a reactionary  impulse 
should  make  the  protestors  unjust  in  their 
turn,  this  one-sidedness,  like  the  other,  may  be 
lamented,  but  must  be  tolerated.  If  Chris- 
tians would  teach  infidels  to  be  just  to  Chris- 
tianity, they  should  themselves  be  just  to  in 
fidelity.  It  can  do  truth  no  service  to  biink 
the  fact,  known  to  all  who  have  the  most  or- 
dinary acquaintance  with  literary  history,  that 
a large  portion  of  the  noblest  and  most  valu- 
able moral  teaching  has  been  the  work,  not 


94 


ON  LIBERTY. 


only  of  men  who  did  not  know,  but  of  men 
who  knew  and  rejected,  the  Christian  faith. 

I do  not  pretend  that  the  most  unlimited 
use  of  the  freedom  of  enunciating  all  possible 
opinions  would  put  an  end  to  the  evils  of  relig- 
ous  or  philosophical  sectarianism.  Every  truth 
which  men  of  narrow  capacity  are  in  earnest 
about,  is  sure  to  be  asserted,  inculcated,  and 
in  many  ways  even  acted  on,  as  if  no  other 
truth  existed  in  the  world,  or  at  all  events 
none  that  could  limit  or  qualify  the  first.  I 
acknowledge  that  the  tendency  of  all  opinions 
to  become  sectarian  is  not  cured  by  the  freest 
discussion,  but  is  often  heightened  and  exacer- 
bated thereby  ; the  truth  which  ought  to  have 
been,  but  was  not,  seen,  being  rejected  all  the 
more  violently  because  proclaimed  by  persons 
regarded  as  opponents.  But  it  is  not  on  the 
impassioned  partisan,  it  is  on  the  calmer  and 
more  disinterested  by-stander,  that  this  collision 
of  opinions  works  its  salutary  effect.  Not  the 
violent  conflict  between  parts  of  the  truth,  but 
the  quiet  suppression  of  half  of  it,  is  the  for* 
midable  evil : there  is  always  hope  when  peo 
pie  are  forced  to  listen  to  both  sides;  it  is 
when  they  attend  only  to  one  that  errors  har- 
den into  prejudices,  and  truth  itself  ceases  tc 
have  the  effect  of  truth,  by  being  exaggerated 
into  falsehood.  And  since  there  are  few  men- 
tal attributes  more  rare  than  that  judicial  fac- 
ulty which  can  sit  in  intelligent  judgment  be- 
tween two  sides  of  a question,  of  which  only 


ON  LIBERTY. 


95 


one  is  represented  by  an  advocate  before 
truth  has  no  chance  but  in  proportion  as  every 
side  of  it,  every  opinion  which  embodies  any 
fraction  of  the  truth,  not  only  finds  advocates, 
but  is  so  advocated  as  to  be  listened  to. 

We  have  now  recognized  the  necessity  to 
the  mental  well-being  of  mankind  (on  which 
all  their  other  well-being  depends)  of  freedom 
of  opinion,  and  freedom  of  the  expression  of 
opinion,  on  four  distinct  grounds  ; which  we 
will  now  briefly  recapitulate. 

First,  if  any  opinion  is  compelled  to  silence, 
that  opinion  may,  for  aught  we  can  certainly 
know,  be  true.  To  deny  this  is  to  assume  our 
own  infallibility. 

Secondly,  though  the  silenced  opinion  be  an 
error,  it  may,  and  very  commonly  does,  contain 
a portion  of  truth ; and  since  the  general  or 
prevailing  opinion  on  any  subject  is  rarely  or 
never  the  whole  truth,  it  is  only  by  the  col 
lision  of  adverse  opinions  that  the  remaindei 
of  the  truth  has  any  chance  of  being  supplied. 

Thirdly,  even  if  the  received  opinion  be  not 
only  true,  but  the  whole  truth ; unless  it  is  suf- 
fered to  be,  and  actually  is,  vigorously  and 
earnestly  contested,  it  will,  by  most  of  those 
who  receive  it,  be  held  in  the  manner  of  a 
prejudice,  with  little  comprehension  or  feeling 
of  its  rational  grounds.  And  not  only  this, 
but,  fourthly,  the  meaning  of  the  doctrine  it- 
self will  be  in  danger  of  being  lost,  or  en- 
feebled, and  deprived  of  its  vital  effect  on  the 


96 


ON  LIBERTY. 


character  and  conduct : the  dogma  becoming  a 
mere  formal  profession,  inefficacious  for  good, 
but  cumbering  the  ground,  and  preventing  the 
growth  of  any  real  and  heartfelt  conviction, 
from  reason  or  personal  experience. 

Before  quitting  the  subject  of  freedom  of 
opinion,  it  is  fit  to  take  some  notice  of  those 
who  say,  that  the  free  expression  of  all  opin- 
ions should  be  permitted,  on  condition  that 
the  manner  be  temperate,  and  do  not  pass  the 
bounds  of  fair  discussion.  Much  might  be 
said  on  the  impossibility  of  fixing  where  these 
supposed  bounds  are  to  be  placed ; for  if  the 
test  be  offence  to  those  whose  opinion  is  at- 
tacked, I think  experience  testifies  that  this 
offence  is  given  whenever  the  attack  is  telling 
and  powerful,  and  that  every  opponent  who 
pushes  them  hard,  and  whom  they  find  it  dif- 
ficult to  answer,  appears  to  them,  if  he  shows 
any  strong  feeling  on  the  subject,  an  intem- 
perate opponent.  But  this,  though  an  impor- 
tant consideration  in  a practical  point  of  view, 
merges  in  a more  fundamental  objection.  Un- 
doubtedly the  manner  of  asserting  an  opinion, 
even  though  it  be  a true  one,  may  be  very  ob- 
jectionable, and  may  justly  incur  severe  cen- 
sure. But  the  principal  offences  of  the  kind 
are  such  as  it  is  mostly  impossible,  unless  by 
accidental  self-betrayal,  to  bring  home  to  con 
viction.  The  gravest  of  them  is,  to  argue  so- 
ph istically,  to  suppress  facts  or  arguments,  to 
misstate  the  elements  of  the  case,  or  misrepre- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


97 


sent  the  opposite  opinion.  Biic  all  this,  even 
to  the  most  aggravated  degree,  is  so  continu- 
ally done  in  perfect  good  faith,  by  persons  who 
are  not  considered,  and  in  many  other  respects 
may  not  deserve  to  be  considered,  ignorant  or 
incompetent,  that  it  is  rarely  possible  on  ade- 
quate grounds  conscientiously  to  stamp  the 
misrepresentation  as  morally  culpable  ; and 
still  less  could  law  presume  to  interfere  with 
this  kind  of  controversial  misconduct.  With 
regard  to  what  is  commonly  meant  by  intem- 
perate discussion,  namely,  invective,  sarcasm, 
personality,  and  the  like,  the  denunciation  of 
these  weapons  would  deserve  more  sympathy 
if  it  were  ever  proposed  to  interdict  them 
equally  to  both  sides  ; but  it  is  only  desired 
to  restrain  the  employment  of  them  against  the 
prevailing  opinion  : against  the  unprevailing 
they  may  not  only  be  used  without  general 
disapproval,  but  will  be  likely  to  obtain  for  him 
who  uses  them  the  praise  of  honest  zeal  and 
righteous  indignation.  Yet  whatever  mischief 
arises  from  their  use,  is  greatest  when  they  are 
employed  against  the  comparatively  defence- 
less ; and  whatever  unfair  advantage  can  be 
derived  by  any  opinion  from  this  mode  of  as- 
serting it,  accrues  almost  exclusively  to  re- 
ceived opinions.  The  worst  offence  of  this 
kind  which  can  be  committed  by  a polemic, 
is  to  stigmatize  those  wlio  hold  the  contrary 
opinion  as  bad  and  immoral  men.  To  cal- 
umny of  this  sort,  those  who  hold  any  unpop- 


98 


ON  LIBERTY. 


ular  opinion  are  peculiarly  exposed,  because 
they  are  in  general  few  and  uninfluential,  and 
nobody  but  themselves  feels  much  interest  in 
&eeing  justice  done  them  ; but  this  weapon  is, 
from  the  nature  of  the  case,  denied  to  those 
who  attack  a prevailing  opinion : they  can  nei- 
ther use  it  with  safety  to  themselves,  nor,  if 
they  could,  would  it  do  anything  but  recoil  on 
their  own  cause.  In  general,  opinions  contrary 
to  those  commonly  received  can  only  obtain  a 
hearing  by  studied  moderation  of  language, 
and  the  most  cautious  avoidance  of  unnecessa- 
ry offence,  from  which  they  hardly  ever  deviate 
even  in  a slight  degree  without  losing  ground : 
while  unmeasured  vituperation  employed  on 
the  side  of  the  prevailing  opinion,  really  does 
deter  people  from  professing  contrary  opinions, 
and  from  listening  to  those  who  profess  them. 
For  the  interest,  therefore,  of  truth  and  jus- 
tice, it  is  far  more  important  to  restrain  this 
employment  of  vituperative  language  than  the 
other;  and,  for  example,  if  it  were  necessary 
to  choose,  there  would  be  much  more  need  to 
discourage  offensive  attacks  on  infidelity,  than 
on  religion.  It  is,  however,  obvious  that  law 
and  authority  have  no  business  with  restrain- 
ing either,  while  opinion  ought,  in  every  in- 
stance, to  determine  its  verdict  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  individual  case  ; condemning 
every  one,  on  whichever  side  of  the  argument 
he  places  himself,  in  whose  mode  of  advocacy 
either  want  of  candor,  or  malignity,  bigotry. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


99 


or  intolerance  of  feeling  manifest  themselves  ; 
but  not  inferring  these  vices  from  the  side 
which  a person  takes,  though  it  be  the  con- 
trary side  of  the  question  to  our  own  : and 
giving  merited  honor  to  every  one,  whatever 
opinion  he  may  hold,  who  has  calmness  to  see 
and  honesty  to  state  what  his  opponents  and 
their  opinions  really  are,  exaggerating  nothing 
to  their  discredit,  keeping  nothing  back  which 
tells,  or  can  be  supposed  to  tell,  in  their  favor. 
This  is  the  real  morality  of  public  discussion ; 
and  if  often  violated,  I am  happy  to  think  that 
there  are  many  controversialists  who  to  a great 
extent  observe  it,  and  a still  greater  number 
who  conscientiously  strive  towards  it. 


CHAPTER  III. 


OF  INDIVIDUALITY,  AS  ONE  OF  THE  ELEMENTS  OF  WELL- 
BEING. 

SUCH  being  the  reasons  which  make  it  iim 
perative  that  human  beings  should  be  free 
to  form  opinions,  and  to  express  their  opinions 
without  reserve ; and  such  the  baneful  conse- 
quences to  the  intellectual,  and  through  that  to 
the  moral  nature  of  man,  unless  this  liberty  is 
either  conceded,  or  asserted  in  spite  of  prohibi- 
tion ; let  us  next  examine  whether  the  same 
reasons  do  not  require  that  men  should  be  free 
to  act  upon  their  opinions  — to  carry  these  out 
in  their  lives,  without  hindrance,  either  physical 
or  moral,  from  their  fellow-men,  so  long  as  it 
is  at  their  own  risk  and  peril.  This  last  pro- 
viso is  of  course  indispensable.  No  one  pre- 
tends that  actions  should  be  as  free  as  opinions. 
On  the  contrary,  even  opinions  lose  their  im- 
munity, when  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
are  expressed  are  such  as  to  constitute  their 
expression  a positive  instigation  to  some  mis- 
chievous act.  An  opinion  that  corn-dealers 
are  starvers  of  the  poor,  or  that  private  prop- 
erty is  robbery,  ought  to  be  unmolested  when 
simply  circulated  through  the  press,  but  may 


ON  LIBEETY. 


101 


justly  incur  punishment  when  delivered  orally 
to  an  excited  mob  assembled  before  the  house 
of  a corn-dealer,  or  when  handed  about  among 
the  same  mob  in  the  form  of  a placard.  Acts, 
of  whatever  kind,  which,  without  justifiable 
cause,  do  harm  to  others,  may  be,  and  in  the 
more  important  cases  absolutely  require  to  be, 
controlled  by  the  unfavorable  sentiments,  and, 
when  needful,  by  the  active  interference  of 
mankind.  The  liberty  of  the  individual  must 
be  thus  far  limited  ; he  must  not  make  himself 
a nuisance  to  other  people.  But  if  he  refrains 
from  molesting  others  in  what  concerns  them, 
and  merely  acts  according  to  his  own  inclina- 
tion and  judgment  in  things  which  concern 
himself,  the  same  reasons  which  show  that 
opinion  should  be  free,  prove  also  that  he 
should  be  allowed,  without  molestation,  to 
carry  his  opinions  into  practice  at  his  own 
cost.  That  mankind  are  not  infallible ; that 
their  truths,  for  the  most  part,  are  only  half- 
truths  ; that  unity  of  opinion,  unless  resulting 
from  the  fullest  and  freest  comparison  of  op- 
posite opinions,  is  not  desirable,  and  diversity 
not  an  evil,  but  a good,  until  mankind  are 
much  more  capable  than  at  present  of  recog- 
nizing all  sides  of  the  truth,  are  principles  ap- 
plicable to  men’s  modes  of  action,  not  less  than 
to  their  opinions.  As  it  is  useful  that  while 
mankind  are  imperfect  there  should  be  different 
opinions,  so  is  it  that  there  should  be  different 
experiments  of  living ; that  free  scope  should 


102 


ON  LIBERTY. 


be  given^to  varieties  of  character,  short  of  in- 
jury to  others ; and  that  the  worth  of  different 
modes  of  life  should  be  proved  practically, 
when  any  one  thinks  fit  to  try  them.  It  is  de- 
sirable, in  short,  that  in  things  which  do  not 
primarily  concern  others,  individuality  should 
assert  itself.  Where,  not  the  person’s  ow'n 
character,  but  the  traditions  or  customs  of  other 
people  are  the  rule  of  conduct,  there  is  wanting 
one  of  the  principal  ingredients  of  human  hap- 
piness, and  quite  the  chief  ingredient  of  indi- 
vidual and  social  progress. 

In  maintaining  this  principle,  the  greatest 
difficulty  to  be  encountered  does  not  lie  in  the 
appreciation  of  means  towards  an  acknowl- 
edged end,  but  in  the  indifference  of  persons  in 
general  to  the  end  itself.  If  it  were  felt  that 
the  free  development  of  individuality  is  one  of 
the  leading  essentials  of  well-being ; that  it  is 
not  only  a coordinate  element  with  all  that  is 
designated  by  the  terms  civilization,  instruc- 
tion, education,  culture,  but  is  itself  a neces- 
sary part  and  condition  of  all  those  things; 
there  wmuld  be  no  danger  that  liberty  should 
be  undervalued,  and  the  adjustment  of  the 
boundaries  betw^een  it  and  social  control  would 
present  no  extraordinary  difficulty.  But  the 
evil  is,  that  individual  spontaneity  is  hardly 
recognized  by  the  common  modes  of  thinking 
as  having  any  intrinsic  worth,  or  deserving  any 
regard  on  its  ow^n  account.  The  majority,  be 
ing  satisfied  with  the  ways  of  mankind  as  they 


ON  LIBEETY. 


103 


now  are  (for  it  is  they  who  make  them  what 
they  are),  cannot  comprehend  why  those  ways 
should  not  be  good  enough  for  everybody ; ana 
what  is  more,  spontaneity  forms  no  part  of  the 
ideal  of  the  majority  of  moral  and  social  re- 
formers, but  is  rather  looked  on  with  jealousy, 
as  a troublesome  and  perhaps  rebellious  ob- 
struction to  the  general  acceptance  of  what 
these  reformers,  in  their  own  judgment,  think 
would  be  best  for  mankind.  Few  persons,  out 
of  Germany,  even  comprehend  the  meaning  of 
the  doctrine  which  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt, 
so  eminent  both  as  a savant  and  as  a politi- 
cian, made  the  text  of  a treatise  — that  “the 
end  of  man,  or  that  which  is  prescribed  by  the 
eternal  or  immutable  dictates  of  reason,  and 
not  suggested  by  vague  and  transient  desires, 
is  the  highest  and  most  harmonious  develop- 
ment of  his  powers  to  a complete  and  consist- 
ent whole that,  therefore,  the  object  “ towards 
which  every  human  being  must  ceaselessly 
direct  his  efforts,  and  on  which  especially  those 
who  design  to  influence  their  fellow-men  must 
ever  keep  their  eyes,  is  the  individuality  of 
power  and  development;’^  that  for  this  there 
are  two  requisites,  “ freedom,  and  a variety  of 
situations  ; ” and  that  from  the  union  of  these 
arise  “ individual  vigor  and  manifold  diversity,” 
which  combine  themselves  in  “ originality.”* 
Little,  however,  as  people  are  accustomed 
to  a doctrine  like  that  of  Von  Humboldt,  and 

* The  Sphere  and  Duties  of  Government^  from  the  Germaa  o/ 
Baron  Wilhilm  von  Humboldt,  pp.  11-13. 


104 


ON  LIBERTY. 


surprising  as  it  may  be  to  them  to  find  so 
high  a value  attached  to  individuality,  the 
question,  one  must  nevertheless  think,  can 
only  be  one  of  degree.  No  one’s  idea  of  ex- 
cellence in  conduct  is  that  people  should  do 
absolutely  nothing  but  copy  one  another.  No 
one  would  assert  that  people  ought  not  to 
put  into  their  mode  of  life,  and  into  the  con- 
duct of  their  concerns,  any  impress  whatever 
of  their  own  judgment,  or  of  their  own  indi- 
vidual character.  On  the  other  hand,  it  would 
be  absurd  to  pretend  that  people  ought  to 
live  as  if  nothing  whatever  had  been  known 
in  the  world  before  they  came  into  it ; as  if 
experience  had  as  yet  done  nothing  towards 
showing  that  one  mode  of  existence,  or  of 
conduct,  is  preferable  to  another.  Nobody 
denies  that  people  should  be  so  taught  and 
trained  in  youth,  as  to  know  and  benefit  by 
the  ascertained  results  of  human  experience. 
But  it  is  the  privilege  and  proper  condition 
of  a human  being,  arrived  at  the  maturity  of 
his  faculties,  to  use  and  interpret  experience 
in  his  own  way.  It  is  for  him  to  find  out 
what  oart  of  recorded  experience  is  proper- 
ij  applicable  to  his  own  circumstances  and 
character.  The  traditions  and  customs  of  oth- 
er people  are,  to  a certain  extent,  evidence  of 
what  their  experience  has  taught  them ; pre- 
sumptive evidence,  and  as  such,  have  a claim 
to  his  deference : but,  in  the  first  place,  their 
experience  may  be  too  narrow  ; or  they  may 


ox  LIBERTY. 


105 


not  have  interpreted  it  rightly.  Secondly,  theh 
interpretation  of  experience  may  be  correct 
but  unsuitable  to  him.  Customs  are  made  for 
customary  circumstances,  and  customary  char- 
acters: and  his  circumstances  or  his  character 
may  be  uncustomary.  Thirdly,  though  the 
customs  be  both  good  as  customs,  and  suitable 
to  him,  yet  to  conform  to  custom,  merely  as 
custom,  does  not  educate  or  develop  in  him 
any  of  the  qualities  which  are  the  distinctive 
endowment  of  a human  being.  The  human 
faculties  of  perception,  judgment,  discrimina- 
tive feeling,  mental  activity,  and  even  moral 
preference,  are  exercised  only  in  making  a 
choice.  He  who  does  anything  because  it  is 
the  custom,  makes  no  choice.  He  gains  no 
practice  either  in  discerning  or  in  desiring  what 
is  best.  The  mental  and  moral,  like  the  mus- 
cular powers,  are  improved  only  by  being  used. 
The  faculties  are  called  into  no  exercise  by  do- 
ing a thing  merely  because  others  do  it,  no  more 
than  by  believing  a thing  only  because  others 
believe  it.  If  the  grounds  of  an  opinion  are 
not  conclusive  to  the  person’s  own  reason,  his 
reason  cannot  be  strengthened,  but  is  likely  to 
be  weakened  by  his  adopting  it : and  if  the  in- 
ducements to  an  act  are  not  such  as  are  con- 
sentaneous to  his  own  feelings  and  character 
(where  affection,  or  the  rights  of  others,  are  not 
concerned),  it  is  so  much  done  towards  render- 
ing his  feelings  and  character  inert  and  torpid, 
instead  of  active  and  energetic. 


106 


ON  LIBERTY. 


He  who  lets  the  world,  or  his  own  portion 
of  it,  choose  his  plan  of  life  for  him,  has  no  need 
of  any  other  faculty  than  the  ape-like  one  of 
imitation.  He  who  chooses  his  plan  for  him- 
self, employs  all  his  faculties.  He  must  use 
observation  to  see,  reasoning  and  judgment  to 
foresee,  activity  to  gather  materials  for  decis- 
ion, discrimination  to  decide,  and  when  he  has 
decided,  firmness  and  self-control  to  hold  to 
his  deliberate  decision.  And  these  qualities 
he  requires  and  exercises  exactly  in  proportion 
as  the  part  of  his  conduct  which  he  determines 
according  to  his  own  judgment  and  feelings  is 
a large  one.  It  is  possible  that  he  might  be 
guided  in  some  good  path,  and  kept  out  of 
harm’s  way,  without  any  of  these  things.  But 
what  will  be  his  comparative  worth  as  a human 
being?  It  really  is  of  importance,  not  only 
what  men  do,  but  also  what  manner  of  men 
they  are  that  do  it.  Among  the  works  of  man, 
which  human  life  is  rightly  employed  in  per- 
fecting and  beautifying,  the  first  in  importance 
surely  is  man  himself.  Supposing  it  were  pos- 
sible to  get  houses  built,  corn  grown,  battles 
fought,  causes  tried,  and  even  churches  erected 
and  prayers  said,  by  machinery  — by  automa- 
tons in  human  form  — it  would  be  a consider- 
able loss  to  exchange  for  these  automatons 
even  the  men  and  women  who  at  present  in- 
habit the  more  civilized  parts  of  the  world,  and 
who  assuredly  are  but  starved  specimens  of 
what  nature  can  and  will  produce.  Human 


ON  LIBERTY. 


107 


nature  is  not  a machine  to  be  built  after  a 
model,  and  set  to  do  exactly  the  work  pre- 
scribed for  it,  but  a tree,  which  requires  to 
grow  and  develop  itself  on  all  sides,  accord- 
ing to  the  tendency  of  the  inward  forces  which 
make  it  a living  thing. 

It  will  probably  be  conceded  that  it  is  de 
sirable  people  should  exercise  their  under- 
standings, and  that  an  intelligent  following 
of  custom,  or  even  occasionally  an  intelligent 
deviation  from  custom,  is  better  than  a blind 
and  simply  mechanical  adhesion  to  it.  To  a 
certain  extent  it  is  admitted,  that  our  under 
standing  should  be  our  own  : but  there  is  not 
the  same  willingness  to  admit  that  our  desires 
and  impulses  should  be  our  own  likewise  ; or 
that  to  possess  impulses  of  our  own,  and  of 
any  strength,  is  anything  but  a peril  and  a 
snare.  Yet  desires  and  impulses  are  as  much 
a part  of  a perfect  human  being,  as  beliefs  and 
restraints  : and  strong  impulses  are  only  peril- 
ous when  not  properly  balanced  ; when  one 
set  of  aims  and  inclinations  is  developed  into 
strength,  while  others,  which  ought  to  coexist 
with  them,  remain  weak  and  inactive.  It  is 
not  because  men’s  desires  are  strong  that  they 
act  ill ; it  is  because  their  consciences  are 
vveak.  There  is  no  natural  connection  be- 
tween strong  impulses  and  a weak  conscience. 
The  natural  connection  is  the  other  way.  To 
say  that  one  person’s  desires  and  feelings  are 
stronger  and  more  various  than  those  of  an- 


108 


ON  LIBERTY. 


other,  is  merely  to  say  that  he  has  more  of  the 
raw  material  of  human  nature,  and  is  there- 
fore capable,  perhaps  of  more  evil,  but  cer- 
lainly  of  more  good.  Strong  impulses  are  but 
another  name  for  energy.  Energy  may  be 
turned  to  bad  uses  ; but  more  good  may  al- 
ways be  made  of  an  energetic  nature,  ihan  of 
an  indolent  and  impassive  one.  Those  who 
have  most  natural  feeling,  are  always  those 
whose  cultivated  feelings  may  be  made  the 
strongest.  The  same  strong  susceptibilities 
which  make  the  personal  impulses  vivid  and 
powerful,  are  also  the  source  from  whence  are 
generated  the  most  passionate  love  of  virtue, 
and  the  sternest  self-control.  It  is  through  the 
cultivation  of  these,  that  society  both  does  its 
duty  and  protects  its  interests  : not  by  reject- 
ing the  stuff  of  which  heroes  are  made,  because 
it  knows  not  how  to  make  them.  A person 
whose  desires  and  impulses  are  his  own  — are 
the  expression  of  his  own  nature,  as  it  has  been 
developed  and  modified  by  his  own  culture  — 
is  said  to  have  a character.  One  whose  de- 
sires and  impulses  are  not  his  own,  has  no 
character,  no  more  than  a steam-engine  has  a 
character.  If,  in  addition  to  being  his  own, 
his  impulses  are  strong,  and  are  under  the 
government  of  a strong  will,  he  has  an  ener- 
getic character.  Whoever  thinks  that  individ- 
uality of  desires  and  impulses  should  not  be 
encouraged  to  unfold  itself,  must  maintain 
that  society  has  no  need  of  strong  natures 


ON  LIBERTY. 


109 


— is  not  the  better  for  containing  many  per 
sons  who  have  much  character  — and  that  a 
high  general  average  of  energy  is  not  desira- 
ble. 

In  some  early  states  of  society,  these  forces 
might  be,  and  were,  too  much  ahead  of  the 
power  which  society  then  possessed  of  disci- 
plining and  controlling  them.  There  has  been 
a time  when  the  element  of  spontaneity  and 
individuality  was  in  excess,  and  the  social 
principle  had  a hard  struggle  with  it.  The 
difficulty  then  was,  to  induce  men  of  strong 
bodies  or  minds  to  pay  obedience  to  any 
rules  which  required  them  to  control  their  im- 
pulses. To  overcome  this  difficulty,  law  and 
discipline,  like  the  Popes  struggling  against  the 
Emperors,  asserted  a power  over  the  whole 
man,  claiming  to  control  all  his  life  in  order  to 
control  his  character  — which  society  had  not 
found  any  other  sufficient  means  of  binding. 
But  society  has  now  fairly  got  the  better  of 
individuality;  and  the  danger  which  threatens 
human  nature  is  not  the  excess,  but  the  defi- 
ciency, of  personal  impulses  and  preferences. 
Things  are  vastly  changed,  since  the  passions 
of  those  who  were  strong  by  station  or  by  per- 
sonal endowment  were  in  a state  of  habitual 
rebellion  against  laws  and  ordinances,  and  re- 
quired to  be  rigorously  chained  up  to  enable 
the  persons  within  their  reach  to  enjoy  any 
particle  of  security.  In  oui  times,  from  the 
highest  class  of  society  down  to  the  lowest 


110 


ON  LIBERTY. 


every  one  lives  as  under  the  eye  of  a hostile 
and  dreaded  censorship.  Not  only  in  what 
concerns  others,  but  in  what  concerns  only 
themselves,  the  individual,  or  the  family,  do 
not  ask  themselves  — what  do  I prefer  ? or, 
v/hat  would  suit  my  character  and  disposition  ? 
or,  what  would  allow  the  best  and  highest  in 
me  to  have  fair  play,  and  enable  it  to  grow  and 
thrive  ? They  ask  themselves,  what  is  suitable 
to  my  position  ? what  is  usually  done  by  per- 
sons of  my  station  and  ‘ pecuniary  circum- 
stances ? or  (worse  still)  what  is  usually  done 
by  persons  of  a station  and  circumstances 
superior  to  mine  ? I do  not  mean  that  they 
choose  what  is  customary,  in  preference  to 
what  suits  their  own  inclination.  It  does  not 
occur  to  them  to  have  any  inclination,  except 
for  what  is  customary.  Thus  the  mind  itself  is 
bowed  to  the  yoke  : even  in  what  people  do  for 
pleasure,  conformity  is  the  first  thing  thought 
of ; they  like  in  crowds ; they  exercise  choice 
only  among  things  commonly  done  : peculiarity 
of  taste,  eccentricity  of  conduct,  are  shunned 
equally  with  crimes  : until  by  dint  of  not  fol- 
lowing their  own  nature,  they  have  no  nature 
to  follow  : their  human  capacities  are  withered 
and  starved  : they  become  incapable  of  any 
strong  wishes  or  native  pleasures,  and  are  gen 
erally  without  either  opinions  or  feelings  of 
home  growth,  or  properly  their  own.  Now  is 
this,  or  is  it  not,  the  desirable  condition  of  hu- 
man nature  ? 


, ON  LIBERTY. 


11] 


It  is  so,  on  the  Calvinistic  theory.  Accord 
ing  to  that,  the  one  great  offence  of  man  is 
Self-will.  All  the  good  of  which  humanity  is 
capal3le,  is  comprised  in  Obedience.  You  have 
no  choice  ; thus  you  must  do,  and  no  other- 
wise : “ whatever  is  not  a duty  is  a sin.”  Hu- 
man nature  being  radically  corrupt,  there  is  no 
redemption  for  any  one  until  human  nature  is 
killed  within  him.  To  one  holding  this  theory 
of  life,  crushing  out  any  of  the  human  faculties, 
capacities,  and  susceptibilities,  is  no  evil : man 
needs  no  capacity,  but  that  of  sun^endering 
himself  to  the  will  of  God  : and  if  he  uses  any 
of  his  faculties  for  any  other  purpose  but  to  do 
that  supposed  will  more  effectually,  he  is  better 
without  them.  That  is  the  theory  of  Calvin- 
ism ; and  it  is  held,  in  a mitigated  form,  by 
many  who  do  not  consider  themselves  Calvin- 
ists ; the  mitigation  consisting  in  giving  a less 
ascetic  interpretation  to  the  alleged  will  of 
God  ; asserting  it  to  be  his  will  that  mankind 
should  gratify  some  of  their  inclinations ; of 
course  not  in  the  manner  they  themselves  prefer, 
but  in  the  way  of  obedience,  that  is,  in  a way 
prescribed  to  them  by  authority  ; and,  therefore, 
by  the  necessary  conditions  of  the  case,  the 
same  for  all. 

In  some  such  insidious  form  there  is  at  pres- 
sent  a strong  tendency  to  this  narrow  theory 
of  life,  and  to  the  pinched  and  hidebound  type 
of  human  character  which  it  patronizes.  Many 
persons,  no  doubt,  sincerely  think  that  human 


112 


ON  LIBERTY.  ^ 


beings  thus  cramped  and  dwarfed,  are  as  then 
Maker  designed  them  to  be  ; just  as  many  have 
thought  that  trees  are  a much  finer  thing  when 
clipped  into  pollards,  or  cut  out  into  figures  of 
animals,  than  as  nature  made  them.  But  if  it 
be  any  part  of  religion  to  believe  that  man  was 
made  by  a good  Being,  it  is  more  consistent 
with  that  faith  to  believe,  that  this  Being  gave 
all  human  faculties  that  they  might  be  culti- 
vated and  unfolded,  not  rooted  out  and  con- 
sumed, and  that  he  takes  delight  in  every 
nearer  approach  made  by  his  creatures  to  the 
ideal  conception  embodied  in  them,  every  in- 
crease in  any  of  their  capabilities  of  compre- 
hension, of  action,  or  of  enjoyment.  There  is 
a different  type  of  human  excellence  from  the 
Calvinistic  ; a conception  of  humanity  as  hav- 
ing its  nature  bestowed  on  it  for  other  purposes 
than  merely  to  be  abnegated.  Pagan  self- 
assertion  ’’  is  one  of  the  elements  of  human 
worth,  as  well  as  ‘‘  Christian  self-denial.’’ 
There  is  a Greek  ideal  of  self-development, 
which  the  Platonic  and  Christian  ideal  of  self- 
government  blends  with,  but  does  not  super- 
sede. It  may  be  better  to  be  a John  Knox 
than  an  Alcibiades,  but  it  is  better  to  be  a 
Pericles  than  either ; nor  would  a Pericles,  if 
we  had  one  in  these  days,  be  without  anything 
good  which  belonged  to  John  Knox. 

It  is  not  by  wearing  down  into  uniformit) 
all  that  is  individual  in  themselves,  but  by  cul 


Sterling’s  Essays. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


113 


(ivating  it  and  calling  it  forth,  within  the  limit? 
imposed  by  the  rights  and  interests  of  others, 
that  human  beings  become  a noble  and  beauti- 
ful object  of  contemplation  ; and  as  the  works 
partake  the  character  of  those  who  do  them, 
by  the  same  process  human  life  also  becomes 
rich,  diversified,  and  animating,  furnishing  more 
abundant  aliment  to  high  thoughts  and  elevat- 
ing feelings,  and  strengthening  the  tie  which 
binds  every  individual  to  the  race,  by  making 
the  race  infinitely  better  worth  belonging  to. 
In  proportion  to  the  development  of  his  indi- 
viduality, each  person  becomes  more  valuable 
to  himself,  and  is  therefore  capable  of  being 
more  valuable  to  others.  There  is  a greater 
fulness  of  life  about  his  own  existence,  and 
when  there  is  more  life  in  the  units  there  is 
more  in  the  mass  which  is  composed  of  them. 
4s  much  compression  as  is  necessary  to  pre- 
vent the  stronger  specimens  of  human  nature 
from  encroaching  on  the  rights  of  others,  can- 
not be  dispensed  with ; but  for  this  there  is 
ample  compensation  even  in  the  point  of  view 
of  human  development.  The  means  of  devel 
opment  which  the  individual  loses  by  being 
prevented  from  gratifying  his  inclinations  tc 
the  injury  of  others,  are  chiefly  obtained  at  the 
expense  of  the  development  of  other  people. 
And  even  to  himself  there  is  a full  equivaleni 
in  the  better  development  of  the  social  part  of 
his  nature,  rendered  possible  by  the  restraini 
put  upon  the  selfish  part.  To  be  held  to  rigid 


114 


ON  LIBERTY. 


rules  of  justice  for  the  sake  of  others,  devel- 
ops the  feelings  and  capacities  which  have 
the  good  of  others  for  their  object.  But  to  be 
restrained  in  things  not  affecting  their  good,  by 
their  mere  displeasure,  developes  nothing  valu- 
able, except  such  force  of  character  as  may 
unfold  itself  in  resisting  the  restraint.  If  ac- 
quiesced in,  it  dulls  and  blunts  the  whole 
nature.  To  give  any  fair  play  to  the  nature 
of  each,  it  is  essential  that  different  persons 
should  be  allowed  to  lead  different  lives.  In 
proportion  as  this  latitude  has  been  exercised 
in  any  age,  has  that  age  been  noteworthy  to 
posterity.  Even  despotism  does  not  produce 
its  worst  effects,  so  long  as  Individuality  exists 
under  it ; and  whatever  crushes  individuality 
is  despotism,  by  whatever  name  it  may  be 
called,  and  whether  it  professes  to  be  enforc- 
ing the  will  of  God  or  the  injunctions  of 
men. 

Having  said  that  Individuality  is  the  same 
thing  with  development,  and  that  it  is  only  the 
cultivation  of  individuality  which  produces,  or 
can  produce,  well-developed  human  beings,  I 
might  here  close  the  argument : for  what  more 
or  better  can  be  said  of  any  condition  of  hu- 
man affairs,  than  that  it  brings  human  beings 
themselves  nearer  to  the  best  thing  they  can 
be?  or  what  worse  can  be  said  of  any  ob- 
struction to  good,  than  that  it  prevents  this  ? 
Doubtless,  however,  these  considerations  will 
not  suffice  to  convince  those  who  most  need 


ON  LIBERTY. 


115 


convincing;  and  it  is  necessary  further  to 
show,  that  these  developed  human  beings  are 
of  some  use  to  the  undeveloped  — to  point  out 
to  those  who  do  not  desire  liberty,  and  would 
not  avail  themselves  of  it,  that  they  may  be  in 
some  intelligible  manner  rewarded  for  allow- 
ing other  people  to  make  use  of  it  without 
hindrance. 

In  the  first  place,  then,  I would  suggest  that 
they  might  possibly  learn  something  from 
them.  It  will  not  be  denied  by  anybody,  that 
originality  is  a valuable  element  in  human 
affairs.  There  is  always  need  of  persons  not 
only  to  discover  new  truths,  and  point  out 
when  what  were  once  truths  are  true  no  longer, 
but  also  to  commence  new  practices,  and  set 
the  example  of  more  enlightened  conduct,  and 
better  taste  and  sense  in  human  life.  This 
cannot  well  be  gainsaid  by  anybody  who  does 
not  believe  that  the  world  has  already  attained 
perfection  in  all  its  ways  and  practices.  It  is 
true  that  this  benefit  is  not  capable  of  being 
rendered  by  everybody  alike : there  are  but  few 
persons,  in  comparison  with  the  whole  of  man- 
kind, whose  experiments,  if  adopted  by  others, 
would  be  likely  to  be  any  improvement  on 
established  practice.  But  these  few  are  ths 
salt  of  the  earth;  without  them,  human  life 
would  become  a stagnant  pool.  Not  only  is 
it  they  who  introduce  good  things  which  did 
not  before  exist ; it  is  they  who  keep  the  life 
in  those  which  already  existed.  If  tliere  were 


116 


ON  LIBERTY. 


nothing  new  to  be  done,  would  human  intel- 
lect cease  to  be  necessary?  Would  it  be  a 
reason  why  those  who  do  the  old  things  should 
forget  why  they  are  done,  and  do  them  like 
cattle,  not  like  human  beings  ? There  is  onij 
too  great  a tendency  in  the  best  beliefs  and 
practices  to  degenerate  into  the  mechanical; 
and  unless  there  were  a succession  of  persons 
whose  ever-recurring  originality  prevents  the 
grounds  of  those  beliefs  and  practices  from  be- 
coming merely  traditional,  such  dead  matter 
would  not  resist  the  smallest  shock  from  any- 
thing really  alive,  and  there  would  be  no  rea- 
son why  civilization  should  not  die  out,  as  in 
the  Byzantine  Empire.  Persons  of  genius,  it 
's  true,  are,  and  are  always  likely  to  be,  a small 
minority;  but  in  order  to  have  them,  it  is 
necessary  to  preserve  the  soil  in  which  they 
grow.  Genius  can  only  breathe  freely  in  an 
atmosphere  of  freedom.  Persons  of  genius  are, 
ex  vi  termini^  more  individual  than  any  other 
people  — less  capable,  consequently,  of  fitting 
themselves,  without  hurtful  compression,  into 
any  of  the  small  number  of  moulds  which 
society  provides  in  order  to  save  its  members 
the  trouble  of  forming  their  own  character.  If 
from  timidity  they  consent  to  be  forced  into 
one  of  these  moulds,  and  to  let  all  that  part 
of  themselves  which  cannot  expand  under  the 
pressure  remain  unexpanded,  society  will  be 
little  the  better  for  their  genius.  If  they  are 
of  a strong  character,  and  break  their  fetters, 


ON  LIBERl’Y. 


117 


they  become  a mark  for  the  society  which  has 
not  sQCceeded  in  reducing  them  to  common- 
place, to  point  at  with  solemn  warning  as 
‘‘  wild,’’  “ erratic,”  and  the  like  ; 'much  as  if 
one  should  complain  of  the  Niagara  river  for 
not  flowing  smoothly  between  its  banks  like  a 
Dutch  canal. 

I insist  thus  emphatically  on  the  importance 
of  genius,  and  the  necessity  of  allowing  it  to 
unfold  itself  freely  both  in  thought  and  in 
practice,  being  well  aware  that  no  one  will 
deny  the  position  in  theory,  but  knowing  also 
that  almost  every  one,  in  reality,  is  totally  in- 
different to  it.  People  think  genius  a fine 
thing  if  it  enables  a man  to  write  an  exciting 
poem,  or  paint  a picture.  But  in  its  true 
feense,  that  of  originality  in  thought  and  ac- 
tion, though  no  one  says  that  it  is  not  a thing 
to  be  admired,  nearly  all,  at  heart,  think  that 
they  can  do  very  well  without  it.  Unhappily 
this  is  too  natural  to  be  wondered  at.  Origi- 
nality is  the  one  thing  which  unoriginal  minds 
cannot  feel  the  use  of.  They  cannot  see  what 
it  is  to  do  for  them  : how  should  they  ? If 
they  could  see  what  it  would  do  for  them,  it 
would  not  be  originality.  The  first  service 
which  originality  has  to  render  them,  is  that 
of  opening  their  eyes : which  being  once  fully 
done,  they  would  have  a chance  of  being  them- 
selves original.  Meanwhile,  recollecting  that 
nothing  was  ever  yet  done  which  some  one 
was  not  the  first  to  do,  and  that  all  good  things 


118 


ON  LIBERTY. 


which  exist  are  the  fruits  of  originality,  lei 
them  be  modest  enough  to  believe  that  there 
is  something  still  left  for  it  to  accomplish,  and 
assure  themselves  that  they  are  more  in  need 
of  originality,  the  less  they  are  conscious  of 
the  want. 

In  sober  truth,  whatever  homage  may  be 
professed,  or  even  paid,  to  real  or  supposed 
mental  superiority,  the  general  tendency  of 
things  throughout  the  world  is  to  render  me- 
diocrity the  ascendant  power  among  mankind. 
In  ancient  history,  in  the  Middle  Ages,  and  in 
a diminishing  degree  through  the  long  transi- 
tion from  feudality  to  the  present  time,  the  in- 
dividual was  a power  in  himself;  and  if  he 
had  either  great  talents  or  a high  social  posi- 
tion, he  was  a considerable  power.  At  present 
individuals  are  lost  in  the  crowd.  In  politics 
it  is  almost  a triviality  to  say  that  public  opin- 
ion now  rules  the  world.  The  only  power  de- 
serving the  name  is  that  of  masses,  and  of  gov- 
ernments while  they  make  themselves  the  organ 
of  the  tendencies  and  instincts  of  masses.  This 
is  as  true  in  the  moral  and  social  relations  of 
private  life  as  in  public  transactions.  Those 
whose  opinions  go  by  the  name  of  public  opin- 
ion, are  not  always  the  same  sort  of  public : in 
America,  they  are  the  whole  white  population 
in  England,  chiefly  the  middle  class.  But  they 
are  always  a mass,  that  is  to  say,  collective  me- 
diocrity. And  what  is  a still  greater  novelty, 
the  mass  do  not  now  take  their  opinions  from 


ON  LIBERTY. 


119 


dignitaries  in  Church  or  State,  from  ostensible 
leaders,  or  from  books.  Their  thinking  is  done 
for  them  by  men  much  like  themselves,  address- 
ing  them  or  speaking  in  their  name,  on  the  spur 
of  the  moment,  through  the  newspapers.  I am 
not  complaining  of  all  this.  I do  not  assert 
that  anything  better  is  compatible,  as  a gen- 
eral rule,  with  the  present  low  state  of  the 
human  mind.  But  that  does  not  hinder  the 
government  of  mediocrity  from  being  medio- 
cre government.  No  government  by  a democ- 
racy or  a numerous  aristocracy,  either  in  its 
political  acts  or  in  the  opinions,  qualities,  and 
tone  of  mind  which  it  fosters,  ever  did  or  could 
rise  above  mediocrity,  except  in  so  far  as  the 
sovereign  Many  have  let  themselves  be  guided 
(which  in  their  best  times  they  always  have 
done)  by  the  counsels  and  influence  of  a more 
highly  gifted  and  instructed  One- or  Few.  The 
initiation  of  all  wise  or  noble  things,  comes  and 
must  come  from  individuals  ; generally  at  first 
from  some  one  individual.  The  honor  and 
glory  of  the  average  man  is  that  he  is  capable 
of  following  that  initiative  ; that  he  can  re- 
spond internally  to  wise  and  noble  things,  and 
be  led  to  them  with  his  eyes  open.  I am  not 
countenancing  the  sort  of  hero-worship  ’’ 
which  applauds  the  strong  man  of  genius  for 
forcibly  seizing  on  the  government  of  the 
world  and  making  it  do  his  bidding  in  spite 
of  itself.  All  he  can  claim  is,  freedom  to  point 
out  the  way.  The  power  of  compelling  others 


120 


ON  LIBERTY. 


into  it,  is  not  only  inconsistent  with  the  free- 
dom and  development  of  all  the  rest,  but  cor- 
rupting to  the  strong  man  himself.  It  does 
seem,  however,  that  when  the  opinions  of 
masses  of  merely  average  men  are  every- 
where become  or  becoming  the  dominant 
power,  the  counterpoise  and  corrective  to 
that  tendency  would  be,  the  more  and  more 
pronounced  individuality  of  those  who  stand 
on  the  higher  eminences  of  thought.  It  is  in 
./hese  circumstances  most  especially,  that  ex- 
ceptional individuals,  instead  of  being  deter- 
ed,  should  be  encouraged  in  acting  different- 
ly from  the  mass.  In  other  times  there  was 
no  advantage  in  their  doing  so,  unless  they 
acted  not  only  differently,  but  better.  In  this 
age  the  mere  example  of  non-conformity,  the 
mere  refusal  to  bend  the  knee  to  custom,  is  it- 
self a service.  Precisely  because  the  tyranny  of 
opinion  is  such  as  to  make  eccentricity  a re- 
proach, it  is  desirable,  in  order  to  break  through 
that  tyranny,  that  people  should  be  eccentric. 
Eccentricity  has  always  abounded  when  and 
where  strength  of  character  has  abounded ; 
and  the  amount  of  eccentricity  in  a society 
has  generally  been  proportional  to  the  amount 
.^f  genius,  mental  vigor,  and  moral  courage 
which  it  contained.  That  so  few  now  dare 
to  be  eccentric,  marks  the  chief  danger  of  the 
time. 

I have  said  that  it  is  important  to  give  the 
freest  scope  possible  to  uncustomary  things,  in 


ON  LIBERTY. 


121 


order  that  it  may  in  time  appear  which  of  these 
are  fit  to  be  converted  into  customs.  But  inde- 
pendence of  action,  and  disregard  of  custom 
are  not  solely  deserving  of  encouragement  for 
the  chance  they  afford  that  better  modes  of 
action,,  and  customs  more  worthy  of  general 
adoption,  may  be  struck  out ; nor  is  it  only 
persons  of  decided  mental  superiority  who  have 
a just  claim  to  carry  on  their  lives  in  their  own 
way.  There  is  no  reason  that  all  human  exist- 
ences should  be  constructed  on  some  one,  or 
some  small  number  of  patterns.  If  a person 
possesses  any  tolerable  amount  of  common 
sense  and  experience,  his  own  mode  of  laying 
out  his  existence  is  the  best,  not  because  it  is 
the  best  in  itself,  but  because  it  is  his  own 
mode.  Human  beings  are  not  like  sheep  ; and 
even  sheep  are  not  undistinguishably  alike.  A 
man  cannot  get  a coat  or  a pair  of  boots  to  fit 
him,  unless  they  are  either  made  to  his  meas- 
ure, or  he  has  a whole  warehouseful  to  choose 
from  : and  is  it  easier  to  fit  him  with  a life  than 
with  a coat,  or  are  human  beings  more  like 
one  another  in  their  whole  physical  and  spirit- 
ual conformation  than  in  the  shape  of  their 
feet  ? If  it  were  only  that  people  have  diver- 
sities of  taste,  that  is  reason  enough  for  not  at- 
tempting to  shape  them  all  after  one  model. 
But  different  persons  also  require  different  con- 
ditions for  their  spiritual  development ; and  can 
no  more  exist  healthily  in  the  same  moral,  than 
all  the  variety  of  plants  can  in  the  same  physi 
6 


122 


OK  LIBERTY. 


cal,  atmosphere  and  climate.  The  same  things 
which  are  helps  to  one  person  towards  the  cul- 
tivation of  his  higher  nature,  are  hindrances 
to  another.  The  same  mode  of  life  is  a healthy 
excitement  to  one,  keeping  all  his  faculties  of 
action  and  enjoyment  in  their  best  order,  while 
to  another  it  is  a distracting  burden,  which  sus- 
pends or  crushes  all  internal  life.  Such  are  the 
differences  among  human  beings  in  their  sources 
of  pleasure,  their  susceptibilities  of  pain,  and 
the  operation  on  them  of  different  physical  and 
moral  agencies,  that  unless  there  is  a corre- 
sponding diversity  in  their  modes  of  life,  they 
neither  obtain  their  fair  share  of  happiness, 
nor  grow  up  to  the  mental,  moral,  and  aesthetic 
stature  of  which  their  nature  is  capable.  Why. 
then  should  tolerance,  as  far  as  the  public  sen- 
timent is  concerned,  extend  only  to  tastes  and 
modes  of  life  which  extort  acquiescence  by  the 
multitude  of  their  adherents  ? Nowhere  (ex- 
cept in  some  monastic  institutions)  is  diversity 
of  taste  entirely  unrecognized ; a person  may 
without  blame,  either  like  or  dislike  rowing,  or 
smoking,  or  music,  or  athletic  exercises,  or 
chess,  or  cards,  or  study,  because  both  those 
who  like  each  of  these  things,  and  those  who 
dislike  them,  are  too  numerous  to  be  put  down. 
But  the  man,  and  still  more  the  woman,  who 
can  be  accused  either  of  doing  “ what  nobody 
does,”  or  of  not  doing  “ what  everybody  does,” 
is  the  subject  of  as  much  depreciatory  remark 
as  if  he  or  she  had  committed  some  grave 


ON  LIBERTY. 


123 


moral  delinquency.  Persons  require  to  possess 
a title,  or  some  other  badge  of  rank,  or  the 
consideration  of  people  of  rank,  to  be  able  to 
indulge  somewhat  in  the  luxury  of  doing  as 
they  like  without  detriment  to  their  estimation. 
To  indulge  somewhat,  I repeat : for  whoever 
allow  themselves  much  of  that  indulgence,  in- 
cur the  risk  of  something  worse  than  disparag- 
ing speeches  — they  are  in  peril  of  a commis- 
sion de  lunatico^  and  of  having  their  property 
taken  from  them  and  given  to  their  rela- 
tions.^ 

* There  is  something  both  contemptible  and  frightful  in  the  sort 
of  evidence  on  which,  of  late  years,  any  person  can  be  judicially 
declared  unfit  for  the  management  of  his  affairs;  and  after  his 
death,  his  disposal  of  his  property  can  be  set  aside,  if  there  is 
enough  of  it  to  pay  the  expenses  of  litigation  — which  are  charged 
on  the  property  itself.  All  the  minute  details  of  his  daily  life  are 
pried  into,  and  whatever  is  found  which,  seen  through  the  medium 
of  the  perceiving  and  describing  faculties  of  the  lowest  of  the  low, 
bears  an  appearance  unlike  absolute  commonplace,  is  laid  before 
the  jury  as  evidence  of  insanit}^  and  often  with  success;  the  ju- 
rors being  little,  if  at  all,  less  vulgar  and  ignorant  than  the  wit- 
nesses; while  the  judges,  with  that  extraordinary  want  of  knowl- 
edge of  human  nature  and  life  which  continually  astonishes  us  in 
English  lawyers,  often  help  to  mislead  them.  These  trials  speak 
volumes  as  to  the  state  of  feeling  and  opinion  among  the  vulgar 
with  regard  to  human  liberty.  So  far  from  setting  any  value  on 
individuality  — so  far  from  respecting  the  rights  of  each  individual 
to  act,  in  things  indifferent,  as  seems  good  to  his  own  judgment 
and  inclinations,  judges  and  juries  cannot  even  conceive  that  a 
person  in  a state  of  sanity  can  desire  such  freedom.  In  former 
da}^s,  when  it  was  proposed  to  burn  atheists,  charitable  people 
used  to  suggest  putting  them  in  a madhouse  instead:  it  would 
oe  nothing  surprising  now-a-daj^s  were  we  to  see  this  done,  and 
vhe  doers  applauding  themselves,  because,  instead  of  persecuting 
for  religion,  they  had  adopted  so  humane  and  Christian  a mode  of 
treating  these  unfortunates,  not  without  a silent  satisfaction  at  then 
having  thereby  obtained  their  deserts. 


124 


ON  LIBERTY. 


There  is  one  characteristic  of  the  present  di- 
rection of  public  opinion,  peculiarly  calculated 
to  make  it  intolerant  of  any  marked  demonstra- 
tion of  individuality.  The  general  average  of 
mankind  are  not  only  moderate  in  intellect,  but 
also  moderate  in  inclinations  : they  have  no 
tastes  or  wishes  strong  enough  to  incline  them 
to  do  anything  unusual,  and  they  consequently 
do  not  understand  those  who  have,  and  class 
all  such  with  the  wild  and  intemperate  whom 
they  are  accustomed  to  look  down  upon. 
Now,  in  addition  to  this  fact  which  is  general, 
we  have  only  to  suppose  that  a strong  move- 
ment has  set  in  towards  the  improvement  of 
morals,  and  it  is  evident  what  we  have  to  ex- 
pect. In  these  days  such  a movement  has  set 
in  ; much  has  actually  been  effected  in  the  way 
of  increased  regularity  of  conduct,  and  discour 
agement  of  excesses;  and  there  is  a philan- 
thropic spirit  abroad,  for  the  exercise  of  whi  jh 
there  is  no  more  inviting  field  than  the  moral 
and  prudential  improvement  of  our  fo-llow- 
creatures.  These  tendencies  of  the  times 
cause  the  public  to  be  more  disposed  than 
at  most  former  periods  to  prescribe  general 
rules  of  conduct,  and  endeavor  to  make  every 
one  conform  to  the  approved  standard.  And 
that  standard,  express  or  tacit,  is  to  desire 
nothing  strongly.  Its  ideal  of  character  is  to 
be  without  any  marked  character ; to  maim  by 
compression,  like  a Chinese  lady’s  foot,  every 
part  of  human  nature  which  stands  out  promi- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


125 


nently,  and  tends  to  make  the  person  mark- 
edly dissimilar  in  outline  to  commonplace 
humanity. 

As  is  usually  the  case  with  ideals  which  ex- 
clude one  half  of  what  is  desirable,  the  present 
standard  of  approbation  produces  only  an  in- 
ferior imitation  of  the  other  half.  Instead  of 
great  energies  guided  by  vigorous  reason,  and 
strong  feelings  strongly  controlled  by  a con- 
scientious will,  its  result  is  weak  feelings  and 
weak  energies,  which  therefore  can  be  kept 
in  outward  conformity  to  rule  without  any 
strength  either  of  will  or  of  reason.  Already 
energetic  characters  on  any  large  scale  are 
becoming  merely  traditional.  There  is  now 
scarcely  any  outlet  for  energy  in  this  country 
except  business.  The  energy  expended  in  that 
may  still  be  regarded  as  considerable.  What 
little  is  left  from  that  employment,  is  expended 
on  some  hobby ; which  may  be  a useful,  even 
a philanthropic  hobby,  but  is  always  some  one 
thing,  and  generally  a thing  of  small  dimen- 
sions. The  greatness  of  England  is  now  all 
collective  : individually  small,  we  only  appeal 
capable  of  anything  great  by  our  habit  of  com- 
bining ; and  with  this  our  moral  and  religious 
philanthropists  are  perfectly  contented.  But  it 
was  men  of  another  stamp  than  this  that  made 
England  what  it  has  been  ; and  men  of  an- 
other stamp  will  be  needed  to  prevent  its  de- 
cline. 

The  despotism  of  custom  is  everywhere  the 


126 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


standing  hindrance  to  human  advancement, 
being  in  unceasing  antagonism  to  that  dispo- 
sition to  aim  at  something  better  than  cus- 
tomary, which  is  called,  according  to  circum- 
stances, the  spirit  of  liberty,  or  that  of  progress 
or  improvement.  The  spirit  of  improvement 
is  not  always  a spirit  of  liberty,  for  it  may  aim 
at  forcing  improvements  on  an  unwilling  peo- 
ple ; and  the  spirit  of  liberty,  in  so  far  as  it  re- 
sists such  attempts,  may  ally  itself  locally  and 
temporarily  with  the  opponents  of  improve- 
ment ; but  the  only  unfailing  and  permanent 
source  of  improvement  is  liberty,  since  by  it 
there  are  as  many  possible  independent  centres 
of  improvement  as  there  are  individuals.  The 
progressive  principle,  however,  in  either  shape, 
whether  as  the  love  of  liberty  or  of  improve- 
ment, is  antagonistic  to  the  sway  of  Custom, 
involving  at  least  emancipation  from  that  yoke ; 
and  the  contest  between  the  two  constitutes  the 
chief  interest  of  the  history  of  mankind.  The 
greater  part  of  the  world  has,  properly  speak- 
ing, no  history,  because  the  despotism  of  Cus- 
tom is  complete.  This  is  the  case  over  the 
whole  East.  Custom  is  there,  in  all  things, 
the  final  appeal ; justice  and  right  mean  con- 
formity to  custom  ; the  argument  of  custom  no 
one,  unless  some  tyrant  intoxicated  with  pow- 
er, thinks  of  resisting.  And  we  see  the  result. 
Those  nations  must  once  have  had  originality; 
they  did  not  start  out  of  the  ground  populous, 
lettered,  and  versed  in  many  of  the  arts  of  life 


ON  LIBERTY. 


127 


they  made  themselves  all  this,  and  were  then 
the  greatest  and  most  powerful  nations  in  the 
world.  What  are  they  now  ? The  subjects  or 
dependents  of  tribes  whose  forefathers  wan- 
dered in  the  forests  when  theirs  had  magnifi 
cent  palaces  and  gorgeous  temples,  but  over 
whom  custom  exercised  only  a divided  rule  with 
liberty  and  progress.  A people,  it  appears,  may 
be  progressive  for  a certain  length  of  time,  and 
then  stop:  when  does  it  stop?  When  it  ceases 
to  possess  individuality.  If  a similar  change 
should  befall  the  nations  of  Europe,  it  will  not 
be  in  exactly  the  same  shape  : the  despotism 
of  custom  with  which  these  nations  are  threat- 
ened is  not  precisely  stationariness.  It  pro- 
scribes singularity,  but  it  does  not  preclude 
change,  provided  all  change  together.  We 
have  discarded  the  fixed  costumes  of  our  fore- 
fathers ; every  one  must  still  dress  like  other 
people,  but  the  fashion  may  change  once  or 
twice  a year.  We  thus  take  care  that  when 
there  is  change,  it  shall  be  for  change’s  sake, 
and  not  from  any  idea  of  beauty  or  conven- 
ience ; for  the  same  idea  of  beauty  or  con- 
venience would  not  strike  all  the  world  at  the 
same  moment,  and  be  simultaneously  thrown 
aside  by  all  at  another  moment.  But  we  are 
progressive  as  well  as  changeable  : we  continu- 
ally make  new  inventions  in  mechanical  things, 
and  keep  them  until  they  are  again  superseded 
by  better ; we  are  eager  for  improvement  in 
politics,  in  education,  even  in  morals,  though 


128 


ON  LIBERTY. 


in  this  last  our  idea  of  improvement  chief!} 
consists  in  persuading  or  forcing  other  people 
to  be  as  good  as  ourselves.  It  is  not  progress 
that  we  object  to  ; on  the  contrary,  we  flattei 
ourselves  that  we  are  the  most  progressive  peo- 
ple who  ever  lived.  It  is  individuality  that  we 
war  against : we  should  think  we  had  done 
v/onders  if  we  had  made  ourselves  all  alike  ; 
forgetting  that  the  unlikeness  of  mne  person  to 
another  is  generally  the  first  thing  which  draws 
the  attention  of  either  to  the  imperfection  of 
his  own  type,  and  the  superiority  of  another, 
or  the  possibility,  by  combining  the  advantages 
of  both,  of  producing  something  better  than 
either.  We  have  a warning  example  in  China 
— a nation  of  much  talent,  and,  in  some  re- 
spects, even  wisdom,  owing  to  the  rare  good 
fortune  of  having  been  provided  at  an  early 
period  with  a particularly  good  set  of  customs, 
the  work,  in  some  measure,  of  men  to  whom 
even  the  most  enlightened  European  must  ac- 
cord, under  certain  limitations,  the  title  of  sages 
and  philosophers.  They  are  remarkable,  too, 
in  the  excellence  of  their  apparatus  for  im- 
pressing, as  far  as  possible,  the  best  wisdom 
they  possess  upon  every  mind  in  the  commu- 
nity, and  securing  that  those  who  have  appro- 
priated most  of  it  shall  occupy  the  posts  of 
honor  and  power.  Surely  the  people  who  did 
this  have  discovered  the  secret  of  human  pro- 
gressiveness, and  must  have  kept  themselves 
steadily  at  the  head  of  the  movement  of  the 


ON  LIBERTY. 


129 


world.  On  the  contrary,  they  have  become 
stationary  — have  remained  so  for  thousands 
of  years  ; and  if  they  are  ever  to  be  farther  im- 
proved, it  must  be  by  foreigners.  They  have 
succeeded  beyond  all  hope  in  what  English 
philanthropists  are  so  industriously  working  at 
— in  making  a people  all  alike,  all  governing 
their  thoughts  and  conduct  by  the  same  max- 
ims and  rules ; and  these  are  the  fruits.  The 
modern  regime  of  public  opinion  is,  in  an  un- 
organized form,  what  the  Chinese  educational 
and  political  systems  are  in  an  organized ; and 
unless  individuality  shall  be  able  successfully 
to  assert  itself  against  this  yoke,  Europe,  not- 
withstanding its  noble  antecedents  and  its  pro- 
fessed Christianity,  will  tend  to  become  another 
China. 

What  is  it  that  has  hitherto  preserved  Eu- 
rope from  this  lot?  What  has  made  the  Eu- 
ropean family  of  nations  an  improving,  instead 
of  a stationary  portion  of  mankind  ? Not  any 
superior  excellence  in  them,  which  when  it 
exists,  exists  as  the  effect,  not  as  tne  cause  ; 
but  their  remarkable  diversity  of  character  and 
culture.  Individuals,  classes,  nations,  have  been 
extremely  unlike  one  another:  they  have  struck 
out  a great  variety  of  paths,  each  leading  to 
something  valuable;  and  although  at  every 
period  those  who  travelled  in  different  paths 
have  been  intolerant  of  one  another,  and  each 
would  have  thought  it  an  excellent  thing  if  ah 
the  rest  could  have  been  compelled  to  travel 
G* 


130 


ON  LIBERTY. 


his  road,  their  attempts  to  thwart  each  other’s 
development  have  rarely  had  any  permaneni 
success,  and  each  has  in  time  endured  to  re- 
ceive the  good  which  the  others  have  offered. 
Europe  is,  in  my  judgment,  wholly  indebted 
to  this  plurality  of  paths  for  its  progressive  and 
many-sided  development.  But  it  already  be- 
gins to  possess  this  benefit  in  a considerably 
less  degree.  It  is  decidedly  advancing  towards 
the  Chinese  ideal  of  making  all  people  alike. 
M.  de  Tocqueville,  in  his  last  important  work, 
remarks  how  much  more  the  Frenchmen  of 
the  present  day  resemble  one  another,  than  did 
those  even  of  the  last  generation.  The  same 
remark  might  be  made  of  Englishmen  in  a far 
greater  degree.  In  a passage  already  quoted 
from  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  he  points  out 
two  things  as  necessary  conditions  of  human 
development,  because  necessary  to  render  peo- 
ple unlike  one  another;  namely,  freedom,  and 
variety  of  situations.  The  second  of  these  two 
conditions  is  in  this  country  every  day  dimin- 
ishing. The  circumstances  which  surround 
different  classes  and  individuals,  and  shape 
their  characters,  are  daily  becoming  more  as- 
similated. Formerly,  different  ranks,  different 
neighborhoods,  different  trades  and  professions, 
lived  in  what  might  be  called  different  worlds 
at  present,  to  a great  degree  in  the  same 
Comparatively  speaking,  they  now  read  the 
same  things,  listen  to  the  same  things,  see 
the  same  things,  go  to  the  same  places,  have 


ON  LIBERTY. 


13J 


their  hopes  and  fears  directed  to  the  same  ob- 
jects,  have  the  same  rights  and  liberties,  and 
the  same  means  of  asserting  them.  Great  as 
are  the  differences  of  position  which  remain, 
they  are  nothing  to  those  which  have  ceased. 
And  the  assimilation  is  still  proceeding.  All 
the  political  changes  of  the  age  promote  it, 
since  they  all  tend  to  raise  the  low  and  to 
lower  the  high.  Every  extension  of  education 
promotes  it,  because  education  brings  people 
under  common  influences,  and  gives  them 
access  to  the  general  stock  of  facts  and 
sentiments.  Improvements  in  the  means  of 
communication  promote  it,  by  bringing  the 
inhabitants  of  distant  places  into  personal  con- 
tact, and  keeping  up  a rapid  flow  of  changes 
of  residence  between  one  place  and  another. 
The  increase  of  commerce  and  manufactures 
promotes  it,  by  diffusing  more  widely  the  ad- 
vantages of  easy  circumstances,  and  opening 
all  objects  of  ambition,  even  the  highest,  to 
general  competition,  whereby  the  desire  of 
rising  becomes  no  longer  the  character  of  a 
particular  class,  but  of  all  classes.  A more 
powerful  agency  than  even  all  these,  in  bring- 
ing about  a general  similarity  among  mankind, 
is  the  complete  establishment,  in  this  and  other 
free  countries,  of  the  ascendency  of  public  opin- 
ion in  the  State.  As  the  various  social  emin- 
ences which  enabled  persons  entrenched  on 
them  to  disregard  the  opinion  of  the  multitude^ 
gradually  become  levelled  ; as  the  very  idea  of 


132 


ON  LIBERTY. 


resisting  the  will  of  the  public,  when  it  is  posi* 
tively  known  that  they  have  a will,  disappears 
more  and  more  from  the  minds  of  practical 
politicians  ; there  ceases  to  be  any  social  sup- 
port for  non-conformity  — any  substantive 
power  in  society,  which,  itself  opposed  to  the 
ascendancy  of  numbers,  is  interested  in  taking 
under  its  protection  opinions  and  tendencies  at 
variance  with  those  of  the  public. 

The  combination  of  all  these  causes  forms  so 
great  a mass  of  influences  hostile  to  Individu- 
ality, that  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how  it  can 
stand  its  ground.  It  will  do  so  with  increas- 
ing difficulty,  unless  the  intelligent  part  of  the 
public  can  be  made  to  feel  its  value  — to  see 
that  it  is  good  there  should  be  differences,  even 
though  not  for  the  better,  even  though,  as  it 
may  appear  to  them,  some  should  be  for  the 
worse.  If  the  claims  of  Individuality  are  ever 
to  be  asserted,  the  time  is  now,  while  much  is 
still  wanting  to  complete  the  enforced  assimi 
lation.  It  is  only  in  the  earlier  stages  that  any 
stand  can  be  successfully  made  against  the  en- 
croachment. The  demand  that  all  other  people 
shall  resemble  ourselves,  grows  by  what  it  feeds 
on.  If  resistance  waits  till  life  is  reduced  near- 
ly to  one  uniform  type,  all  deviations  from  that 
type  will  come  to  be  considered  impious,  im- 
moral, even  monstrous  and  contrary  to  nature. 
Mankind  speedily  become  unable  to  conceive 
diversity,  when  they  have  been  for  some  time 
unaccustomed  to  see  it. 


CHAPTER  lY. 


OF  THE  LIMITS  TO  THE  AUTHORITY  OF  SOCIETY  OVER  THE 
INDIVIDUAL. 


HAT,  then,  is  the  rightful  limit  to  the 


sovereignty  of  the  individual  over  him- 
self ? Where  does  the  authority  of  society 
begin?  How  much  of  human  life  should  be 
assigned  to  individuality,  and  how  much  to 
society  ? 

Each  will  receive  its  proper  share,  if  each 
has  that  which  more  particularly  concerns  it. 
To  individuality  should  belong  the  part  of  life 
in  which  it  is  chiefly  the  individual  that  is 
interested ; to  society,  the  part  which  chiefly 
interests  society. 

Though  society  is  not  founded  on  a con- 
tract, and  though  no  good  purpose  is  answered 
by  inventing  a contract  in  order  to  deduce 
social  obligations  from  it,  every  one  who  re- 
ceives the  protection  of  society  owes  a return 
for  the  benefit,  and  the  fact  of  living  in  society 
renders  it  indispensable  that  each  should  be 
bound  to  observe  a certain  line  of  conduct  tow- 
ards the  rest.  This  conduct  consists,  first,  in 
not  injuring  the  interests  of  one  another;  or 
rather  certain  interests,  which,  either  by  express 


134 


ON  LIBERTY. 


legal  provision  or  by  tacit  understanding,  ough 
to  be  considered  as  rights ; and  secondly^  in 
each  person’s  bearing  his  share  (to  be  fixed  on 
some  equitable  principle)  of  the  labors  and  sac- 
rifices incurred  for  defending  the  society  or  its 
members  from  injury  and  molestation.  These 
conditions  society  is  justified  in  enforcing,  at 
all  costs  to  those  who  endeavor  to  withhold 
fulfilment.  Nor  is  this  all  that  society  may  do. 
The  acts  of  an  individual  may  be  hurtful  to 
others,  or  wanting  in  due  consideration  for 
their  welfare,  without  going  the  length  of  vio- 
lating any  of  their  constituted  rights.  The 
offender  may  then  be  justly  punished  by  opin- 
ion, though  not  by  law.  As  soon  as  any  part 
of  a person’s  conduct  affects  prejudicially 
the  interests  of  others,  society  has  jurisdiction 
over  it,  and  the  question  w^hether  the  general 
welfare  will^or  will  not  be  promoted  by  inter- 
fering with  it,  becomes  open  to  discussion. 
But  there  is  no  room  for  entertaining  any  such 
question  when  a person’s  conduct  affects  the 
interests  of  no  persons  besides  himself,  or 
needs  not  affect  them  unless  they  like  (all  the 
persons  concerned  being  of  full  age,  and  the 
ordinary  amount  of  understanding).  In  all 
such  cases  there  should  be  perfect  freedom, 
legal  and  social,  to  do  the  action  and  stand 
the  consequences. 

It  would  be  a great  misunderstanding  of 
this  doctrine,  to  suppose  that  it  is  one  of  self- 
ish indifference,  which  pretends  that  human 


ON  LIBERTY. 


135 


beings  have  no  business  with  each  other’s  con- 
duct in  life,  and  that  they  should  not  concern 
themselves  about  the  well-doing  or  well-being 
of  one  another,  unless  their  own  interest  is  in- 
volved. Instead  of  any  diminution,  there  is 
need  of  a great  increase  of  disinterested  exer- 
tion to  promote  the  good  of  others.  But  dis- 
interested benevolence  can  find  other  instru- 
ments to  persuade  people  to  their  good,  than 
whips  and  scourges,  either  of  the  literal  or  the 
metaphorical  sort.  I am  the  last  person  to 
undervalue  the  self-regarding  virtues ; they  are 
only  second  in  importance,  if  even  second,  to 
the  social.  It  is  equally  the  business  of  educa- 
tion to  cultivate  both.  But  even  education 
works  by  conviction  and  persuasion  as  well  as 
by  compulsion,  and  it  is  by  the  former  only 
that,  when  the  period  of  education  is  past,  the 
self- regarding  virtues  should  be  inculcated 
Human  beings  owe  to  each  other  help  to  dis- 
tinguish the  better  from  the  worse,  and  encour- 
agement to  choose  the  former  and  avoid  the 
latter.  They  should  be  forever  stimulating 
each  other  to  increased  exercise  of  their  higher 
faculties,  and  increased  direction  of  their  feel- 
ings and  aims  towards  wise  instead  of  foolish, 
elevating  instead  of  degrading,  objects  and 
contemplations.  But  neither  one  person,  nor 
any  number  of  persons,  is  warranted  in  saying 
to  another  human  creature  of  ripe  years,  that 
he  snail  not  do  with  his  life  for  his  own  ben- 
efit what  he  chooses  to  do  with  t.  He  is  the 


13) 


ON  LIBERTY. 


person  most  interested  in  his  own  well-being 
the  interest  which  any  other  person,  except  ir 
cases  of  strong  personal  attachment,  can  have 
in  it,  is  trifling,  compared  with  that  which  he 
himself  has ; the  interest  which  society  has  in 
him  individually  (except  as  to  his  conduct  to 
others)  is  fractional,  and  altogether  indirect: 
while,  with  respect  to  his  own  feelings  and  cir- 
cumstances, the  most  ordinary  man  or  woman 
has  means  of  knowledge  immeasurably  sur- 
passing those  that  can  be  possessed  by  any 
one  else.  The  interference  of  society  to  over- 
rule his  judgment  and  purposes  in  what  only 
regards  himself,  must  be  grounded  on  general 
presumptions;  which  maybe  altogether  wrong, 
and  even  if  right,  are  as  likely  as  not  to  be 
misapplied  to  individual  cases,  by  persons  no 
better  acquainted  with  the  circumstances  of 
such  cases  than  those  are  who  look  at  them 
merely  from  without.  In  this  department, 
therefore,  of  human  affairs,  Individuality  ha& 
its  proper  field  of  action.  In  the  conduct  of 
human  beings  towards  one  another,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  general  rules  should  for  the  most 
part  be  observed,  in  order  that  people  may 
know  what  they  have  to  expect ; but  in  each 
person’s  own  concerns,  his  individual  sponta- 
neity is  entitled  to  free  exercise.  Considera- 
tions to  aid  his  judgment,  exhortations  to 
strengthen  his  will,  m^y  be  offered  to  him,  even 
obtruded  on  him,  by  others ; but  he,  himself,  is 
the  final  judge.  All  errors  which  he  is  likely 


ON  LIBERTY. 


137 


to  commit  against  advice  and  warning,  are  fai 
outweighed  by  the  evil  of  allowing  others  to 
constrain  him  to  what  they  deem  his  good. 

I do  not  mean  that  the  feelings  with  which 
a person  is  regarded  by  others,  ought  not  to  be 
in  any  way  affected  by  his  self-regarding  quali- 
ties or  deficiencies.  This  is  neither  possible 
nor  desirable.  If  he  is  eminent  in  any  of  the 
qualities  which  conduce  to  his  own  good,  he 
is,  so  far,  a proper  object  of  admiration.  He 
is  so  much  the  nearer  to  the  ideal  perfection 
of  human  nature.  If  he  is  grossly  deficient  in 
those  qualities,  a sentiment  the  opposite  of  ad- 
miration will  follow.  There  is  a degree  of 
folly,  and  a degree  of  what  may  be  called 
(though  the  phrase  is  not  unobjectionable) 
lowness  or  depra  ation  of  taste,  which,  though 
it  cannot  justify  doing  harm  to  the  person 
who  manifests  it,  renders  him  necessarily  and 
properly  a subject  of  distaste,  or,  in  extreme 
cases,  even  of  contempt:  a person  could  not 
have  the  opposite  qualities  in  due  strength 
without  entertaining  these  feelings.  Though 
doing  no  wrong  to  any  one,  a person  may  so 
act  as  to  compel  us  to  judge  him,  and  feel  to 
him,  as  a fool,  or  as  a being  of  an  inferior 
order : and  since  this  judgment  and  feeling 
are  a fact  which  he  would  prefer  to  avoid,  it 
is  doing  him  a service  to  warn  him  of  it  before- 
hand, as  of  any  other  disagreeable  consequence 
to  which  he  exposes  himself.  It  would  be  well, 
indeed,  if  this  good  office  were  much  more 


138 


ON  LIBERTY. 


freely  rendered  than  the  common  notions  of 
politeness  at  present  permit,  and  if  one  person 
could  honestly  point  out  to  another  that  he 
thinks  him  in  fault,  without  being  considered 
unmannerly  or  presuming.  We  have  a right, 
also,  in  various  ways,  to  act  upon  our  unfavor- 
able opinion  of  any  one,  not  to  the  oppression 
of  his  individuality,  but  in  the  exercise  of  ours. 
Wo  are  not  bound,  for  example,  to  seek  his 
society  ; we  have  a right  to  avoid  it  (though 
not  to  parade  the  avoidance),  for  we  have  a 
right  to  choose  the  society  most  acceptable  to 
us.  We  have  a right,  and  it  may  be  our  duty 
to  caution  others  against  him,  if  we  think  his 
example  or  conversation  likely  to  have  a per- 
nicious effect  on  those  with  whom  he  asso- 
ciates. We  may  give  others  a preference  over 
him  in  optional  good  offices,  except  those 
which  tend  to  his  improvement.  In  these 
various  modes  a person  may  suffer  very  severe 
penalties  at  the  hands  of  others,  for  faults 
which  directly  concern  only  himself;  but  he 
suffers  these  penalties  only  in  so  far  as  they 
are  the  natural,  and,  as  it  were,  the  spontane- 
ous consequences  of  the  faults  themselves,  not 
because  they  are  purposely  inflicted  on  him  for 
the  sake  of  punishment.  A person  who  shows 
rashness,  obstinacy,  self-conceit  — who  cannot 
live  within  moderate  means  — who  cannot 
restrain  himself  from  hurtful  indulgences  — 
who  pursues  anima^  pleasures  at  the  expense 
of  those  of  feeling  and  intellect  — must  expect 


ON  LIBEKTT. 


139 


to  be  lowered  in  the  opinion  of  others,  and  to 
have  a less  share  of  their  favorable  sentiments , 
but  of  this  he  has  no  right  to  complain,  unless 
he  has  merited  their  favor  by  special  excellence 
in  his  social  relations,  and  has  thus  established 
a title  to  their  good  offices,  which  is  not  af- 
fected by  his  demerits  towards  himself. 

What  I contend  for  is,  that  the  inconven- 
iences which  are  strictly  inseparable  from  the 
unfavorable  judgment  of  others,  are  the  only 
ones  to  which  a person  should  ever  be  subject 
ed  for  that  portion  of  his  conduct  and  character 
which  concerns  his  own  good,  but  which  does 
not  affect  the  interests  of  others  in  their  rela- 
tions with  him.  Acts  injurious  to  others  re- 
quire a totally  different  treatment.  Encroach- 
ment on  their  rights ; infliction  on  them  of  any 
loss  or  damage  not  justified  by  his  own  rights ; 
falsehood  or  duplicity  in  dealing  with  them  ; 
unfair  or  ungenerous  use  of  advantages  over 
them ; even  selfish  abstinence  from  defending 
them  against  injury  — these  are  fit  objects  of 
moral  reprobation,  and,  in  grave  cases,  of  moral 
retribution  and  punishment.  And  not  only 
these  acts,  but  the  dispositions  which  lead  to 
them,  are  properly  immoral,  and  fit  subjects  of 
disapprobation  which  may  rise  to  abhorrence. 
Cruelty  of  disposition ; malice  and  ill-nature ; 
that  most  anti-social  and  odious  of  all  pas- 
sions, envy  ; dissimulation  and  insincerity ; 
irascibility  on  insufficient  cause,  and  resent- 
ment disproportioned  to  the  provocation ; the 


140 


ON  LIBERTY. 


love  of  domineering  over  others ; the  desire  to 
engross  more  than  one’s  share  of  advantages 
(the  TrXeoveita  of  the  Greeks) ; the  pride  which 
derives  gratification  from  the  abasement  of 
others;  the  egotism  which  thinks  self  and  its 
concerns  more  important  than  everything  else, 
and  decides  all  doubtful  questions  in  his  own 
favor; — these  are  moral  vices,  and  consti- 
tute a bad  and  odious  moral  character : unlike 
the  self-regarding  faults  previously  mentioned, 
which  are  not  properly  immoralities,  and  to 
whatever  pitch  they  may  be  carried,  do  not 
constitute  wickedness.  They  may  be  proofs 
of  any  amount  of  folly,  or  want  of  personal 
dignity  and  self-respect ; but  they  are  only  a 
subject  of  moral  reprobation  when  they  in- 
volve a breach  of  duty  to  others,  for  whose 
sake  the  individual  is  bound  to  have  care  for 
himself.  What  are  called  duties  to  ourselves 
are  not  socially  obligatory,  unless  circumstances 
render  them  at  the  same  time  duties  to  others. 
The  term  duty  to  oneself,  when  it  means  any- 
thing more  than  prudence,  means  self-respect 
or  self-development ; and  for  none  of  these  is 
any  one  accountable  to  his  fellow-creatures, 
because  for  none  of  them  is  it  for  the  good  of 
mankind  that  he  be  held  accountable  to  them. 

The  distinction  between  the  loss  of  consider- 
ation which  a person  may  rightly  incur  by  de- 
fect of  prudence  or  of  personal  dignity,  and 
the  reprobation  which  is  due  to  him  for  an 
offence  against  the  rights  of  others,  is  not  a 


ON  LIBERTY. 


141 


merely  nominal  distinction.  It  makes  a vast 
difference  both  in  our  feelings  and  in  our  con- 
duct towards  him,  whether  he  displeases  us  in 
things  in  which  we  think  we  have  a right  to 
control  him,  or  in  things  in  which  we  know 
that  we  have  not.  If  he  displeases  us,  we  may 
express  our  distaste,  and  we  may  stand  aloof 
from  a person  as  well  as  from  a thing  that  dis- 
pleases us  ; but  we  shall  not  therefore  feel 
called  on  to  make  his  life  uncomfortable.  We 
shall  reflect  that  he  already  bears,  or  will  bear, 
the  whole  penalty  of  his  error ; if  he  spoils  his 
life  by  mismanagement,  we  shall  not,  for  that 
reason,  desire  to  spoil  it  still  further : instead 
of  wishing  to  punish  him,  we  shall  rather  en- 
deavor to  alleviate  his  punishment,  by  showing 
him  how  he  may  avoid  or  cure  the  evils  his 
conduct  tends  to  bring  upon  him.  He  may  be 
to  us  an  object  of  pity,  perhaps  of  dislike,  but 
not  of  anger  or  resentment ; we  shall  not  treat 
him  like  an  enemy  of  society : the  worst  we 
shall  think  ourselves  justified  in  doing  is  leav- 
ing him  to  himself,  if  we  do  not  interfere  be- 
nevolently by  showing  interest  or  concern  for 
him.  It  is  far  otherwise  if  he  has  infringed 
the  rules  necessary  for  the  protection  of  his  fel- 
low-creatures, individually  or  collectively.  The 
evil  consequences  of  his  acts  do  not  then  fall 
on  himself,  but  on  others  ; and  society,  as  the 
protector  of  all  its  members,  must  retaliate  on 
him ; must  inflict  pain  on  him  for  the  express 
purpose  of  punishment,  and  must  take  care 


142 


ON  LIBERTY. 


that  it  be  sufficiently  severe.  In  the  one  case, 
he  is  an  offender  at  our  bar,  and  we  are  called 
on  not  only  to  sit  in  judgment  on  him,  but,  in 
one  shape  or  another,  to  execute  our  own  sen- 
tence : in  the  other  case,  it  is  not  our  part  to 
inflict  any  suffering  on  him,  except  what  may 
incidentally  follow  from  our  using  the  same 
liberty  in  the  regulation  of  our  own  affairs, 
which  we  allow  to  him  in  his. 

The  distinction  here  pointed  out  between 
the  part  of  a person’s  life  which  concerns  only 
himself,  and  that  which  concerns  others,  many 
persons  will  refuse  to  admit.  How  (it  may  be 
asked)  can  any  part  of  the  conduct  of  a mem- 
ber of  society  be  a matter  of  indifference  to 
the  other  members  ? No  person  is  an  entirely 
isolated  being;  it  is  impossible  for  a person  to 
do  anything  seriously  or  permanently  hurtful 
to  himself,  without  mischief  reaching  at  least 
to  his  near  connections,  and  often  far  beyond 
them.  If  he  injures  his  property,  he  does  harm 
to  those  who  directly  or  indirectly  derived  sup- 
port from  it,  and  usually  diminishes,  by  a 
greater  or  less  amount,  the  general  resources  of 
the  community.  If  he  deteriorates  his  bodily 
or  mental  faculties,  he  not  only  brings  evil 
upon  all  who  depended  on  him  for  any  portion 
of  their  happiness,  but  disqualifies  himself  for 
rendering  the  services  which  he  owes  to  his 
fellow-creatures  generally  ; perhaps  becomes  a 
l>urden  on  their  affection  or  benevolence  ; and 
if  such  conduct  were  very  frequent,  hardly  any 


ON  LIBERTY. 


143 


offence  that  is  committed  would  detrac.t  more 
from  the  general  sum  of  good.  Finally,  if  by 
his  vices  or  follies  a person  does  no  direct  harm 
to  others,  he  is  nevertheless  (it  may  be  said) 
injurious  by  his  example  ; and  ought  to  be 
compelled  to  control  hirnself,  for  the  sake  of 
those  whom  the  sight  or  knowledge  of  his  coE"* 
duct  might  corrupt  or  mislead. 

And  even  (it  will  be  added)  if  the  conse- 
quences of  misconduct  could  be  confined  to 
the  vicious  or  thoughtless  individual,  ought 
society  to  abandon  to  their  own  guidance  those 
who  are  manifestly  unfit  for  it  ? If  protection 
against  themselves  is  confessedly  due  to  chil- 
dren and  persons  under  age,  is  not  society 
equally  bound  to  afford  it  to  persons  of  mature 
years  who  are  equally  incapable  of  self-govern- 
ment ? If  gambling,  or  drunkenness,  or  incon- 
tinence, or  idleness,  or  uncleanliness,  are  as  in- 
jurious to  happiness,  and  as  great  a hindrance 
to  improvement,  as  many  or  most  of  the  acts 
prohibited  by  law,  why  (it  may  be  asked)  should 
not  law,  so  far  as  is  consistent  with  practica- 
bility and  social  convenience,  endeavor  to  re- 
press these  also  ? And  as  a supplement  to  the 
unavoidable  imperfections  of  law,  ought  not 
opinion  at  least  to  organize  a powerful  police 
against  these  vices,  and  visit  rigidly  with  social 
penalties  those  who  are  known  to  practise 
them  ? There  is  no  question  here  (it  may  be 
said)  about  restricting  individuality,  or  imped- 
ing the  trial  of  new  and  original  experiments 


144: 


ON  LIBERTY. 


in  living.  The  only  things  it  is  sought  to  pre- 
vent are  things  which  have  been  tried  and  con- 
demned from  the  beginning  of  the  world  unth 
now;  things  which  experience  has  shown  not  to 
be  useful  or  suitable  to  any  person’s  individual- 
ity. There  must  be  some  length  of  time  and 
amount  of  experience,  after  which  a moral  or 
prudential  truth  may  be  regarded  as  established: 
and  it  is  merely  desired  to  prevent  generation  af- 
ter generation  from  falling  over  the  same  preci- 
pice which  has  been  fatal  to  their  predecessors. 

I fully  admit  that  the  mischief  which  a per- 
son does  to  himself,  may  seriously  affect,  both 
through  their  sympathies  and  their  interests, 
those  nearly  connected  with  him,  and  in  a mi- 
nor degree,  society  at  large.  When,  by  con- 
duct of  this  sort,  a person  is  led  to  violate  a 
distinct  and  assignable  obligation  to  any  other 
person  or  persons,  the  case  is  taken  out  of  the 
self-regarding  class,  and  becomes  amenable  to 
moral  disapprobation  in  the  proper  sense  of 
the  term.  If,  for  example,  a man,  through  in- 
temperance or  extravagance,  becomes  unable  to 
pay  his  debts,  or,  having  undertaken  the  moral 
responsibility  of  a family,  becomes  from  the 
same  cause  incapable  of  supporting  or  edu- 
cating them,  he  is  deservedly  reprobated,  and 
might  be  justly  punished  ; but  it  is  for  the 
breach  of  duty  to  his  family  or  creditors,  not 
for  the  extravagance.  If  the  resources  which 
ought  to  have  been  devoted  to  them,  had  been 
diverted  from  them  for  the  most  prudent  in- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


145 


vestment,  the  moral  culpability  would  have 
been  the  same.  George  Barnwell  murdered 
his  uncle  to  get  money  for  his  mistress,  but  if 
he  had  done  it  to  set  himself  up  in  business, 
he  would  equally  have  been  hanged.  Again, 
in  the  frequent  case  of  a man  who  causes  grief 
to  his  family  by  addiction  to  bad  habits,  he 
deserves  reproach  for  his  unkind  ness  or  ingrat- 
itude; but  so  he  may  for  cultivating  habits 
not  in  themselves  vicious,  if  they  are  painful 
to  those  with  whom  he  passes  his  life,  or  who 
from  personal  ties  are  dependent  on  him  for 
their  comfort.  Whoever  fails  in  the  consider- 
ation generally  due  to  the  interests  and  feel- 
ings of  others,  not  being  compelled  by  some, 
more  imperative  duty,  or  justified  by  allowable 
self-preference,  is  a subject  of  moral  disappro- 
bation for  that  failure,  but  not  for  the  cause  of 
it,  nor  for  the  errors,  merely  personal  to  him- 
self, which  may  have  remotely  led  to  it.  In 
like  manner,  when  a person  disables  himself, 
by  conduct  purely  self-regarding,  from  the  per- 
formance of  some  definite  duty  incumbent  on 
him  to  the  public,  he  is  guilty  of  a social  of- 
fence. No  person  ought  to  be  punished  sirn 
ply  for  being  drunk ; but  a soldier  or  a police- 
man should  be  punished  for  being  drunk  on 
duty.  Whenever,  in  short,  there  is  a definite 
damage,  or  a definite  risk  of  damage,  either  to 
an  individual  or  to  the  public,  the  case  is  taken 
out  of  the  province  of  liberty,  and  placed  in 
that  of  morality  or  law. 

7 


146 


ON  LIBERTY. 


But  with  regard  to  the  merely  contingent, 
or,  as  it  may  be  called,  constructive  injury 
which  a person  causes  to  society,  by  conduct 
which  neither  violates  any  specific  duty  to  the 
public,  nor  occasions  perceptible  hurt  to  any 
assignable  individual  except  himself ; the  in- 
convenience is  one  which  society  can  afford  to 
bear,  for  the  sake  of  the  greater  good  of  human 
freedom.  If  grown  persons  are  to  be  punished 
for  not  taking  proper  care  of  themselves,  I 
would  rather  it  were  for  their  own  sake,  than 
under  pretence  of  preventing  them  from  im- 
pairing their  capacity  of  rendering  to  society 
benefits  which  society  does  not  pretend  it  has 
a right  to  exact.  But  I cannot  consent  to  ar- 
gue the  point  as  if  society  had  no  means  of 
bringing  its  weaker  members  up  to  its  ordi- 
nary standard  of  rational  conduct,  except  wait- 
ing till  they  do  something  irrational,  and  then 
punishing  them,  legally  or  morally,  for  it.  So- 
ciety has  had  absolute  power  over  them  during 
all  the  early  portion  of  their  existence : it  has 
had  the  whole  period  of  childhood  and  nonage 
in  which  to  try  whether  it  could  make  them 
capable  of  rational  conduct  in  life.  The  ex- 
isting generation  is  master  both  of  the  train- 
ing and  the  entire  circumstances  of  the  gener- 
ation to  come ; it  cannot  indeed  make  them 
perfectly  wise  and  good,  because  it  is  itself  so 
lamentably  deficient  in  goodness  and  wisdom  ; 
and  its  best  efforts  are  not  always,  in  individ- 
ual cases,  its  most  successful  ones ; but  it  is 


ON  LIBERTY. 


147 


perfectly  well  able  to  make  the  rising  genera- 
tion, as  a whole,  as  good  as,  and  a little  beb 
ter  than,  itself.  If  society  lets  any  consider- 
able number  of  its  members  grow  up  mere 
children,  incapable  of  being  acted  on  by  ra- 
tional consideration  of  distant  motives,  so- 
ciety has  itself  to  blame  for  the  consequences. 
Armed  not  only  with  all  the  powers  of  educa- 
tion, but  with  the  ascendency  which  the  au- 
thority of  a received  opinion  always  exercises 
over  the  minds  who  are  least  fitted  to  judge 
for  themselves  ; and  aided  by  the  natural  pen- 
alties which  cannot  be  prevented  from  falling 
on  those  who  incur  the  distaste  or  the  con 
tempt  of  those  who  know  them  ; let  not  so- 
ciety pretend  that  it  needs,  besides  all  this,  the 
power  to  issue  commands  and  enforce  obedi- 
ence in  the  personal  concerns  of  individuals, 
in  which,  on  all  principles  of  justice  and  pol- 
icy, the  decision  ought  to  rest  with  those  who 
are  to  abide  the  consequences.  Nor  is  there 
anything  which  tends  more  to  discredit  and 
frustrate  the  better  means  of  influencing  con- 
duct, than  a resort  to  the  worse.  If  there  be 
among  those  whom  it  is  attempted  to  coerce 
into  prudence  or  temperance,  any  of  the  mate- 
rial of  which  vigorous  and  independent  charac- 
ters are  made,  they  will  infallibly  rebel  against 
the  yoke.  No  such  person  will  ever  feel  that 
others  have  a right  to  control  him  in  his  con- 
cerns, such  as  they  have  to  prevent  him  from 
injuring  them  in  theirs  ; and  it  easily  comes  tc 


148 


ON  LIBERTY. 


be  considered  a mark  of  spirit  and  courage  to 
fly  in  the  face  of  such  usurped  authority,  and 
do  with  ostentation  the  exact  opposite  of  what 
it  enjoins ; as  in  the  fashion  of  grossness  which 
succeeded,  in  the  time  of  Charles  IL,  to  the 
fanatical  moral  intolerance  of  the  Puritans 
With  respect  to  what  is  said  of  the  necessity 
of  protecting  society  from  the  bad  example  set 
to  others  by  the  vicious  or  the  self-indulgent ; 
it  is  true  that  bad  example  may  have  a perni- 
cious effect,  especially  the  example  of  doing 
wrong  to  others  with  impunity  to  the  wrong- 
doer. But  we  are  now  speaking  of  conduct 
which,  while  it  does  no  wrong  to  others,  is 
supposed  to  do  great  harm  to  the  agent  him- 
self : and  I do  not  see  how  those  who  believe 
this,  can  think  otherwise  than  that  the  exam- 
ple, on  the  whole,  must  be  more  salutary  than 
hurtful,  since,  if  it  displays  the  misconduct,  it 
displays  also  the  painful  or  degrading  conse- 
quences which,  if  the  conduct  is  justly  cen- 
sured, must  be  supposed  to  be  in  all  or  most 
cases  attendant  on  it. 

But  the  strongest  of  all  the  arguments 
against  the  interference  of  the  public  with 
purely  personal  conduct,  is  that  when  it  does 
interfere,  the  odds  are  that  it  interferes  wrong- 
ly, and  in  the  wrong  place.  On  questions  of 
social  morality,  of  duty  to  others,  the  opinion 
of  the  public,  that  is,  of  an  overruling  ma- 
jority, though  often  wrong,  is  likely  to  be  still 
oftener  right ; because  on  such  questions  they 


ON  LIBERTY. 


149 


are  only  required  to  judge  of  their  own  inter- 
ests ; of  the  manner  in  which  some  mode  of 
conduct,  if  allowed  to  be  practised,  would 
affect  themselves.  But  the  opinion  of  a sim- 
ilar majority,  imposed  as  a law  on  the  minor- 
ity, on  questions  of  self-regarding  conduct,  is 
quite  as  likely  to  be  wrong  as  right  ; for  in 
these  cases  public  opinion  means,  at  the  best, 
some  people’s  opinion  of  what  is  good  or  bad 
foi  other  people ; while  very  often  it  does  not 
even  mean  that ; the  public,  with  the  most  per- 
fect indifference,  passing  over  the  pleasure  or 
convenience  of  those  whose  conduct  they  cen- 
sure, and  considering  only  their  own  prefer- 
ence. There  are  many  who  consider  as  an 
injury  to  themselves  any  conduct  which  they 
have  a distaste  for,  and  resent  it  as  an  outrage 
to  their  feelings ; as  a religious  bigot,  when 
charged  with  disregarding  the  religious  feel- 
ings of  others,  has  been  known  to  retort  that 
they  disregard  his  feelings,  by  persisting  in 
their  abominable  worship  or  creed.  But  there 
is  no  parity  between  the  feeling  of  a person 
for  his  own  opinion,  and  the  feeling  of  another 
who  is  offended  at  his  holding  it ; no  more 
than  between  the  desire  of  a thief  to  take  a 
purse,  and  the  desire  of  the  right  owner  to 
keep  it.  And  a person’s  taste  is  as  much  his 
own  peculiar  concern  as  his  opinion  or  his 
purse.  It  is  easy  for  any  one  to  imagine  an 
ideal  public,  which  leaves  the  freedom  and 
choice  of  individuals  in  all  uncertain  matters 


150 


ON  LIBERTY. 


undisturbed,  and  only  requires  them  to  abstaui 
from  modes  of  conduct  which  universal  experi- 
ence has  condemned.  But  where  has  there  been 
seen  a public  which  set  any  such  limit  to  its  cen- 
sorship ? or  when  does  the  public  trouble  itself 
about  universal  experience  ? In  its  interferen- 
ces with  personal  conduct  it  is  seldom  thinking 
of  anything  but  the  enormity  of  acting  or  feel- 
ing differently  from  itself;  and  this  standard  of 
judgment,  thinly  disguised,  is  held  up  to  man- 
kind as  the  dictate  of  religion  and  philosophy, 
by  nine  tenths  of  all  moralists  and  speculative 
writers.  These  teach  that  things  are  right  be- 
cause they  are  right ; because  we  feel  them  to 
be  so.  They  tell  us  to  search  in  our  own  minds 
and  hearts  for  laws  of  conduct  binding  on  our- 
selves and  on  all  others.  What  can  the  poor 
public  do  but  apply  these  instructions,  and 
make  their  own  personal  feelings  of  good  and 
evil,  if  they  are  tolerably  unanimous  in  them, 
obligatory  on  all  the  world  ? 

The  evil  here  pointed  out  is  not  one  which 
exists  only  in  theory ; and  it  may  perhaps 
be  expected  that  I should  specify  the  in- 
stances in  which  the  public  of  this  age  and 
country  improperly  invests  its  own  preferences 
with  the  character  of  moral  laws.  I am  not 
writing  an  essay  on  the  aberrations  of  existing 
moral  feeling.  That  is  too  weighty  a subject 
to  be  discussed  parenthetically,  and  by  way  of 
illustration.  Yet  examples  are  necessary,  to 
show  that  the  principle  I maintain  is  of  seri 


ON  LIBEETY. 


151 


JUS  and  practical  moment,  and  that  I am  not 
endeavoring  to  erect  a barrier  against  imagin- 
ary evils.  And  it  is  not  difficult  to  show,  by 
abundant  instances,  that  to  extend  the  bounds 
of  what  may  be  called  moral  police,  until  it 
encroaches  on  the  most  unquestionably  legiti- 
mate liberty  of  the  individual,  is  one  of  the 
most  universal  of  all  human  propensities. 

As  a first  instance,  consider  the  antipathies 
which  men  cherish  on  no  better  grounds  than 
that  persons  whose  religious  opinions  are  dif- 
ferent from  theirs,  do  not  practise  their  relig- 
ious observances,  especially  their  religious  ab- 
stinences. To  cite  a rather  trivial  example, 
nothing  in  the  creed  or  practice  of  Christians 
does  more  to  envenom  the  hatred  of  Mahome- 
dans  against  them,  than  the  fact  of  their  eat- 
ing pork.  There  are  few  acts  which  Christians 
and  Europeans  regard  with  more  unaffected 
disgust,  than  Mussulmans  regard  this  partic- 
ular mode  of  satisfying  hunger.  It  is,  in  the 
first  place,  an  offence  against  their  religion  ; 
but  this  circumstance  by  no  means  explains 
either  the  degree  or  the  kind  of  their  repug- 
nance ; for  wine  also  is  forbidden  by  their 
religion,  and  to  partake  of  it  is  by  all  Mussul- 
mans accounted  wrong,  but  not  disgusting. 
Their  aversion  to  the  flesh  of  the  ‘‘unclean 
beast  ” is,  on  the  contrary,  of  that  peculiai 
character,  resembling  an  instinctive  antipathy, 
which  the  idea  of  uncleanness,  when  once  it 
thoroughly  sinks  into  the  feelings,  se(;ms  a! 


152 


ON  LIBERTY. 


Ways  to  excite  even  in  those  whose  persona] 
habits  are  anything  but  scrupulously  cleanly, 
and  of  which  the  sentiment  of  religions  im- 
purity, so  intense  in  the  Hindoos,  is  a remark- 
able example.  Suppose  now  that  in  a people, 
of  whom  the  majority  were  Mussulmans,  that 
majority  should  insist  upon  not  permitting 
pork  to  be  eaten  within  the  limits  of  the  coun- 
try. This  would  be  nothing  new  in  Mahome- 
dan  countries.*  Would  it  be  a legitimate  ex- 
ercise of  the  moral  authority  of  public  opinion? 
and  if  not,  why  not  ? The  practice  is  really 
revolting  to  such  a public.  They  also  sincerely 
think  that  it  is  forbidden  and  abhorred  by  the 
Deity.  Neither  could  the  prohibition  be  cen- 
sured as  religious  persecution.  It  might  be  re- 
ligious in  its  origin,  but  it  would  not  be  per- 
secution for  religion,  since  nobody’s  religion 
makes  it  a duty  to  eat  pork.  The  only  tena- 
ble ground  of  condemnation  would  be,  that 
with  the  personal  tastes  and  self-regarding 
concerns  of  individuals  the  public  has  no  busi- 
ness to  interfere. 

^ The  case  of  the  Bombay  Parsees  is  a curious  instauce  in  point. 
When  this  industrious  and  enterprising  tribe,  the  descendants  of 
the  Persian  fire-worshippers,  flying  from  their  native  country  be- 
fore the  Caliphs,  arrived  in  Western  India,  they  were  admitted  to 
toleration  by  the  Hindoo  sovereigns,  on  condition  of  not  eating 
beef.  When  those  regions  afterwards  fell  under  the  dominion  of 
Mahomedan  conquerors,  the  Parsees  obtained  from  them  a con- 
tinuance of  indulgence,  on  condition  df  refraining  from  pork. 
What  was  at  first  obedience  to  authority  became  a second  na- 
ture, and  the  Parsees  to  this  day  abstain  both  from  beef  and  pork. 
Though  not  required  by  their  religion,  the  double  abstinence  has 
iiad  time  to  grow  into  a custom  of  their  tribe;  and  custom,  in  the 
Ea.^t,  is  a religion. 


ON  LIBERTY. 


153 


To  come  somewhat  nearer  home  : the  major- 
ity of  Spaniards  consider  it  a gross  impiety, 
offensive  in  the  highest  degree  to  the  Supreme 
Being,  to  worship  him  in  any  other  manner  than 
the  Roman  Catholic  ; and  no  other  public  wor^ 
ship  is  lawful  on  Spanish  soil.  The  people  of 
all  Southern  Europe  look  upon  a married  clergy 
as  not  only  irreligious,  but  unchaste,  indecent, 
gross,  disgusting.  What  do  Protestants  think 
of  these  perfectly  sincere  feelings,  and  of  the 
attempt  to  enforce  them  against  non-Catho- 
lics  ? Yet,  if  mankind  are  justified  in  inter- 
fering with  each  other’s  liberty  in  things  which 
do  not  concern  the  interests  of  others,  on  what 
principle  is  it  possible  consistently  to  exclude 
these  cases  ? or  who  can  blame  people  for  de- 
siring to  suppress  what  they  regard  as  a scan- 
dal in  the  sight  of  God  and  man  ? No  stronger 
case  can  be  shown  for  prohibiting  anything 
which  is  regarded  as  a personal  immorality, 
than  is  made  out  for  suppressing  these  prac- 
tices in  the  eyes  of  those  who  regard  them  as 
impieties  ; and  unless  we  are  willing  to  adopt 
the  logic  of  persecutors,  and  to  say  that  we 
may  persecute  others  because  we  are  right, 
and  that  they  must  not  persecute  us  because 
they  are  wrong,  we  must  beware  of  admitting 
a principle  of  which  we  should  resent  as  a gross 
injustice  the  application  to  ourselves. 

The  preceding  instances  may  be  objected  to, 
all  hough  unreasonably,  as  drawn  from  contin- 
gencies impossible  among  us : opinion,  in  this 


154 


ON  LIBERTY. 


country,  not  being  likely  to  enforce  abstinence 
from  meats,  or  to  interfere  with  people  for  wor- 
shipping, and  for  either  marrying  or  not  marry- 
ing, according  to  their  creed  or  inclination. 
The  next  example,  however,  shall  be  taken 
from  an  interference  with  liberty  which  we 
have  by  no  means  passed  all  danger  of. 
Wherever  the  Puritans  have  been  sufficiently 
powerful,  as  in  New  England,  and  in  Great 
Britain  at  the  time  of  the  Commonwealth, 
they  have  endeavored,  with  considerable  suc- 
cess, to  put  down  all  public,  and  nearly  all 
private,  amusements:  especially  music,  danc- 
ing, public  games,  or  other  assemblages  for 
purposes  of  diversion,  and  the  theatre.  There 
are  still  in  this  country  large  bodies  of  persons 
by  whose  notions  of  morality  and  religion  these 
recreations  are  condemned  : and  those  persons 
belonging  chiefly  to  the  middle  class,  who  are 
the  ascendant  power  in  the  present  social  and 
political  condition  of  the  kingdom,  it  is  by  no 
means  impossible  that  persons  of  these  senti- 
ments may  at  some  time  or  other  command  a 
majority  in  Parliament.  How  will  the  remain 
ing  portion  of  the  community  like  to  have  the 
amusements  that  shall  be  permitted  to  them 
regulated  by  the  religious  and  moral  senti- 
ments of  the  stricter  Calvinists  and  Method- 
ists ? Would  they  not,  with  considerable 
peremptoriness,  desire  these  intrusively  pious 
members  of  society  to  mind  their  own  busi- 
ness ? This  is  precisely  what  should  be  said 


ON  LIBERTY. 


155 


to  every  government  and  every  public,  who 
have  the  pretension  that  no  person  shall  enjoy 
any  pleasure  which  they  think  wrong.  But  if 
the  principle  of  the  pretension  be  admitted,  no 
one  can  reasonably  object  to  its  being  acted  on 
in  the  sense  of  the  majority,  or  other  prepon- 
derating power  in  the  country  ; and  all  persons 
must  be  ready  to  conform  to  the  idea  of  a 
Christian  commonwealth,  as  understood  by  the 
early  settlers  in  New  England,  if  a religious 
profession  similar  to  theirs  should  ever  succeed 
in  regaining  its  lost  ground,  as  religions  sup 
posed  to  be  declining  have  so  often  been  known 
to  do. 

To  imagine  another  contingency,  perhaps 
more  likely  to  be  realized  than  the  one  last 
mentioned.  There  is  confessedly  a strong  ten- 
dency in  the  modern  world  towards  a demo- 
cratic constitution  of  society,  accompanied  or 
not  by  popular  political  institutions.  It  is  af- 
firmed that  in  the  country  where  this  tendency 
is  most  completely  realized  — where  both  so- 
ciety and  the  government  are  most  democratic 
— the  United  States  — the  feeling  of  the  ma- 
jority, to  whom  any  appearance  of  a more 
showy  or  costly  style  of  living  than  they  can 
hope  to  rival  is  disagreeable,  operates  as  a tol- 
erably effectual  sumptuary  law,  and  that  in 
many  parts  of  the  Union  it  is  really  difficult 
for  a person  possessing  a very  large  income,  to 
find  any  mode  of  spending  it,  which  will  not 
incur  popular  disapprobation.  Though  such 


156 


ON  LIBERTY. 


statements  as  these  are  doubtless  much  exag- 
gerated as  a representation  of  existing  facts, 
the  state  of  things  they  describe  is  not  only  a 
conceivable  and  possible,  but  a probable  result 
of  democratic  feeling,  combined  with  the  no- 
tion that  the  public  has  a right  to  a veto  on 
the  manner  in  which  individuals  shall  spend 
their  incomes.  We  have  only  further  to  sup- 
pose a considerable  diffusion  of  Socialist  opin- 
ions, and  it  may  become  infamous  in  the  eyes 
of  the  majority  to  possess  more  property  than 
some  very  small  amount,  or  any  income  not 
earned  by  manual  labor.  Opinions  similar  in 
principle  to  these,  already  prevail  widely  among 
the  artisan  class,  and  weigh  oppressively  on 
those  who  are  amenable  to  the  opinion  chiefly 
of  that  class,  namely,  its  own  members.  It  is 
known  that  the  bad  workmen  who  form  the 
majority  of  the  operatives  in  many  branches 
of  industry,  are  decidedly  of  opinion  that  bad 
workmen  ought  to  receive  the  same  wages  as 
good,  and  that  no  one  ought  to  be  allowed, 
through  piecework  or  otherwise,  to  earn  by 
superior  skill  or  industry  more  than  others  can 
without  it.  And  they  employ  a moral  police, 
which  occasionally  becomes  a physical  one,  to 
deter  skilful  workmen  from  receiving,  and  em- 
ployers from  giving,  a larger  remuneration  for 
a more  useful  service.  If  the  public  have  anj 
jurisdiction  over  private  concerns,  I cannot  see 
that  these  people  are  in  fault,  or  that  any  indi- 
riduaPs  particular  public  can  be  blamed  for  as- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


157 


serting  the  same  authority  over  nis  individual 
conduct,  which  the  general  public  asserts  over 
people  in  general. 

But,  without  dwelling  upon  supposititious 
cases,  there  are,  in  our  own  day,  gross  usurpa- 
tions upon  the  liberty  of  private  life  actually 
practised,  and  still  greater  ones  threatened  with 
some  expectation  of  success,  and  opinions  pro- 
posed which  assert  an  unlimited  right  in  the 
public  not  only  to  prohibit  by  law  everything 
which  it  thinks  wrong,  but  in  order  to  get  at 
what  it  thinks  wrong,  to  prohibit  any  number 
of  things  which  it  admits  to  be  innocent. 

Under  the  name  of  preventing  intemperance, 
the  people  of  one  English  colony,  and  of 
nearly  half  the  United  States,  have  been  inter- 
dicted by  law  from  making  any  use  whatever 
of  fermented  drinks,  except  for  medical  pur- 
poses: for  prohibition  of  their  sale  is  in  fact, 
as  it  is  intended  to  be,  prohibition  of  their  use. 
And  though  the  impracticability  of  executing 
the  law  has  caused  its  repeal  in  several  of  the 
States  which  had  adopted  it,  including  the  one 
from  which  it  derives  its  name,  an  attempt  has 
notwithstanding  been  commenced,  and  is  pros- 
ecuted wdth  considerable  zeal  by  many  of  the 
professed  philanthropists,  to  agitate  for  a simi- 
lar law  in  this  country.  The  association,  or 

Alliance  ” as  it  terms  itself,  which  has  been 
formed  for  this  purpose,  has  acquired  some 
notoriety  through  the  publicity  given  to  a cor- 
respondence between  its  Secretary  and  one  of 


158 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


the  very  few  English  public  men  who  hold  that 
a politician’s  opinions  ought  to  be  founded  on 
principles.  Lord  Stanley’s  share  in  this  cor- 
respondence is  calculated  to  strengthen  the 
hopes  already  built  on  him,  by  those  who  know 
how  rare  such  qualities  as  are  manifested  in 
some  of  his  public  appearances,  unhappily  are 
among  those  who  figure  in  political  life.  The 
organ  of  the  Alliance,  who  would  deeply 
deplore  the  recognition  of  any  principle  which 
could  be  wrested  to  justify  bigotry  and  perse- 
cution,” undertakes  to  point  out  the  “ broad 
and  impassable  barrier”  which  divides  such 
principles  from  those  of  the  association.  “ All 
matters  relating  to  thought,  opinion,  con- 
science, appear  to  me,”  he  says,  to  be  with- 
out the  sphere  of  legislation ; all  pertaining  to 
social  act,  habit,  relation,  subject  only  to  a dis- 
cretionary power  vested  in  the  State  itself,  and 
not  in  the  individual,  to  be  within  it.”  No 
mention  is  made  of  a third  class,  different  from 
either  of  these,  viz.,  acts  and  habits  which  are 
not  social,  but  individual;  although  it  is  to 
this  class,  surely,  that  the  act  of  drinking  fer- 
mented liquors  belongs.  Selling  fermented 
liquors,  however,  is  trading,  and  trading  is  a 
social  act.  But  the  infringement  complained 
of  is  not  on  the  liberty  of  the  seller,  but  on 
that  of  the  buyer  and  consumer;  since  the 
State  might  just  as  well  forbid  him  to  drink 
wine,  as  purposely  make  it  impossible  for  him 
to  obtain  it.  The  Secretary,  however,  says,  7 


ON  LIBERTY. 


159 


claim,  as  a citizen,  a right  to  legislate  when- 
ever my  social  rights  are  invaded  by  the  social 
act  of  another.”  And  now  for  the  definition 
of  these  “ social  rights,”  If  anything  invades 
my  social  rights,  certainly  the  traffic  in  strong 
drink  does.  It  destroys  my  primary  right  of 
security,  by  constantly  creating  and  stimulating 
social  disorder.  It  invades  my  right  of  equal- 
ity,  by  deriving  a profit  from  the  creation  of  a 
misery,  I am  taxed  to  support.  It  impedes  my 
right  to  free  moral  and  intellectual  develop- 
ment, by  surrounding  my  path  with  dangers, 
and  by  weakening  and  demoralizing  society, 
from  which  I have  a right  to  claim  mutual  aid 
and  intercourse.”  A theory  of  ‘‘  social  rights,” 
the  like  of  which  probably  never  before  found 
its  way  into  distinct  language  — being  nothing 
short  of  this  — that  it  is  the  absolute  social 
right  of  every  individual,  that  every  other  in- 
dividual shall  act  in  every  respect  exactly  as 
he  ought;  that  who >oever  fails  thereof  in  the 
smallest  particular,  violates  my  social  right, 
and  entitles  me  to  demand  from  the  legislature 
the  removal  of  the  grievance.  So  monstrous 
a principle  is  far  more  dangerous  than  any 
single  interference  with  liberty;  there  is  no 
violation  of  liberty  which  it  would  not  justify; 
it  acknowledges  no  right  to  any  freedom  what- 
ever, except  perhaps  to  that  of  holding  opin- 
ions in  secret,  without  ever  disclosing  them ; 
for  the  moment  an  opinion  which  I consider 
noxious,  passes  any  one’s  lips,  it  invades  all 


160 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


the  “ social  rights  ” attributed  to  me  by  the 
Alliance.  The  doctrine  ascribes  to  all  mankind 
a vested  interest  in  each  other’s  moral,  intel- 
lectual, and  even  physical  perfection,  to  be  de- 
fined by  each  claimant  according  to  his  own 
standard. 

Another  important  example  of  illegitimate 
interference  with  the  rightful  liberty  of  the  in- 
dividual, not  simply  threatened,  but  long  since 
carried  into  triumphant  effect,  is  Sabbatarian 
legislation.  Without  doubt,  abstinence  on  one 
day  in  the  week,  so  far  as  the  exigencies  of 
life  permit,  from  the  usual  daily  occupation, 
though  in  no  respect  religiously  binding  on 
any  except  Jews,  is  a highly  beneficial  custom. 
And  inasmuch  as  this  custom  cannot  be  ob- 
served without  a general  consent  to  that  effect 
among  the  industrious  classes,  therefore,  in  so 
far  as  some  persons  by  working  may  impose 
the  same  necessity  on  others,  it  may  be  allow- 
able and  right  that  the  law  should  guarantee 
to  each,  the  observance  by  others  of  the  cus- 
tom, by  suspending  the  greater  operations  of 
industry  on  a particular  day.  But  this  justi- 
fication, grounded  on  the  direct  interest  which 
others  have  in  each  individual’s  observance  of 
the  practice,  does  not  apply  to  the  self-chosen 
occupations  in  which  a person  may  think  fit 
to  employ  his  leisure ; nor  does  it  hold  good, 
in  the  smallest  degree,  for  legal  restrictions  on 
amusements.  It  is  true  that  the  amusement 
of  some  is  the  day’s  work  of  others ; but  the 


ON  LIBEPwTY. 


16] 


pleasure,  not  to  say  the  useful  recreation,  ot 
many,  is  worth  the  labor  of  a few,  providee 
the  occupation  is  freely  chosen,  and  can  be 
freely  resigned.  The  operatives  are  perfectl) 
right  in  think  mg  that  if  all  worked  on  Sunday 
seven  days’  work  would  have  to  be  given  foi 
six  days’  wages : but  so  long  as  the  great  mass 
of  employments  are  suspended,  the  small  num- 
ber who  for  the  enjoyment  of  others  must  still 
work,  obtain  a proportional  increase  of  earn- 
ings ; and  they  are  not  obliged  to  follow  those 
occupations,  if  they  prefer  leisure  to  emolu- 
ment. If  a further  remedy  is  sought,  it  might 
be  found  in  the  establishment  by  custom  of  a 
holiday  on  some  other  day  of  the  week  for 
those  particular  classes  of  persons.  The  only 
ground,  therefore,  on  which  restrictions  on 
Sunday  amusements  can  be  defended,  must  be 
that  they  are  religiously  wrong;  a motive  of 
legislation  which  never  can  be  too  earnestly 
protested  against.  ‘‘ Deorurn  injuriae  Diis 
curae.”  It  remains  to  be  proved  that  society 
or  any  of  its  officers  holds  a commission  from 
on  high  to  avenge  any  supposed  offence  to 
Omnipotence,  which  is  not  also  a wrong  to  our 
fellow-creatures.  The  notion  that  it  is  one 
man’s  duty  that  another  should  be  religious, 
was  the  foundation  of  all  the  religious  perse- 
cutions ever  perpetrated,  and  if  admitted, 
would  fully  justify  them.  Though  the  feeling 
which  breaks  out  in  the  repeated  attempts  to 
fitop  railway  travelling  on  Sunday,  in  the  re* 


162 


ON  LIBERTY. 


sistance  to  the  opening  of  Museum?,  and  the 
like,  has  not  the  cruelty  of  the  old  persecutors, 
the  state  of  mind  indicated  by  it  is  fundamen- 
tally the  same.  It  is  a determination  not  to 
tolerate  others  in  doing  what  is  permitted  by 
their  religion,  because  it  is  not  permitted  by 
the  persecutor’s  religion.  It  is  a belief  that 
God  not  only  abominates  the  act  of  the  mis- 
believer, but  will  not  hold  us  guiltless  if  wt 
leave  him  unmolested. 

I cannot  refrain  from  adding  to  these  ex- 
amples of  the  little  account  commonly  made 
of  human  liberty,  the  language  of  downright 
persecution  which  breaks  out  from  the  press 
of  this  country,  whenever  it  feels  called  on  to 
notice  the  remarkable  phenomenon  of  Mor- 
monism.  Much  might  be  said  on  the  unex- 
pected and  instructive  fact,  that  an  alleged 
new  revelation,  and  a religion  founded  on  it, 
the  product  of  palpable  imposture,  not  even 
supported  by  the  prestige  of  extraordinary 
qualities  in  its  founder,  is  believed  by  hun- 
dreds of  thousands,  and  has  been  made  the 
foundation  of  a society,  in  the  age  of  news- 
papers, railways,  and  the  electric  telegraph. 
What  here  concerns  us  is,  that  this  religion, 
like  other  and  better  religions,  has  its  martys  ; 
that  its  prophet  and  founder  was,  for  his  teach- 
ing, put  to  death  by  a mob ; that  others  of  its 
adherents  lost  their  lives  by  the  same  lawless 
violence ; that  they  were  forcibly  expelled,  in 
a body,  from  the  country  in  which  they  first 


ON  LIBERTY. 


163 


grew  up  ; while,  now  that  they  have  been 
chased  into  a solitary  recess  in  the  midst  of  a 
desert,  many  in  this  country  openly  declare 
that  it  would  be  right  (only  that  it  is  not  con- 
venient) to  send  an  expedition  against  them, 
and  compel  them  by  force  to  conform  to  the 
opinions  of  other  people.  The  article  of  the 
Mormonite  doctrine  which  is  the  chief  provo- 
cative to  the  antipathy  which  thus  breaks 
through  the  ordinary  restraints  of  religious 
tolerance,  is  its  sanction  of  polygamy ; which, 
though  permitted  to  Mahomedans,  and  Hin- 
doos, and  Chinese,  seems  tr  excite  unquench- 
able animosity  when  practised  by  persons  who 
speak  English,  and  profess  to  be  a kind  of 
Christians.  No  one  has  a deeper  disapproba- 
tion than  I have  of  this  Mormon  institution  ; 
both  for  other  reasons,  and  because,  far  from 
being  in  any  way  countenanced  by  the  prin- 
ciple of  liberty,  it  is  a direct  infraction  of  that 
principle,  being  a mere  riveting  of  the  chains 
of  one  half  of  the  community,  and  an  emanci- 
pation of  the  other  from  reciprocity  of  obliga- 
tion towards  them.  Still,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  relation  is  as  much  voluntary 
on  the  part  of  the  women  concerned  in  it,  and 
who  may  be  deemed  the  sufferers  by  it,  as  is 
the  case  with  any  other  form  of  the  marriage 
institution ; and  however  surprising  this  fact 
may  appear,  it  has  its  explanation  in  the  com- 
mon ideas  and  customs  of  the  world,  which 
teaching  women  to  think  marriage  the  one 


164 


ON  LIBERTY. 


thing  neeclfu.,  make  it  intelligible  that  rnanj 
a woman  should  prefer  being  one  of  severa. 
wives,  to  not  being  a wife  at  all.  Other  coun- 
tries are  not  asked  to  recognize  such  unions, 
or  release  any  portion  of  their  inhabitants  from 
their  own  laws  on  the  score  of  Mormonite 
opinions.  But  when  the  dissentients  have 
conceded  to  the  hostile  sentiments  of  others, 
far  more  than  could  justly  be  demanded ; 
when  they  have  left  the  countries  to  which 
their  doctrines  were  unacceptable,  and  estab 
lished  themselves  in  a remote  corner  of  the 
earth,  which  they  have  been  the  first  to  render 
habitable  to  human  beings ; it  is  difficult  to 
see  on  what  principles  but  those  of  tyranny 
they  can  be  prevented  from  living  there  under 
what  laws  they  please,  provided  they  commit 
no  aggi'ession  on  other  nations,  and  allow  per- 
fect freedom  of  departure  to  those  who  are 
dissatisfied  with  their  ways.  A recent  writer, 
in  some  respects  of  considerable  merit,  pro- 
poses (to  use  his  own  words,)  not  a crusade, 
but  a civilizade^  against  this  polygamous  com- 
munity, to  put  an  end  to  what  seems  to  him  a 
retrograde  step  in  civilization.  It  also  appears 
so  to  me,  but  I am  not  aware  that  any  com- 
munity has  a right  to  force  another  to  be  civ- 
ilized. So  long  as  the  sufferers  by  the  bad  lav/ 
do  not  invoke  assistance  from  other  commu- 
nities, I cannot  admit  that  persons  entirely 
unconnected  with  them  ought  to  step  in  and 
require  that  a condition  of  things  with  which 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


165 


all  who  are  directly  interested  appear  to  be 
satisfied,  should  be  put  an  end  to  because  it 
is  a scandal  to  persons  some  thousands  of 
miles  distant,  who  have  no  part  or  concern  in 
it.  Let  them  send  missionaries,  if  they  please, 
to  preach  against  it;  and  let  them,  by  any 
fair  means  (of  which  silencing  the  teachers  is 
not  one,)  oppose  the  progress  of  similar  doc- 
trines among  their  own  people.  If  civilization 
has  got  the  better  of  barbarism  when  bar- 
barism had  the  world  to  itself,  it  is  too  much 
to  profess  to  be  afraid  lest  barbarism,  after 
having  been  fairly  got  under,  should  revive 
and  conquer  civilization.  A civilization  that 
can  thus  succumb  to  its  vanquished  enemy 
must  first  have  become  so  degenerate,  that 
neither  its  appointed  priests  and  teachers,  nor 
anybody  else,  has  the  capacity,  or  will  take 
the  trouble,  to  stand  up  for  it.  If  this  be  so, 
the  sooner  such  a cizilization  receives  notice 
to  quit,  the  better.  It  can  only  go  on  from 
bad  to  worse,  until  destroyed  and  regenerated 
(like  the  Western  Empire)  by  energetic  bar- 
barians. 


CHAPTER  V. 


APPLICATIONS. 

^pHE  principles  asserted  in  these  pages  must 
A bo  more  generally  admitted  as  the  basis  for 
discussion  of  details,  before  a consistent  appli- 
cation of  them  to  all  the  various  departments 
of  government  and  morals  can  be  attempted 
with  any  prospect  of  advantage.  The  few  ob- 
servations I propose  to  make  on  questions  of 
detail,  are  designed  to  illustrate  the  principles, 
rather  than  to  follow  them  out  to  their  conse- 
quences. I offer,  not  so  much  applications,  as 
specimens  of  application  ; which  may  serve  to 
hring  into  greater  clearness  the  meaning  and 
limits  of  the  two  maxims  which  together  form 
the  entire  doctrine  of  this  Essay,  and  to  assist 
the  judgment  in  holding  the  balance  between 
them,  in  the  cases  where  it  appears  doubtful 
which  of  them  is  applicable  to  the  case. 

The  maxims  are,  first,  that  the  individual  is 
not  accountable  to  society  for  his  actions,  in  so 
far  as  these  concern  the  interests  of  no  person 
but  himself.  Advice,  instruction,  persuasion, 
and  avoidance  by  other  people,  if  thought  ne« 
cessary  by  them  for  their  own  good,  are  the 
only  measures  by  which  society  can  justifiably 


ON  LIBERTY. 


167 


express  its  dislike  or  disapprobation  of  his  con- 
duct. Secondly,  that  for  such  actions  as  are 
prejudicial  to  the  interests  of  others,  the  indh 
vidual  is  accountable,  and  may  be  subjected 
(‘.ither  to  social  or  to  legal  punishments,  if  so- 
ciety is  of  opinion  that  the  one  or  the  other  is 
requisite  for  its  protection. 

In  the  first  place,  it  must  by  no  means  be 
supposed,  because  damage,  or  probability  of 
damage,  to  the  interests  of  others,  can  alone 
justify  the  interference  of  society,  that  there- 
fore it  always  does  justify  such  interference. 
In  many  cases,  an  individual,  in  pursuing  a 
legitimate  object,  necessarily  and  therefore  le- 
gitimately causes  pain  or  loss  to  others,  or 
intercepts  a good  which  they  had  a reasonable 
hope  of  obtaining.  Such  oppositions  of  inter- 
est between  individuals  often  arise  from  bad 
social  institutions,  but  are  unavoidable  while 
those  institutions  last ; and  some  would  be 
unavoidable  under  any  institutions.  Whoever 
succeeds  in  an  overcrowded  profession,  or  in  a 
competitive  examination  ; whoever  is  preferred 
to  another  in  any  contest  for  an  object  which 
both  desire,  reaps  benefit  from  the  loss  of  oth- 
ers, from  their  wasted  exertion  and  their  disap- 
pointment. But  it  is,  by  common  admission, 
better  for  the  general  interest  of  mankind,  that 
persons  should  pursue  their  objects  undeterred 
by  this  sort  of  consequences.  In  other  words, 
society  admits  no  right,  cither  legal  or  moral,  in 
the  disappointed  competitors,  to  immunity  from 


168 


ON  LIBERTY. 


this  kind  of  suffering;  and  feels  called  on  to  in- 
terfere, only  when  means  of  success  have  been 
employed  which  it  is  contrary  to  the  general 
interest  to  permit  — namely,  fraud  or  treachery 
and  force. 

Again,  trade  is  a social  act.  Whoever  un- 
dertakes to  sell  any  description  of  goods  to  the 
public,  does  what  affects  the  interest  of  other 
persons,  and  of  society  in  general ; and  thus 
his  conduct,  in  principle,  comes  within  the  ju- 
risdiction of  society : accordingly,  it  was  once 
held  to  be  the  duty  of  governments,  in  all  cases 
which  were  considered  of  importance,  to  fix 
prices,  and  regulate  the  processes  of  manu- 
facture. But  it  is  now  recognized,  though  not 
till  after  a long  struggle,  that  both  the  cheap- 
ness and  the  good  quality  of  commodities  are 
most  effectually  provided  for  by  leaving  the 
producers  and  sellers  perfectly  free,  under  the 
sole  check  of  equal  freedom  to  the  buyers  for 
supplying  themselves  elsewhere.  This  is  the 
so-called  doctrine  of  Free  Trade,  which  rests 
on  grounds  different  from,  though  equally  solid 
with,  the  principle  of  individual  liberty  asserted 
in  this  Essay.  Restrictions  on  trade,  or  on 
production  for  purposes  of  trade,  are  indeed 
restraints ; and  all  restraint,  qua  restraint,  is  an 
evil:  but  the  restraints  in  question  affect  only 
that  part  of  conduct  which  society  is  competent 
to  restrain,  and  are  wrong  solely  because  they 
do  not  really  produce  the  results  which  it  is  de- 
sired to  produce  by  them.  As  the  principle  of 


ON  LIBERTY. 


169 


individual  liberty  is  not  involved  in  the  doc- 
trine of  Free  Trade,  so  neither  is  it  in  most  of 
the  questions  which  arise  respecting  the  limits 
of  that  doctrine ; as  for  example,  what  amount 
of  public  control  is  admissible  for  the  preven- 
tion of  fraud  by  adulteration  ; how  far  sanitary 
precautions,  or  arrangements  to  protect  work- 
people employed  in  dangerous  occupations, 
should  be  enforced  on  employers.  Such  ques- 
tions involve  considerations  of  liberty,  only  in 
so  far  as  leaving  people  to  themselves  is  always 
better,  cceteris  paribus^  than  controlling  them  : 
but  that  they  may  be  legitimately  controlled 
for  these  ends,  is  in  principle  undeniable.  On 
the  other  hand,  there  are  questions  relating  to 
interference  with  trade,  which  are  essentially 
questions  of  liberty ; such  as  the  Maine  Law, 
already  touched  upon ; the  prohibition  of  the 
importation  of  opium  into  China ; the  restric- 
tion of  the  sale  of  poisons ; all  cases,  in  short, 
where  the  object  of  the  interference  is  to  make 
it  impossible  or  difficult  to  obtain  a particular 
commodity.  These  interferences  are  objection- 
able, not  as  infringements  on  the  liberty  of  the 
producer  or  seller,  but  on  that  of  the  buyer. 

One  of  these  examples,  that  of  the  sale  of 
poisons,  opens  a new  question ; the  proper 
limits  of  what  may  be  called  the  functions  of 
police  ; how  far  liberty  may  legitimately  be  in- 
vaded for  the  prevention  of  crime,  or  of  acci- 
dent. It  is  one  of  the  undisputed  functions  of 
government  to  take  precautions  against  crime 
8 


170 


ON  LIBERTY. 


before  it  has  been  committed,  as  well  as  to  de- 
tect and  punish  it  afterwards.  The  preventive 
function  of  government,  however,  is  far  more 
liable  to  be  abused,  to  the  prejudice  of  liberty, 
than  the  punitory  function  ; for  there  is  hardly 
any  part  of  the  legitimate  freedom  of  action 
of  a human  being  which  would  not  admit  of 
being  represented,  and  fairly  too,  as  increasing 
the  facilities  for  some  form  or  other  of  delin- 
quency. Nevertheless,  if  a public  authority,  or 
even  a private  person, 'sees  any  one  evidently 
preparing  to  commit  a crime,  they  are  not 
bound  to  look  on  inactive  until  the  crime  is 
committed,  but  may  interfere  to  prevent  it.  If 
poisons  were  never  bought  or  used  for  any  pur- 
pose except  the  commission  of  murder,  it  would 
be  right  to  prohibit  their  manufacture  and  sale 
They  may,  however,  be  wanted  not  only  foi 
innocent  but  for  useful  purposes,  and  restric- 
tions cannot  be  imposed  in  the  one  case  with- 
out operating  in  the  other.  Again,  it  is  a 
proper  office  of  public  authority  to  guard 
against  accidents.  If  either  a public  officer 
or  any  one  else  saw  a person  attempting  to 
cross  a bridge  which  had  been  ascertained  to 
be  unsafe,  and  there  were  no  time  to  warn  him 
of  his  danger,  they  might  seize  him  and  turn 
him  back,  without  any  real  infringement  of  his 
liberty  ; for  liberty  consists  in  doing  what  one; 
desires,  and  he  does  not  desire  to  fall  into  the 
river.  Nevertheless,  when  there  is  not  a cer- 
tainty, but  only  a danger  of  mischief,  no  one 


ON  LIBERTY. 


171 


but  the  person  himself  can  judge  of  t’ne  suffi- 
ciency of  the  motive  which  may  prompt  him 
to  incur  the  risk  : in  this  case,  therefore,  (unless 
he  is  a child,  or  delirious,  or  in  some  state  of 
excitement  or  absorption  incompatible  with  the 
full  use  of  the  reflecting  faculty),  he  ought,  I 
conceive,  to  be  only  warned  of  the  danger  ; not 
forcibly  prevented  from  exposing  himself  to  it 
Similar  considerations,  applied  to  such  a ques 
tion  as  the  sale  of  poisons,  may  enable  us  to 
decide  which  among  the  possible  modes  of  reg- 
ulation are  or  are  not  contrary  to  principle. 
Such  a precaution,  for  example,  as  that  of  la- 
belling the  drug  with  some  word  expressive  of 
its  dangerous  character,  may  be  enforced  with- 
out violation  of  liberty : the  buyer  cannot  wish 
not  to  know  that  the  thing  he  possesses  has 
poisonous  qualities.  But  to  require  in  all  cases 
the  certificate  of  a medical  practitioner,  would 
make  it  sometimes  impossible,  always  expen- 
sive, to  obtain  the  article  for  legitimate  uses. 
The  only  mode  apparent  to  me,  in  which  diffi- 
culties may  be  thrown  in  the  way  of  crime 
committed  through  this  means,  without  any 
infringement,  worth  taking  into  account,  upon 
the  liberty  of  those  who  desire  the  poisonous 
substance  for  other  purposes,  consists  in  pro- 
viding what,  in  the  apt  language  of  Bentham, 
is  called  ‘‘preappointed  evidence.”  This  pro- 
vision is  familiar  to  every  one  in  the  case  of 
contracts.  It  is  usual  and  right  that  the  law, 
when  a contract  is  entered  into,  should  require 


172 


ON  LIBERTY. 


as  the  condition  of  its  enforcing  performance, 
that  certain  formalities  should  be  observed, 
such  as  signatures,  attestation  of  witnesses, 
and  the  like,  in  order  that  in  case  of  subse- 
quent dispute,  there  may  be  evidence  to  prove 
that  the  contract  was  really  entered  into,  and 
that  there  was  nothing  in  the  circumstances  to 
render  it  legally  invalid  : the  effect  being,  to 
throw  great  obstacles  in  the  way  of  fictitious 
contracts,  or  contracts  made  in  circumstances 
which,  if  known,  would  destroy  their  validity. 
Precautions  of  a similar  nature  might  be  en- 
forced in  the  sale  of  articles  adapted  to  be  in- 
struments of  crime.  The  seller,  for  example, 
might  be  required  to  enter  in  a register  the  ex- 
act time  of  the  transaction,  the  name  and  ad- 
dress of  the  buyer,  the  precise  quality  and 
quantity  sold ; to  ask  the  purpose  for  which  it 
was  wanted,  and  record  the  answer  he  received. 
When,  there  was  no  medical  prescription,  the 
presence  of  some  third  person  might  be  re- 
quired, to  bring  home  the  fact  to  the  purchaser, 
in  case  there  should  afterwards  be  reason  to 
believe  that  the  article  had  been  applied  to 
criminal  purposes.  Such  regulations  would  in 
general  be  no  material  impediment  to  obtain- 
ing the  article,  but  a very  considerable  one  to 
making  an  improper  use  of  it  without  detec- 
tion. 

The  right  inherent  in  society,  to  ward  off 
crimes  against  itself  by  antecedent  precautions, 
suggests  the  obvious  limitations  to  the  maxim, 


ON  LIBERTY. 


173 


that  purely  self-regarding  misconduct  cannot 
properly  be  meddled  with  in  the  way  of  pre* 
vention  or  punishment.  Drunkenness,  for  ex- 
ample, in  ordinary  cases,  is  not  a fit  subject 
for  legislative  interference ; but  I should  deem 
it  |)erfectly  legitimate  that  a person,  who  had 
once  been  convicted  of  any  act  of  violence  to 
others  under  the  influence  of  drink,  should  be 
placed  under  a special  legal  restriction,  per 
sonal  to  himself;  that  if  he  were  afterwards 
found  drunk,  he  should  be  liable  to  a penalty, 
and  that  if  when  in  that  state  he  committed 
another  offence,  the  punishment  to  which  he 
would  be  liable  for  that  other  offence  should 
be  increased  in  severity.  The  making  himself 
drunk,  in  a person  whom  drunkenness  excites 
to  do  harm  to  others,  is  a crime  against  others. 
So,  again,  idleness,  except  in  a person  receiv- 
ing support  from  the  public,  or  except  when  it 
constitutes  a breach  of  contract,  cannot  with- 
out tyranny  be  made  a subject  of  legal  punish- 
ment ; but  if  either  from  idleness  or  from  any 
other  avoidable  cause,  a man  fails  to  perform 
his  legal  duties  to  others,  as  for  instance  to 
support  his  children,  it  is  no  tyranny  to  force 
him  to  fulfil  that  obligation,  by  compulsory 
labor,  if  no  other  means  are  available. 

Again,  there  are  many  acts  which,  being 
directly  injurious  only  to  the  agents  them- 
selves, ought  not  to  be  legally  interdicted,  but 
which,  if  done  publicly,  are  a violation  of  good 
manners,  and  coming  thus  within  the  category 


174 


ON  LIBERTY. 


of  ofibnces  against  others,  may  rightfully  l)e 
prohibited.  Of  this  kind  are  offences  against 
decency;  on  which  it  is  unnecessary  to  dwell, 
the  rather  as  they  are  only  connected  indirectly 
with  our  subject,  the  objection  to  publicity  be- 
ing  equally  strong  in  the  case  of  many  actions 
not  in  themselves  condemnable,  nor  supposed 
to  be  so. 

There  is  another  question  to  which  an  an- 
swer must  be  found,  consistent  with  the  prin- 
ciples which  have  been  laid  down.  In  cases 
of  personal  conduct  supposed  to  be  blaraeable, 
but  which  respect  for  liberty  precludes  society 
from  preventing  oi  punishing,  because  the  evil 
directly  resulting  falls  wholly  on  the  agent; 
what  the  agent  is  free  to  do,  ought  other  per- 
sons to  be  equally  free  to  counsel  or  instigate  ? 
This  question  is  not  free  from  difficulty.  The 
case  of  a person  who  solicits  another  to  do  an 
act,  is  not  strictly  a case  of  self-regarding  con- 
duct. To  give  advice  or  offer  inducements  to 
any  one,  is  a social  act,  and  may  therefore, 
like  actions  in  general  which  affect  others,  be 
supposed  amenable  to  social  control.  But  a 
little  reflection  corrects  the  first  impression,  by 
showing  that  if  the  case  is  not  strictly  within 
the  definition  of  individual  liberty,  yet  the 
reasons  on  which  the  principle  of  individual 
liberty  is  grounded,  are  applicable  to  it.  If 
people  must  be  allowed,  in  whatever  concerns 
only  themselves,  to  act  as  seems  best  to  them- 
selves at  their  own  peril,  they  must  equally  be 


ON  LIBERTY. 


175 


free  to  consult  with  one  another  about  what  is 
fit  to  be  so  done ; to  exchange  opinions,  and 
give  and  receive  suggestions.  Whatever  it  is 
permitted  to  do,  it  must  be  permitted  to  ad- 
vise to  do.  The  question  is  doubtful,  only 
when  the  instigator  derives  a personal  benefit 
from  his  advice ; when  he  makes  it  his  occu- 
pation, for  subsistence  or  pecuniary  gain,  to 
promote  what  society  and  the  State  consider 
to  be  an  evil.  Then,  indeed,  a new  element 
ol  complication  is  introduced ; namely,  the  ex- 
istence of  classes  of  persons  with  an  interest 
opposed  to  what  is  considered  as  the  public 
weal,  and  whose  mode  of  living  is  grounded  ^ 
on  the  counteraction  of  it.  Ought  this  to  be 
interfered  with,  or  not?  Fornication,  for  ex- 
ample, must  be  tolerated,  and  so  must  gam- 
bling; but  should  a person  be  free  to  be  a 
pimp,  or  to  keep  a gambling-house  ? The 
case  is  one  of  those  which  lie  on  the  exact 
boundary  line  between  two  principles,  and  it 
is  not  at  once  apparent  to  which  of  the  two  it 
properly  belongs.  There  are  arguments  on 
both  sides.  On  the  side  of  toleration  it  may 
be  said,  that  the  fact  of  following  anything  as 
an  occupation,  and  living  or  profiting  by  the 
practice  of  it,  cannot  make  that  criminal  which 
would  otherwise  be  admissible;  that  the  act 
should  either  be  consistently  permitted  or  con- 
sistently prohibited;  that  if  the  principles  which 
we  have  hitherto  defended  are  true,  society  has 
no  business,  as  society,  to  decide  anything  to 


176 


ON  LIBERTY. 


be  wrong  which  concerns  only  the  individual; 
that  it  cannot  go  beyond  dissuasion,  and  that 
one  person  should  be  as  free  to  persuade,  as 
another  to  dissuade.  In  opposition  to  this  it 
may  be  contended,  that  although  the  public, 
or  the  State,  are  not  warranted  in  authorita- 
tively deciding,  for  purposes  of  repression  or 
punishment,  that  such  or  such  conduct  affect- 
ing only  the  interests  of  the  individual  is  good 
or  bad,  they  are  fully  justified  in  assuming,  if 
they  regard  it  as  bad,  that  its  being  so  or  not 
is  at  least  a disputable  question  : That,  this 
being  supposed,  they  cannot  be  acting  wrong- 
ly in  endeavoring  to  exclude  the  influence  of 
solicitations  which  are  not  disinterested,  of 
instigators  who  cannot  possibly  be  impartial 
— who  have  a direct  personal  interest  on  one 
side,  and  that  side  the  one  which  the  State 
believes  to  be  wrong,  and  who  confessedly  pro- 
mote it  for  personal  objects  only.  There  can 
surely,  it  may  be  urged,  be  nothing  lost,  no 
sacrifice  of  good,  by  so  ordering  matters  that 
persons  shall  make  their  election,  either  wisely 
or  foolishly,  on  their  own  prompting,  as  free  as 
possible  from  the  arts  of  persons  who  stimu- 
late their  inclinations  for  interested  purposes 
of  their  own.  Thus  (it  may  be  said)  though 
the  statutes  respecting  unlawful  games  are 
utterly  indefensible  — though  all  persons  should 
be  free  to  gamble  in  their  own  or  each  other’s 
houses,  or  in  any  place  of  meeting  established 
by  their  own  subscriptions,  and  open  only  to 


ON  LIBERTY. 


177 


the  members  and  their  visitors  — yet  public 
gambling-houses  should  not  be  permitted.  It 
is  true  that  the  prohibition  is  never  effectual, 
and  that  whatever  amount  of  tyrannical  power 
is  given  to  the  police,  gambling-houses  can  al- 
ways be  maintained  under  other  pretences  • 
but  they  may  be  compelled  to  conduct  their 
operations  with  a certain  degree  of  secrecy 
and  mystery,  so  that  nobody  knows  anything 
about  them  but  those  who  seek  them ; and 
more  than  this,  society  ought  not  to  aim  at. 
There  is  considerable  force  in  these  arguments. 
I will  not  venture  to  decide  whether  they  are 
sufficient  to  justify  the  moral  anomaly  of  pun- 
ishing the  accessary,  when  the  principal  is 
(and  must  be)  allowed  to  go  free ; of  fining  or 
imprisoning  the  procurer,  but  not  the  forni- 
cator, the  gambling-house  keeper,  but  not  the 
gambler.  Still  less  ought  the  common  opera- 
tions of  buying  and  selling  to  be  interfered 
with  on  analogous  grounds.  Almost  every 
article  which  is  bought  and  soxd  may  used  in 
excess,  and  the  sellers  have  a pecuniary  in- 
terest in  encouraging  that  excess  ; but  no  argu- 
ment can  be  founded  on  this,  in  favor,  for  in- 
stance, of  the  Maine  Law  ; because  the  class 
of  dealers  in  strong  drinks,  though  interested 
in  their  abuse,  are  indispensably  required  for 
the  sake  of  their  legitimate  use.  The  interest 
however,  of  these  dealers  in  promoting  intern* 
perance  is  a real  evil,  and  justifies  the  State  in 
imposing  restrictions  and  requiring  guarantees 
8* 


178 


ON  LIBERTY, 


which  but  for  that  justification  would  be  in» 
fringements  of  legitimate  liberty. 

A further  question  is,  whether  the  State, 
while  it  permits,  should  nevertheless  indirectly 
discourage  conduct  which  it  deems  contrary  to 
the  best  interests  of  the  agent;  whether,  for 
example,  it  should  take  measures  to  render  the 
means  of  drunkenness  more  costly,  or  add  to 
the  difficulty  of  procuring  them,  by  limiting 
the  number  of  the  places  of  sale.  On  this  as 
on  most  other  practical  questions,  many  distinc- 
/ tions  require  to  be  made.  To  tax  stimulants  for 
the  sole  purpose  of  making  them  more  difficult 
to  be  obtained,  is  a measure  differing  only  in 
degree  from  their  entire  prohibition  ; and  would 
be  justifiable  only  if  that  were  justifiable. 
^ Every  increase  of  cost  is  a prohibition,  to  those 
/ whose  means  do  not  come  up  to  the  augmented 
\ price  ; and  to  those  who  do,  it  is  a penalty  laid 
^ on  them  for  gratifying  a particular  taste.  Their 
\ choice  of  pleasures,  and  their  mode  of  expcmd- 
I ing  their  income,  after  satisfying  their  legal  and 
I moral  obligations  to  the  State  and  to  individ 
uals,  are  their  own  concern,  and  must  rest  with 
their  own  judgment.  These  considerations 
may  seem  at  first  sight  to  condemn  the  selec- 
tion of  stimulants  as  special  subjects  of  taxation 
for  purposes  of  revenue.  But  it  must  be  re- 
membered that  taxation  for  fiscal  purposes  is 
absolutely  inevitable ; that  in  most  countries 
it  is  necessary  that  a considerable  part  of  that 
taxation  should  be  indirect;  that  the  State, 


/ 


'I- . 


ON  LIBERTY. 


179 


therefore,  cannot  help  imposing  penalties,  which 
to  some  persons  may  be  prohibitory,  on  the  use 
of  some  articles  of  consumption.  It  is  hence 
the  duty  of  the  State  to  consider,  in  the  impo- 
sition of  taxes,  what  commodities  the  consum- 
ers can  best  spare ; and  d fortiori^  to  select  in 
preference  those  of  wdiich  it  deems  the  use,  be- 
yond a very  moderate  quantity,  to  be  positively 
injurious.  Taxation,  therefore,  of  stimulants, 
up  to  the  point  which  produces  the  largest 
amount  of  revenue  (supposing  that  the  State 
needs  all  the  revenue  which  it  yields)  is  not 
only  admissible,  but  to  be  approved  of. 

The  question  of  making  the  sale  of  these 
commodities  a more  or  less  exclusive  privilege, 
must  be  answered  differently,  according  to  the 
purposes  to  which  the  restriction  is  intended 
to  be  subservient.  All  places  of  public  resort 
require  the  restraint  of  a police,  and  places  of 
this  kind  peculiarly,  because  offences  against 
society  are  especially  apt  to  originate  there.  It 
is,  therefore,  fit  to  confine  the  power  of  selling 
these  commodities  (at  least  for  consumption 
on  the  spot)  to  persons  of  known  or  vouched- 
for  respectability  of  conduct ; to  make  such 
regulations  respecting  hours  of  opening  and 
closing  as  may  be  requisite  for  public  surveil- 
lance, and  to  withdraw  the  license  if  breaches 
of  the  peace  repeatedly  take  place  through  the 
connivance  or  incapacity  of  the  keeper  of  the 
house,  or  if  it  becomes  a rendezvous  for  con- 
cocting and  preparing  offences  against  the  law 


180 


ON  LIBERTY. 


Any  further  restriction  I do  not  conceive  to 
be,  in  principle,  justifiable.  The  limitation  in 
number,  for  instance,  of  beer  and  spirit-houses, 
for  the  express  purpose  of  rendering  them  more 
difficult  of  access,  and  diminishing  the  occa- 
sions of  temptation,  not  only  exposes  all  to 
an  inconvenience  because  there  are  some  by 
whom  the  facility  would  be  abused,  but  is 
suited  only  to  a state  of  society  in  which  the 
laboring  classes  are  avowedly  treated  as  chil- 
dren or  savages,  and  placed  under  an  educa- 
tion of  restraint,  to  fit  them  for  future  admis- 
sion to  the  privileges  of  freedom.  This  is  not 
the  principle  on  which  the  laboring  classes  are 
professedly  governed  in  any  free  country ; and 
no  person  who  sets  due  value  on  freedom  will 
give  his  adhesion  to  their  being  so  governed, 
unless  after  all  efforts  have  been  exhausted  to 
educate  them  for  freedom  and  govern  them  as 
freemen,  and  it  has  been  definitively  proved 
that  they  can  only  be  governed  as  children. 
The  bare  statement  of  the  alternative  shows 
the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  such  efforts 
have  been  made  in  any  case  which  needs  be 
considered  here.  It  is  only  because  the  insti- 
tutions of  this  country  are  a mass  of  incon- 
sistencies, that  things  find  admittance  into  our 
practice  which  belong  to  the  system  of  des- 
potic, or  what  is  called  paternal,  government, 
while  the  general  freedom  of  our  institutions 
precludes  the  exercise  of  the  amount  of  con- 


ON  LIBEKTY. 


181 


trol  necessary  to  render  the  restraint  of  any 
real  efficacy  as  a moral  education. 

It  was  pointed  out  in  an  early  part  of  this 
Essay,  that  the  liberty  of  the  individual,  in 
things  wherein  the  individual  is  alone  con- 
cerned, implies  a corresponding  liberty  in  any 
number  of  individuals  to  regulate  by  mutual 
agi'eement  such  things  as  regard  them  jointly, 
and  regard  no  persons  but  themselves.  This 
question  prese  .its  no  difficulty,  so  long  as  the 
will  of  all  the  persons  implicated  remains  un- 
altered ; but  since  that  will  may  change,  it  is 
often  necessary,  even  in  things  in  which  they 
alone  are  concerned,  that  they  should  enter  into 
engagements  with  one  another;  and  when  they 
do,  it  is  fit,  as  a general  rule,  that  those  en- 
gagements should  be  kept.  Yet  in  the  laws, 
probably,  of  every  country,  this  general  rule 
has  some  exceptions.  Not  only  persons  are 
not  held  to  engagements  which  violate  the 
rights  of  third  parties,  but  it  is  sometimes  con- 
sidered a sufficient  reason  for  releasing  them 
from  an  engagement,  that  it  is  injurious  to 
themselves.  In  this  and  most  other  civilized 
countries,  for  example,  an  engagement  by 
which  a person  should  sell  himself,  or  allow 
himself  to  be  sold,  as  a slave,  would  be  null 
and  void ; neither  enforced  by  law  nor  by  opin- 
ion. The  ground  for  thus  limiting  his  power 
of  voluntarily  disposing  of  his  own  lot  in  life, 
is  apparent,  and  is  very  clearly  seen  in  this  ex- 
treme case.  The  reason  for  not  interfering, 


182 


ON  LIBEET\. 


unless  for  the  sake  of  others,  with  a person  a 
voluntary  acts,  is  consideration  for  his  liberty 
His  voluntary  choice  is  evidence  that  what  he 
so  chooses  is  desirable,  or  at  the  least  endur- 
able, to  him,  and  his  good  is  on  the  whole  best 
provided  for  by  allowing  him  to  take  his  own 
m()ans  of  pursuing  it.  But  by  selling  himself 
for  a slave,  he  abdicates  his  liberty ; he  fore- 
goes any  future  use  of  it,  beyond  that  single 
act.  He  therefore  defeats,  in  his  own  case,  the 
very  purpose  which  is  the  justification  of  al 
lowing  him  to  dispose  of  himself.  He  is  no 
longer  free  ; but  is  thenceforth  in  a position 
which  has  no  longer  the  presumption  in  its 
favor,  that  would  be  afforded  by  his  voluntarily 
remaining  in  it.  The  principle  of  freedom 
cannot  require  that  he  should  be  free  not  to  be 
free.  It  is  not  freedom,  to  be  allowed  to  alien- 
ate his  freedom.  These  reasons,  the  force  of 
which  is  so  conspicuous  in  this  peculiar  case, 
are  evidently  of  far  wider  application  ; yet  a 
limit  is  everywhere  set  to  them  by  the  necessi- 
ties of  life,  which  continually  require,  not  in- 
deed that  we  should  resign  our  freedom,  but 
that  we  should  consent  to  this  and  the  other 
limitation  of  it.  The  principle,  however, 
which  demands  uncontrolled  freedom  of  ac- 
tion in  all  that  concerns  only  the  agents  them- 
selves, requires  that  those  who  have  become 
bound  to  one  another,  in  things  which  concern 
no  third  party,  should  be  able  to  release  one 
another  from  the  engagement : and  even  with- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


183 


out  such  voluntary  release,  there  are  perhaps 
no  contracts  or  engagements,  except  those  that 
relate  to  money  or  money’s  worth,  of  which  one 
can  ventme  to  say  that  there  ought  to  be  no 
liberty  whatever  of  retractation.  Baron  Wil- 
helm von  Humboldt,  in  the  excellent  Essay 
from  which  I have  already  quoted,  states  it  as 
las  conviction,  that  engagements  which  involve 
personal  relations  or  services,  should  never  be 
legally  binding  beyond  a limited  duration  of 
time  ; and  that  the  most  important  of  these 
engagements,  marriage,  having  the  peculiarity 
that  its  objects  are  frustrated  unless  the  feel- 
ings of  both  the  parties  are  in  harmony  with 
it,  should  require  nothing  more  than  the  de- 
clared will  of  either  party  to  dissolve  it.  This 
subject  is  too  important,  and  too  complicated, 
to  be  discussed  in  a parenthesis,  and  I touch 
on  it  only  so  far  as  is  necessary  for  purposes  of 
illustration.  If  the  conciseness  and  generality 
of  Baron  Humboldt’s  dissertation  had  not  ob- 
liged him  in  this  instance  to  content  himself 
with  enunciating  his  conclusion  without  dis- 
cussing the  premises,  he  would  doubtless  have 
recognized  that  the  question  cannot  be  decided 
on  grounds  so  simple  as  those  to  which  he  con- 
fines himself.  When  a person,  either  by  ex- 
press promise  or  by  conduct,  has  encouraged 
another  to  rely  upon  his  continuing  to  act  in  a 
certain  way  — to  build  expectations  and  calcu- 
lations, and  stake  any  part  of  his  plan  of  life 
upon  that  supposition,  a new  series  of  moral 


184 


ON  LIBERTY. 


obligations  arises  on  his  part  towards  that  per- 
son, which  may  possibly  be  overruled,  but  can- 
not be  ignored.  And  again,  if  the  relation 
between  two  contracting  parties  has  been  fol- 
lowed by  consequences  to  others ; if  it  has 
placed  third  parties  in  any  peculiar  position, 
or,  as  in  the  case  of  marriage,  has  even  called 
third  parties  into  existence,  obligations  arise  on 
the  part  of  both  the  contracting  parties  towards 
those  third  persons,  the  fulfilment  of  which,  or 
at  all  events  the  mode  of  fulfilment,  must  be 
greatly  affected  by  the  continuance  or  disrup- 
tion of  the  relation  between  the  original  par- 
ties to  the  contract.  It  does  not  follow,  nor 
can  I admit,  that  these  obligations  extend  to 
requiring  the  fulfilment  of  the  contract  at  all 
costs  to  the  happiness  of  the  reluctant  party ; 
but  they  are  a necessary  element  in  the  ques- 
tion ; and  even  if,  as  Von  Humboldt  main- 
tains, they  ought  to  make  no  difference  in  the 
legal  freedom  of  the  parties  to  release  them- 
selves from  the  engagement  (and  I also  hold 
that  they  ought  not  to  make  much  difference), 
they  necessarily  make  a great  difference  in  the 
moral  freedom.  A person  is  bound  to  take  ah 
these  circumstances  into  account,  before  resolv- 
ing on  a step  which  may  affect  such  important 
interests  of  others ; and  if  he  does  not  allow 
proper  weight  to  those  interests,  he  is  morally 
responsible  for  the  wrong.  I have  made  these 
obvious  remarks  for  the  better  illustration  of 
the  general  principle  of  liberty,  and  not  be* 


ON  LIBERTY. 


185 


cause  they  are  at  all  needed  on  the  particuia/ 
question,  which,  on  the  contrary,  is  usually 
discussed  as  if  the  interest  of  children  was 
everything,  and  that  of  grown  persons  noth- 
ing. 

I have  already  observed  that,  owing  to  the 
absence  of  any  recognized  general  principles, 
liberty  is  often  granted  where  it  should  be 
withheld,  as  well  as  withheld  where  it  should 
be  granted  ; and  one  of  the  cases  in  which,  in 
the  modern  European  world,  the  sentiment  of 
liberty  is  the  strongest,  is  a case  where,  in  my 
view,  it  is  altogether  misplaced.  A person 
should  be  free  to  do  as  he  likes  in  his  own  con- 
cerns ; but  he  ought  not  to  be  free  to  do  as  he 
likes  in  acting  for  another  under  the  pretext 
that  the  affairs  of  another  are  his  own  affairs. 
The  State,  while  it  respects  the  liberty  of  each 
in  what  specially  regards  himself,  is  bound  to 
maintain  a vigilant  control  over  his  exercise 
of  any  power  which  it  allows  him  to  possess 
over  others.  This  obligation  is  almost  entirely 
disregarded  in  the  case  of  the  family  relations, 
a case,  in  its  direct  influence  on  human  happi- 
ness, more  important  than  all  others  taken  to- 
gether. The  almost  despotic  power  of  hus- 
bands over  wives  needs  not  be  enlarged  upon 
here,  because  nothing  more  is  needed  for  the 
(‘omplete  removal  of  the  evil,  than  that  wives 
should  have  the  same  rights,  and  should  receive 
the  protection  of  law  in  the  same  manner,  as 
all  other  persons ; and  because,  on  this  subject 


186 


ON  LIBERTY. 


the  defenders  of  established  injustice  do  nol 
avail  themselves  of  the  plea  of  liberty,  but 
stand  forth  openly  as  the  champions  of  power. 
It  is  in  the  case  of  children,  that  misapplied 
notions  of  liberty  are  a real  obstacle  to  the  ful- 
filment by  the  State  of  its  duties.  One  would 
almost  think  that  a man’s  children  were  sup- 
posed to  be  literally,  and  not  metaphorically,  a 
part  of  himself,  so  jealous  is  opinion  of  the 
smallest  interference  of  law  with  his  absolute 
and  exclusive  control  over  them  ; more  jealous 
than  of  almost  any  interference  with  his  own 
freedom  of  action  : so  much  less  do  the  gen- 
erality of  mankind  value  liberty  than  power. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  case  of  education. 
Is  it  not  almost  a self-evident  axiom,  that  the 
State  should  require  and  compel  the  educa- 
tion, up  to  a certain  standard,  of  every  human 
being  who  is  born  its  citizen  ? Yet  who  is 
there  that  is  not  afraid  to  recognize  and  assert 
this  truth  ? Hardly  any  one  indeed  will  deny 
that  it  is  one  of  the  most  sacred  duties  of  the 
parents  (or,  as  law  and  usage  now  stand,  the 
father),  after  summoning  a human  being  into 
the  world,  to  give  to  that  being  an  education 
fitting  him  to  perform  his  part  well  in  life  to- 
wards others  and  towards  himself.  But  while 
this  is  unanimously  declared  to  be  the  father’s 
duty,  scarcely  anybody,  in  this  country,  will 
bear  to  heai  of  obliging  him  to  perform  it.  In- 
stead of  his  being  required  to  make  any  exer 
tion  or  sacrifice  for  securing  education  to  the 


ON  LIBERTY. 


187 


child,  it  is  left  to  his  choice  to  accept  it  or  not 
when  it  is  provided  gratis ! It  still  remains 
unrecognized,  that  to  bring  a child  into  exist- 
ence without  a fair  prospect  of  being  able,  not 
only  to  provide  food  for  its  body,  but  instruc- 
tion and  training  for  its  mind,  is  a moral  crime, 
both  against  the  unfortunate  offspring  and 
against  society;  and  that  if  the  parent  does 
not  fulfil  this  obligation,  the  State  ought  to  see 
it  fulfilled  at  the  charge,  as  far  as  possible,  of 
the  parent. 

Were  the  duty  of  enforcing  universal  educa- 
tion once  admitted,  there  would  be  an  end  to 
the  difficulties  about  what  the  State  should 
teach,  and  how  it  should  teach,  which  now 
convert  the  subject  into  a mere  battle-field  foi 
sects  and  parties,  causing  the  time  and  labor 
which  should  have  been  spent  in  educating,  to 
be  wasted  in  quarrelling  about  education.  If 
the  government  would  make  up  its  mind  to 
require  for  every  child  a good  education,  it 
might  save  itself  the  trouble  of  providing  one. 
It  might  leave  to  parents  to  obtain  the  educa- 
tion where  and  how  they  pleased,  and  content 
itself  with  helping  to  pay  the  school  fees  of  the 
poorer  classes  of  children,  and  defraying  the 
entire  school  expenses  of  those  who  have  no 
one  else  to  pay  for  them.  The  objections 
which  are  urged  with  reason  against  State 
education,  do  not  apply  to  the  enforcement  of 
education  by  the  State,  but  to  the  State’s  tak- 
ing upon  itself  to  direct  that  education  : which 


188 


ON  LIBERTY. 


is  a totally  different  thing.  That  the  whole  oi 
any  large  part  of  the  education  of  the  people 
should  be  in  State  hands,  I go  as  far  as  any 
one  in  deprecating.  All  that  has  been  said  of 
the  importance  of  individuality  of  character, 
and  diversity  in  opinions  and  modes  of  con- 
duct, involves,  as  of  the  same  unspeakable  im- 
portance, diversity  of  education.  A general 
State  education  is  a mere  contrivance  foi 
moulding  people  to  be  exactly  like  one  an- 
other: and  as  the  mould  in  which  it  casts 
them  is  that  which  pleases  the  predominant 
power  in  the  government,  whether  this  be  a 
monarch,  a priesthood,  an  aristocracy,  or  the 
majority  of  the  existing  generation,  in  propor- 
tion as  it  is  efficient  and  successful,  it  estab- 
lishes a despotism  over  the  mind,  leading  by 
natural  tendency  to  one  over  the  body.  An 
education  established  and  controlled  by  the 
State,  should  only  exist,  if  it  exist  at  all,  as 
one  among  many  competing  experiments,  car- 
ried on  for  the  purpose  of  example  and  stimu 
lus,  to  keep  the  others  up  to  a certain  standard 
of  excellence.  Unless,  indeed,  when  -^lociety  in 
general  is  in  so  backward  a state  that  it  could 
not  or  would  not  provide  for  itself  any  proper 
institutions  of  education,  unless  the  govern- 
ment undertook  the  task ; then,  indeed,  the 
government  may,  as  the  less  of  two  great  evils, 
take  upon  itself  the  business  of  schools  and 
universities,  as  it  may  that  of  joint-stock  com- 
panies, when  private  enterprise,  in  a shape  fit^ 


ON  LIBERTY. 


18S 


f:ed  for  undertaking  great  works  of  industry 
does  not  exist  in  the  country.  But  in  general, 
if  the  country  contains  a sufficient  number  of 
persons  qualified  to  provide  education  under 
government  auspices,  the  same  persons  would 
be  able  and  willing  to  give  an  equally  good 
education  on  the  voluntary  principle,  under 
the  assurance  of  remuneration  afforded  by  a 
law  rendering  education  compulsory,  combined 
with  State  aid  to  those  unable  to  defray  the 
expense. 

The  instrument  for  enforcing  the  law  could 
be  no  other  than  public  examinations,  extend- 
ing to  all  children,  and  beginning  at  an  early 
age.  An  age  might  be  fixed  at  which  every 
child  must  be  examined,  to  ascertain  if  he  (or 
she)  is  able  to  read.  If  a child  proves  unable, 
the  father,  unless  he  has  some  sufficient  ground 
of  excuse,  might  be  subjected  to  a moderate 
fine,  to  be  worked  out,  if  necessary,  by  his 
labor,  and  the  child  might  be  put  to  school  at 
his  expense.  Once  in  every  year  the  examina- 
tion should  be  renewed,  with  a gradually  ex- 
tending range  of  subjects,  so  as  to  make  the 
universal  acquisition,  and  what  is  more,  reten- 
tion, of  a certain  minimum  of  general  knowl- 
edge, virtually  compulsory.  Beyond  that  min- 
imum, there  should  be  voluntary  examinations 
on  all  subjects,  at  which  all  who  come  up  to 
a certain  standard  of  proficiency  might  claim 
a certificate.  To  prevent  the  State  from  exer- 
cising through  these  arrangements,  an  impropei 


190 


ON  LIBERTY. 


influence  over  opinion,  the  knowledge  required 
for  passing  an  examination  (beyond  the  merely 
instrumental  parts  of  knowledge,  such  as  lan- 
guages and  their  use)  should,  even  in  the  high- 
er class  of  examinations,  be  confined  to  facts 
and  positive  science  exclusively.  The  exami- 
nations on  religion,  politics,  or  other  disputed 
topics,  should  not  turn  on  the  truth  or  false- 
hood of  opinions,  but  on  the  matter  of  fact 
that  such  and  such  an  opinion  is  held,  on 
such  grounds,  by  such  authors,  or  schools,  oi 
churches.  Under  this  system,  the  rising  gen- 
eration would  be  no  worse  off*  in  regard  to  all 
disputed  truths,  than  they  are  at  present ; they 
would  be  brought  up  either  churchmen  or  dis- 
senters as  they  now  are,  the  State  merely  tak 
ing  care  that  they  should  be  instructed  church- 
men, or  instructed  dissenters.  There  would 
be  nothing  to  hinder  them  from  being  taught 
religion,  if  their  parents  chose,  at  the  same 
schools  where  they  were  taught  other  things. 
All  attempts  by  the  State  to  bias  the  conclu- 
sions of  its  citizens  on  disputed  subjects,  are 
evil ; but  it  may  very  properly  offer  to  ascer- 
tain and  certify  that  a person  possesses  the 
knowledge,  requisite  to  make  his  conclusions, 
on  any  given  subject,  worth  attending  to.  A 
student  of  philosophy  would  be  the  better  for 
being  able  to  stand  an  examination  both  in 
Locke  and  in  Kant,  whichever  of  the  two  he 
takes  up  with,  or  even  if  with  neither : and 
there  is  no  reas\:)nable  objection  to  examining 


ON  LIBERTY. 


191 


an  atheist  in  the  evidences  of  Christianity,  pro- 
vided he  is  not  required  to  profess  a belief  in 
them.  The  examinations,  however,  in  the 
higher  branches  of  knowledge  should,  I con- 
ceive, be  entirely  voluntary.  It  would  be  giv- 
ing too  dangerous  a power  to  governments, 
were  they  allowed  to  exclude  any  one  from 
professions,  even  from  the  profession  of  teach- 
er, for  alleged  deficiency  of  qualifications  : and 
I think,  with  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt,  that  de- 
grees, or  other  public  certificates  of  scientific 
or  professional  acquirements,  should  be  given 
to  all  who  present  themselves  for  examination, 
and  stand  the  test ; but  that  such  certificates 
snould  confer  no  advantage  over  competitors, 
other  than  the  weight  which  may  be  attached 
to  their  testimony  by  public  opinion. 

It  is  not  in  the  matter  of  education  only, 
that  misplaced  notions  of  liberty  prevent  moral 
obligations  on  the  part  of  parents  from  being 
recognized,  and  legal  obligations  from  being 
imposed,  where  there  are  the  strongest  grounds 
for  the  former  always,  and  in  many  cases  for 
the  latter  also.  The  fact  itself,  of  causing  the 
existence  of  a human  being,  is  one  of  the  most 
responsible  actions  in  the  range  of  human  life. 
To  undertake  this  responsibility  — to  bestow  a 
life  which  may  be  either  a curse  or  a blessing 
— unless  the  being  on  whom  it  is  to  be  be- 
stowed will  have  at  east  the  ordinary  chances 
of  a desirable  existence,  is  a crime  against  tnat 
being.  And  in  a country  either  over-peopled. 


192 


ON  LIBERTY. 


or  threatened  with  being  so,  to  produce  ciiil 
dren,  beyond  a very  small  number,  with  the 
effect  of  reducing  the  reward  of  labor  by  their 
competition,  is  a serious  offence  against  all 
who  live  by  the  remuneration  of  their  labor. 
The  laws  which,  in  many  countries  on  the 
Continent,  forbid  marriage  unless  the  parties 
can  show  that  they  have  the  means  of  sup- 
porting a family,  do  not  exceed  the  legitimate 
powers  of  the  State  : and  whether  such  laws 
be  expedient  or  not  (a  question  mainly  depen 
dent  on  local  circumstances  and  feelings),  they 
are  not  objectionable  as  violations  of  liberty. 
Such  laws  are  interferences  of  the  State  to  pro- 
hibit a mischievous  act — an  act  injurious  to 
others,  which  ought  to  be  a subject  of  reproba- 
tion, and  social  stigma,  even  when  it  is  not 
deemed  expedient  to  superadd  legal  punish- 
ment. Yet  the  current  ideas  of  liberty,  which 
bend  so  easily  to  real  infringements  of  the 
freedom  of  the  individual,  in  things  which 
concern  only  himself,  would  repel  the  attempt 
to  put  any  restraint  upon  his  inclinations  when 
the  consequence  of  their  indulgence  is  a life, 
or  lives,  of  wretchedness  and  depravity  to  the 
offspring,  with  manifold  evils  to  those  suffi- 
ciently within  reach  to  be  in  any  way  affected 
by  their  actions.  When  we  compare  the 
strange  respect  of  mankind  for  liberty,  with 
their  strange  want  of  respect  for  it,  we  might 
imagine  that  a man  had  an  indispensable 
right  to  do  harm  to  others,  and  no  right  at 


ON  LIBERTY. 


193 


all  to  please  himself  without  giving  pain  to 
any  one. 

I have  reserved  for  the  last  place  a large  class 
of  questions  respecting  the  limits  of  govern- 
ment interference,  which,  though  closely  con- 
nected with  the  subject  of  this  Essay,  do  not, 
in  strictness,  belong  to  it.  These  are  cases  in 
which  the  reasons  against  interference  do  not 
turn  upon  the  principle  of  liberty:  the  question 
is  not  about  restraining  .the  actions  of  individ- 
uals, but  about  helping  them : it  is  asked 
whether  the  government  should  do,  or  cause  to 
be  done,  something  for  their  benefit,  instead  of 
leaving  it  to  be  done  by  themselves,  individu- 
ally, or  in  voluntary  combination. 

The  objections  to  government  interference, 
when  it  is  not  such  as  to  involve  infringement 
of  liberty,  may  be  of  three  kinds. 

The  first  is,  when  the  thing  to  be  done  is 
likely  to  be  better  done  by  individuals  than  by 
the  government.  Speaking  generally,  there  is 
no  one  so  fit  to  conduct  any  business,  or  to  de- 
termine how  or  by  whom  it  shall  be  conducted, 
as  those  who  are  personally  interested  in  it. 
This  principle  condemns  the  interferences,  once 
so  common,  of  the  legislature,  or  the  officers  of 
government,  with  the  ordinary  processes  of  in- 
dustry. But  this  part  of  the  subject  has  been 
sufficiently  enlarged  upon  by  political  econo- 
mists, and  is  not  particularly  related  to  the 
principles  of  this  Essay. 

The  second  objection  is  more  nearly  allied  to 
9 


194: 


ON  LIBERTY. 


our  subject.  In  many  cases,  though  individu- 
als may  not  do  the  particular  thing  so  well,  on 
the  average,  as  the  officers  of  government)  it  is 
nevertheless  desirable  that  it  should  be  done  by 
them,  rather  than  by  the  government,  as  a 
means  to  their  own  mental  education — a mode 
of  strengthening  their  active  faculties,  exercis- 
ing their  judgment,  and  giving  them  a familiar 
knowledge  of  the  subjects  with  which  they  are 
thus  left  to  deal.  This  is  a principal,  though 
not  the  sole,  recommendation  of  jury  trial  (in 
cases  not  political) ; of  free  and  popular  local 
and  municipal  institutions ; of  the  conduct  of 
industrial  and  philanthropic  enterprises  by  vol- 
untary associations.  These  are  not  questions 
of  liberty,  and  are  connected  with  that  subject 
only  by  remote  tendencies  ; but  they  are  ques- 
tions of  development.  It  belongs  to  a different 
occasion  from  the  present  to  dwell  on  these 
things  as  parts  of  national  education  ; as  being, 
in  truth,  the  peculiar  training  of  a citizen,  the 
practical  part  of  the  political  education  of  a 
free  people,  taking  them  out  of  the  narrow  cir- 
cle of  personal  and  family  selfishness,  and  ac- 
customing them  to  the  comprehension  of  joint 
interests,  the  management  of  joint  concerns  — 
habituating  them  to  act  from  public  or  semi- 
public motives,  and  guide  their  conduct  by 
aims  which  unite  instead  of  isolating  them 
from  one  another.  Without  these  habits  and 
powers,  a free  constitution  can  neither  be 
worked  nor  preserved,  as  is  exemplified  by  fhe 


ON  LIBERTY. 


195 


too-often  transitory  nature  of  political  freedom 
in  countries  where  it  does  not  rest  upon  a suffi- 
cient basis  of  local  liberties.  The  management 
of  purely  local  business  by  the  localities,  and 
of  the  great  enterprises  of  industry  by  the 
union  of  those  who  voluntarily  supply  the  pe- 
cuniary means,  is  further  recommended  by  all 
the  advantages  which  have  been  set  forth  in 
this  Essay  as  belonging  to  individuality  of  de- 
velopment, and  diversity  of  modes  of  action. 
Government  operations  tend  to  be  everywhere 
alike.  With  individuals  and  voluntary  asso- 
ciations, on  the  contrary,  there  are  varied  ex- 
periments, and  endless  diversity  of  experience. 
What  the  State  can  usefully  do,  is  to  make 
itself  a central  depository,  and  active  circulator 
and  diffuser,  of  the  experience  resulting  from 
many  trials.  Its  business  is  to  enable  each  ex- 
perimentalist to  benefit  by  the  experiments  of 
others,  instead  of  tolerating  no  experiments  but 
its  own. 

The  third,  and  most  cogent  reason  for  re- 
stricting the  interference  of  government,  is  the 
great  evil  of  adding  unnecessarily  to  its  power. 
Every  function  superadded  to  those  already  ex- 
ercised by  the  government,  causes  its  influence 
over  hopes  and  fears  to  be  more  widely  diffused, 
ani  converts,  more  and  more,  the  active  and 
arr.bitious  part  of  the  public  into  hangers-on 
of  the  government,  or  of  some  party  which 
aims  at  becoming  the  government  It  the 
roads,  the  railways,  the  banks,  the  insurance 


196 


ON  LIBERTY. 


offices,  the  gi-eat  joint-stock  companies,  the 
universities,  and  the  public  charities,  were  all 
of  them  branches  of  the  government;  if,  in 
addition,  the  municipal  corporations  and  loca) 
boards,  with  all  that  now  devolves  on  them,  be- 
came departments  of  the  central  administration; 
if  the  employes  of  all  these  different  enterprises 
were  appointed  and  paid  by  the  government, 
and  looked  to  the  government  for  every  rise  in 
life ; not  all  the  freedom  of  the  press  and  popu- 
lar constitution  of  the  legislature  would  make 
this  or  any  other  country  free  otherwise  than 
in  name.  And  the  evil  would  be  greater,  the 
more  efficiently  and  scientifically  the  adminis- 
trative machinery  was  constructed  — the  more 
skilful  the  arrangements  for  obtaining  the  best 
qualified  hands  and  heads  with  which  to  work 
it.  In  England  it  has  of  late  been  proposed 
that  all  the  members  of  the  civil  service  of 
government  should  be  selected  by  competitive 
examination,  to  obtain  for  those  employments 
the  most  intelligent  and  instructed  persons  pro- 
curable ; and  much  has  been  said  and  written 
for  and  against  this  proposal.  One  of  the 
arguments  most  insisted  on  by  its  opponents, 
is  that  the  occupation  of  a permanent  official 
servant  of  the  State  does  not  hold  out  suffic- 
ient prospects  of  emolument  and  importance  to 
attract  the  highest  talents,  which  will  always 
be  able  to  find  a more  inviting  career  in  the 
professions,  or  in  the  service  of  companies  and 
other  public  bodies.  One  would  not  have  been 


ON  LIBERTY. 


197 


surprised  if  this  argument  had  been  used  by 
the  friends  of  the  proposition,  as  an  answer  to 
its  principal  difficulty.  Coming  from  the  op- 
ponents it  is  strange  enough.  What  is  urged 
as  an  objection  is  the  safety-valve  of  the  pro- 
posed system.  If  indeed  all  the  high  talent  of 
the  country  could  be  drawn  into  the  service  of 
the  government,  a proposal  tending  to  bring 
about  that  result  might  well  inspire  uneasiness. 
If  every  part  of  the  business  of  society  which  re- 
quired organized  concert,  or  large  and  compre 
hensive  views,  were  in  the  hands  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  if  government  offices  were  univer- 
sally filled  by  the  ablest  men,  all  the  enlarged 
culture  and  practised  intelligence  in  the  country, 
except  the  purely  speculative,  would  be  concen- 
trated in  a numerous  bureaucracy,  to  whom 
alone  the  rest  of  the  community  would  look 
for  all  things : the  multitude  for  direction  and 
dictation  in  all  they  had  to  do;  the  able  and 
aspiring  for  personal  advancement.  To  be  ad- 
mitted into  the  ranks  of  this  bureaucracy,  and 
when  admitted,  to  rise  therein,  would  be  the 
sole  objects  of  ambition*  Under  this  regime, 
not  only  is  the  outside  public  ill-qualified,  for 
want  of  practical  experience,  to  criticize  or 
check  the  mode  of  operation  of  the  bureau- 
cracy, but  even  if  the  accidents  of  despotic  or 
the  natural  working  of  popular  institutions  oc- 
casionally raise  to  the  summit  a ruler  or  rulers 
of  reforming  inclinations,  no  reform  can  be 
effected  which  is  contrary  to  the  interest  of 


198 


ON  LIBERTY. 


the  bureaucracy.  Such  is  the  melancholy  con 
dition  of  the  Russian  empire,  as  is  shown  in 
the  accounts  of  those  who  have  had  sufficient 
opportunity  of  observation.  The  Czar  himself 
is  powerless  against  the  bureaucratic  body  ; he 
can  send  any  one  of  them  to  Siberia,  but  he 
cannot  govern  without  them,  or  against  their 
will.  On  every  decree  of  his  they  have  a tacit 
veto,  by  merely  refraining  from  carrying  it  into 
effect.  In  countries  of  more  advanced  civiliza- 
tion and  of  a more  insurrectionary  spirit,  the 
public,  accustomed  to  expect  everything  to  be 
done  for  them  by  the  State,  or  at  least  to  do 
nothing  for  themselves  without  asking  from 
the  State  not  only  leave  to  do  it,  but  even 
how  it  is  to  be  done,  naturally  hold  the  State 
responsible  for  all  evil  which  befalls  them, 
and  when  the  evil  exceeds  their  amount  of 
patience,  they  rise  against  the  government  and 
make  what  is  called  a revolution  ; whereupon 
somebody  else,  with  or  without  legitimate  au 
thority  from  the  nation,  vaults  into  the  seat, 
issues  his  orders  to  the  bureaucracy,  and  every- 
thing goes  on  much  as  it  did  before  ; the  bu- 
reaucracy being  unchanged,  and  nobody  else 
being  capable  of  taking  their  place. 

A very  different  spectacle  is  exhibited  among 
a people  accustomed  to  transact  their  own  busi- 
ness. In  France,  a large  part  of  the  people 
having  been  engaged  in  military  service,  many 
of  whom  have  held  at  least  the  rank  of  non- 
commissioned officers,  there  are  in  every  pop- 


ON  LIBERTY. 


199 


ular  insurrection  several  persons  compe  ent  tc 
take  the  lead,  and  improvise  some  tolerable 
plan  of  action.  What  the  French  are  in  mili- 
tary affairs,  the  Americans  are  in  every  kind 
of  civil  business;  let  them  be  left  without  a 
government,  every  body  of  Americans  is  able 
to  improvise  one,  and  to  carry  on  that  or  any 
other  public  business  with  a sufficient  amount 
of  intelligence,  order,  and  decision.  This 
what  every  free  people  ought  to  be  : and  a 
people  capable  of  this  is  certain  to  be  free  ; it 
will  never  let  itself  be  enslaved  by  any  man  oi 
body  of  men  because  these  are  able  to  seize 
and  pull  the  reins  of  the  central  administration. 
No  bureaucracy  can  hope  to  make  such  a peo- 
ple as  this  do  or  undergo  anything  that  they 
do  not  like.  But  where  everything  is  done 
through  the  bureaucracy,  nothing  to  which  the 
bureaucracy  is  really  adverse  can  be  done  at  all. 
The  constitution  of  such  countries  is  an  organ- 
ization of  the  experience  and  practical  ability 
of  the  nation,  into  a disciplined  body  for  the 
purpose  of  governing  the  rest ; and  the  more 
perfect  that  organization  is  in  itself,  the  more 
successful  in  drawing  to  itself  and  educating 
for  itself  the  persons  of  greatest  capacity  from 
all  ranks  of  the  community,  the  more  complete 
is  the  bondage  of  all,  the  members  of  the  bu- 
reaucracy included.  For  the  governors  are  as 
much  the  slaves  of  their  organization  and  dis- 
cipline, as  the  governed  are  of  the  governors. 
A Chinese  mandarin  is  as  much  the  tool  and 


200 


ON  LIBERTY. 


creature  of  a despotism  as  the  humblest  culti- 
vator. An  individual  Jesuit  is  to  the  utmost 
degree  of  abasement  the  slave  of  his  order 
though  the  order  itself  exists  for  the  collective 
power  and  importance  of  its  members. 

It  is  not,  also,  to  be  forgotten,  that  the  ab- 
sorption of  all  the  principal  ability  of  the  coun- 
try into  the  governing  body  is  fatal,  sooner  or 
later,  to  the  mental  activity  and  progressiveness 
of  the  body  itself.  Banded  together  as  they 
are  — working  a system  which,  like  all  sys- 
tems, necessarily  proceeds  in  a great  measure 
by  fixed  rules  — the  official  body  are  under  the 
constant  temptation  of  sinking  into  indolent 
routine,  or,  if  they  now  and  then  desert  that 
mill-horse  round,  of  rushing  into  some  half- 
examined  crudity  which  has  struck  the  fancy 
of  some  leading  member  of  the  corps  : and  the 
sole  check  to  these  closely  allied,  though  seem- 
ingly opposite,  tendencies,  the  only  stimulus 
which  can  keep  the  ability  of  the  body  itself 
up  to  a high  standard,  is  liability  to  the  watch- 
ful criticism  of  equal  ability  outside  the  body. 
It  is  indispensable,  therefore,  that  the  means 
should  exist,  independently  of  the  government, 
of  forming  such  ability,  and  furnishing  it  with 
the  opportunities  and  experience  necessary  for 
a correct  judgment  of  great  practical  affairs. 
If  we  would  possess  permanently  a skilful  and 
efficient  body  of  functionaries  — above  all,  a 
body  able  to  originate  and  willing  to  adopt 
improvements ; if  we  would  not  have  our  bu 


ON  LIBERTY. 


201 


reaucracy  degenerate  into  a pedantocracy,  this 
body  must  not  engross  all  the  occupations 
which  form  and  cultivate  the  faculties  required 
for  the  government  of  mankind. 

To  determine  the  point  at  which  evils,  so  for- 
midable to  human  freedom  and  advancement, 
begin,  or  rather  at  which  they  begin  to  predo- 
minate over  the  benefits  attending  the  collec- 
tive application  of  the  force  of  society,  under 
its  recognized  chiefs,  for  the  removal  of  the 
obstacles  which  stand  in  the  way  of  its  well- 
being , to  secure  as  much  of  the  advantages 
of  centralized  power  and  intelligence,  as  can 
be  had  without  turning  into  governmental 
channels  too  great  a proportion  of  the  gen- 
eral activity,  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  and 
complicated  questions  in  the  art  of  govern- 
ment. It  is,  in  a great  measure,  a question  of 
detail,  in  which  many  and  various  considera- 
tions must  be  kept  in  view,  and  no  absolute 
rule  can  be  laid  down.  But  I believe  that  the 
practical  principle  in  which  safety  resides,  the 
ideal  to  be  kept  in  view,  the  standard  by  which 
to  test  all  arrangements  intended  for  overcom- 
ing the  difficulty,  may  be  conveyed  in  these 
words : the  greatest  dissemination  of  power 
consistent  with  efficiency ; but  the  greatest 
possible  centralization  of  information,  and 
diffusion  of  it  from  the  centre.  Thus,  in 
municipal  administration,  there  would  be,  as 
in  the  New  England  States,  a very  minute 
division  among  separate  officers,  chosen  by  the 


202 


ON  LIBERTY. 


localities,  of  all  business  which  is  not  better 
left  to  the  persons  directly  interested ; but  be^ 
sides  this,  there  would  be,  in  each  department 
of  local  affairs,  a central  superintendence,  form- 
ing a branch  of  the  general  government.  The 
organ  of  this  superintendence  would  concen- 
trate, as  in  a focus,  the  variety  of  information 
and  experience  derived  from  the  conduct  of  that 
branch  of  public  business  in  all  the  localitieSj 
from  everything  analogous  which  is  done  in 
foreign  countries,  and  from  the  general  princi- 
ples of  political  science.  This  central  organ 
should  have  a right  to  know  all  that  is  done, 
and  its  special  duty  should  be  that  of  making 
the  knowledge  acquired  in  one  place  available 
for  others.  Emancipated  from  the  petty  prej- 
udices and  narrow  views  of  a locality  by  its 
elevated  position  and  comprehensive  sphere  of 
observation,  its  advice  would  naturally  carry 
much  authority ; but  its  actual  power,  as  a per- 
manent institution,  should,  I conceive,  be  limit- 
ed to  compelling  the  local  officers  to  obey  the 
laws  laid  down  for  their  guidance.  In  all 
things  not  provided  for  by  general  rules,  those 
officers  should  be  left  to  their  own  judgment, 
under  responsibility  to  their  constituents.  For 
the  violation  of  rules,  they  should  be  responsi- 
ble to  law,  and  the  rules  themselves  should  be 
laid  down  by  the  legislature  ; the  central  ad- 
ministrative authority  only  watching  over  their 
execution,  and  if  they  were  not  properly  carried 
into  effect,  appealing,  according  to  the  nature 


ON  LIBERTY. 


203 


of  the  case,  to  the  tribunal  to  enforce  the  laW; 
or  to  the  constituencies  to  dismiss  the  function^ 
aries  who  had  not  executed  it  according  to  its 
spirit.  Such,  in  its  general  conception,  is  the 
central  superintendence  which  the  Poor  Law 
Board  is  intended  to  exercise  over  the  adminis- 
trators of  the  Poor  Rate  throughout  the  coun« 
try.  Whatever  powers  the  Board  exercises 
beyond  this  limit,  were  right  and  necessary  in 
that  peculiar  case,  for  the  cure  of  rooted  habits 
of  mal-administration  in  matters  deeply  aflFect- 
ing  not  the  localities  merely,  but  the  whole 
community;  since  no  locality  has  a moral 
right  to  make  itself  by  mismanagement  a nest 
of  pauperism,  necessarily  overflowing  into  other 
localities,  and  impairing  the  moral  and  physical 
condition  of  the  whole  laboring  community. 
The  powers  of  administrative  coercion  and 
subordinate  legislation  possessed  by  the  Poor 
Law  Board  (but  which,  owing  to  the  state  of 
opinion  on  the  subject,  are  very  scantily  exer- 
cised by  them),  though  perfectly  justifiable  in 
a case  of  a first-rate  national  interest,  would 
be  wholly  out  of  place  in  the  superintendence 
of  interests  purely  local.  But  a central  organ  of 
information  and  instruction  for  all  the  localities, 
would  be  equally  valuable  in  all  departments 
of  administration,  A government  cannot  have 
too  much  of  the  kind  of  activity  which  does 
Jiot  impede,  but  aids  and  stimulates,  individual 
exertion  and  development.  The  mischief  be- 
gins when,  instead  of  calling  forth  the  activity 


204: 


OlSr  LIBERTY. 


and  powers  of  individuals  and  bodies,  it  sub* 
stitutes  its  own  activity  for  theirs ; when,  in* 
stead  of  informing,  advising,  and,  upon  occa- 
sion, denouncing,  it  makes  them  work  in  fetters, 
or  bids  them  stand  aside  and  does  their  worl 
instead  of  them.  The  worth  of  a State,  in  the 
long  run,  is  the  worth  of  the  individuals  com- 
posing it ; and  a State  wh^ch  postpones  the 
interests  ol  their  mental  expansion  and  eleva 
tion,  to  a little  more  of  administrative  skill,  oj 
that  semblance  of  it  which  practice  gives,  ii 
the  details  of  business  ; a State  which  dwarfs 
its  men,  in  order  that  they  may  be  more  docile 
instruments  in  its  hands  even  for  beneficial 
purposes,  will  find  that  with  small  men  no 
great  thing  can  really  be  accomplished  ; and 
that  the  perfection  of  machinery  to  which  it 
has  sacrificed  everything,  will  in  the  end  avail 
it  nothing,  for  want  of  the  vital  power  which, 
in  order  that  the  machine  might  work  more 
smoothly,  it  has  preferred  to  banish. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN, 


CHAPTEE  L 


^HE  object  of  this  Essay  is  to  explain  as 
clearly  as  I am  able^  the  grounds  of  an 
opinion  wbicb  I have  held  from  the  very  earliest 
period  when  I had  formed  any  opinions  at  all  on 
social  or  political  matters,  and  which,  instead  of 
being  weakened  or  modified,  has  been  constantly 
growing  stronger  by  the  progress  of  refiection 
and  the  experience  of  life : That  the  principle 

which  regulates  the  existing  social  relations 
between  the  two  sexes — the  legal  subordination  of 
one  sex  to  the  other — is  wrong  in  itself,  and  now 
one  of  the  chief  hindrances  to  human  improve- 
ment ; and  that  it  ought  to  be  replaced  by  a 
principle  of  perfect  equality,  admitting  no  power 
or  privilege  on  the  one  side,  nor  disability  on  the 
other. 

The  very  words  necessary  to  express  the  task 
I have  undertaken,  show  how  arduous  it  is. 
But  it  would  be  a mistake  to  suppose  that  the 
diflBculty  of  the  case  must  lie  in  the  insufficiency 
or  obscurity  of  the  grounds  of  reason  on  which 


208 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


my  conviction  rests.  The  difficulty  is  that  which 
exists  in  all  cases  in  which  there  is  a mass  of 
feeling  to  be  contended  against.  So  long  as 
an  opinion  is  strongly  rooted  in  the  feelings^ 
it  gains  rather  than  loses  in  stability  by  having 
a preponderating  weight  of  argument  against 
it.  For  if  it  were  accepted  as  a result  of 
argument^  the  refutation  of  the  argument  might 
shake  the  solidity  of  the  conviction ; but  when  it 
rests  solely  on  feelings  the  worse  it  fares  in  argu- 
mentative contest,  the  more  persuaded  its  adhe- 
rents  are  that  their  feeling  must  have  some  deeper 
ground^  which  the  arguments  do  not  reach ; 
and  while  the  feeling  remains,  it  is  always  throw- 
ing up  fresh  intrenchments  of  argument  to  repair 
any  breach  made  in  the  old.  And  there  are  so 
many  causes  tending  to  make  the  feelings  con- 
nected with  this  subject  the  most  intense  and 
most  deeply-rooted  of  all  those  which  gather 
round  and  protect  old  institutions  and  customs, 
that  we  need  not  wonder  to  find  them  as  yet  less 
undermined  and  loosened  than  any  of  the  rest 
by  the  progress  of  the  great  modern  spiritual  and 
social  transition ; nor  suppose  that  the  barbarisms 
to  which  men  cling  longest  must  be  less  bar- 
barisms than  those  which  they  earlier  shake  off. 

In  every  respect  the  burthen  is  hard  on  those 
who  attack  an  almost  universal  opinion.  They 
must  be  very  fortunate  as  well  as  unusually 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


209 


capable  if  they  obtain  a hearing  at  all.  They 
have  more  difficulty  in  obtaining  a trials  than 
any  other  litigants  have  in  getting  a verdict.  If 
they  do  extort  a hearings  they  are  subjected  to  a 
set  of  logical  requirements  totally  dilferent  from 
those  exacted  from  other  people.  In  all  other 
cases^  the  burthen  of  proof  is  supposed  to  lie  with 
the  affirmative.  If  a person  is  charged  with  a 
murder,  it  rests  with  those  who  accuse  him  to 
give  proof  of  his  guilt,  not  with  himself  to  prove 
his  innocence.  If  there  is  a difference  of  opinion 
about  the  reality  of  any  alleged  historical  event, 
in  Avhich  the  feelings  of  men  in  general  are  not 
much  interested,  as  the  Siege  of  Troy  for 
example,  those  who  maintain  that  the  event  took 
place  are  expected  to  produce  their  proofs,  before 
those  who  take  the  other  side  can  be  required  to 
say  anything;  and  at  no  time  are  these  re- 
quired to  do  more  than  show  that  the  evidence 
produced  by  the  others  is  of  no  value.  Again,  in 
practical  matters,  the  burthen  of  proof  is  sup- 
posed to  be  with  those  who  are  against  liberty ; 
who  contend  for  any  restriction  or  prohibi- 
tion ; either  any  limitation  of  the  general  freedom 
of  human  action,  or  any  disqualification  or  dis- 
parity of  privilege  affecting  one  person  or  kind 
of  persons,  as  compared  with  others.  The 
a priori  presumption  is  in  favour  of  freedom 
and  impartiality.  It  is  held  that  there  should 


210 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


be  no  restraint  not  required  by  the  general  good, 
and  that  the  law  should  be  no  respecter  of  persons, 
but  should  treat  all  alike,  save  where  dissimilarity 
of  treatment  is  required  by  positive  reasons,  eitlicr 
of  justice  or  of  policy.  But  of  none  of  these  rules 
of  evidence  will  the  benefit  be  allowed  to  those 
who  maintain  the  opinion  I profess.  It  is  use- 
less for  me  to  say  that  those  who  maintain  the 
doctrine  that  men  have  a right  to  command  and 
women  are  under  an  obligation  to  obey,  or  that 
men  are  lit  for  government  and  women  unfit,  are 
on  the  affirmative  side  of  the  question,  and  that 
they  are  bound  to  show  positive  evidence  for  the 
assertions,  or  submit  to  their  rejection.  It  is 
equally  unavailing  for  me  to  say  that  those  who 
deny  to  women  any  freedom  or  privilege  rightly 
allowed  to  men,  having  the  double  presumption 
against  them  that  they  are  opposing  freedom 
and  recommending  partiality,  must  be  held  to 
the  strictest  proof  of  their  case,  and  unless  their 
success  be  such  as  to  exclude  all  doubt,  the  judg- 
ment ought  to  go  against  them.  These  would  be 
thought  good  pleas  in  any  common  case ; but 
they  will  not  be  thought  so  in  this  instance. 
Before  I could  hope  to  make  any  impression, 
I should  be  expected  not  only  to  answer 
all  that  has  ever  been  said  by  those  who  take 
the  other  side  of  the  question,  but  to  imagine 
aU  that  could  be  said  by  them — ^to  find  them 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


211 


in  reasons,  as  well  as  answer  all  I find:  and 
besides  refuting  all  arguments  for  tbe  affirmative, 
I shall  be  called  upon  for  invincible  positive 
arguments  to  prove  a negative.  And  even  if  1 
could  do  all  this,  and  leave  the  opposite  party 
with  a host  of  unanswered  arguments  against 
them,  and  not  a single  unrefuted  one  on  their  side, 
I should  be  thought  to  have  done  little ; for 
a cause  supported  on  the  one  hand  by  universal 
usage,  and  on  the  other  by  so  great  a preponde- 
rance of  popular  sentiment,  is  supposed  to  have  a 
presumption  in  its  favour,  superior  to  any  con- 
viction which  an  appeal  to  reason  has  power  to 
produce  in  any  intellects  but  those  of  a high  class. 

I do  not  mention  these  difiiculties  to  complain 
of  them ; first,  because  it  would  be  useless ; they 
are  inseparable  from  having  to  contend  through 
people^s  understandings  against  the  hostility 
of  their  feelings  and  practical  tendencies  : and 
truly  the  understandings  of  the  majority  of  man- 
kind would  need  to  be  much  better  cultivated  than 
has  ever  yet  been  the  case,  before  they  can  be 
asked  to  place  such  reliance  in  their  own  power 
of  estimating  arguments,  as  to  give  up  practical 
principles  in  which  they  have  been  born  and  bred 
and  which  are  the  basis  of  much  of  the  existing 
order  of  the  world,  at  the  first  argumentative 
attack  which  they  are  not  capable  of  logically 
resisting.  I do  not  therefore  quarrel  with  them 


212 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


for  having  too  little  faith  in  argument,  but  for 
having  too  much  faith  in  custom  and  the  general 
feeling.  It  is  one  of  the  characteristic  preju- 
dices of  the  reaction  of  the  nineteenth  century 
against  the  eighteenth,  to  accord  to  the  unrea- 
soning elements  in  human  nature  the  infallibility 
which  the  eighteenth  century  is  supposed  to  have 
ascribed  to  the  reasoning  elements.  For  the 
apotheosis  of  Reason  we  have  substituted  that  of 
Instinct ; and  we  call  everything  instinct  which 
we  find  in  ourselves  and  for  which  we  cannot 
trace  any  rational  foundation.  This  idolatry, 
infinitely  more  degrading  than  the  other,  and 
the  most  pernicious  of  the  false  worships  of 
the  present  day,  of  all  of  which  it  is  now  the 
main  support,  will  probably  hold  its  ground  until 
it  gives  way  before  a sound  psychology,  laying 
bare  the  real  root  of  much  that  is  bowed  down 
to  as  the  intention  of  Nature  and  the  ordinance 
of  God.  As  regards  the  present  question,  I am 
willing  to  accept  tbe  unfavourable  conditions 
which  the  prejudice  assigns  to  me.  I consent 
that  established  custom,  and  the  general  feeling, 
should  be  deemed  conclusive  against  me,  unless 
that  custom  and  feeling  from  age  to  age  can  be 
shown  to  have  owed  their  existence  to  other 
causes  than  their  soundness,  and  to  have  derived 
their  power  from  the  worse  rather  than  the  better 
parts  of  human  nature.  I am  willing  that  judg- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


213 


ment  should  go  against  me^  unless  I can  slio^ 
that  my  judge  has  been  tampered  with.  The  con- 
cession is  not  so  great  as  it  might  appear ; for  to 
prove  this^  is  by  far  the  easiest  portion  of  my  task. 

The  generality  of  a practice  is  in  some  cases  a 
strong  presumption  that  it  is^  or  at  all  events 
once  w^s^  conducive  to  laudable  ends.  This  is 
the  case^  when  the  practice  was  first  adopted^  or 
afterwards  kept  up^  as  a means  to  such  ends^  and 
was  grounded  on  experience  of  the  mode  in  which 
they  could  be  most  effectually  attained.  If  the 
authority  of  men  over  women^  when  first  esta- 
blished^ had  been  the  result  of  a conscientious 
comparison  between  different  modes  of  consti- 
tuting the  government  of  society ; if^  after  trying 
various  other  modes  of  social  organization — ^the 
government  of  women  over  men^  equality  between 
the  two^  and  such  mixed  and  divided  modes  of 
government  as  might  be  invented — it  had  been 
decided^  on  the  testimony  of  experience,  that  the 
mode  in  which  women  are  wholly  under  the  rule 
of  men,  having  no  share  at  all  in  public  concerns, 
and  each  in  private  being  under  the  legal  ob- 
ligation of  obedience  to  the  man  with  whom  she 
has  associated  her  destiny,  was  the  arrangement 
most  conducive  to  the  happiness  and  well  being  of 
both ; its  general  adoption  might  then  be  fairly 
thought  to  be  some  evidence  that,  at  the  time 
when  it  was  adopted,  it  was  the  best : though  even 


214 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


then  the  considerations  which  recommended  it 
may^  like  so  many  other  primeval  social  facts  of 
the  greatest  importance^  have  subsequently,  in  the 
course  of  ages,  ceased  to  exist.  But  the  state  of 
the  case  is  in  every  respect  the  reverse  of  this. 
In  the  first  place,  the  opinion  in  favour  of  the 
present  system,  which  entirely  subordinates  the 
weaker  sex  to  the  stronger,  rests  upon  theory 
only ; for  there  never  has  been  trial  made  of 
any  other  : so  that  experience,  in  the  sense  in 
which  it  is  vulgarly  opposed  to  theory,  cannot  be 
pretended  to  have  pronounced  any  verdict.  And 
in  the  second  place,  the  adoption  of  this  system 
of  inequality  never  was  the  result  of  deliberation, 
or  forethought,  or  any  social  ideas,  or  any  notion 
whatever  of  what  conduced  to  the  benefit  of 
humanity  or  the  good  order  of  society.  It  arose 
simply  from  the  fact  that  from  the  very  earliest 
twilight  of  human  society,  every  woman  (owing 
to  the  value  attached  to  her  by  men,  combined 
with  her  inferiority  in  muscular  strength)  was 
found  in  a state  of  bondage  to  some  man. 
Laws  and  systems  of  polity  always  begin  by 
recognising  the  relations  they  find  already  exist- 
ing between  individuals.  They  convert  what 
was  a mere  physical  fact  into  a legal  right,  give 
it  the  sanction  of  society,  and  principally  aim  at 
the  substitution  of  public  and  organized  means 
of  asserting  and  protecting  these  rights,  instead 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


215 


of  tlie  irregular  and  lawless  conflict  of  physical 
strength.  Those  who  had  already  been  compelled 
to  obedience  became  in  this  manner  legally  bound 
to  it.  Slavery^  from  being  a mere  afiair  of  force 
between  the  master  and  the  slave^  became  regu- 
larized and  a matter  of  compact  among  the 
masters,,  who^  binding  themselves  to  one  another 
for  common  protection,  guaranteed  by  their 
collective  strength  the  private  possessions  of 
each,  including  his  slaves.  In  early  times, 
the  great  majority  of  the  male  sex  w^ere  slaves, 
as  well  as  the  whole  of  the  female.  And  many 
ages  elapsed,  some  of  them  ages  of  high  culti- 
vation, before  any  thinker  was  bold  enough  to 
question  the  rightfulness,  and  the  absolute  social 
necessity,  either  of  the  one  slavery  or  of  the 
other.  By  degrees  such  thinkers  did  arise:  and 
(the  general  progress  of  society  assisting)  the 
slavery  of  the  male  sex  has,  in  all  the  countries 
of  Christian  Europe  at  least  (though,  in  one  of 
them,  only  wdthin  the  last  few  years)  been  at 
length  abolished,  and  that  of  the  female  sex  has 
been  gradually  changed  into  a milder  form  of 
dependence.  But  this  dependence,  as  it  exists 
at  present,  is  not  an  original  institution,  taking 
a fresh  start  from  considerations  of  justice  and 
social  expediency — it  is  the  primitive  state  of 
slavery  lasting  on,  through  successive  mitigations 
and  modifications  occasioned  by  the  same  causes 


216 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


which  have  softened  the  general  manners,  and 
brought  all  human  relations  more  under  the 
control  of  justice  and  the  influence  of  humanity. 
It  has  not  lost  the  taint  of  its  brutal  origin. 
No  presumption  in  its  favour,  therefore,  can  be 
drawn  from  the  fact  of  its  existence.  The 
only  such  presumption  which  it  could  be  sup- 
posed to  have,  must  be  grounded  on  its  having 
lasted  till  now,  when  so  many  other  things  which 
came  down  from  the  same  odious  source  have 
been  done  away  with.  And  this,  indeed,  is  what 
makes  it  strange  to  ordinary  ears,  to  hear  it 
asserted  that  the  inequality  of  rights  between 
men  and  women  has  no  other  source  than  the 
law  of  the  strongest. 

That  this  statement  should  have  the  efiect  of 
a paradox,  is  in  some  respects  creditable  to  the 
progress  of  civilization,  and  the  improvement  of 
the  moral  sentiments  of  mankind.  We  now  live 
— that  is  to  say,  one  or  two  of  the  most  ad- 
vanced nations  of  the  world  now  live — in  a state 
in  which  the  law  of  the  strongest  seems  to  be 
entirely  abandoned  as  the  regulating  principle 
of  the  world^s  affairs : nobody  professes  it,  and, 
as  regards  most  of  the  relations  between  human 
beings,  nobody  is  permitted  to  practise  it.  When 
any  one  succeeds  in  doing  so,  it  is  under  cover  of 
some  pretext  which  gives  him  the  semblance  of 
having  some  general  social  interest  on  his  side. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


217 


This  being  the  ostensible  state  cf  things,  people 
flatter  themselves  that  the  rule  of  mere  force  is 
ended;  that  the  law  of  the  strongest  cannot  be  the 
reason  of  existence  of  anything  which  has  remained 
in  full  operation  down  to  the  present  time.  How- 
ever any  of  our  present  institutions  may  have  be- 
gun, it  can  only,  they  think,  have  been  preserved 
to  this  period  of  advanced  civilization  by  a well- 
grounded  feeling  of  its  adaptation  to  human  na- 
ture, and  conduciveness  to  the  general  good.  They 
do  not  understand  the  great  vitality  and  dura- 
bility of  institutions  which  place  right  on  the  side 
of  might ; how  intensely  they  are  clung  to  ; how 
the  good  as  well  as  the  bad  propensities  and  senti- 
ments of  those  who  have  power  in  their  hands, 
become  identified  with  retaining  it ; how  slowly 
these  bad  institutions  give  way,  one  at  a time, 
the  weakest  first,  beginning  with  those  which  are 
least  interwoven  with  the  daily  habits  of  life  ; and 
how  very  rarely  those  who  have  obtained  legal 
power  because  they  first  had  physical,  have  ever 
lost  their  hold  of  it  until  the  physical  power  had 
passed  over  to  the  other  side.  Such  shifting  of 
the  physical  force  not  having  taken  place  in  the 
case  of  women ; this  fact,  combined  with  all  the 
peculiar  and  characteristic  features  of  the  parti- 
cular ^case,  made  it  certain  from  the  first  that  this 
branch  of  the  system  of  right  founded  on  might, 
though  softened  in  its  most  atrocious  features  at  an 
10 


218 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


earlier  period  than  several  of  the  others,  would  be 
the  very  last  to  disappear.  It  was  inevitable  that 
this  one  case  of  a social  relation  grounded  on  foreej 
would  survive  through  generations  of  institutions 
grounded  on  equal  justice,  an  almost  solitary 
exception  to  the  general  character  of  their  laws 
and  customs ; but  which,  so  long  as  it  does  not 
proclaim  its  own  origin,  and  as  discussion  has 
not  brought  out  its  true  character,  is  not  felt  to 
jar  with  modern  civilization,  any  more  than 
domestic  slavery  among  the  Greeks  jarred  with 
their  notion  of  themselves  as  a free  people. 

The  truth  is,  that:  people  of  the  present  and 
the  last  two  or  three  generations  have  lost  all 
practical  sense  of  the  primitive  condition  of 
humanity;  and  only  the  few  who  have  studied 
history  accurately,  or  have  much  frequented  the 
parts  of  the  world  occupied  by  the  living  repre- 
sentatives of  ages  long  past,  are  able  to  form  any 
mental  picture  of  what  society  then  was.  People 
are  not  aware  how  entirely,  in  former  ages,  the 
law  of  superior  strength  was  the  rule  of  life ; how 
publicly  and  openly  it  was  avowed^  I do  not  say 
cynically  or  shamelessly — for  these  words  imply 
a feeling  that  there  was  something  in  it  to  be 
ashamed  of,  and  no  such  notion  could  find  a 
place  in  the  faculties  of  any  person  in  those  ages, 
except  a philosopher  or  a saint.  History  gives  a 
cruel  experience  of  human  nature,  in  shewing 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


219 


how  exactly  the  regard  due  to  the  life^  possessions, 
and  entire  earthly  happiness  of  any  class  of  per- 
sons, was  measured  by  what  they  had  the  power 
of  enforcing;  how  all  who  made  any  resistance 
to  authorities  that  had  arms  in  their  hands,  how- 
ever dreadful  might  be  the  provocation,  had  not 
only  the  law  of  force  but  all  other  laws,  and  all 
the  notions  of  social  obligation  against  them;  and 
in  the  eyes  of  those  whom  they  resisted,  were 
not  only  guilty  of  crime,  but  of  the  worst  of  all 
crimes,  deserving  the  most  cruel  chastisement 
which  human  beings  could  inflict.  The  first 
small  vestige  of  a feeling  of  obligation  in  a 
superior  to  acknowledge  any  right  in  inferiors, 
began  when  he  had  been  induced,  for  convenience, 
to  make  some  promise  to  them.  Though  these 
promises,  even  when  sanctioned  by  the  most 
solemn  oaths,  were  for  many  ages  revoked  or 
violated  on  the  most  trifling  provocation  or 
temptation,  it  is  probable  that  this,  except  by 
persons  of  still  worse  than  the  average  morality, 
was  seldom  done  without  some  twinges  of  con- 
science. The  ancient  republics,  being  mostly 
grounded  from  the  first  upon  some  kind  of 
mutual  compact,  or  at  any  rate  formed  by  an 
union  of  persons  not  very  unequal  in  strength, 
afforded,  in  consequence,  the  first  instance  of  a 
portion  of  human  relations  fenced  round,  and 
placed  under  the  dominion  of  another  law  than 


220 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


that  of  force.  And  though  the  original  law  of 
force  remained  in  full  operation  between  them 
and  their  slaves^  and  also  (except  so  far  as  limited 
by  express  compact)  between  a commonwealth 
and  its  subjects^  or  other  independent  common- 
wealths ; the  banishment  of  that  primitive  law 
even  from  so  narrow  a fields  commenced  the  re- 
generation of  human  nature^  by  giving  birth  to 
sentiments  of  which  experience  soon  demon- 
strated the  immense  value  even  for  material  in- 
terests^ and  which  thenceforward  only  required 
to  be  enlarged^,  not  created.  Though  slaves  were 
no  part  of  the  commonwealth^  it  was  in  the  free 
states  that  slaves  were  first  felt  to  have  rights  as 
human  beings.  The  Stoics  were^  I believe^  the 
first  (except  so  far  as  the  Jewish  law  constitutes 
an  exception)  who  taught  as  a part  of  morality 
that  men  were  bound  by  moral  obligations  to 
their  slaves.  No  one^  after  Christianity  became 
ascendant^  could  ever  again  have  been  a stranger 
to  this  belief^  in  theory  ; nor^  after  the  rise  of  the 
Catholic  Churchy  was  it  ever  without  persons  to 
stand  up  for  it.  Yet  to  enforce  it  was  the  most 
arduous  task  which  Christianity  ever  had  to  per- 
form. For  more  than  a thousand  years  the 
Church  kept  up  the  contest^  with  hardly  any  per- 
ceptible success.  It  was  not  for  want  of  power 
over  men'^s  minds.  Its  power  was  prodigious. 
It  could  make  kings  and  nobles  resign  theii  most 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


221 


valued  possessions  to  enrieh  the  Chureh.  It 
could  make  thousands,  in  the  prime  of  life  and 
the  height  of  worldly  advantages,  shut  themselves 
up  in  convents  to  work  out  their  salvation  by 
poverty,  fasting,  and  prayer.  It  could  send 
hundreds  of  thousands  across  land  and  sea, 
Europe  and  Asia,  to  give  their  lives  for  the  de- 
liverance of  the  Holy  Sepulchre.  It  could  make 
kings  relinquish  wives  who  were  the  object  of 
their  passionate  attachment,  because  the  Church 
declared  that  they  were  within  the  seventh  (by  our 
calculation  the  fourteenth)  degree  of  relationship. 
All  this  it  did ; but  it  could  not  make  men  fight 
less  with  one  another,  nor  tyrannize  less  cruelly 
over  the  serfs,  and  when  they  were  able,  over 
burgesses.  It  could  not  make  them  renounce 
either  of  the  applications  of  force  ; force  militant, 
or  force  triumphant.  This  they  could  never 
be  induced  to  do  until  they  were  themselves  in 
their  turn  compelled  by  superior  force.  Only 
by  the  growing  power  of  kings  was  an  end  put  to 
fighting  except  between  kings,  or  competitors  for 
kingship;  only  by  the  growth  of  a wealthy  and 
warlike  bourgeoisie  in  the  fortified  towns,  and  of  a 
plebeian  infantry  which  proved  more  powerful 
in  the  field  than  the  undisciplined  chivalry,  was  the 
insolent  tyranny  of  the  nobles  over  the  bour- 
geoisie and  peasantry  brought  within  some  bounds. 
It  was  persisted  in  not  only  until,  but  long  after. 


222 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


the  oppressed  had  obtained  a power  enabling 
them  often  to  take  conspicuous  vengeance;  and 
on  the  Continent  much  of  it  continued  to  the 
time  of  the  French  Revolution,,  though  in  England 
the  earlier  and  better  organization  of  the  demo- 
cratic classes  put  an  end  to  it  sooner,  by  establish- 
ing equal  laws  and  free  national  institutions. 

If  people  are  mostly  so  little  aware  how  com- 
pletely^ during  the  greater  part  of  the  duration 
of  our  species,,  the  law  of  force  was  the  avowed 
rule  of  general  conduct^  any  other  being  only 
a special  and  exceptional  consequence  of  peculiar 
ties — and  from  how  very  recent  a date  it  is  that 
the  affairs  of  society  in  general  have  been  even 
pretended  to  be  regulated  according  to  any 
moral  law ; as  little  do  people  remember  or 
consider,  how  institutions  and  customs  which 
never  had  any  ground  but  the  law  of  force,  last 
on  into  ages  and  states  of  general  opinion  which 
never  would  have  permitted  their  first  establish- 
ment. Less  than  forty  years  ago,  Englishmen 
might  still  bylaw  hold  human  beings  in  bondage 
as  saleable  property  : within  the  present  century 
they  might  kidnap  them  and  carry  them  off,  and 
work  them  literally  to  death.  This  absolutely 
extreme  case  of  the  law  of  force,  condemned  by 
those  who  can  tolerate  almost  every  other  form 
of  arbitrary  power,  and  which,  of  all  others,  pre- 
sents features  the  most  revolting  to  the  feelings 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


223 


of  all  who  look  at  it  from  an  impartial  position, 
was  the  law  of  civilized  and  Christian  England 
within  the  memory  of  persons  now  living : and 
in  one  half  of  Anglo-Saxon  America  three  or 
four  years  ago,  not  only  did  slavery  exist,  but 
the  slave  trade,  and  the  breeding  of  slaves  ex- 
pressly for  it,  was  a general  practice  between 
slave  states.  Yet  not  only  was  there  a greater 
strength  of  sentiment  against  it,  but,  in  England 
at  least,  a less  amount  either  of  feeling  or  of  in- 
terest in  favour  of  it,  than  of  any  other  of  the 
customary  abuses  of  force  : for  its  motive  was 
the  love  of  gain,  un mixed  and  undisguised ; and 
those  who  profited  by  it  were  a very  small  nu- 
merical fraction  of  the  country,  while  the  natural 
feeling  of  all  who  were  not  personally  interested 
in  it,  was  unmitigated  abhorrence.  So  extreme 
an  instance  makes  it  almost  superfluous  to  refer 
to  any  other  : but  consider  the  long  duration  of 
absolute  monarchy.  In  England  at  present  it 
is  the  almost  universal  conviction  that  military 
despotism  is  a case  of  the  law  of  force,  having 
no  other  origin  or  justification.  Yet  in  all  the 
great  nations  of  Europe  except  England  it  either 
still  exists,  or  has  only  just  ceased  to  exist,  and 
has  even  now  a strong  party  favourable  to  it  in 
all  ranks  of  the  people,  especially  among  persons 
of  station  and  consequence.  Such  is  the  power 
of  an  established  system,  even  when  far  from 


224 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


universal ; when  not  only  in  almost  every  period 
of  history  there  have  been  great  and  well-known 
examples  of  the  contrary  system,  but  these  have 
almost  invariably  been  afforded  by  the  most 
illustrious  and  most  prosperous  communities.  In 
this  case,  too,  the  possessor  of  the  undue  power, 
the  person  directly  interested  in  it,  is  only  one 
person,  while  those  who  are  subject  to  it  and 
suffer  from  it  are  literally  all  the  rest.  The 
yoke  is  naturally  and  necessarily  humiliating  to  all 
persons,  except  the  one  who  is  on  the  throne, 
together  with,  at  most,  the  one  who  expects  to 
succeed  to  it.  How  different  are  these  cases 
from  that  of  the  power  of  men  over  women  ! I 
am  not  now  prejudging  the  question  of  its  justifi- 
ableness. I am  showing  how  vastly  more  perma- 
nent it  could  not  but  be,  even  if  not  justifiable, 
than  these  other  dominations  which  have  never- 
theless lasted  down  to  our  own  time.  What- 
ever gratification  of  pride  there  is  in  the  posses- 
sion of  powder,  and  whatever  personal  interest  in 
its  exercise,  is  in  this  case  not  confined  to  a 
limited  class,  but  common  to  the  whole  male 
sex.  Instead  of  being,  to  most  of  its  supporters, 
a thing  desirable  chiefly  in  the  abstract,  or,  like 
the  political  ends  usually  contended  for  by  fac- 
tious, of  little  private  importance  to  any  but  the 
leaders  ; it  comes  home  to  the  person  and  hearth 
of  every  male  head  of  a family,  and  of  every  one 


THK  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


225 


who  looks  forward  to  being  so.  The  clodhopper 
exercises^  or  is  to  exereise,  his  share  of  the  power 
equally  with  the  highest  nobleman.  And  the 
case  is  that  in  which  the  desire  of  power  is  the 
strongest:  for  every  one  who  desires  power^  desires 
it  most  over  those  who  are  nearest  to  him^  with 
Vfhom  his  life  is  passed^  with  whom  he  has  most 
coneerns  in  common,  and  in  whom  any  inde- 
pendence of  his  authority  is  oftenest  likely  to 
interfere  with  his  individual  preferenees.  If,  iu 
the  other  cases  specified,  powers  manifestly 
grounded  only  on  force,  and  having  so  much  less 
to  support  them,  are  so  slowly  and  with  so  much 
difficulty  got  rid  of,  much  more  must  it  be  so 
with  this,  even  if  it  rests  on  no  better  foundation 
than  those.  We  must  consider,  too,  that  the 
possessors  of  the  power  have  facilities  in  this 
case,  greater  than  in  any  other,  to  prevent  any 
uprising  against  it.  Every  one  of  the  subjects 
lives  under  the  very  eye,  and  almost,  it  may  be 
said,  in  the  hands,  of  one  of  the  masters — in 
closer  intimacy  with  him  than  with  any  of  her 
fellow-subjects ; with  no  means  of  combining 
against  him,  no  power  of  even  locally  over- 
mastering him,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the 
strongest  motives  for  seeking  his  favour  and 
avoiding  to  give  him  offence.  In  struggles  for 
political  emancipation,  everybody  knows  how  often 
its  champions  are  bought  off  by  bribes,  or  daunted 
10* 


226 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


by  terrors.  In  the  case  of  women^  each  indi- 
vidual of  the  subject-class  is  in  a chronic  state  of 
bribery  and  intimidation  eombined.  In  setting 
up  the  standard  of  resistance^  a large  number  of 
the  leaders^  and  still  more  of  the  followers^  must 
make  an  almost  complete  sacrifice  of  the  plea- 
sures or  the  alleviations  of  their  own  individual 
lot.  If  ever  any  system  of  privilege  and  en- 
forced subjection  had  its  yoke  tightly  riveted 
on  the  necks  of  those  who  are  kept  down  by  it, 
this  has.  I have  not  yet  shown  that  it  is  a 
wrong  system  : but  every  one  who  is  capable  of 
thinking  on  the  subject  must  see  that  even  if  it 
is,  it  was  certain  to  outlast  all  other  forms  of 
unjust  authority.  And  when  some  of  the  grossest 
of  the  other  forms  still  exist  in  many  civilized 
countries,  and  have  only  recently  been  got  rid 
of  in  others,  it  would  be  strange  if  that  which 
is  so  much  the  deepest -rooted  had  yet  been 
perceptibly  shaken  anywhere.  There  is  more 
reason  to  wonder  that  the  protests  and  testi- 
monies against  it  should  have  been  so  numerous 
and  so  weighty  as  they  are. 

Some  will  object,  that  a comparison  cannot 
fairly  be  made  between  the  government  of  the 
male  sex  and  the  forms  of  unjust  power  which  I 
have  adduced  in  illustration  of  it,  since  these  are 
arbitrary,  and  the  effect  of  mere  usurpation, 
while  it  on  the  contrary  is  natural.  But  was 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


221 


fcliere  ever  any  domination  which  did  not  appeal 
natural  to  tliose*^ who  possessed  it  ? There  was 
a time  when  the  division  of  mankind  into  two 
classes^  a small  one  of  masters  and  a numerous 
one  of  slaves^  appeared^  even  to  the  most  culti- 
vated minds^  to  be  a natural^  and  the  only  natural^ 
condition  of  the  human  race.  No  less  an  in- 
tellect^ and  one  which  contributed  no  less  to  the 
progress  of  human  thought^  than  Aristotle^  held 
this  opinion  without  doubt  or  misgiving ; and 
rested  it  on  the  same  premises  on  which  the 
same  assertion  in  regard  to  the  dominion  of  men 
over  women  is  usually  based^  namely  that  there 
are  different  natures  among  mankind,  free  na- 
tures, and  slave  natures ; that  the  Greeks  were 
of  a free  nature,  the  barbarian  races  of  Thracians 
and  Asiatics  of  a slave  nature.  But  why  need  I 
go  back  to  Aristotle  ? Did  not  the  slaveowners 
of  the  Southern  United  States  maintain  the  same 
doctrine,  with  all  the  fanaticism  with  which  men 
cling  to  the  theories  that  justify  their  passions 
and  legitimate  their  personal  interests  ? Did 
they  not  call  heaven  and  earth  to  witness  that 
the  dominion  of  the  white  man  over  the  black  is 
natural,  that  the  black  race  is  by  nature  inca- 
pable of  freedom,  and  marked  out  for  slavery? 
some  even  going  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  freedom 
of  manual  labourers  is  an  unnatural  order  of 
things  anywhere.  Again,  the  theorists  of  abso- 


228 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


lute  luonarcLy  have  always  affirmed  it  to  he  the 
only  natural  form  of  government ; issuing  from 
the  patriarchal  which  was  the  primitive  and 
spontaneous  form  of  society,  framed  on  the 
model  of  the  paternal,  which  is  anterior  to  society 
itself,  and,  as  they  contend,  the  most  natural 
authority  of  all.  Nay,  for  that  matter,  the  law 
of  force  itself,  to  those  who  could  not  plead  any 
other,  has  always  seemed  the  most  natural  of  all 
grounds  for  the  exercise  of  authority.  Conquer- 
ing races  hold  it  to  be  Nature^s  own  dictate  that 
the  conquered  should  obey  the  conquerors,  or,  as 
they  euphoniously  paraphrase  it,  that  the  feebler 
and  more  unwarlike  races  should  submit  to  the 
braver  and  manlier.  The  smallest  acquaintance 
with  human  life  in  the  middle  ages,  shows  how 
supremely  natural  the  dominion  of  the  feudal 
nobility  over  men  of  low  condition  appeared  to 
the  nobility  themselves,  and  how  unnatural  the 
conception  seemed,  of  a person  of  the  inferior 
class  claiming  equality  with  them,  or  exercising 
authority  over  them.  It  hardly  seemed  less  so 
to  the  class  held  in  subjection.  The  emanci- 
pated serfs  and  burgesses,  even  in  their  most 
vigorous  struggles,  never  made  any  pretension  to 
a share  of  authority ; they  only  demanded  more 
or  less  of  limitation  to  the  power  of  tyrannizing 
over  them.  So  true  is  it  that  unnatural  gene- 
rally means  only  uncustomary,  and  that  every- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


229 


thing  which  is  usual  appears  natural.  The  sub- 
jection of  women  to  men  being  a universal 
custom^  any  departure  from  it  quite  naturally 
appears  unnatural.  But  how  entirely,  even  in 
this  case,  the  feeling  is  dependent  on  custom, 
appears  by  ample  experience.  Nothing  so  much 
astonishes  the  people  of  distant  parts  of  the 
world,  when  they  first  learn  anything  about 
England,  as  to  be  told  that  it  is  under  a queen : 
the  thing  seems  to  them  so  unnatural  as  to  be 
almost  incredible.  To  Englishmen  this  does  not 
seem  in  the  least  degree  unnatural,  because  they 
are  used  to  it ; but  they  do  feel  it  unnatural  that 
women  should  be  soldiers  or  members  of  parlia- 
ment. In  the  feudal  ages,  on  the  contrary,  war 
and  politics  were  not  thought  unnatural  to 
women,  because  not  unusual ; it  seemed  natural 
that  women  of  the  privileged  classes  should  be 
of  manly  character,  inferior  in  nothing  but  bodily 
strength  to  their  husbands  and  fathers.  The 
independence  of  women  seemed  rather  less  un- 
natural to  the  Greeks  than  to  other  ancients,  on 
account  of  the  fabulous  Amazons  (whom  they 
believed  to  be  historical),  and  the  partial  example 
afforded  by  the  Spartan  women ; who,  though  no 
less  subordinate  by  law  than  in  other  Greek 
states,  were  more  free  in  fact,  and  being  trained 
to  bodily  exercises  in  the  same  manner  with 
men,  gave  ample  proof  that  they  were  not  natu-* 


230 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


rally  disqualified  for  them.  There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  Spartan  experience  suggested  to  Plato, 
among  many  other  of  his  doctrines^  that  of  the 
social  and  political  equality  of  the  two  sexes. 

But,  it  will  be  said,  the  rule  of  men  over  women 
diiffers  from  all  these  others  in  not  being  a rule 
of  force  : it  is  accepted  voluntarily ; women  make 
no  complaint,  and  are  consenting  parties  to  it. 
In  the  first  place,  a great  number  of  women  do 
not  accept  it.  Ever  since  there  have  been  women 
able  to  make  their  sentiments  known  by  their 
writings  (the  only  mode  of  publicity  which  society 
permits  to  them),  an  increasing  number  of  them 
have  recorded  protests  against  their  present  social 
condition  : and  recently  many  thousands  of  them, 
headed  by  the  most  eminent  women  known  to 
the  public,  have  petitioned  Parliament  for  their 
admission  to  the  Parliamentary  Suffrage.  The 
claim  of  women  to  be  educated  as  solidly,  and  in 
the  same  branches  of  knowledge,  as  men,  is  urged 
with  growing  intensity,  and  with  a great  prospect 
of  success ; while  the  demand  for  their  admission 
into  professions  and  occupations  hitherto  closed 
against  them,  becomes  every  year  more  urgent. 
Though  there  are  not  in  this  country,  as  there 
are  in  the  United  States,  periodical  Conventions 
and  an  organized  party  to  agitate  for  the  Bights 
of  Women,  there  is  a numerous  and  active  Society 
organized  and  managed  by  women,  for  the  more 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


231 


limited  object  of  obtaining  the  political  franchise. 
Nor  IS  it  only  in  our  own  country  and  in  America 
that  women  are  beginning  to  protest,  more  or 
less  collectively,  against  the  disabilities  under 
which  they  labour.  France,  and  Italy,  and 
Switzerland,  and  Russia  now  afford  examples  of 
the  same  thing.  How  many  more  women  there 
are  who  silently  cherish  similar  aspirations,  no 
one  can  possibly  know ; but  there  are  abundant 
tokens  how  many  would  cherish  them,  were  they 
not  so  strenuously  taught  to  repress  them  as  con- 
trary to  the  proprieties  of  their  sex.  It  must  be 
remembered,  also,  that  no  enslaved  class  ever 
asked  for  complete  liberty  at  once.  When  Simon 
de  Montfort  called  the  deputies  of  the  commons 
to  sit  for  the  first  time  in  Parliament,  did  any 
of  them  dream  of  demanding  that  an  assembly, 
elected  by  their  constituents,  should  make  and 
destroy  ministries,  and  dictate  to  the  king  in 
affairs  of  state?  No  such  thought  entered  into 
the  imagination  of  the  most  ambitious  of  them. 
The  nobility  had  already  these  pretensions ; the 
commons  pretended  to  nothing  but  to  be  exempt 
from  arbitrary  taxation,  and  from  the  gross  indi- 
vidual oppression  of  the  king^s  officers.  It  is  a 
political  law  of  nature  that  those  who  are  under 
any  power  of  ancient  origin,  never  begin  by 
complaining  of  the  power  itself,  but  only  of  its 
oppressive  exercise.  There  is  never  any  want  of 


232 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


women  who  complain  of  ill  usage  by  their  hus« 
bands.  There  would  be  infinitely  more^  if  com- 
plaint were  not  the  greatest  of  all  provocatives 
to  a repetition  and  increase  of  the  ill  usage.  It 
is  this  which  frustrates  all  attempts  to  maintain 
the  power  but  protect  the  woman  against  its 
abuses.  In  no  other  case  (except  that  of  a child) 
is  the  person  who  has  been  proved  judicially  to 
have  suflPered  an  injury^  replaced  under  the  phy- 
sical power  of  the  culprit  who  infiicted  it. 
Accordingly  wives,  even  in  the  most  extreme  and 
protracted  cases  of  bodily  ill  usage,  hardly  ever 
dare  avail  themselves  of  the  laws  made  for  their 
protection : and  if,  in  a moment  of  irrepressible 
indignation,  or  by  the  interference  of  neighbours, 
they  are  induced  to  do  so,  their  whole  effort  after- 
wards is  to  disclose  as  little  as  they  can,  and  to 
beg  off  their  tyrant  from  his  merited  chastisement. 

All  causes,  social  and  natural,  combine  to 
make  it  unlikely  that  women  should  be  col- 
lectively rebellious  to  the  power  of  men.  They 
are  so  far  in  a position  different  from  all  other 
subject  classes,  that  their  masters  require  some- 
thing more  from  them  than  actual  service.  Men 
do  not  want  solely  the  obedience  of  women,  they 
want  their  sentiments.  All  men,  except  the  most 
brutish,  desire  to  have,  in  the  woman  most  nearly 
connected  with  them,  not  a forced  slave  but  a 
willing  one,  not  a slave  merely,  but  a favourite. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


233 


They  have  therefore  put  everything  in  practice 
to  enslave  their  minds.  The  masters  of  all 
other  slaves  rely,  for  maintaining  obedience,  on 
fear ; either  fear  of  themselves,  or  religions  fears. 
The  masters  of  women  wanted  more  than  simple 
obedience,  and  they  turned  the  whole  force  of 
education  to  effect  their  purpose.  All  women 
are  brought  up  from  the  very  earliest  years  in 
the  belief  that  their  ideal  of  character  is  the  very 
opposite  to  that  of  men;  not  self-will,  and  govern- 
ment by  self-control,  but  submission,  and  yielding 
to  the  control  of  others.  All  the  moralities  tell 
them  that  it  is  the  duty  of  women,  and  all  the 
current  sentimentalities  that  it  is  their  nature,  to 
live  for  others;  to  make  complete  abnegation  of 
themselves,  and  to  have  no  life  but  in  their 
affections.  And  by  their  affections  are  meant 
the  only  ones  they  are  allowed  to  have — those  to 
the  men  with  whom  they  are  connected,  or  to 
the  children  who  constitute  an  additional  and 
indefeasible  tie  between  them  and  a man.  When 
we  put  together  three  things — first,  the  natural 
attraction  between  opposite  sexes  ; secondly,  the 
wife’s  entire  dependence  on  the  husband,  every 
privilege  or  pleasure  she  has  being  either  his 
gift,  or  depending  entirely  on  his  v/ill ; and  lastly, 
that  the  principal  object  of  human  pursuit,  consi- 
deration, and  all  objects  of  social  ambition,  can  in 
general  be  sought  or  obtained  by  her  only  through 


23-Jr 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


him^  it  would  be  a miracle  if  the  object  of  being 
attractive  to  men  had  not  become  the  polar  star 
of  feminine  education  and  formation  of  character. 
And^  this  great  means  of  influence  over  the  minds 
of  women  having  been  acquired^  an  instinct  of 
selfishness  made  men  avail  themselves  of  it  to 
the  utmost  as  a means  of  holding  women  in 
subjection^  by  representing  to  them  meekness^ 
submissiveness^  and  resignation  of  all  individual 
will  into  the  hands  of  a man,  as  an  essential 
part  of  sexual  attractiveness.  Can  it  be  doubted 
that  any  of  the  other  yokes  which  mankind  have 
succeeded  in  breaking,  would  have  subsisted  till 
now  if  the  same  means  had  existed,  and  had  been 
as  sedulously  used,  to  bow  down  their  minds  to  it  ? 
If  it  had  been  made  the  object  of  the  life  of  every 
young  plebeian  to  find  personal  favour  in  the 
eyes  of  some  patrician,  of  every  young  serf  with 
some  seigneur ; if  domestication  with  him,  and 
a share  of  his  personal  affections,  had  been  held 
out  as  the  prize  which  they  all  should  look  out 
for,  the  most  gifted  and  aspiring  being  able  to 
reckon  on  the  most  desirable  prizes ; and  if,  when 
this  prize  had  been  obtained,  they  had  been  shut 
out  by  a wall  of  brass  from  all  interests  not 
centering  in  him,  all  feelings  and  desires  but 
those  which  he  shared  or  inculcated ; would  not 
Rerfs  and  seigneurs,  plebeians  and  patricians,  have 
teen  as  broadly  distinguished  at  this  day  as  men 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN.  235 

and  women  are  ? and  would  not  all  but  a 
thinker  here  and  tliere^  have  believed  the  dis- 
tinction to  be  a fundamental  and  unalterable  fact 
in  human  nature  ? 

The  preceding  considerations  are  amply  suffix 
cient  to  show  that  custom^  however  universal  it 
may  be,  affords  in  this  case  no  presumption,  and 
ought  not  to  create  any  prejudice,  in  favour  of 
the  arrangements  which  place  women  in  social 
and  political  subjection  to  men.  But  I may  go 
farther,  and  maintain  that  the  course  of  history, 
and  the  tendencies  of  progressive  human  society, 
afford  not  only  no  presumption  in  favour  of  this 
system  of  inequality  of  rights,  but  a strong  one 
against  it ; and  that,  so  far  as  the  whole  course  of 
human  improvement  up  to  this  time,  the  whole 
stream  of  modern  tendencies,  warrants  any  in- 
ference on  the  subject,  it  is,  that  this  relic  of  the 
past  is  discordant  with  the  future,  and  must 
necessarily  disappear. 

For,  what  is  the  peculiar  character  of  the 
modern  world — the  difference  which  chiefly  dis- 
tinguishes modern  institutions,  modern  social 
ideas,  modern  life  itself,  from  those  of  times  long 
past  ? It  is,  that  human  beings  are  no  longer 
born  to  their  place  in  life,  and  chained  down  by 
an  inexorable  bond  to  the  place  they  are  born  to, 
but  are  free  to  employ  their  faculties,  and  such 
favourable  chances  as  offer,  to  achieve  the  lot  which 


236 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


may  appear  to  them  most  desirable.  Human 
society  of  old  was  constituted  on  a very  different 
principle.  All  were  born  to  a fixed  social  posi- 
tion^ and  were  mostly  kept  in  it  by  law^  or  inter- 
dicted from  any  means  by  which  they  could 
emerge  from  it.  As  some  men  are  born  white 
and  others  blacky  so  some  were  born  slaves  and 
others  freemen  and  citizens ; some  were  born 
patricians^ others  plebeians;  some  were  born  feudal 
nobles^  others  commoners  and  roturiers,  A slave 
or  serf  could  never  make  himself  free^  nor, 
except  by  the  will  of  his  master,  become  so. 
In  most  European  countries  it  was  not  till 
towards  the  close  of  the  middle  ages,  and  as  a 
consequence  of  the  growth  of  regal  power,  that 
commoners  could  be  ennobled.  Even  among  nobles, 
the  eldest  son  was  born  the  exclusive  heir  to  the 
paternal  possessions,  and  a long  time  elapsed  before 
it  was  fully  established  that  the  father  could  dis- 
inherit him.  Among  the  industrious  classes,  only 
those  who  were  born  members  of  a guild,  or  were 
admitted  into  it  by  its  members,  could  lawfully 
practise  their  calling  within  its  local  limits  ; and 
nobody  could  practise  any  calling  deemed  im- 
portant, in  any  but  the  legal  manner — by  pro- 
cesses authoritatively  prescribed.  Manufacturers 
have  stood  in  the  pillory  for  presuming  to  carry 
on  their  business  by  new  and  improved  methods. 
In  modern  Europe,  and  most  in  those  parts  of 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


231 


It  which  have  participated  most  largely  in  all 
other  modern  improvements^  diametrically  op- 
posite doctrines  now  prevail.  Law  and  govern- 
ment do  not  undertake  to  prescribe  by  whom 
any  social  or  industrial  operation  shall  or  shall 
not  be  conducted,  or  what  modes  of  conducting 
them  shall  be  lawful.  These  things  are  left  to 
the  unfettered  choice  of  individuals.  Even  the 
laws  which  required  that  workmen  should  serve 
an  apprenticeship,  have  in  this  country  been 
repealed  : there  being  ample  assurance  that  in 
all  cases  in  which  an  apprenticeship  is  necessary, 
its  necessity  will  suffice  to  enforce  it.  The  old 
theory  was,  that  the  least  possible  should  be  left 
to  the  choice  of  the  individual  agent;  that  all 
he  had  to  do  should,  as  far  as  practicable,  be  laid 
down  for  him  by  superior  wisdom.  Left  to 
himself  he  was  sure  to  go  wrong.  The  modern 
conviction,  the  fruit  of  a thousand  years  of 
experience,  is,  that  things  in  which  the  individual 
is  the  person  directly  interested,  never  go  right 
but  as  th^y  are  left  to  his  own  discretion ; and 
that  any  regulation  of  them  by  authority,  exeept 
to  protect  the  rights  of  others,  is  sure  to  be  mis- 
chievous. This  conclusion,  slowly  arrived  at,  and 
not  adopted  until  almost  every  possible  applica- 
tion of  the  contrary  theory  had  been  made  with 
disastrous  result,  now  (in  the  industrial  depart- 
ment) prevails  universally  in  the  most  advanced 


238 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


countries^  almost  universally  in  all  that  have 
pretensions  to  any  sort  of  advaneement.  It  is 
not  that  all  processes  are  supposed  1po  be  equally 
good^  or  all  persons  to  be  equally  qualified  for 
everything ; but  that  freedom  of  individual 
choice  is  now  known  to  be  the  only  thing 
which  procures  the  adoption  of  the  best  pro- 
cesses^ and  throws  each  operation  into  the  hands 
of  those  who  are  best  qualified  for  it.  Nobody 
thinks  it  necessary  to  make  a law  that  only  a 
strong-armed  man  shall  be  a blacksmith.  Free- 
dom and  competition  suffice  to  make  blacksmiths 
strong-armed  men^  because  the  weak-armed  can 
earn  more  by  engaging  in  occupations  for  which 
they  are  more  fit.  In  consonance  with  this 
doctrine^  it  is  felt  to  be  an  overstepping  of  the 
proper  bounds  of  authority  to  fix  beforehand, 
on  some  general  presumption,  that  certain  per- 
sons are  not  fit  to  do  certain  things.  It  is  now 
thoroughly  known  and  admitted  that  if  some 
such  presumptions  exist,  no  such  presumption  is 
infallible.  Even  if  it  be  well  grounded  in  a 
majority  of  cases,  which  it  is  very  likely  not 
to  be,  there  will  be  a minority  of  exceptional 
eases  in  which  it  does  not  hold : and  in  those 
it  is  both  an  injustice  to  the  individuals,  and 
a detriment  to  society,  to  place  barriers  in  the 
w^ay  of  their  using  their  faculties  for  their  own 
benefit  and  for  that  of  others.  In  the  cases, 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


239 


on  tlie  other  hand^  in  which  the  unfitness  is 
real,  the  ordinary  motives  of  human  conduct 
will  on  the  whole  suffice  to  prevent  the  incom- 
petent person  from  making,  or  from  persisting 
in,  the  attempt. 

If  this  general  principle  of  social  and  econo- 
mical science  is  not  true;  if  individuals,  witli 
such  help  as  they  can  derive  from  the  opinion 
of  those  who  know  them,  are  not  better  judges 
than  the  law  and  the  government,  of  their 
own  capacities  and  vocation ; the  world  cannot 
too  soon  abandon  this  principle,  and  return  to 
the  old  system  of  regulations  and  disabilities. 
But  if  the  principle  is  true,  we  ought  to  act 
as  if  we  believed  it,  and  not  to  ordain  that  to 
be  born  a girl  instead  of  a boy,  any  more 
than  to  be  born  black  instead  of  white,  or  a 
commoner  instead  of  a nobleman,  shall  decide 
the  personas  position  through  all  life  — shall 
interdict  people  from  all  the  more  elevated 
social  positions,  and  from  all,  except  a few, 
respectable  occupations.  Even  were  we  to  admit 
the  utmost  that  is  ever  pretended  as  to  the 
superior  fitness  of  men  for  all  the  functions  now 
reserved  to  them,  the  same  argument  applies 
which  forbids  a legal  qualification  for  members  oi 
Parliament.  If  only  once  in  a dozen  years  the 
conditions  of  eligibility  exclude  a fit  person, 
there  is  a real  loss,  while  the  exclusion  of  thou* 


240 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


sands  of  unfit  persons  is  no  gain  ; for  if  the  con- 
stitution of  the  electoral  body  disposes  them  to 
choose  unfit  persons^  there  are  always  plenty  of 
such  persons  to  choose  from.  In  all  things  of 
raiy  difficulty  and  importance^  those  who  can  do 
them  well  are  fewer  than  the  need,  even  with 
the  most  unrestricted  latitude  of  choice : and  any 
limitation  of  the  field  of  selection  deprives  society 
of  some  chances  of  being  served  by  the  competent, 
without  ever  saving  it  from  the  incompetent. 

At  present^  in  the  more  improved  countries, 
the  disabilities  of  women  are  the  only  case,  save 
one,  in  which  laws  and  institutions  take  persons 
at  their  birth,  and  ordain  that  they  shall  never  in 
all  their  lives  be  allowed  to  compete  for  certain 
things.  The  one  exception  is  that  of  royalty. 
Persons  still  are  born  to  the  throne ; no  one,  not 
of  the  reigning  family,  can  ever  occupy  it,  and 
no  one  even  of  that  family  can,  by  any  means 
but  the  course  of  hereditary  succession,  attain  it. 
All  other  dignities  and  social  advantages  are  open 
to  the  whole  male  sex  : many  indeed  are  only 
attainable  by  wealth,  but  wealth  may  be  striven 
for  by  any  one,  and  is  actually  obtained  by  many 
men  of  the  very  humblest  origin.  The  difficulties, 
to  the  majority,  are  indeed  insuperable  without 
the  aid  of  fortunate  accidents ; but  no  male 
human  being  is  under  any  legal  ban  : neither 
law  nor  opinion  superadd  artificial  obstacles  to 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


241 


the  natural  ones.  Royalty^  as  I have  said^  is 
excepted  ; but  in  this  case  every  one  feels  it  to  be 
an  exception — an  anomaly  in  the  modem  worlds 
in  marked  opposition  to  its  customs  and  princi- 
ples^ and  to  be  justified  only  bj^  extraordinary 
special  expediencies^  which^  though  individuals 
and  nations  differ  in  estimating  their  weighty 
unquestionably  do  in  fact  exist.  But  in  this 
exceptional  case,  in  which  a high  social  function 
is,  for  important  reasons,  bestowed  on  birth  instead 
of  being  put  up  to  competition,  all  free  nations 
contrive  to  adhere  in  substance  to  the  principle 
from  which  they  nominally  derogate ; for  they 
circumscribe  this  high  function  by  conditions 
avowedly  intended  to  prevent  the  person  to  whom 
it  ostensibly  belongs  from  really  performing  it ; 
while  the  person  by  whom  it  is  performed,  the 
responsible  minister,  does  obtain  the  post  by  a 
competition  from  which  no  full-grown  citizen  of 
the  male  sex  is  legally  excluded.  The  disabilities, 
therefore,  to  which  women  are  subject  from  the 
mere  fact  of  their  birth,  are  the  solitary  examples 
of  the  kind  in  modern  legislation.  In  no 
instance  except  this,  which  comprehends  half  the 
human  race,  are  the  higher  social  functions 
closed  against  any  one  by  a fatality  of  birth  which 
no  exertions,  and  no  change  of  circumstances, 
can  overcome ; for  even  religious  disabilities 
(besides  that  in  England  and  in  Europe  they 
11 


242 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


have  practically  almost  ceased  to  exist)  do  not 
close  any  career  to  the  disqualified  person  in  case 
of  conversion. 

The  social  subordination  of  women  thus  stands 
out  an  isolated,  fact  in  modern  social  institutions  ; 
a solitary  breach  of  what  has  become  their  funda- 
mental law ; a single  relic  of  an  old  world  of 
thought  and  practice  exploded  in  everything  else^ 
but  retained  in  the  one  thing  of  most  universal 
interest ; as  if  a gigantic  dolmen^  or  a vast  temple 
of  Jupiter  Olympius^  occupied  the  site  of  St. 
PauFs  and  received  daily  worship^  while  the  sur- 
rounding Christian  churches  were  only  resorted  to 
on  fasts  and  festivals.  This  entire  discrepancy 
between  one  social  fact  and  all  those  which 
accompany  it^  and  the  radical  opposition  between 
its  nature  and  the  progressive  movement  which  is 
the  boast  of  the  modern  worlds  and  which  has 
successively  swept  away  everything  else  of  an 
analogous  character^,  surely  affords^  to  a con- 
scientious obsejwer  of  human  tendencies^  serious 
matter  for  reflection.  It  raises  a prima  facie  pre- 
sumption on  the  unfavourable  side^  far  outweigh- 
ing any  which  custom  and  usage  could  in  such 
circumstances  create  on  the  favourable ; and 
should  at  least  suffice  to  make  this^  like  the 
choice  between  republicanism  and  royalty^  a 
balanced  question. 

The  least  that  can  be  demanded  is,  that  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


243 


question  should  not  be  considered  as  prejudged 
by  existing  fact  and  existing  opinion^  but  open  to 
discussion  on  its  merits^  as  a question  of  justice 
and  expediency : the  decision  on  this^  as  on 
any  of  the  other  social  arrangements  of  mankind, 
depending  on  what  an  enlightened  estimate  of 
tendencies  and  consequenees  may  show  to  be 
most  advantageous  to  humanity  in  general,  with- 
out distinetion  of  sex.  And  the  discussion  must 
be  a real  discussion,  descending  to  foundations, 
and  not  resting  satisfied  with  vague  and  general 
assertions.  It  will  not  do,  for  instance,  to  assert 
in  general  terms,  that  the  experience  of  mankind 
has  pronounced  in  favour  of  the  existing  system. 
Experienee  cannot  possibly  have  decided  between 
two  courses,  so  long  as  there  has  only  been  expe- 
rience of  one.  If  it  be  said  that  the  doetrine  of 
the  equality  of  the  sexes  rests  only  on  theory,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  contrary  doctrine 
also  has  only  theory  to  rest  upon.  All  that  is 
proved  in  its  favour  by  direct  experience,  is  that 
mankind  have  been  able  to  exist  under  it,  and  to 
attain  the  degree  of  improvement  and  prosperity 
which  we  now  see  ; but  whether  that  prosperity 
has  been  attained  sooner,  or  is  now  greater,  than 
it  would  have  been  under  the  other  system,  ex- 
perience does  not  say.  On  the  other  hand,  ex- 
perience does  say,  that  every  step  in  improvement 
has  been  so  invariably  accompanied  by  a step 


244 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


made  in  raising  the  social  position  of  women, 
that  historians  and  philosophers  have  been  led  to 
adopt  their  elevation  or  debasement  as  on  the 
whole  the  surest  test  and  most  correct  measure  of 
the  civilization  of  a people  or  an  age.  Through 
all  the  progessive  period  of  human  history,  the 
condition  of  women  has  been  approaching  nearer 
to  equality  with  men.  This  does  not  of  itself 
prove  that  the  assimilation  must  go  on  to  complete 
equality ; but  it  assuredly  affords  some  presump- 
tion that  such  is  the  case. 

Neither  does  it  avail  anything  to  say  that  the 
nature  of  the  two  sexes  adapts  them  to  their 
present  functions  and  position,  and  renders  these 
appropriate  to  them.  Standing  on  the  ground  of 
common  sense  and  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind,  I deny  that  any  one  knows,  or  can  know, 
the  nature  of  the  two  sexes,  as  long  as  they  have 
only  Deen  seen  in  their  present  relation  to  one 
another.  If  men  had  ever  been  found  in  soeiety 
without  women,  or  women  without  men,  or  if 
there  had  been  a society  of  men  and  women  in 
which  the  women  were  not  under  the  control  of 
the  men,  something  might  have  been  positively 
known  about  the  mental  and  moral  differences 
which  may  be  inherent  in  the  nature  of  each. 
What  is  now  called  the  nature  of  women  is  an 
eminently  artificial  thing — the  result  of  forced 
repression  in  some  directions,  unnatural  stimula* 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


245 


tion  in  others.  It  may  be  asserted  without 
scruple^  that  no  other  class  of  dependents  have 
had  their  character  so  entirely  distorted  from  its 
natural  proportions  by  their  relation  with  theii 
masters ; for,  if  conquered  and  slave  races  have 
been,  in  some  respects,  more  forcibly  repressed, 
whatever  in  them  has  not  been  crushed  down  by  an 
iron  heel  has  generally  been  let  alone,  and  if  left 
with  any  liberty  of  development,  it  has  developed 
itself  according  to  its  own  laws;  but  in  the  case 
of  women,  a hot-house  and  stove  cultivation  has 
always  been  carried  on  of  some  of  the  capabilities 
of  their  nature,  for  the  benefit  and  pleasure  of 
their  masters.  Then,  because  certain  products  of 
the  general  vital  force  sprout  luxuriantly  and 
reach  a great  development  in  this  heated  atmo- 
sphere and  under  this  active  nurture  and  water- 
ing, while  other  shoots  from  the  same  root,  which 
are  left  outside  in  the  wintry  air,  with  ice  pur- 
posely heaped  all  round  them,  have  a stunted 
growth,  and  some  are  burnt  off  with  fire  and 
disappear;  men,  with  that  inability  to  recognise 
their  own  work  which  distinguishes  the  un- 
analytic  mind,  indolently  believe  that  the  tree 
grows  of  itself  in  the  way  they  have  made  it 
grow,  and  that  it  would  die  if  one  half  of  it 
were  not  kept  in  a vapour  bath  and  the  other 
half  in  the  snow. 

Of  all  difficulties  which  impede  the  progress 


246 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


of  thought,  and  the  formation  of  well-grounded 
opinions  on  life  and  social  arrangements,  the 
greatest  is  now  the  unspeakable  ignorance  and 
inattention  of  mankind  in  respect  to  the  in- 
fluences which  form  human  character.  Whatever 
any  portion  of  the  human  species  now  arc,  or 
seem  to  be,  such,  it  is  supposed,  they  have  a 
natural  tendency  to  be  : even  when  the  most 
elementary  knowledge  of  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  have  been  placed,  clearly  points  out 
the  causes  that  made  them  what  they  are. 
Because  a cottier  deeply  in  arrears  to  his  land- 
lord is  not  industrious,  there  are  people  who 
think  that  the  Irish  are  naturally  idle.  Because 
constitutions  can  be  overthrown  when  the  autho- 
rities appointed  to  execute  them  turn  their  arms 
against  them,  there  are  people  who  think  the 
French  incapable  of-free  government.  Because 
the  Greeks  cheated  the  Turks,  and  the  Turks  only 
plundered  the  Greeks,  there  are  persons  Avho 
think  that  the  Turks  are  naturally  more  sincere : 
and  because  women,  as  is  often  said,  care  nothing 
about  politics  except  their  personalities,  it  is 
supposed  that  the  general  good  is  naturally  less 
interesting  to  women  than  to  men.  History, 
which  is  now  so  much  better  understood  than 
formerly,  teaches  another  lesson  : if  only  by  show- 
ing the  extraordinary  susceptibility  of  human 
nature  to  external  influences,  and  the  extreme 


THE  SUBJIi:CTIOH  OF  WOMEN. 


247 


variableness  of  those  of  its  manifestations  whieli 
are  supposed  to  be  most  universal  and  uniform. 
But  in  history^  as  in  travelling,  men  usually  see 
only  what  they  already  had  in  their  own  minds  ; 
and  few  learn  much  from  history,  who  do  not 
bring  much  with  them  to  its  study. 

Hence,  in  regard  to  that  most  difficult  ques- 
tion, what  are  the  natural  differences  between 
the  two  sexes — a subject  on  which  it  is  impossible 
in  the  present  state  of  society  to  obtain  com- 
plete and  correct  knowledge — while  almost  every- 
body dogmatizes  upon  it,  almost  all  neglect  and 
make  light  of  the  only  means  by  which  any 
partial  insight  can  be  obtained  into  it.  This  is, 
an  analytic  study  of  the  most  important  de- 
partment of  psychology,  the  laws  of  the  influence 
of  circumstances  on  character.  For,  however 
great  and  apparently  ineradicable  the  moral  and 
intellectual  differences  between  men  and  women 
might  be,  the  evidence  of  their  being  natural 
differences  could  only  be  negative.  Those  only 
could  be  inferred  to  be  natural  wdiich  could  not 
possibly  be  artificial — the  residuum,  after  de- 
ducting every  characteristic  of  either  sex  which 
can  admit  of  being  explained  from  education  or 
external  circumstances.  The  profoundest  know- 
ledge of  the  laws  of  the  formation  of  character 
is  indispensable  to  entitle  any  one  to  affirm  even 
that  there  is  any  difference,  much  more  what 


248 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


the  difference  is^  between  tbe  two  sexes  con- 
sidered as  moral  and  rational  beings ; and  since 
no  one^  as  yet^  has  that  knowledge^  (for  there  is 
hardly  any  subject  which^  in  proportion  to  its 
importance,  has  been  so  little  studied),  no  one  is 
thus  far  entitled  to  any  positive  opinion  on  the 
subject.  Conjectures  are  all  that  can  at  present 
be  made;  conjectures  more  or  less  probable, 
according  as  more  or  less  authorized  by  such 
knowledge  as  we  yet  have  of  the  laws  of  psy- 
chology, as  applied  to  the  formation  of  character. 

Even  the  preliminary  knowledge,  what  the 
differences  between  the  sexes  now  are,  apart 
from  all  question  as  to  how  they  are  made  what 
they  are,  is  still  in  the  crudest  and  most  incom- 
plete state.  Medical  practitioners  and  physio- 
logists have  ascertained,  to  some  extent,  the 
differences  in  bodily  constitution;  and  this  is  an 
important  element  to  the  psychologist : but 

hardly  any  medical  practitioner  is  a psychologist. 
Respecting  the  mental  characteristics  of  women ; 
their  observations  are  of  no  more  worth  than 
those  of  common  men.  It  is  a subject  on  which 
nothing  final  can  be  known,  so  long  as  those 
who  alone  can  really  know  it,  women  themselves, 
have  given  but  little  testimony,  and  that  little, 
mostly  suborned.  It  is  easy  to  know  stupid 
women.  Stupidity  is  much  the  same  all  the 
world  over,  A stupid  personas  notions  and  feel- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


249 


ings  may  confidently  be  inferred  from  those  which 
prevail  in  the  circle  by  which  the  person  is  sur- 
rounded. Not  so  with  those  whose  opinions  and 
feelings  are  an  emanation  from  their  own  nature 
and  faeulties.  It  is  only  a man  here  and  there 
who  has  any  tolerable  knowledge  of  the  character 
even  of  the  women  of  his  own  family.  I do 
not  mean^  of  their  capabilities;  these  nobody 
knows^  not  even  themselves^  because  most  of 
them  have  never  been  called  out.  I mean  their 
actually  existing  thoughts  and  feelings.  Many 
a man  thinks  he  perfectly  understands  women^ 
because  he  has  had  amatory  relations  with 
several^  perhaps  with  many  of  them.  If  he  is 
a good  observer^  and  his  experience  extends  to 
quality  as  well  as  quantity,  he  may  have  learnt 
something  of  one  narrow  department  of  their 
nature — an  important  department,  no  doubt. 
But  of  all  the  rest  of  it,  few  persons  are  gene- 
rally more  ignorant,  because  there  are  few  from 
whom  it  is  so  carefully  hidden.  The  most 
favourable  case  which  a man  can  generally  have 
for  studying  the  character  of  a woman,  is  that 
of  his  own  wife  : for  the  opportunities  are  greater, 
and  the  cases  of  complete  sympathy  not  so  un- 
speakably rare.  And  in  fact,  this  is  the  source 
from  which  any  knowledge  worth  having  on  the 
subject  has,  I believe,  generally  come.  But  most 
men  have  not  had  the  opportunity  of  studying  in 
11* 


250 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


this  way  more  ttan  a single  case : accordingly 
one  can^  to  an  almost  laughable  degree^  infer 
what  a man^s  wife  is  like^  from  his  opinions 
about  women  in  general.  To  make  even  this 
one  case  yield  any  result^  the  woman  must  be 
worth  knowings  and  the  man  not  only  a compe- 
tent judge^  but  of  a character  so  sympathetic  in 
itself^  and  so  well  adapted  to  hers^  that  he  can 
either  read  her  mind  by  sympathetic  intuition, 
or  has  nothing  in  himself  which  makes  her  shy 
of  disclosing  it.  Hardly  anything,  I believe, 
can  be  more  rare  than  this  conjunction.  It 
often  happens  that  there  is  the  most  complete 
unity  of  feeling  and  community  of  interests  as 
to  all  external  things,  yet  the  one  has  as  little 
admission  into  the  internal  life  of  the  other  as 
if  they  were  common  acquaintance.  Even  with 
true  affection,  authority  on  the  one  side  and  sub- 
ordination on  the  other  prevent  perfect  confi- 
dence. Though  nothing  may  be  intentionally 
withheld,  much  is  not  shown.  In  the  analogous 
relation  of  parent  and  child,  the  corresponding 
phenomenon  must  have  been  in  the  observation 
of  every  one.  As  between  father  and  son,  how 
many  are  the  cases  in  which  the  father,  in  spite 
of  real  affection  on  both  sides,  obviously  to  all 
the  world  does  not  know,  nor  suspect,  parts  of 
the  son^s  character  familiar  to  his  companions 
and  equals.  The  truth  is,  that  the  position  of 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


251 


looking  up  to  another  is  extremely  unpropitious 
to  complete  sincerity  and  openness  with  him. 
The  fear  of  losing  ground  in  his  opinion  or  in  his 
feelings  is  so  strong_,  that  even  in  an  upright  cha- 
racter^ there  is  an  unconscious  tendency  to  show 
only  the  best  side^  or  the  side  which^  though  not 
the  best,  is  that  which  he  most  likes  to  see  : and  it 
may  be  confidently  said  that  thorough  knowledge 
of  one  another  hardly  ever  exists,  but  between 
persons  who,  besides  being  intimates,  are  equals. 
How  much  more  true,  then,  must  all  this  be, 
when  the  one  is  not  only  under  the  authority  of 
the  other,  but  has  it  inculcated  on  her  as  a duty 
to  reckon  everything  else  subordinate  to  his 
comfort  and  pleasure,  and  to  let  him  neither  see 
nor  feel  anything  coming  from  her,  except  what 
is  agreeable  to  bim.  All  these  difficulties  stand 
in  the  way  of  a man'^s  obtaining  any  thorough 
knowledge  even  of  the  one  woman  whom  alone, 
in  general,  he  has  sufficient  opportunity  of  study- 
ing. When  we  further  consider  that  to  under- 
stand one  woman  is  not  necessarily  to  understand 
any  other  woman;  that  even  if  he  could  study 
many  women  of  one  rank,  or  of  one  country,  he 
would  not  thereby  understand  women  of  other 
ranks  or  countries ; and  even  if  he  did,  they  are 
still  only  the  women  of  a single  period  of  history; 
we  may  safely  assert  that  the  knowledge  which 
men  can  acquire  of  women,  even  as  they  have 


252 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


been  and  are,  witliout  reference  to  what  they 
might  be,  is  wretchedly  imperfect  and  superficial, 
and  always  will  be  so,  until  women  themselves 
have  told  all  that  they  have  to  tell. 

And  this  time  has  not  come ; nor  will  it  come 
otherwise  than  gradually.  It  is  but  of  yesterday 
that  women  have  either  been  qualified  by  literary 
accomplishments,  or  permitted  by  society,  to  tell 
anything  to  the  general  public.  As  yet  very 
few  of  them  dare  tell  anything,  which  men,  on 
whom  their  literary  success  depends,  are  un- 
willing to  hear.  Let  us  remember  in  what  manner, 
up  to  a very  recent  time,  the  expression,  even 
by  a male  author,  of  uncustomary  opinions,  or 
what  are  deemed  eccentric  feelings,  usually  was, 
and  in  some  degree  still  is,  received ; and  we  may 
form  some  faint  conception  under  what  impedi- 
ments a woman,  who  is  brought  up  to  think 
custom  and  opinion  her  sovereign  rule,  attempts 
to  express  in  books  anything  drawn  from  the 
depths  of  her  own  nature.  The  greatest  woman 
who  has  left  writings  behind  her  sufficient  to 
give  her  an  eminent  rank  in  the  literature  of  her 
country,  thought  it  necessary  to  prefix  as  a motto 
to  her  boldest  work,  Un  homme  pent  braver 
Topinion;  une  femme  doit  s^y  soumettre.'^'^^  The 
greater  part  of  wLat  women  vrrite  about  women 
is  mere  sycophancy  to  men.  In  the  case  of  an« 

* Title-page  of  Mme.  de  Stael’s  “ Delpbiue.’* 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


253 


married  women^  mncli  of  it  seems  only  intended 
to  increase  their  chance  of  a husband.  Many, 
both  married  and  unmarried^  overstep  the  mark, 
and  inculcate  a servility  beyond  what  is  desired 
or  relished  by  any  man,  except  the  very  vulgarest. 
But  this  is  not  so  often  the  case  as,  even  at  a 
quite  late  period,  it  still  was.  Literary  women 
are  becoming  more  freespoken,  and  more  willing 
to  express  their  real  sentiments.  Unfortunately, 
in  this  country  especially,  they  are  themselves 
such  artificial  products,  that  their  sentiments  are 
compounded  of  a small  element  of  individual 
observation  and  consciousness,  and  a very  large 
one  of  acquired  associations.  This  will  be  less 
and  less  the  case,  but  it  will  remain  true  to  a 
great  extent,  as  long  as  social  institutions  do  not 
admit  the  same  free  development  of  originality 
in  women  which  is  possible  to  men.  When  that 
time  comes,  and  not  before,  we  shall  see,  and 
not  merely  hear,  as  much  as  it  is  necessary  to 
know  of  the  nature  of  women,  and  the  adaptation 
of  other  things  to  it. 

I have  dwelt  so  much  on  the  difficulties  which 
at  present  obstruct  any  real  knowledge  by  men 
of  the  true  nature  of  women,  because  in  this  as 
in  so  many  other  things  opinio  copiae  inter 
maximas  causas  inopiae  est  and  there  is  little 
chance  of  reasonable  thinking  on  the  matter, 
while  people  flatter  themselves  that  they  perfectly 


254: 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


understand  a subject  of  whicli  most  men  kno\^ 
absolutely  nothings  and  of  wbicb  it  is  at  present 
impossible  that  any  man^  or  all  men  taken  toge- 
ther^ should  have  knowledge  which  can  qualify 
them  to  lay  down  the  law  to  women  as  to  what 
is^  or  is  not^  their  vocation.  Happily^  no  such 
knowledge  is  necessary  for  any  practical  purpose 
connected  with  the  position  of  women  in  relation 
to  society  and  life.  For^  according  to  all  the 
principles  involved  in  modern  society^  the  question 
rests  with  women  themselves — to  be  decided  by 
their  own  experience^  and  by  the  use  of  their 
own  faculties.  There  are  no  means  of  finding 
what  either  one  person  or  many  can  do^  but  by 
trying — and  no  means  by  which  any  one  else  can 
discover  for  them  what  it  is  for  their  happiness 
to  do  or  leave  undone. 

One  thing  we  may  be  certain  of — that  what  is 
conti^ary  to  women^s  nature  to  do^  they  never 
will  be  made  to  do  by  simply  giving  their  nature 
free  play.  The  anxiety  of  mankind  to  interfere 
in  behalf  of  nature^  for  fear  lest  nature  should 
not  succeed  in  effecting  its  purpose,  is  an  alto- 
gether unnecessary  solicitude.  What  women  by 
nature  cannot  do,  it  is  quite  superfluous  to  forbid 
them  from  doing.  What  they  can  do,  but  not 
so  well  as  the  men  who  are  their  competitors, 
competition  suffices  to  exclude  them  from  ; since 
nobody  asks  for  protective  duties  and  bounties 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


255 


in  favour  of  women;  it  is  only  asked  that  the 
present  bounties  and  protective  duties  in  favour 
of  men  should  be  recalled.  If  women  have  a 
greater  natural  inclination  for  some  things  than 
for  others^  there  is  no  need  of  laws  or  social 
inculcation  to  make  the  majority  of  them  do 
the  former  in  preference  to  the  latter.  What- 
ever women’s  services  are  most  wanted  for^  the 
free  play  of  competition  will  hold  out  the 
strongest  inducements  to  them  to  undertake* 
And,  as  the  words  imply,  they  are  most  wanted 
for  the  things  for  which  they  are  most  fit ; by 
the  apportionment  of  which  to  them,  the  col- 
lective faculties  of  the  two  sexes  can  be  applied 
on  the  whole  with  the  greatest  sum  of  valuable 
result. 

The  general  opinion  of  men  is  supposed  to  be, 
that  the  natural  vocation  of  a woman  is  that  of 
a wife  and  mother.  I say,  is  supposed  to  be, 
because,  judging  from  acts — from  the  whole  of 
the  present  constitution  of  society — one  might 
infer  that  their  opinion  was  the  direct  contrary. 
They  might  be  supposed  to  think  that  the 
alleged  natural  vocation  of  women  was  of  all 
things  the  most  repugnant  to  their  nature ; 
insomuch  that  if  they  are  free  to  do  anything 
else — if  any  other  means  of  living,  or  occupation 
of  their  time  and  faculties,  is  open,  which  has 
any  chance  of  appearing  desirable  to  them—there 


256 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


will  not  be  enough  of  them  who  will  be  willing 
to  accept  the  condition  said  to  be  natural  to 
them.  If  this  is  the  real  opinion  of  men  in 
general,  it  would  be  well  that  it  should  be 
spoken  out.  I should  like  to  hear  somebody 
openly  enunciating  the  doctrine  (it  is  already 
implied  in  much  that  is  written  on  the  sub- 
ject)— It  is  necessary  to  society  that  women 
should  marry  and  produce  children.  They  will 
not  do  so  unless  they  are  compelled.  Therefore 
it  is  necessary  to  compel  them.^”^  The  merits  of 
the  case  would  then  be  clearly  defined.  It 
would  be  exactly  that  of  the  slaveholders  of 
South  Carolina  and  Louisiana.  It  is  necessary 
that  cotton  and  sugar  should  be  grown.  White 
men  cannot  produce  them.  Negroes  will  not, 
for  any  wages  which  we  choose  to  give.  Ergo 
they  must  be  compelled. An  illustration  still 
closer  to  the  point  is  that  of  impressment. 
Sailors  must  absolutely  be  had  to  defend  the 
country.  It  often  happens  that  they  will  not 
voluntarily  enlist.  Therefore  there  must  be 
the  power  of  forcing  them.  How  often  has 
this  logic  been  used ! and,  but  for  one  flaw 
in  it,  without  doubt  it  would  have  been  suc- 
cessful up  to  this  day.  But  it  is  open  to  the 
retort — First  pay  the  sailors  the  honest  value 
of  their  labour.  When  you  have  made  it  as 
well  worth  their  while  to  serve  you,  as  to  work  for 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


257 


other  employers^  you  will  have  ho  more  difficulty 
than  others  have  in  obtaining  their  services* 
To  this  there  is  no  logical  answer  except  I will 
not  and  as  people  are  now  not  only  ashamed^ 
but  are  not  desirous^  to  rob  the  labourer  of  his 
hire^  impressment  is  no  longer  advocated.  Those 
who  attempt  to  force  women  into  marriage  by 
closing  all  other  doors  against  them^  lay  them- 
selves open  to  a similar  retort.  If  they  mean 
what  they  say^  their  opinion  must  evidently  be, 
that  men  do  not  render  the  married  condition 
so  desirable  to  women^  as  to  induce  them  to 
accept  it  for  its  own  recommendations.  It  is 
not  a sign  of  one'’s  thinking  the  boon  one  offers 
very  attractive^  when  one  allows  only  Hobson^s 
choice,  that  or  none.*^^  And  here,  I believe, 
is  the  clue  to  the  feelings  of  those  men,  who 
have  a real  antipathy  to  the  equal  freedom  of 
women.  I believe  they  are  afraid,  not  lest 
women  should  be  unwilling  to  marry,  for  I 
do  not  think  that  any  one  in  reality  has  that 
apprehension ; but  lest  they  should  insist  that 
marriage  should  be  on  equal  conditions ; lest 
all  women  of  spirit  and  capacity  should  prefer 
doing  almost  anything  else,  not  in  their  own 
eyes  degrading,  rather  than  marry,  when  marry^ 
ing  is  giving  themselves  a master,  and  a master 
too  of  all  their  earthly  possessions.  And  truly, 
if  this  consequence  were  necessarily  incident  to 


!-/58  THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 

marriage,  I think  that  the  apprehension  would 
be  very  well  founded.  I agree  in  thinkiug  it 
probable  that  few  women,  capable  of  anything 
else,  would,  unless  under  an  irresistible  entraine- 
merit y rendering  them  for  the  time  insensible 
to  anything  but  itself,  choose  such  a lot,  when 
any  other  means  were  open  to  them  of  tilling 
a conventionally  honourable  place  in  life : and 
if  men  are  determined  that  the  law  of  marriage 
shall  be  a law  of  despotism,  they  are  quite  right, 
in  point  of  mere  policy,  in  leaving  to  women 
only  Hobson'^s  choice.  But,  in  that  case,  all 
that  has  been  done  in  the  modern  world  to 
relax  the  chain  on  the  minds  of  women,  has 
been  a mistake.  They  never  should  have  been 
allowed  to  receive  a literary  education.  Women 
who  read,  much  more  women  who  write,  are, 
in  the  existing  constitution  of  things,  a con- 
tradiction and  a disturbing  element : and  it  was 
wrong  to  bring  women  up  with  any  acquire- 
ments but  those  of  an  odalisque,  or  of  a domestic 
servant. 


CHAPTER  IL 


IT  will  be  well  to  commence  the  detailed  dis- 
cussion of  the  subject  by  the  particular 
branch  of  it  to  which  the  course  of  our  observa- 
tions has  led  us  ; the  conditions  which  the  laws 
of  this  and  all  other  countries  annex  to  the 
marriage  contract.  Marriage  being  the  destina- 
tion appointed  by  society  for  women^  the  prospect 
they  are  brought  up  to^  and  the  object  which  it 
is  intended  should  be  sought  by  all  of  them^  ex- 
cept those  who  are  too  little  attractive  to  be 
chosen  by  any  man  as  his  companion ; one  might 
have  supposed  that  everything  would  have  been 
done  to  make  this  condition  as  eligible  to  them 
as  possible^  that  they  might  have  no  cause  to 
regret  being  denied  the  option  of  any  other. 
Society^  however,  both  in  this^  and^  at  firsts  in  all 
other  cases^  has  preferred  to  attain  its  object  by 
foul  rather  than  fair  means  : but  this  is  the  only 
case  in  which  it  has  substantially  persisted  in 
them  even  to  the  present  day.  Originally  women 
were  taken  by  force^  or  regularly  sold  by  their 
father  to  the  husband.  Until  a late  period  in 


260 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


European  history,  the  father  had  the  power  to 
dispose  of  his  daughter  in  marriage  at  his  own 
will  and  pleasure,  without  any  regard  to  hers. 
The  Church,  indeed,  was  so  far  faithful  to  a better 
morality  as  to  require  a formal  yes^^  from  the 
woman  at  the  marriage  ceremony ; but  there  was 
nothing  to  shew  that  the  cousent  was  other  than 
compulsory;  and  it  was  practically  impossible  for 
the  girl  to  refuse  compliance  if  the  father  perse- 
vered, except  perhaps  when  she  might  obtain  the 
protection  of  religion  by  a determined  resolution 
to  take  monastic  vows.  After  marriage,  the  man 
had  anciently  (but  this  was  anterior  to  Christi- 
anity) the  power  of  life  and  death  over  his  wife. 
She  could  invoke  no  law  against  him  ; he  was 
her  sole  tribunal  and  law.  For  a long  time 
he  could  repudiate  her,  but  she  had  no  corre- 
sponding power  in  regard  to  him.  By  the  old 
laws  of  England,  the  husband  was  called  the  lord 
of  the  wife;  he  was  literally  regarded  as  her 
sovereign,  inasmuch  that  the  murder  of  a man 
by  his  wife  was  called  treason  {'petty  as  distin- 
guished from  high  treason),  and  was  more  cruelly 
avenged  than  was  usually  the  case  with  high 
treason,  for  the  penalty  was  burning  to  death. 
Because  these  various  enormities  have  fallen  into 
disuse  (for  most  of  them  were  never  formally 
abolished,  or  not  until  they  had  long  ceased  to 
be  practised)  men  suppose  that  all  is  now  as  it 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN.  261 

should  be  in  regard  to  the  marriage  contract; 
and  we  are  continually  told  that  civilization  and 
Christianity  have  restored  to  the  woman  her  just 
rights.  Meanwhile  the  wife  is  the  actual  bond- 
servant  of  her  husband  : no  less  so^  as  far  as  legal 
obligation  goes^  than  slaves  commonly  so  called. 
She  vows  a lifelong  obedience  to  him  at  the 
altar^  and  is  held  to  it  all  through  her  life  by 
law.  Casuists  may  say  that  the  obligation  of 
obedience  stops  short  of  participation  in  crime, 
but  it  certainly  extends  to  everything  else.  She 
can  do  no  act  whatever  but  by  his  permission^  at 
least  tacit.  She  can  acquire  no  property  but  for 
him ; the  instant  it  becomes  hers,  even  if  by 
inheritance,  it  becomes  i^so  facto  his.  In  this 
respect  the  wife^s  position  under  the  common 
law  of  England  is  worse  than  that  of  slaves  in 
the  laws  of  many  countries : by  the  Roman  law, 
for  example,  a slave  might  have  his  peculium, 
which  to  a certain  extent  the  law  guaranteed  to 
him  for  his  exclusive  use.  The  higher  classes 
in  this  country  have  given  an  analogous  advan- 
tage to  their  women,  through  special  contracts 
setting  aside  the  law,  bj^  conditions  of  pin-money, 
&c. : since  parental  feeling  being  stronger  with 
fathers  than  the  class  feeling  of  their  own  sex,  a 
father  generally  prefers  his  own  daugliter  to  a 
son-in-law  who  is  a stranger  to  him.  By  means 
of  settlements,  the  rich  usually  contrive  to  with- 


262 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


draw  the  whole  or  part  of  the  inherited  property 
of  the  wife  from  the  absolute  control  of  the 
husband : but  they  do  not  succeed  in  keeping  it 
under  her  own  control ; the  utmost  they  can 
do  only  prevents  the  husband  from  squandering 
it_,  at  the  same  time  debarring  the  rightful  owner 
from  its  use.  The  property  itself  is  out  of  the 
reach  of  both ; and  as  to  the  income  derived  from 
it^  the  form  of  settlement  most  favourable  to  the 
wife  (that  called  to  her  separate  use’^)  only 
precludes  the  husband  from  receiving  it  instead 
of  her  : it  must  pass  through  her  hands^  but  if 
he  takes  it  from  her  by  personal  violence  as  soon 
as  she  receives  it.  he  can  neither  be  punished, 
nor  compelled  to  restitution.  This  is  the  amount 
of  the  protection  which,  under  the  laws  of  this 
country,  the  most  powerful  nobleman  can 
give  to  his  own  daughter  as  respects  her  hus- 
band. In  the  immense  majority  of  cases  there 
is  no  settlement : and  the  absorption  of  all  rights, 
all  property,  as  well  as  all  freedom  of  action, 
is  complete.  The  two  are  called  one  person  in 
law/^  for  the  purpose  of  inferring  that  whatever 
is  hers  is  his,  but  the  parallel  inference  is  never 
drawn  that  whatever  is  his  is  hers ; the  maxim  is 
not  applied  against  the  man,  except  to  make  him 
responsible  to  third  parties  for  her  acts,  as  a 
master  is  for  the  acts  of  his  slaves  or  of  his  cattle. 
I am  far  from  pretending  that  wives  are  in 


263 


THE  SUBJECTION  OU  WOMEN. 

general  no  better  treated  than  slaves  ; but  no 
slave  is  a slave  to  the  same  lengths^  and  in  so 
full  a sense  of  the  word^  as  a wife  is.  Hardly 
any  slave^  except  one  immediately  attached  to  the 
master^s  person^  is  a slave  at  all  hours  and  all 
minutes;  in  general  he  has^  like  a soldier^  his 
fixed  task^  and  when  it  is  done^  or  when  he  is  off 
duty^  he  disposes^  within  certain  limits,  of  his 
own  time^  and  has  a family  life  into  which  the 
master  rarely  intrudes.  Uncle  Tom^^  under  his 
first  master  had  his  own  life  in  his  cabin/^ 
almost  as  much  as  any  man  whose  work  takes 
him  away  from  home^  is  able  to  have  in  his  own 
family.  But  it  cannot  be  so  with  the  wife.  Above 
alb  a female  slave  has  (in  Christian  countries)  an 
admitted  right,  and  is  considered  under  a moral 
obligation,  to  refuse  to  her  master  the  last  fami- 
liarity. Not  so  the  wife  : however  brutal  a tyrant 
she  may  unfortunatelj^  be  chained  to — though  she 
may  know  that  he  hates  her,  though  it  may  be 
his  daily  pleasure  to  torture  her,  and  though  she 
may  feel  it  impossible  not  to  loathe  him — he  can 
claim  from  her  and  enforce  the  lowest  degrada- 
tion of  a human  being,  that  of  being  made  the 
instrument  of  an  animal  function  contrary  to  her 
inclinations.  While  she  is  held  in  this  worst  de- 
scription of  slavery  as  to  her  own  person,  what 
is  her  position  in  regard  to  the  children  in 
whom  she  and  her  master  have  a joint  interest  ? 


264: 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  V/OMEN. 


They  are  by  law  his  children.  He  alone  has  any 
legal  rights  over  them.  Not  one  act  can  she  do 
towards  or  in  relation  to  them,  except  by  delega- 
tion from  him.  Even  after  he  is  dead  she  is 
not  their  legal  guardian,  unless  he  by  will  has 
made  her  so.  He  could  even  send  them  away 
from  her,  and  deprive  her  of  the  means  of  seeing 
or  corresponding  with  them,  until  this  power  was 
in  some  degree  restricted  by  Serjeant  Talfourd’s 
Act.  This  is  her  legal  state.  And  from  this  state 
she  has  no  means  of  withdrawing  herself.  If  she 
leaves  her  husband,  she  can  take  nothing  with 
her,  neither  her  children  nor  anything  which  is 
rightfully  her  own.  If  he  chooses,  he  can  compel 
her  to  return,  by  law,  or  by  physical  force ; or  he 
may  content  himself  with  seizing  for  his  own  use 
anything  which  she  may  earn,  or  which  may  be 
given  to  her  by  her  relations.  It  is  only  legal 
separation  by  a decree  of  a court  of  justice,  which 
entitles  her  to  live  apart,  without  being  forced 
back  into  the  custody  of  an  exasperated  jailer — or 
w^hich  empowers  her  to  apply  any  earnings  to  her 
own  use,  without  fear  that  a man  whom  perhaps 
she  has  not  seen  for  twenty  years  will  pounce 
upon  her  some  day  and  carry  all  off.  This  legal 
separation,  until  lately,  the  courts  of  justice  would 
only  give  at  an  expense  which  made  it  inacces- 
sible to  any  one  out  of  the  higher  ranks.  Even 
now  it  is  only  given  in  cases  of  desertion,  or  of 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


265 


the  extreme  of  cruelty ; and  yet  complaints  ar« 
made  every  day  that  it  is  granted  too  easily. 
Surely^  if  a woman  is  denied  any  lot  in  life  but 
that  of  being  the  personal  body-servant  of  a 
despot^  and  is  dependent  for  everything  upon  the 
chance  of  finding  one  who  may  be  disposed  to 
make  a favourite  of  her  instead  of  merely  a 
drudge^  it  is  a very  cruel  aggravation  of  her  fate 
that  she  should  be  allowed  to  try  this  chance  only 
once.  The  natural  sequel  and  corollary  from 
this  state  of  things  would  be^  that  since  her  all  in 
life  depends  upon  obtaining  a good  master,  she 
should  be  allowed  to  change  again  and  again 
until  she  finds  one.  I am  not  saying  that  she 
ought  to  be  allowed  this  privilege.  That  is  a 
totally  different  consideration.  The  question  of 
divorce,inthe  sense  involving  liberty  of  remarriage, 
is  one  into  which  it  is  foreign  to  my  purpose  to 
enter.  All  I now  say  is,  that  to  those  to  whom 
nothing  but  servitude  is  allowed,  the  free  choice 
of  servitude  is  the  only,  though  a most  insufficient, 
alleviation.  Its  refusal  completes  the  assimila- 
tion of  the  wife  to  the  slave — and  the  slave 
under  not  the  mildest  form  of  slavery : for  ir 
some  slave  codes  the  slave  could,  under  certaii 
circumstances  of  ill  usage,  legally  compel  thv 
master  to  sell  him.  But  no  amount  of  ill  usage 
without  adultery  superadded,  will  in  Englant 
free  a wife  from  her  tormentor. 

12 


26G 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


I have  no  desire  to  exaggerate^  nor  does  the 
ease  stand  in  any  need  of  exaggeration.  I have 
described  the  witVs  legal  position^  not  her  actual 
treatment.  The  laws  of  most  countries  are  far 
worse  than  the  people  who  execute  them,  and 
many  of  them  are  only  able  to  remain  laws  by 
being  seldom  or  never  carried  into  effect.  If 
married  life  were  all  that  it  might  be  expected 
to  be,  looking  to  the  laws  alone,  society  would 
be  a hell  upon  earth.  Happily  there  are  both 
feelings  and  interests  which  in  many  men 
exclude,  and  in  most,  greatly  temper,  the  im- 
pulses and  propensities  which  lead  to  tyranny  : 
and  of  those  feelings,  the  tie  which  connects 
a man  with  his  wife  affords,  in  a normal 
state  of  things,  incomparably  the  strongest 
example.  The  only  tie  which  at  all  approaches 
to  it,  that  between  him  and  his  children,  tends, 
in  all  save  exceptional  cases,  to  strengthen, 
instead  of  conflicting  with,  the  first.  Because 
this  is  true ; because  men  in  general  do  not 
inflict,  nor  women  suffer,  all  the  misery  which 
could  be  inflicted  and  suffered  if  the  full  power 
of  tyranny  with  which  the  man  is  legally  in- 
vested were  acted  on ; the  defenders  of  the 
existing  form  of  the  institution  think  that  all 
its  iniquity  is  justified,  and  that  any  complaint 
is  merely  quarrelling  with  the  evil  which  is  the 
price  paid  for  every  great  good.  But  the  miti* 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


267 


gations  in  practice^  which  are  compatible  with 
maintaining  in  full  legal  force  this  or  any  other 
kind  of  tyranny^  instead  of  being  any  apology 
for  despotism,  only  serve  to  prove  what  power 
human  nature  possesses  of  reacting  against  the 
vilest  institutions,  and  with  what  vitality  the 
seeds  of  good  as  well  as  those  of  evil  in  human 
character  diffuse  and  propagate  themselves.  Not 
a word  can  be  said  for  despotism  in  the  family 
which  cannot  be  said  for  political  despotism. 
Every  absolute  king  does  not  sit  at  his  window 
to  enjoy  the  groans  of  his  tortured  subjects,  nor 
strips  them  of  their  last  rag  and  turns  them 
out  to  shiver  in  the  road.  The  despotism  of 
Louis  XYI.  was  not  the  despotism  of  Philippe 
le  Bel,  or  of  Nadir  Shah,  or  of  Caligula;  but 
it  was  bad  enough  to  justify  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, and  to  palliate  even  its  horrors.  If  an 
appeal  be  made  to  the  intense  attachments 
which  exist  between  wives  and  their  husbands, 
exactly  as  much  may  be  said  of  domestic  slavery. 
It  was  quite  an  ordinary  fact  in  Greece  and 
Rome  for  slaves  to  submit  to  death  by  torture 
rather  than  betray  their  masters.  In  the  pro- 
scriptions of  the  Roman  civil  wars  it  was 
remarked  that  wives  and  slaves  were  heroically 
faithful,  sons  very  commonly  treacherous.  Yet 
we  know  how  cruelly  many  Romans  treated 
their  slaves.  But  in  truth  these  intense  in<« 


268 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


dividual  feelings  nowhere  rise  to  snch  a luxuriant 
height  as  under  the  most  atrocious  institutions. 
It  is  part  of  the  irony  of  life^  that  the  strongest 
feelings  of  devoted  gratitude  of  which  human 
nature  seems  to  be  susceptible^  are  called  forth 
in  human  beings  towards  those  who^  having  the 
power  entirely  to  crush  their  earthly  existence, 
voluntarily  refrain  from  using  that  power.  How 
great  a place  in  most  men  this  sentiment  fills,  even 
in  religious  devotion,  it  would  be  cruel  to  inquire. 
We  daily  see  how  much  their  gratitude  to 
Heaven  appears  to  be  stimulated  by  the  con- 
templation of  fellow-creatures  to  whom  God 
has  not  been  so  merciful  as  he  has  to  themselves. 

Whether  the  institution  to  be  defended  is 
slavery,  political  absolutism,  or  the  absolutism  of 
the  head  of  a family,  we  are  always  expected  to 
judge  of  it  from  its  best  instances ; and  we  are 
presented  with  pictures  of  loving  exercise  of 
authority  on  one  side,  loving  submission  to  it  on 
the  other — superior  wisdom  ordering  all  things 
for  the  greatest  good  of  the  dependents,  and  sur- 
rounded by  their  smiles  and  benedictions.  All 
this  would  be  very  much  to  the  purpose  if  any 
one  pretended  that  there  are  no  such  things  as 
good  men.  Who  doubts  that  there  may  be  great 
goodness,  and  great  happiness,  and  great  affection, 
under  the  absolute  government  of  a good  man? 
Meanwhile,  laws  and  institutions  require  to  be 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


269 


adapted,  not  to  good  men,  but  to  bad.  Marriage 
is  not  an  institution  designed  for  a select  few. 
Men  are  not  required,  as  a preliminary  to  tbe 
marriage  ceremony,  to  prove  by  testimonials  that 
they  are  fit  to  be  trusted  with  the  exercise  of 
absolute  power.  The  tie  of  affection  and  obliga- 
tion to  a wife  and  children  is  very  strong  with 
those  whose  general  social  feelings  are  strong, 
and  with  many  who  are  little  sensible  to  any 
other  social  ties ; but  there  are  all  degrees  of 
sensibility  and  insensibility  to  it,  as  there  are  all 
grades  of  goodness  and  wickedness  in  men,  down 
to  those  whom  no  ties  will  bind,  and  on  whom 
society  has  no  action  but  through  its  ultima  ratioy 
the  penalties  of  the  law.  In  every  grade  of  this 
descending  scale  are  men  to  whom  are  committed 
all  the  legal  powers  of  a husband.  The  vilest 
malefactor  has  some  wretched  woman  tied  to 
him,  against  whom  he  can  commit  any  atrocity 
except  killing  her,  and,  if  tolerably  cautious,  can 
do  that  without  much  danger  of  the  legal  penalty. 
And  how  many  thousands  are  there  among  the 
lowest  classes  in  every  country,  who,  without 
being  in  a legal  sense  malefactors  in  any  other 
respect,  because  in  every  other  quarter  their 
aggressions  meet  with  resistance,  indulge  the 
utmost  habitual  excesses  of  bodily  violence  to- 
wards the  unhappy  wife,  who  alone,  at  least  o 
grown  persons,  can  neither  repel  nor  escape  from 


270 


TUE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


their  brutality;  and  towards  whom  the  excess 
of  dependence  inspires  their  mean  and  savage 
natures,  not  with  a generous  forbearance,  and  a 
point  of  honour  to  behave  well  to  one  whose  lot 
in  life  is  trusted  entirely  to  their  kindness,  but 
on  the  contrary  with  a notion  that  the  law  has 
delivered  her  to  them  as  their  thing,  to  be  used 
at  their  pleasure,  and  that  they  are  not  expected 
to  practise  the  consideration  towards  her  which 
is  required  from  them  towards  everybody  else. 
The  law,  which  till  lately  left  even  these  atrocious 
extremes  of  domestic  oppression  practically  un- 
punished, has  within  these  few  years  made  some 
feeble  attempts  to  repress  them.  But  its  attempts 
have  done  little,  and  cannot  be  expected  to  do 
much,  because  it  is  contrary  to  reason  and  expe- 
rience to  suppose  that  there  can  be  any  real  check 
to  brutality,  consistent  with  leaving  the  victim 
still  in  the  power  of  the  executioner.  Until  a 
conviction  for  personal  violence,  or  at  all  events 
a repetition  of  it  after  a first  conviction,  entitles 
the  woman  ipso  facto  to  a divorce,  or  at  least  to 
a judicial  separation,  the  attempt  to  repress  these 
aggravated  assaults^^  by  legal  penalties  will 
break  down  for  want  of  a prosecutor,  or  for  want 
of  a witness. 

When  we  consider  how  vast  is  the  number  of 
men,  in  any  great  country,  who  are  little  higher 
than  brutes,  and  that  this  never  prevents  them 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


271 


from  being  able^  tbrongb  the  law  of  marriage^ 
to  obtain  a victim^,  the  breadth  and  depth  of 
human  misery  caused  in  this  shape  alone  by  the 
abuse  of  the  institution  swells  to  something  ap- 
palling. Yet  these  are  only  the  extreme  cases. 
They  are  the  lowest  abysses^  but  there  is  a sad 
succession  of  depth  after  depth  before  reaching 
them.  In  domestic  as  in  political  tyranny^  the 
case  of  absolute  monsters  chiefly  illustrates  the 
institution  by  showing  that  there  is  scarcely  any 
horror  which  may  not  occur  under  it  if  the 
despot  pleases^  and  thus  setting  in  a strong  light 
what  must  be  the  terrible  frequency  of  things 
only  a little  less  atrocious.  Absolute  fiends  are 
as  rare  as  angels^  perhaps  rarer : ferocious 

savages^  with  occasional  touches  of  humanity^  are 
however  very  frequent : and  in  the  wide  interval 
which  separates  these  from  any  worthy  represen- 
tatives of  the  human  species^  how  many  are  the 
forms  and  gradations  of  animalism  and  selfish- 
ness^ often  under  an  outward  varnish  of  civiliza- 
tion and  even  cultivation^  living  at  peace  with 
the  law^  maintaining  a creditable  appearance  to 
all  who  are  not  under  their  power,  yet  sufficient 
often  to  make  the  lives  of  all  who  are  so,  a 
torment  and  a burthen  to  them ! It  would  be 
tiresome  to  repeat  the  commonplaces  about  the 
unfitness  of  men  in  general  for  power,  which, 
after  the  political  discussions  of  centuries,  every 


272 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


one  knows  by  heart,  were  it  not  that  hardly  any 
one  thinks  of  applying  these  maxims  to  the  case 
in  which  above  all  others  they  are  applicable, 
that  of  power,  not  placed  in  the  hands  of  a man 
here  and  there,  but  offered  to  every  adult  male, 
down  to  the  basest  and  most  ferocious.  It  is 
not  because  a man  is  not  known  to  have  broken 
any  of  the  Ten  Commandments,  or  because  he 
maintains  a respectable  character  in  his  dealings 
with  those  whom  he  cannot  compel  to  have 
intercourse  with  him,  or  because  he  does  not  fly 
out  into  violent  bursts  of  ill-temper  against  those 
who  are  not  obliged  to  bear  with  him,  that  it  is 
possible  to  surmise  of  what  sort  his  conduct  will 
be  in  the  um^estraint  of  home.  Even  the  com- 
monest men  reserve  the  violent,  the  sulky,  the 
undisguisedly  selfish  side  of  their  character  for 
those  who  ha.ve  no  power  to  withstand  it.  The 
relation  of  superiors  to  dependents  is  the  nursery 
of  these  vices  of  character,  w^hich,  wherever  else 
they  exist,  are  an  overflowing  from  that  source. 
A man  who  is  morose  or  violent  to  his  equals, 
is  sure  to  be  one  who  has  lived  among  inferiors, 
whom  he  could  frighten  or  worry  into  submis- 
sion. If  the  family  in  its  best  forms  is,  as  it  is 
often  said  to  be,  a school  of  sympathy,  tenderness, 
and  loving  forgetfulness  of  self,  it  is  still  oftener, 
as  respects  its  chief,  a school  of  wilfulness,  over- 
bearingness, unbounded  self-indulgence,  and  a 


THE  SUBJECTION  OP  WOMEN.  273 

double-dyed  and  idealized  selfishness^  of  which 
sacrifice  itself  is  only  a particular  form : the  care 
for  the  wife  and  children  being  only  care  for 
them  as  parts  of  the  man^s  own  interests  and 
belongings^  and  their  individual  happiness  being 
immolated  in  every  shape  to  his  smallest  pre- 
ferences. What  better  is  to  be  looked  for  under 
the  existing  form  of  the  institution?  We  know 
that  the  bad  piopensities  of  human  nature  are 
only  kept  within  bounds  when  they  are  allowed 
no  scope  for  their  indulgence.  We  know  that 
from  impulse  and  habit^  when  not  from  delibe- 
rate purpose,  almost  every  one  to  whom  others 
yield,  goes  on  encroaching  upon  them,  until  a 
point  is  reached  at  which  they  are  compelled  to 
resist.  Such  being  the  common  tendency  of 
human  nature ; the  almost  unlimited  power  which 
present  social  institutions  give  to  the  man  over 
at  least  one  human  being — the  one  with  whom 
he  resides,  and  whom  he  has  always  present — 
this  power  seeks  out  and  evokes  the  latent  germs 
of  selfishness  in  the  remotest  corners  of  his 
nature — fans  its  faintest  sparks  and  smouldering 
embers — oflfers  to  him  a license  for  the  indulgence 
of  those  points  of  his  original  character  which 
in  all  other  relations  he  would  have  found  it  ne* 
cessary  to  repress  and  conceal,  and  the  repression 
of  which  would  in  time  have  become  a second 
nature.  I know  that  there  is  another  side  to 


12* 


274: 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


the  question.  I grant  that  the  wife,  if  she 
cannot  effectually  resist,  can  at  least  retaliate ; 
she,  too,  ean  make  the  man^s  life  extremely  un- 
comfortable, and  by  that  power  is  able  to  carry 
many  points  which  she  ought,  and  many  which 
she  ought  not,  to  prevail  in.  But  this  instru- 
ment of  self-proteetion — which  may  be  called 
the  power  of  the  scold,  or  the  shrewish  sanetion 
— has  the  fatal  defeet,  that  it  avails  most  against 
the  least  tyrannical  superiors,  and  in  favour  of 
the  least  deserving  dependents.  It  is  the  weapon 
of  irritable  and  self-willed  women ; of  those  who 
would  make  the  worst  use  of  power  if  they  them- 
selves had  it,  and  who  generally  turn  this  power 
to  a bad  use.  The  amiable  cannot  use  such  an 
instrument,  the  highminded  disdain  it.  And  on 
the  other  hand,  the  husbands  against  whom  it  is 
used  most  effeetively  are  the  gentler  and  more 
inoffensive;  those  who  cannot  be  induced,  even 
by  provocation,  to  resort  to  any  very  harsh  exer- 
cise of  authority.  The  wife^s  power  of  being 
disagreeable  generally  only  establishes  a counter- 
tyranny, and  makes  vietims  in  their  turn  chiefly 
of  those  husbands  who  are  least  inclined  to  be 
tyrants. 

What  is  it,  then,  whieh  really  tempers  the 
corrupt  ng  effects  of  the  power,  and  makes  it 
compatible  with  sueh  amount  of  good  as  we 
actually  see?  Mere  feminine  blandishments. 


THE  STJBJECTIOlSr  OF  WOMEN. 


275 


though  of  great  effect  in  individual  instances, 
have  very  little  eflPect  in  modifying  the  general 
tendencies  of  the  situation  ; for  their  power  only 
lasts  while  the  woman  is  young  and  attractive, 
often  only  while  her  charm  is  new,  and  not 
dimmed  by  familiarity ; and  on  many  men  they 
have  not  much  influence  at  any  time.  The  real 
mitigating  causes  are,  the  personal  affection 
which  is  the  growth  of  time,  in  so  far  as  the  man^s 
nature  is  susceptible  of  it,  and  the  womaii'^s 
character  sufficiently  congenial  with  his  to  excite 
it  j their  common  interests  as  regards  the  chil- 
dren, and  their  general  community  of  interest 
as  concerns  third  persons  (to  which  however  there 
are  very  great  limitations)  ; the  real  importance 
of  the  wife  to  his  daily  comforts  and  enjoyments, 
and  the  value  he  consequently  attaches  to  her 
on  his  personal  account,  which,  in  a man  capable 
of  feeling  for  others,  lays  the  foundation  of  caring 
for  her  on  her  own  ; and  lastly,  the  influence  na- 
turally acquired  over  almost  all  human  beings  by 
those  near  to  their  persons  (if  not  actually  disagree- 
able to  them) : who,  both  by  their  direct  entreaties, 
and  by  the  insensible  contagion  of  their  feelings 
and  dispositions,  are  often  able,  unless  counter- 
acted by  some  equally  strong  personal  influence, 
to  obtain  a degree  of  command  over  the  conduct 
of  the  superior,  altogether  excessive  and  un- 
reasonable. Through  these  various  means,  the 


276 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


wife  frequently  exercises  even  too  mncli  power 
over  the  man  ; she  is  able  to  aflPect  his  conduct 
in  things  in  which  she  may  not  be  qualified  to 
influence  it  for  good — in  which  her  influence  may 
be  not  only  unenlightened,  but  employed  on  the 
morally  wrong  side;  and  in  which  he  would  act 
better  if  left  to  his  own  prompting.  But  neither 
in  the  affairs  of  families  nor  in  those  of  states 
is  power  a compensation  for  the  loss  of  freedom. 
Her  power  often  gives  her  what  she  has  no  right 
to^  but  does  not  enable  her  to  assert  her  own 
rights.  A Sultanas  favourite  slave  has  slaves 
under  her^  over  whom  she  tyrannizes;  but  the 
desirable  thing  would  be  that  she  should  neither 
have  slaves  nor  be  a slave.  By  entirely  sinking 
her  own  existence  in  her  husband ; by  having  no 
will  (or  persuading  him  that  she  has  no  will)  but 
his^  in  anything  which  regards  their  joint  rela- 
tion^ and  by  making  it  the  business  of  her  life 
to  w ork  upon  his  sentiments^  a wife  may  gratify 
herself  by  influencing^  and  very  probably  per- 
verting, his  conduct^  in  those  of  his  external  re- 
lations which  she  has  never  qualified  herself  to 
judge  of,  or  in  which  she  is  herself  wholly  in- 
fluenced by  some  personal  or  other  partiality  or 
prejudice.  Accordingly^  as  things  now  are, 
those  who  act  most  kindly  to  their  wives,  are 
quite  as  often  made  worse,  as  better,  by  the  wife^s 
influence,  in  respect  to  all  interests  extending 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


277 


beyond  the  family.  She  is  taught  that  she  has 
no  business  with  things  out  of  that  sphere ; and 
accordingly  she  seldom  has  any  honest  and  con- 
scientious opinion  on  them  ; and  therefore  hardly 
ever  meddles  with  them  for  any  legitimate  pur- 
pose^ but  generally  for  an  interested  one.  She 
neither  knows  nor  cares  which  is  the  right  side  in 
politics^  but  she  knows  what  will  bring  in  money 
or  invitations^  give  her  husband  a title,  her  son 
a place,  or  her  daughter  a good  marriage. 

But  how,  it  will  be  asked,  can  any  society 
exist  without  government  ? In  a family,  as  in  a 
state,  some  one  person  must  be  the  ultimate 
ruler.  Who  shall  decide  when  married  people 
differ  in  opinion  ? Both  cannot  have  their  way, 
yet  a decision  one  way  or  the  other  must  be 
come  to. 

It  is  not  true  that  in  all  voluntary  association 
between  two  people,  one  of  them  must  be  absolute 
master ; still  less  that  the  law  must  determine 
which  of  them  it  shall  be.  The  most  frequent 
case  of  voluntary  association,  next  to  marriage, 
is  partnership  in  business : and  it  is  not  found  or 
thought  necessary  to  enact  that  in  every  partner- 
ship, one  partner  shall  have  entire  control  over 
the  concern,  and  the  others  shall  be  bound  to 
obey  his  orders.  No  one  would  enter  into  part- 
nership on  terms  which  would  subject  him  to  the 
responsibilities  of  a principal,  with  only  tho 


278 


THE  SUBJECTION  OB'  WOMEN. 


powers  and  privileges  of  a clerk  or  agent.  li 
the  law  dealt  with  other  contracts  as  it  does  with 
marriage,  it  would  ordain  that  one  partner  should 
administer  the  common  business  as  if  it  was  his 
private  concern ; that  the  otliers  should  have  only 
delegated  powers  ; and  that  this  one  should  be 
designated  by  some  general  presumption  of  law, 
for  example  as  being  the  eldest.  The  law  never 
does  this : nor  does  experience  show  it  to  he 
necessary  that  any  theoretical  inequality  of  power 
should  exist  between  the  partners,  qr  that  the 
partnership  should  have  any  other  conditions  than 
what  they  may  themselves  appoint  by  their  articles 
of  agreement.  Yet  it  might  seem  that  the  ex- 
clusive power  might  be  conceded  with  less  danger 
to  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  inferior,  in  the 
case  of  partnership  than  in  that  of  marriage, 
since  he  is  free  to  cancel  the  power  by  with- 
drawing from  the  connexion.  The  wife  has  no 
such  power,  and  even  if  she  had,  it  is  almost 
always  desirable  that  she  should  try  all  measures 
before  resorting  to  it. 

It  is  quite  true  that  things  which  have  to 
be  decided  every  day,  and  cannot  adjust  them- 
selves gradually,  or  wait  for  a compromise,  ought 
to  depend  on  one  will : one  person  must  have 
their  sole  control.  But  it  does  not  follow  that 
this  should  always  be  the  same  person.  The 
natural  arrangement  is  a division  of  powers 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


279 


between  tte  two;  each  being  absolute  in  the 
executive  branch  of  their  own  department,  and 
any  change  of  system  and  principle  requiring  the 
consent  of  both.  The  division  neither  can  nor 
should  be  pre-established  by  the  law,  since  it 
must  depend  on  individual  capacities  and  suita- 
bilities. If  the  two  persons  chose,  they  might 
pre-appoint  it  by  the  marriage  contract,  as  pe- 
cuniary arrangements  are  now  often  pre-ap- 
pointed.  There  would  seldom  be  any  difficulty 
in  deciding  such  things  by  ihutual  consent,  unless 
the  marriage  was  one  of  those  unhappy  ones  in 
which  all  other  things,  as  well  as  this,  become 
subjects  of  bickering  and  dispute.  The  division 
of  rights  would  naturally  follow  the  division  of 
duties  and  functions ; and  that  is  already  made 
by  consent,  or  at  all  events  not  by  law,  but  by 
general  custom,  modified  and  modifiable  at  the 
pleasure  of  the  persons  concerned. 

The  real  practical  decision  of  affairs,  to  which- 
ever may  be  given  the  legal  authority,  will  greatly 
depend,  as  it  even  now  does,  upon  comparative 
qualifications.  The  mere  fact  that  he  is  usually 
the  eldest,  will  in  most  cases  give  the  prepon- 
derance to  the  man ; at  least  until  they  both 
attain  a time  of  life  at  which  the  difference 
in  their  years  is  of  no  importance.  There  will 
naturally  also  be  a more  potential  voice  on  the 
eide,  whichever  it  is,  that  brings  the  means  of 


280 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


support.  Inequality  from  this  source  does  not 
depend  on  the  law  of  marriage^  but  on  the 
general  conditions  of  human  society^  as  now 
constituted.  The  influence  of  mental  supe- 
riority^ either  general  or  special,  and  of  superior 
decision  of  character,  will  necessarily  tell  for 
much.  It  always  does  so  at  present.  And  this 
fact  shows  how  little  foundation  there  is  for  the 
apprehension  that  the  powers  and  responsibilities 
of  partners  in  life  (as  of  partners  in  business), 
cannot  be  satisfactorily  apportioned  by  agree- 
ment between  themselves.  They  always  are  so 
apportioned,  except  in  cases  in  which  the  mar- 
riage institution  is  a failure.  Things  never 
come  to  an  issue  of  downright  power  on  one 
side,  and  obedience  on  the  other,  except  where 
the  connexion  altogether  has  been  a mistake, 
and  it  would  be  a blessing  to  both  parties  to 
be  relieved  from  it.  Some  may  say  that  the 
very  thing  by  which  an  amicable  settlement  of 
differences  becomes  possible,  is  the  power  of 
legal  compulsion  known  to  be  in  reserve ; as 
people  submit  to  an  arbitration  because  there 
is  a court  of  law  in  the  background,  which  they 
know  that  they  can  be  forced  to  obey.  But 
to  make  the  cases  parallel,  we  must  suppose 
that  the  rule  of  the  court  of  law  was,  not  to 
try  the  cause,  but  to  give  judgment  always  for 
the  same  side,  suppose  the  defendant.  If  so, 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMl^N. 


281 


tlie  amenability  to  it  would  be  a motive  with 
the  plaintiff  to  agree  to  almost  any  arbitration, 
but  it  would  be  just  the  reverse  with  the 
defendant.  The  despotic  power  which  the  law 
gives  to  the  husband  may  be  a reason  to  make 
the  wife  assent  to  any  compromise  by  which 
power  is  practically  shared  between  the  two, 
but  it  cannot  be  the  reason  why  the  husband 
does.  That  there  is  always  among  decently 
conducted  people  a practical  compromise,  though 
one  of  them  at  least  is  under  no  physical  or 
moral  necessity  of  making  it,  shows  that  the 
natural  motives  which  lead  to  a voluntary 
adjustment  of  the  united  life  of  two  persons 
in  a manner  acceptable  to  both,  do  on  the 
whole,  except  in  unfavourable  cases,  prevail.  The 
matter  is  certainly  not  improved  by  laying  down 
as  an  ordinance  of  law,  that  the  superstructure  of 
free  government  shall  be  raised  upon  a legal 
basis  of  despotism  on  one  side  and  subjection 
on  the  other,  and  that  every  concession  which 
the  despot  makes  may,  at  his  mere  pleasure, 
and  without  any  warning,  be  recalled.  Besides 
that  no  freedom  is  worth  much  when  held  on 
so  precarious  a tenure,  its  conditions  are  not 
likely  to  be  the  most  equitable  when  the  law 
throws  so  prodigious  a weight  into  one  scale ; 
when  the  adjustment  rests  between  two  persons 
one  of  whom  is  declared  to  be  entitled  to 


282 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


everything,  the  other  not  only  entitled  to 
nothing  except  during  the  good  pleasure  of 
the  first,  but  under  the  strongest  moral  and 
religious  obligation  not  to  rebel  under  any  excess 
of  oppression. 

A pertinacious  adversary,  pushed  to  extremi- 
ties, may  say,  that  husbands  indeed  are  willing 
to  be  reasonable,  and  to  make  fair  concessions 
to  their  partners  without  being  compelled  to  it, 
but  that  wives  are  not : that  if  allowed  any  rights 
of  their  own,  they  will  acknowledge  no  rights  at 
all  in  any  one  else,  and  never  will  yield  in  any- 
thing, unless  they  can  be  compelled,  by  the 
man^s  mere  authority,  to  yield  in  everything. 
This  would  have  been  said  by  many  persons  some 
generations  ago,  when  satires  on  women  were  in 
vogue,  and  men  thought  it  a clever  thing  to  in- 
sult women  for  being  what  men  made  them. 
But  it  will  be  said  by  no  one  now  who  is  worth 
replying  to.  It  is  not  the  doctrine  of  the  present 
day  that  women  are  less  susceptible  of  good 
feeling,  and  consideration  for  those  wdth  whom 
they  are  united  by  the  strongest  ties,  than  men 
are.  On  the  contrary,  we  are  perpetually  told 
that  women  are  better  than  men,  by  those  who 
are  totally  opposed  to  treating  them  as  if  they 
were  as  good ; so  that  the  saying  has  passed  into 
a piece  of  tiresome  cant,  intended  to  put  a com- 
plimentary face  upon  an  injury,  and  resembling 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


283 


those  celebrations  of  royal  clemency  which,  ac- 
cording to  Gulliver,  the  king  of  Lilliput  always 
prefixed  to  his  most  sanguinary  decrees.  If 
women  are  better  than  men  in  anything,  it  surely 
is  in  individual  self-sacrifice  for  those  of  their 
oVn  family.  But  I lay  little  stress  on  this,  so 
long  as  they  are  universally  taught  that  they 
are  born  and  created  for  self-sacrifice.  I believe 
that  equality  of  rights  would  abate  the  exagge- 
rated self-abnegation  which  is  the  present  arti- 
ficial ideal  of  feminine  character,  and  that  a good 
woman  would  not  be  more  self-sacrificing  than 
the  best  man : but  on  the  other  hand,  men 
would  be  much  more  unselfish  and  self-sacrificing 
than  at  present,  because  they  would  no  longer 
be  taught  to  worship  their  own  will  as  such  a 
grand  thing  that  it  is  actually  the  law  for  another 
rational  being.  There  is  nothing  which  men  so 
easily  learn  as  this  self- worship : all  privileged 
persons,  and  all  privileged  classes,  have  had  it. 
The  more  we  descend  in  the  scale  of  humanity, 
the  intenser  it  is ; and  most  of  all  in  those  who 
are  not,  and  can  never  expect  to  be,  raised  above 
any  one  except  an  unfortunate  wife  and  children. 
The  honourable  exceptions  are  proportionally 
fewer  than  in  the  case  of  almost  any  other  hu- 
man infirmity.  Philosophy  and  religion,  instead 
of  keeping  it  in  check,  are  generally  suborned  to 
defend  it ; and  nothing  controls  it  but  that 


284 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


practical  feeling  of  tlie  equality  of  human  beings, 
which  is  the  theory  of  Christianity^  but  which 
Christianity  will  never  practically  teach,  while 
it  sanctions  institutions  grounded  on  an  arbitrary 
preference  of  one  human  being  over  another. 

There  are,  no  doubt,  women,  as  there  are 
men,  whom  equality  of  consideration  will  not 
satisfy ; with  w horn  there  is  no  peace  while  any 
will  or  wish  is  regarded  but  their  own.  Such 
persons  are  a proper  subject  for  the  law  of 
divorce.  They  are  only  fit  to  live  alone,  and 
no  human  beings  ought  to  be  compelled  to  asso- 
ciate their  lives  wdth  them.  But  the  legal  sub- 
ordination tends  to  make  sueh  characters 
among  women  more,  rather  than  less,  frequent. 
If  the  man  exerts  his  whole  power,  the  woman 
is  of  course  crushed ; but  if  she  is  treated  with 
indulgence,  and  permitted  to  assume  power, 
there  is  no  rule  to  set  limits  to  her  encroach- 
ments. The  law,  not  determining  her  rights,  but 
theoretically  allowing  her  none  at  all,  practically 
declares  that  the  measure  of  what  she  has  s 
right  to,  is  what  she  can  contrive  to  get. 

The  equality  of  married  persons  before  the 
law,  is  not  only  the  sole  mode  in  which  that 
particular  relation  can  be  made  consistent  with 
justice  to  both  sides,  and  conducive  to  the 
happiness  of  both,  but  it  is  the  only  means 
of  rendering  the  daily  life  of  mankind,  in  any 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


285 


high  sense,  a school  of  moral  cnltivation.  Though 
the  truth  may  not  be  felt  or  generally  acknow- 
ledged for  generations  to  come,  the  only  school 
of  genuine  moral  sentiment  is  society  between 
equals.  The  moral  education  of  mankind  has 
hitherto  emanated  chiefly  from  the  law  of  force, 
and  is  adapted  almost  solely  to  the  relations 
which  force  creates.  In  the  less  advanced 
states  of  society,  people  hardly  recognise  any 
relation  with  their  equals.  To  be  an  equal  is 
to  be  an  enemy.  Society,  from  its  highest  place 
to  its  lowest,  is  one  long  chain,  or  rather  ladder, 
where  every  individual  is  either  above  or  below 
his  nearest  neighbour,  and  wherever  he  does 
not  command  he  must  obey.  Existing  moralities, 
accordingly,  are  mainly  fitted  to  a relation  of 
command  and  obedience.  Yet  command  and 
obedience  are  but  unfortunate  necessities  of 
human  life  : society  in  equality  is  its  normal 
state.  Already  in  modern  life,  and  more  and 
more  as  it  progressively  improves,  command 
and  obedience  become  exceptional  facts  in  life, 
equal  association  its  general  rule.  The  morality 
of  the  first  ages  rested  on  the  obligation  to 
submit  to  power ; that  of  the  ages  next  following, 
on  the  right  of  the  weak  to  the  forbearance  and 
protection  of  the  strong.  How  much  longer  is 
one  form  of  society  and  life  to  content  itself  with 
the  morality  made  for  another?  We  have  had 


28G 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


the  morality  of  submission^  and  the  morality 
of  chivalry  and  generosity ; the  time  is  now 
come  for  the  morality  of  justice.  Whenever^ 
in  former  ages^  any  approach  has  been  made 
to  society  in  equality^  Justice  has  asserted  its 
claims  as  the  foundation  of  virtue.  It  was 
thus  in  the  free  republics  of  antiquity.  But 
even  in  the  best  of  these,  the  equals  were  limited 
to  the  free  male  citizens;  slaves,  women,  and 
the  unenfranchised  residents  were  under  the 
law  of  force.  The  joint  influence  of  Homan 
civilization  and  of  Christianity  obliterated  these 
distinctions,  and  in  theory  (if  only  partially  in 
practice)  declared  the  claims  of  the  human 
being,  as  such,  to  be  paramount  to  those  of 
sex,  class,  or  social  position.  The  barriers  which 
had  begun  to  be  levelled  were  raised  again  by 
the  northern  conquests ; and  the  whole  of  modern 
history  consists  of  the  slow  process  by  which 
they  have  since  been  wearing  away.  We  are 
entering  into  an  order  of  things  in  which  justice 
will  again  be  the  primary  virtue ; grounded  as 
before  on  equal,  but  now  also  on  sympathetic 
association ; having  its  root  no  longer  in  the 
instinct  of  equals  for  self-protection,  but  in  a 
cultivated  sympathy  between  them  ; and  no  one 
being  now  left  out,  but  an  equal  measure  being 
extended  to  all.  It  is  no  novelty  that  mankind 
do  not  distinctly  foresee  their  own  changes, 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


287 


and  that  their  sentiments  are  adapted  to  past, 
not  to  coming  ages.  To  see  the  futurity  of  the 
species  has  always  been  the  privilege  of  the  intel- 
lectual elite,  or  of  those  who  have  learnt  from 
them ; to  have  the  feelings  of  that  futurity  has 
been  the  distinction,  and  usually  the  martyrdom, 
of  a still  rarer  elite.  Institutions,  books,  edu- 
cation, society,  all  go  on  training  human  beings 
for  the  old,  long  after  the  new  has  come ; much 
more  when  it  is  only  coming.  But  the  true 
virtue  of  human  beings  is  fitness  to  live  together 
as  equals ; claiming  nothing  for  themselves  but 
what  they  as  freely  concede  to  every  one  else ; 
regarding  command  of  any  kind  as  an  excep- 
tional necessity,  and  in  all  cases  a temporary 
one ; and  preferring,  whenever  possible,  the 
society  of  those  with  whom  leading  and  fol- 
lowing can  be  alternate  and  reciprocal.  To 
these  virtues,  nothing  in  life  as  at  present  con- 
stituted gives  cultivation  by  exercise.  The 
family  is  a school  of  despotism,  in  which  the 
virtues  of  despotism,  but  also  its  vices,  are  largely 
nourished.  Citizenship,  in  free  countries,  is  partly 
a school  of  society  in  equality ; but  citizenship  fills 
only  a small  place  in  modern  life,  and  does  not 
come  near  the  daily  habits  or  inmost  sentiments. 
The  family,  justly  constituted,  would  be  the  real 
school  of  the  virtues  of  freedom.  It  is  sure  to 
oe  a sufficient  one  of  everything  else.  It  will 


288 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


alvrays  be  a school  of  obedience  for  the  children, 
of  command  for  the  parents.  What  is  needed 
is,  that  it  should  be  a school  of  sympathy  in 
equality,  of  living  together  in  love,  without 
power  on  one  side  or  obedience  on  the  other. 
This  it  ought  to  be  between  the  parents.  It 
would  then  be  an  exercise  of  those  virtues  which 
each  requires  to  fit  them  for  all  other  associa- 
tion, and  a model  to  the  children  of  the  feelings 
and  conduct  which  their  temporary  training  by 
means  of  obedience  is  designed  to  render  habitual, 
and  therefore  natural,  to  them.  The  moral  train- 
ing of  mankind  will  never  be  adapted  to  the 
conditions  of  the  life  for  which  all  other  human 
progress  is  a preparation,  until  they  practise  in 
the  family  the  same  moral  rule  which  is  adapted 
to  the  normal  constitution  of  human  soci';ty. 
Any  sentiment  of  freedom  which  can  exist  in 
a man  whose  nearest  and  dearest  intimacies  are 
with  those  of  whom  he  is  absolute  master , is 
not  the  genuine  or  Christian  love  of  freed  >m, 
but,  what  the  love  of  freedom  generally  v\as 
in  the  ancients  and  in  the  middle  ages-  -an 
intense  feeling  of  the  dignity  and  importance 
of  his  own  personality;  making  him  disdain  a 
yoke  for  himself,  of  which  he  has  no  abhorrence 
whatever  in  the  abstract,  but  which  he  is  abun- 
dantly ready  to  impose  on  others  for  his  own 
interest  or  glorification. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


289 


I readily  admit  (and  it  is  the  very  foundation 
/ my  hopes)  that  numbers  of  married  people 
ven  under  the  present  law^  (in  the  higher  classes 
of  England  probably  a great  majority^)  live  in 
the  spirit  of  a just  law  of  equality.  Laws  never 
would  be  improved^  if  there  were  not  nume- 
rous persons  whose  moral  sentiments  are  better 
than  the  existing  laws.  Such  persons  ought 
to  support  the  principles  here  advocated;  of 
which  the  only  object  is  to  make  all  other 
married  couples  similar  to  what  these  are  now. 
But  persons  even  of  considerable  moral  worth, 
unless  they  are  also  thinkers^  are  very  ready 
to  believe  that  laws  or  practices^  the  evils  of 
which  they  have  not  personally  experienced, 
do  not  produce  any  evils,  but  (if  seeming  to 
be  generally  approved  of)  probably  do  good, 
and  that  it  is  wrong  to  object  to  them.  It 
would,  however,  be  a great  mistake  in  such 
married  people  to  su^^pose,  because  the  legal  con- 
ditions of  the  tie  which  unites  them  do  not  occur 
to  their  thoughts  once  in  a twelvemonth,  and  be- 
cause they  live  and  feel  in  all  respects  as  if  they 
were  legally  equals,  that  the  same  is  the  case  with 
all  other  married  couples,  wherever  the  husband  is 
not  a notorious  ruffian.  To  suppose  this,  would 
be  to  show  equal  ignorance  of  human  nature  and 
of  fact.  The  less  fit  a man  is  for  the  possession 
of  power — the  less  likely  to  be  allowed  tr  exercisf 


290 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


it  over  any  person  with  that  personas  voluntary 
consent — the  more  does  he  hug  himself  in  the 
consciousness  of  the  power  the  law  gives  him^ 
exact  its  legal  rights  to  the  utmost  point  which 
custom  (the  custom  of  men  like  himself)  will 
tolerate^  and  take  pleasure  in  using  the  power, 
merely  to  enliven  the  agreeable  sense  of  possess- 
ing it.  What  is  more  ; in  the  most  naturally 
brutal  and  morally  uneducated  part  of  the  lower 
classes,  the  legal  slavery  of  the  woman,  and  some- 
thing in  the  merely  physical  subjection  to  their 
will  as  an  instrument,  causes  them  to  feel  a 
sort  of  disrespect  and  contempt  towards  their 
own  wife  which  they  do  not  feel  towards  any 
other  woman,  or  any  other  human  being,  with 
whom  they  come  in  contact ; and  which  makes 
her  seem  to  them  an  appropriate  subject  for  any 
kind  of  indignity.  Let  an  acute  observer  of  the 
signs  of  feeling,  who  has  the  requisite  opportuni- 
ties, judge  for  himself  whether  this  is  not  the  case  : 
and  if  he  finds  that  it  is,  let  him  not  wonder  at 
any  amount  of  disgust  and  indignation  that  can 
be  felt  against  institutions  which  lead  naturally 
to  this  depraved  state  of  the  human  mind. 

We  shall  be  told,  perhaps,  that  religion  imposes 
the  duty  of  obedience  ; as  every  established  fact 
which  is  too  bad  to  admit  of  any  other  defence, 
is  always  presented  to  us  as  an  injunction  of 
religion.  The  Church,  it  is  very  true,  enjoins  it 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


291 


in  her  formularies^  but  it  would  be  difficult  to 
derive  any  such  injunction  from  Christianity. 
We  are  told  that  St.  Paul  said^  ^^Wives^  obey 
your  husbands  but  he  also  said.,  Slaves^  obey 
your  masters.^^  It  was  not  St.  PauPs  business^ 
nor  Avas  it  consistent  with  his  object,  the  propa- 
gation of  Christianity,  to  incite  any  one  to  rebel- 
lion against  existing  laws.  The  apostle^s  aceep- 
tance  of  all  social  institutions  as  he  found  them, 
is  no  more  to  be  construed  as  a disapproval  of 
attempts  to  improve  them  at  the  proper  time, 
than  his  declaration,  The  powers  that  be  are 
ordained  of  God,^^  gives  his  sanction  to  mili- 
tary despotism,  and  to  that  alone,  as  the 
Christian  form  of  political  government,  or  com- 
mands passive  obedience  to  it.  To  pretend 
that  Christianity  was  intended  to  stereotype 
existing  forms  of  government  and  society,  and 
protect  them  against  change,  is  to  reduce  it  to 
the  level  of  Islam! sm  or  of  Brahminism.  It  is 
precisely  because  Christianity  has  not  done  this, 
that  it  has  been  the  religion  of  the  progressive 
portion  of  mankind,  and  Islamism,  Brahminism, 
&c.,  have  been  those  of  the  stationary  portions ; 
or  rather  (for  there  is  no  such  thing  as  a really 
stationary  society)  of  the  declining  portions. 
There  have  been  abundance  of  people,  in  all  ages  of 
Christianity,  who  tried  to  make  it  something  of  the 
same  kind ; to  convert  us  into  a sort  of  Christian 


292 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


Mussulmans^  the  Bible  for  a Koran,  prohi- 
biting all  improvement : and  great  has  been  theif 
power,  and  many  have  had  to  sacrifice  their  lives 
in  resisting  them.  But  they  have  been  resisted, 
and  the  resistance  has  made  us  what  we  are,  and 
will  yet  make  us  what  we  are  to  be. 

After  what  has  been  said  respecting  the  ob- 
ligation of  obedience,  it  is  almost  superfluous  to 
say  anything  concerning  the  more  special  point 
included  in  the  general  one — a woman^s  right 
to  her  own  property;  for  I need  not  hope  that 
this  treatise  can  make  any  impression  upon  those 
who  need  anything  to  convince  them  that  a 
woman^s  inheritance  or  gains  ought  to  be  as 
much  her  own  after  marriage  as  before.  The 
rule  is  simple  : whatever  would  be  the  husband^s 
or  wife^s  if  they  were  not  married,  should  be 
under  their  exclusive  control  during  marriage; 
which  need  not  interfere  with  the  power  to  tie 
up  property  by  settlement,  in  order  to  preserve 
it  for  children.  Some  people  are  sentimentally 
shocked  at  the  idea  of  a separate  interest  in 
money  matters,  as  inconsistent  with  the  ideal 
fusion  of  two  lives  into  one.  For  my  own  part, 
I am  one  of  the  strongest  supporters  of  community 
of  goods,  when  resulting  from  an  entire  unity  of 
feeling  in  the  owners,  which  makes  all  things 
common  between  them.  But  I have  no  relish 
for  a community  of  goods  resting  on  the  doc- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


293 


trine^  that  what  is  mine  is  yours  but  what  is 
yours  is  not  mine ; and  I should  prefer  to  de- 
cline entering  into  such  a compact  with  any 
one^  though  I were  myself  the  person  to  profit 
by  it. 

This  particular  injustice  and  oppression  to 
women^  which  is^  to  common  apprehensions^  more 
obvious  than  all  the  rest^  admits  of  remedy 
without  interfering  with  any  other  mischiefs  : and 
there  can  be  little  doubt  that  it  will  be  one  of 
the  earliest  remedied.  Already^  in  many  of  the 
new  and  several  of  the  old  States  of  the  Ame- 
rican Confederation^  provisions  have  been  in- 
serted even  in  the  written  Constitutions,  securing 
to  women  equality  of  rights  in  this  respect : and 
thereby  improving  materially  the  position,  in 
the  marriage  relation,  of  those  women  at  least 
who  have  property,  by  leaving  them  one  instru- 
ment of  power  which  they  have  not  signed 
away ; and  preventing  also  the  scandalous  abuse 
of  the  marriage  institution,  which  is  perpetrated 
when  a man  entraps  a girl  into  marrying  him 
without  a settlement,  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
getting  possession  of  her  money.  When  the 
support  of  the  family  depends,  not  on  property, 
but  on  earnings,  the  common  arrangement,  by 
which  the  man  earns  the  income  and  the  wife 
superintends  the  domestic  expenditure,  seems  to 
me  in  general  the  most  suitable  division  of 


294 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


labour  between  the  two  persons.  If,  in  addition 
to  the  physical  suffering  of  bearing  children, 
and  the  whole  responsibility  of  their  care  and 
education  in  eaidy  years,  the  wife  undertakes 
the  careful  and  economical  application  of  tlie 
husband^s  earnings  to  the  general  comfort  of  the 
family ; she  takes  not  only  her  fair  share,  but 
usually  the  larger  share,  of  the  bodily  and  mental 
exertion  required  by  their  joint  existence.  If 
she  undertakes  any  additional  portion,  it  seldom 
relieves  her  from  this,  but  only  prevents  her 
from  performing  it  properly.  The  care  which 
she  is  herself  disabled  from  taking  of  the  chil- 
dren and  the  household,  nobody  else  takes; 
those  of  the  children  who  do  not  die,  grow  up 
as  they  best  can,  and  the  management  of  the 
household  is  likely  to  be  so  bad,  as  even  in  point 
of  economy  to  be  a great  drawback  from  the 
value  of  the  wife^s  earnings.  In  an  otherwise 
just  state  of  things,  it  is  not,  therefore,  I think, 
a desirable  custom,  that  the  wife  should  con- 
tribute by  her  labour  to  the  income  of  the  family. 
In  an  unjust  state  of  things,  her  doing  so  may 
be  useful  to  her,  by  making  her  of  more  value 
in  the  eyes  of  the  man  who  is  legally  her  master ; 
but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  enables  him  still  farther 
to  abuse  his  power,  by  forcing  her  to  work,  and 
leaving  the  support  of  the  family  to  her  exer- 
tions, while  he  spends  most  of  his  time  in  drink- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


295 


ing  and  idleness.  The  power  of  earning  is  essen- 
tial to  the  dignity  of  a woman^  if  she  has  not 
independent  property.  Bnt  if  marriage  were  an 
equal  contract,  not  implying  the  obligation  of 
obedience ; if  the  connexion  were  no  longer  en- 
forced to  the  oppression  of  those  to  whom  it  ia 
purely  a mischief,  but  a separation,  on  just 
terms  (I  do  not  now  speak  of  a divorce),  could 
be  obtained  by  any  woman  who  was  morally 
entitled  to  it ; and  if  she  would  then  find  all 
honourable  employments  as  freely  open  to  her  as 
to  men ; it  would  not  be  necessary  for  her  pro- 
tection, that  during  marriage  she  should  make 
this  particular  use  of  her  faculties.  Like  a man 
when  he  chooses  a profession,  so,  when  a woman 
marries,  it  may  in  general  be  understood  that 
she  makes  choice  of  the  management  of  a house- 
hold, and  the  bringing  up  of  a family,  as  the 
first  call  upon  her  exertions,  during  as  many 
years  of  her  life  as  may  be  required  for  the  pur- 
pose ; and  that  she  renounces,  not  all  other  ob- 
jects and  occupations,  but  all  which  are  not 
consistent  with  the  requirements  of  this.  The 
actual  exercise,  in  a habitual  or  systematic 
manner,  of  outdoor  occupations,  or  such  as 
cannot  be  carried  on  at  home,  would  by  this 
principle  be  practically  interdicted  to  the  greater 
number  of  married  women.  But  the  utmost 
latitude  ought  to  exist  for  the  adaptation  of 


296 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


general  rules  to  individual  suitabilities;  and  there 
ought  to  be  nothing  to  prevent  faculties  excep- 
tionally adapted  to  any  other  pursuit^  from 
obeying  their  vocation  notwithstanding  mar- 
riage : due  provision  being  made  for  supplying 
otherwise  any  falling-short  which  might  become 
inevitable^  in  her  full  performance  of  the  ordinary 
functions  of  mistress  of  a family.  These  things, 
if  once  opinion  were  rightly  directed  on  the 
subject,  might  with  perfect  safety  be  left  to  be 
regulated  by  opinion,  without  any  interfenence 
of  law# 


CHAPTER  III. 


N tlie  other  point  which  is  involved  in  the 


just  equality  of  women^  their  admissibility 
to  all  the  functions  and  occupations  hitherto 
retained  as  the  monopoly  of  the  stronger  sex, 
I should  anticipate  no  difficulty  in  convincing 
any  one  who  has  gone  with  me  on  the  subject  of 
the  equality  of  women  in  the  family.  I believe 
that  their  disabilities  elsewhere  are  only  clung  to 
in  order  to  maintain  their  subordination  in  do- 
mestic life;  because  the  generality  of  the  male 
sex  cannot  yet  tolerate  the  idea  of  living  with 
an  equal.  Were  it  not  for  that,  I think  that 
almost  every  one,  in  the  existing  state  of  opinion 
in  politics  and  political  economy,  would  admit 
the  injustice  of  excluding  half  the  human  race 
from  the  greater  number  of  luerative  occupations, 
and  from  almost  all  high  social  functions  ; or- 
daining from  their  birth  either  that  they  are  not, 
and  cannot  by  any  possibility  become,  fit  for 
employments  which  are  legally  open  to  the 
stupidest  and  basest  of  the  other  sex,  or  else  that 
however  fit  they  may  be,  those  employments  shaU 


13* 


298 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


be  interdicted  to  tbem,  in  order  to  be  preserved 
for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  males.  In  the  last 
two  centuries^  when  (which  was  seldom  the  case) 
any  reason  beyond  the  mere  existence  of  the  fact 
was  thought  to  be  required  to  justify  the  disabili- 
ties of  women^  people  seldom  assigned  as  a reason 
their  inferior  mental  capacity ; which^  in  times 
when  there  was  a real  trial  of  personal  faculties 
(from  which  all  women  were  not  excluded)  in  the 
struggles  of  public  life^  no  one  really  believed  in. 
The  reason  given  in  those  days  was  not  women^s 
unfitness^  but  the  interest  of  society,  by  which  was 
meant  the  interest  of  men : just  as  the  raison  d’etat y 
meaning  the  convenience  of  the  government^  and 
the  support  of  existing  authority,  was  deemed  a 
sufficient  explanation  and  excuse  for  the  most  flagi- 
tious crimes.  In  the  present  day,  power  holds 
a smoother  language,  and  whomsoever  it  oppresses, 
always  pretends  to  do  so  for  their  own  good  : 
accordingly,  when  anything  is  forbidden  to  women, 
it  is  thought  necessary  to  say,  and  desirable  to 
believe,  that  they  are  incapable  of  doing  it,  and 
that  they  depart  from  their  real  path  of  success 
and  happiness  when  they  aspire  to  it.  But  to 
make  this  reason  plausible  (I  do  not  say  valid), 
those  by  whom  it  is  urged  must  be  prepared  to 
carry  it  to  a much  greater  length  than  any  one 
ventures  to  do  in  the  face  of  present  experience. 
It  is  not  sufficient  to  maintain  that  women  on 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


299 


the  average  are  less  gifted  than  men  on  the 
average^  with  certain  of  the  higher  mental 
faeulties^  or  that  a smaller  number  of  women 
than  of  men  are  fit  for  occupations  and  functions 
of  the  highest  intellectual  character.  It  is 
necessary  to  maintain  that  no  women  at  all  are 
fit  for  them^  and  that  the  most  eminent  women 
are  inferior  in  mental  faculties  to  the  most 
mediocre  of  the  men  on  whom  those  functions 
at  present  devolve.  For  if  the  performance  of  the 
function  is  decided  either  by  competition^ or  by  any 
mode  of  choice  which  secures  regard  to  the  public 
interest^  there  needs  be  no  apprehension  that  any 
important  employments  will  fall  into  the  hands  of 
women  inferior  to  average  men^  or  to  the  average 
of  their  male  competitors.  The  only  result  would 
be  that  there  would  be  fewer  women  than  men 
in  such  employments ; a result  certain  to  happen 
in  any  case^  if  only  from  the  preference  always 
likely  to  be  felt  by  the  majority  of  women  for  the 
one  vocation  in  which  there  is  nobody  to  compete 
with  them.  Now^  the  most  determined  depre- 
ciator  of  women  will  not  venture  to  deny^  that 
when  we  add  the  experience  of  recent  times  to 
that  of  ages  past^  women,  and  not  a few  merely, 
but  many  women,  have  proved  themselves  capable 
of  everything,  perhaps  without  a single  excep- 
tion, which  is  done  by  men,  and  of  doing  it  suc- 
cessfully and  creditably.  The  utmost  that  can  be 


300 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


said  is,  that  there  are  many  things  which  none  ol 
them  have  succeeded  in  doing  as  well  as  they 
have  been  done  by  some  men — many  in  which 
they  have  not  reached  the  very  highest  rank. 
But  there  are  extremely  few,  dependent  only  on 
mental  faculties,  in  which  they  have  not  attained 
the  rank  next  to  the  highest.  Is  not  this  enough, 
and  much  more  than  enough,  to  make  it  a 
tyranny  to  them,  and  a detriment  to  society,  that 
they  should  not  be  allowed  to  compete  with  men 
for  the  exercise  of  these  functions  ? Is  it  not  a 
mere  truism  to  say,  that  such  functions  are  often 
filled  by  men  far  less  fit  for  them  than  numbers 
of  women,  and  who  would  be  beaten  by  women 
in  any  fair  field  of  competition  ? What  difference 
does  it  make  that  there  may  be  men  somewhere, 
fully  employed  about  other  things,  who  may  be 
still  better  qualified  for  the  things  in  question 
than  these  women  ? Does  not  this  take  place 
in  all  competitions?  Is  there  so  great  a super- 
fiuity  of  men  fit  for  high  duties,  that  society  can 
afford  to  reject  the  service  of  any  competent 
person  ? Are  we  so  certain  of  always  finding  a 
man  made  to  our  hands  for  any  duty  or  function 
of  social  importance  which  falls  vacant,  that  we 
lose  nothing  by  putting  a ban  upon  one-half  of 
mankind,  and  refusing  beforehand  to  make  their 
faculties  available,  however  distinguished  they 
may  be  ? And  even  if  we  could  do  without 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


301 


them,  would  it  be  consistent  with  justice  to  refuse 
to  them  their  fair  share  of  honour  and  distinction, 
or  to  deny  to  them  the  equal  moral  right  of  all 
human  beings  to  choose  their  oceupation  (short 
of  injury  to  others)  according  to  their  own 
preferences,  at  their  own  risk?  Nor  is  the  in- 
justice confined  to  them : it  is  shared  by  those 
who  are  in  a position  to  benefit  by  their  services. 
To  ordain  that  any  kind  of  persons  shall  not  be 
physicians,  or  shall  not  be  advocates,  or  shall  not 
be  members  of  parliament,  is  to  injure  not  them 
only,  but  all  who  employ  physicians  or  advocates, 
or  elect  members  of  parliament,  and  who  are 
deprived  of  the  stimulating  effect  of  greater  com- 
petition on  the  exertions  of  the  competitors,  as 
well  as  restricted  to  a narrower  range  of  indi- 
vidual choice. 

It  will  perhaps  be  sufficient  if  I confine 
myself,  in  the  details  of  my  argument,  to  func- 
tions of  a public  nature  : since,  if  I am  successful 
as  to  those,  it  probably  will  be  readily  granted 
that  women  should  be  admissible  to  all  other 
occupations  to  which  it  is  at  all  material  whether 
they  are  admitted  or  not.  And  here  let  me 
begin  by  marking  out  one  function,  broadly  dis- 
tinguished from  all  others,  their  right  to  which  is 
entirely  independent  of  any  question  which  can 
be  raised  concerning  their  faculties.  I mean  the 
suffrage,  both  parliamentary  and  municipal.  The 


302 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


right  to  share  in  the  choice  of  those  who  are  to 
exercise  a public  trusty  is  altogether  a distinct 
thing  from  that  of  competing  for  the  trust  itself. 
If  no  one  could  vote  for  a member  of  parliament 
who  was  not  fit  to  be  a candidate^  the  govern- 
ment would  be  a narrow  oligarchy  indeed.  To 
have  a voice  in  choosing  those  by  whom  one  is 
to  be  governed^  is  a means  of  self-protection  due 
to  every  one^  though  he  were  to  remain  for  ever 
excluded  from  the  function  of  governing  : and 
that  women  are  considered  fit  to  have  such 
a choice^  may  be  presumed  from  the  fact^  that 
the  law  already  gives  it  to  women  in  the 
most  important  of  all  cases  to  themselves  : for 
the  choice  of  the  man  who  is  to  govern  a 
woman  to  the  end  of  life^  is  always  supposed 
to  be  voluntarily  made  by  herself.  In  the  case 
of  election  to  public  trusts^  it  is  the  business 
of  constitutional  law  to  surround  the  right  of 
suffrage  with  all  needful  securities  and  limita- 
tions; but  whatever  securities  are  sufficient  in 
the  case  of  the  male  sex^  no  others  need  be 
required  in  the  case  of  women.  Under  whatever 
conditions,  and  within  whatever  limits,  men  are 
admitted  to  the  suffrage,  there  is  not  a shadow  of 
justification  for  not  admitting  women  under  the 
same.  The  majority  of  the  women  of  any  class 
are  not  likely  to  differ  in  political  opinion  from 
the  majority  of  the  men  of  the  same  class,  unless 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


303 


tlie  question  be  one  in  which  the  interests  of 
women,  as  such,  are  in  some  way  involved ; and  if 
they  are  so,  women  require  the  suffrage,  as  their 
guarantee  of  just  and  equal  consideration.  This 
ought  to  be  obvious  even  to  those  who  coincide 
in  no  other  of  the  doctrines  for  which  I contend. 
Even  if  every  woman  were  a wife,  and  if  every 
wife  ought  to  be  a slave,  all  the  more  would 
these  slaves  stand  in  need  of  legal  protection  : and 
we  know  what  legal  protection  the  slaves  have, 
where  the  laws  are  made  by  their  masters. 

With  regard  to  the  fitness  of  women,  not  only 
to  participate  in  elections,  but  themselves  to 
hold  offices  or  practise  professions  involving 
important  public  responsibilities ; I have  already 
observed  that  this  consideration  is  not  essential 
to  the  practical  question  in  dispute : since  any 
woman,  who  succeeds  in  an  open  profession, 
proves  by  that  very  fact  that  she  is  qualified  for 
it.  And  in  the  case  of  public  offices,  if  the  political 
system  of  the  country  is  such  as  to  exclude 
unfit  men,  it  will  equally  exclude  unfit  women  : 
while  if  it  is  not,  there  is  no  additional  evil  in  the 
fact  that  the  unfit  persons  whom  it  admits  may 
be  either  women  or  men.  As  long  therefore  as 
it  is  acknowledged  that  even  a few  women  may 
be  fit  for  these  duties,  the  laws  which  shut  the 
door  on  those  exceptions  cannot  be  justified  by 
any  opinion  which  can  be  held  respecting  the 


301 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


capacities  of  women  in  general.  But,  though  th  is 
last  consideration  is  not  essential^  it  is  far  from 
being  irrelevant.  An  unprejudiced  view  of  it 
gives  additional  strength  to  the  arguments  against 
the  disabilities  of  women,  and  reinforces  them  by 
Jiigh  considerations  of  practical  utility. 

Let  us  at  first  make  entire  abstraction  of  all 
psychological  considerations  tending  to  show,  that 
any  of  the  mental  differences  supposed  to  exist 
between  women  and  men  are  but  the  natural 
effect  of  the  differences  in  their  education  and 
circumstances,  and  indicate  no  radical  difference, 
far  less  radical  inferiority,  of  nature.  Let  us 
consider  women  only  as  they  already  are,  or  as 
they  are  known  to  have  been  ; and  the  capacities 
which  they  have  already  practically  shown. 
What  they  have  done,  that  at  least,  if  nothing 
else,  it  is  proved  that  they  can  do.  When  we 
consider  how  sedulously  they  are  all  trained  away 
from,  instead  of  being  trained  towards,  any  of 
the  occupations  or  objects  reserved  for  men,  it  is 
evident  that  I am  taking  a very  humble  ground 
for  them,  when  I rest  their  case  on  what  they 
have  actually  achieved.  For,  in  this  case,  negative 
evidence  is  worth  little,  while  any  positive  evi- 
dence is  conclusive.  It  cannot  be  inferred  to  be 
impossible  that  a woman  should  be  a Homer,  or 
an  Aristotle,  or  a Michael  Angelo,  or  a Beet- 
hoven, because  no  woman  has  yet  actually  pro- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


305 


duced  works  comparable  to  theirs  in  any  of  those 
lines  of  excellence.  This  negative  fact  at  most 
leaves  the  question  uncertain^  and  open  to 
psychological  discussion.  But  it  is  quite  certain 
that  a woman  can  be  a Queen  Elizabeth^,  or  a 
Deborah^  or  a Joan  of  Arc^  since  this  is  not 
inference^  but  fact.  Now  it  is  a curious  consi- 
deration^ that  the  only  things  wdiich  the  existing 
law  excludes  women  from  doings  are  the  things 
which  they  have  proved  that  they  are  able  to  do. 
There  is  no  law  to  prevent  a woman  from  having 
written  all  the  plays  of  Shakspeare^  or  composed 
all  the  operas  of  Mozart.  But  Queen  Elizabeth 
or  Queen  Victoria^  had  they  not  inherited  the 
throne^  could  not  have  been  intrusted  with  the 
smallest  of  the  political  duties^  of  which  the 
former  showed  herself  equal  to  the  greatest. 

If  anything  conclusive  could  be  inferred  from 
experience^  without  psychological  analysis^  it 
would  be  that  the  things  which  women  are  not 
allowed  to  do  are  the  veny  ones  for  which  they 
are  peculiarly  qualified ; since  their  vocation  for 
government  has  made  its  way^  and  become  con- 
spicuous^ through  the  very  few  opportunities 
which  have  been  given ; while  in  the  lines  of 
distinction  which  apparently  were  freely  open  to 
them^  they  have  by  no  means  so  eminently  dis- 
tinguished themselves.  We  know  how  small  a 
number  of  reigning  queens  history  presents^  in 


306 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


comparison  with  that  of  kings.  Of  this  smaller 
number  a far  larger  proportion  have  shown 
talents  for  rule;  though  many  of  them  have 
occupied  the  throne  in  diffieult  periods.  It  is 
remarkable^  too^  that  they  have,  in  a great 
number  of  instances,  been  distinguished  by  merits 
the  most  opposite  to  the  imaginary  and  conven- 
tional character  of  women : they  have  been  as 
mueh  remarked  for  the  firmness  and  vigour  of 
their  rule,  as  for  its  intelligenee.  When,  to 
queens  and  empresses,  we  add  regents,  and  vice- 
roys of  provinces,  the  list  of  women  who  have 
been  eminent  rulers  of  mankind  swells  to  a great 
length.”^  This  fact  is  so  undeniable,  that  some 
one,  long  ago,  tried  to  retort  the  argument,  and 
turned  the  admitted  truth  into  an  additional 
insult,  by  saying  that  queens  are  better  than 

* Especially  is  this  true  if  we  take  into  consideration  Asia 
as  well  as  Europe.  If  a Hindoo  principality  is  strongly,  vigi- 
lantly, and  economically  governed  ; if  order  is  preserved  without 
oppression ; if  cultivation  is  extending,  and  the  people  prosperous, 
in  three  cases  out  of  four  that  principality  is  under  a woman’s 
rule.  This  fact,  to  me  an  entirely  unexpected  one,  I have  col- 
lected from  a long  official  knowledge  of  Hindoo  governments. 
There  are  many  such  instances : for  though,  by  Hindoo  institutions, 
a woman  cannot  reign,  she  is  the  legal  regent  of  a kingdom  during 
the  minority  of  the  heir  ; and  minorities  are  frequent,  the  lives  of 
the  male  rulers  being  so  often  prematurely  terminated  through 
the  effect  of  inactivity  and  sensual  excesses.  When  we  consider 
that  these  princesses  have  never  been  seen  in  public,  have  never 
conversed  with  any  man  not  of  their  own  family  except  from  be- 
hind a curtain,  that  they  do  not  read,  and  if  they  did,  there  is  no 
book  in  their  languages  which  can  give  them  the  smallest  in- 
struction on  political  affairs;  the  example  they  afford  of  the  na* 
tural  capacity  cf  women  for  government  is  very  striking. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


307 


kirigs^  because  under  kings  women  govern^  but 
under  queens^  men. 

It  may  seem  a waste  of  reasoning  to  argue 
against  a bad  joke ; but  such  things  do  affect 
people^s  minds ; and  I have  heard  men  quote  this 
sayings  with  an  air  as  if  they  thought  that  there 
was  something  in  it.  At  any  rate^  it  will  serve 
as  well  as  anything  else  for  a starting  point  in 
discussion.  I say,  then,  that  it  is  not  true  that 
under  kings,  women  govern.  Such  cases  are 
entirely  exceptional : and  weak  kings  have  quite 
as  often  governed  ill  through  the  influence  of 
male  favourites,  as  of  female.  When  a king 
is  governed  by  a woman  merely  through  his 
amatory  propensities,  good  government  is  not 
probable,  though  even  then  there  are  exceptions. 
But  French  history  counts  two  kings  who  have 
voluntarily  given  the  direction  of  affairs  during 
many  years,  the  one  to  his  mother,  the  other  to 
his  sister : one  of  them,  Charles  VIII.,  was  a 
mere  boy,  but  in  doing  so  he  followed  the  inten- 
tions of  his  father  Louis  XI.,  the  ablest  monarch 
of  his  age.  The  other.  Saint  Louis,  was  the 
best,  and  one  of  the  most  vigorous  rulers,  since 
the  time  of  Charlemagne.  Both  these  princesses 
ruled  in  a manner  hardly  equalled  by  any 
prince  among  their  cotemporaries.  The  emperor 
Charles  the  Fifth,  the  most  politic  prince  of  his 
time,  who  had  as  great  a number  of  able  men  in 


308 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


his  service  as  a ruler  ever  had,  and  was  one  of  the 
least  likely  of  all  sovereigns  to  sacrifice  his  interest 
to  personal  feelings,  made  two  princesses  of  his 
family  successively  Governors  of  the  Netherlands, 
and  kept  one  or  other  of  them  in  that  post  during 
his  whole  life,  (they  were  afterwards  succeeded 
by  a third).  Both  ruled  very  successfully,  and 
one  of  them,  Margaret  of  Austria,  was  one  of 
the  ablest  politicians  of  the  age.  So  much  for 
one  side  of  the  question.  Now  as  to  the  other. 
When  it  is  said  that  under  queens  men  govern, 
is  the  same  meaning  to  be  understood  as  when 
kings  are  said  to  be  governed  by  women  ? Is  it 
meant  that  queens  choose  as  their  instruments 
of  government,  the  associates  of  their  personal 
pleasures?  The  case  is  rare  even  with  those 
who  are  as  unscrupulous  on  the  latter  point  as 
Catherine  II. : and  it  is  not  in  these  cases  that 
the  good  government,  alleged  to  arise  from  male 
infiuence,  is  to  be  found.  If  it  be  true,  then,  that 
the  administration  is  in  the  hands  of  better  men 
under  a queen  than  under  an  average  king,  it 
must  be  that  queens  have  a superior  capacity 
for  choosing  them ; and  women  must  be  better 
qualified  than  men  both  for  the  position  of  sove- 
reign, and  for  that  of  chief  minister ; for  the 
prineipal  business  of  a prime  minister  is  not  to 
govern  in  person,  but  to  find  the  fittest  persons 
to  conduct  every  department  of  public  aflfairsL 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


309 


The  more  rapid  insight  into  character^  which 
is  one  of  the  admitted  points  of  superiority 
in  women  over  men^  must  certainly  make  them, 
with  anything  like  parity  of  qualifications  in 
other  respects,  more  apt  than  men  in  that  choice 
of  instruments,  which  is  nearly  the  most  im- 
portant business  of  every  one  who  has  to  do  with 
governing  mankind.  Even  the  unprincipled 
Catherine  de^  Medici  could  feel  the  value  of  a 
Chancellor  de  FHopital.  But  it  is  also  true 
that  most  great  queens  have  been  great  by  their 
own  talents  for  government,  and  have  been 
well  served  precisely  for  that  reason.  They 
retained  the  supreme  direction  of  affairs  in  their 
own  hands  : and  if  they  listened  to  good  advisers, 
they  gave  by  that  fact  the  strongest  proof  that 
their  judgment  fitted  them  for  dealing  with  the 
great  questions  of  government. 

Is  it  reasonable  to  think  that  those  who  are 
fit  for  the  greater  functions  of  politics,  are  in- 
capable of  qualifying  themselves  for  the  less? 
Is  there  any  reason  in  the  nature  of  things,  that 
the  wives  and  sisters  of  princes  should,  whenever 
called  on,  be  found  as  competent  as  the  princes 
themselves  to  their  business,  but  that  the  wives 
and  sisters  of  statesmen,  and  administrators,  and 
directors  of  companies,  and  managers  of  public 
institutions,  should  be  unable  to  do  what  is  done 
by  their  brothers  and  husbands  ? The  real 


310 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


reason  is  plain  enongli;  it  is  that  princesses, 
being  more  raised  above  the  generality  of  men 
by  their  rank  than  placed  below  them  by  their 
sex^  have  never  been  taught  that  it  was  improper 
for  them  to  concern  themselves  with  politics ; 
but  have  been  allowed  to  feel  the  liberal  interest 
natural  to  any  cultivated  human  being,  in  the 
great  transactions  which  took  place  around  them, 
and  in  which  they  might  be  called  on  to  take  a 
part.  The  ladies  of  reigning  families  are  the 
only  women  who  are  allowed  the  same  range  of 
interests  and  freedom  of  development  as  men ; 
and  it  is  precisely  in  their  case  that  there  is  not 
found  to  be  any  inferiority.  Exactly  where  and 
in  proportion  as  women^s  capacities  for  govern- 
ment have  been  tried,  in  that  proportion  have 
they  been  found  adequate. 

This  fact  is  in  accordance  with  the  best 
general  conclusions  which  the  world^s  imperfect 
experience  seems  as  yet  to  suggest,  concerning 
the  peculiar  tendencies  and  aptitudes  charac- 
teristic of  women,  as  women  have  hitherto  been. 
I do  not  say,  as  they  will  continue  to  be ; for,  as 
I have  already  said  more  than  once,  I consider 
it  presumption  in  any  one  to  pretend  to  decide 
what  women  are  or  are  not,  can  or  cannot  be,  by 
natural  constitution.  They  have  always  hitherto 
been  kept,  as  far  as  regards  spontaneous  develop- 
ment, in  so  unnatural  a state,  that  their  nature 


THE  SUBJECnON  OF  WOMEN. 


31l 


cannot  but  bave  been  greatly  distorted  and  dis- 
guised ; and  no  one  can  safely  pronounce  that  if 
women^s  nature  were  left  to  choose  its  direction  as 
freely  as  men^s,  and  if  no  artificial  bent  were  at- 
tempted to  be  given  to  it  except  that  required  by 
the  conditions  of  human  society^  and  given  to  both 
sexes  alike,  there  would  be  any  material  diffe- 
rence, or  perhaps  any  difference  at  all,  in  the 
character  and  capacities  which  would  unfold 
themselves.  I shall  presently  show,  that  even 
the  least  contestable  of  the  differences  which 
now  exist,  are  such  as  may  very  well  have  been 
produced  merely  by  circumstances,  without  any 
difference  of  natural  capacity.  But,  looking  at 
women  as  they  are  known  in  experience,  it  may 
be  said  of  them,  with  more  truth  than  belongs 
to  most  other  generalizations  on  the  subject,  that 
the  general  bent  of  their  talents  is  towards  the 
practical.  This  statement  is  conformable  to  all 
the  public  history  of  women,  in  the  present  and 
the  past.  It  is  no  less  borne  out  by  common 
and  daily  experience.  Let  us  consider  the 
special  nature  of  the  mental  capacities  most 
characteristic  of  a woman  of  talent.  They  are 
all  of  a kind  which  fits  them  for  practice,  and 
makes  them  tend  towards  it.  What  is  meant 
by  a woman^s  capacity  of  intuitive  perception  ? 
It  means,  a rapid  and  correct  insight  into  present 
fact.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  general  prin- 


312 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


ciples.  Nobody  ever  perceived  a scientific  law 
of  nature  by  intuition,  nor  arrived  at  a general 
rule  of  duty  or  prudence  by  it.  These  are 
results  of  slow  and  careful  collection  and  com- 
parison of  experience  ; and  neither  the  men  noi 
the  women  of  intuition  usually  shine  in  this  de- 
partment, unless,  indeed,  the  experience  necessary 
is  such  as  they  can  acquire  by  themselves.  For 
what  is  called  their  intuitive  sagacity  makes 
them  peculiarly  apt  in  gathering  such  general 
truths  as  can  be  collected  from  their  individual 
means  of  observation.  When,  consequently,  they 
chance  to  be  as  well  provided  as  men  are  with 
the  results  of  other  people^s  experience,  by 
reading  and  education,  (I  use  the  word  chance 
advisedly,  for,  in  respect  to  the  knowledge  that 
tends  to  fit  them  for  the  greater  concerns  of 
life,  the  only  educated  women  are  the  self- 
educated)  they  are  better  furnished  than  men 
in  general  with  the  essential  requisites  of  skilful 
and  successful  practice.  Men  who  have  been 
much  taught,  are  apt  to  be  deficient  in  the 
sense  of  present  fact;  they  do  not  see,  in  the 
facts  which  they  are  called  upon  to  deal  with, 
what  is  really  there,  but  what  they  have  been 
taught  to  expect.  This  is  seldom  the  case  with 
women  of  any  ability.  Their  capacity  of  ^^in- 
tuition preserves  them  from  it.  With  equality 
of  experience  and  of  general  faculties,  a woman 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


313 


usually  sees  mucli  more  than  a man  of  what 
is  immediately  before  her.  Now  this  sensibility 
to  the  present,,  is  the  main  quality  on  which  the 
capacity  for  practice^  as  distinguished  from  theory, 
depends.  To  discover  general  principles,  belongs 
to  the  speculative  faculty : to  discern  and  dis- 
criminate the  particular  cases  in  which  they  are 
and  are  not  applicable,  constitutes  practical  talent : 
and  for  this,  women  as  they  now  are  have  a 
peculiar  aptitude.  I admit  that  there  can  be 
no  good  practice  without  principles,  and  that 
the  predominant  place  which  quickness  of  obser- 
vation holds  among  a woman^s  faculties,  makes 
her  particularly  apt  to  build  over-hasty  gene- 
ralizations upon  her  own  observation ; though  at 
the  same  time  no  less  ready  in  rectifying  those 
generalizations,  as  her  observation  takes  a wider 
range.  But  the  corrective  to  this  defect,  is  access 
to  the  experience  of  the  human  race ; general 
knowledge — exactly  the  thing  which  education, 
can  best  supply.  A woman^s  mistakes  are  spe- 
cifically those  of  a clever  self-educated  man,  who 
often  sees  what  men  trained  in  routine  do  not 
see,  but  falls  into  errors  for  want  of  knowing 
things  which  have  long  been  known.  Of  course 
he  has  acquired  much  of  the  pre-existing  know- 
ledge, or  he  could  not  have  got  on  at  all;  but 
what  he  knows  of  it  he  has  picked  up  in  frag- 
ments and  at  random,  as  women  do. 

14 


314 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


Bnt  this  gravitation  of  women’s  minds  to 
the  present^  to  the  real,  to  actual  fact,  while 
in  its  exclusiveness  it  is  a source  of  errors,  is 
also  a most  useful  counteractive  of  the  contrary 
error.  The  principal  and  most  characteristic 
aberration  of  speculative  minds  as  such,  consists 
precisely  in  the  deficiency  of  this  lively  per- 
ception and  ever-present  sense  of  objective  fact 
Tor  want  of  this,  they  often  not  only  overlook 
the  contradiction  which  outward  facts  oppose 
to  their  theories,  but  lose  sight  of  the  legiti- 
mate purpose  of  speculation  altogether,  and  let 
their  speculative  faculties  go  astray  into  regions 
not  peopled  with  real  beings,  animate  or  inani- 
mate, even  idealized,  but  with  personified  shadows 
created  by  the  illusions  of  metaphysics  or  by  the 
mere  entanglement  of  words,  and  think  these 
shadows  the  proper  objects  of  the  highest,  the  most 
transcendant,  philosophy.  Hardly  anything  can 
be  of  greater  value  to  a man  of  theory  and 
speculation  who  employs  himself  not  in  col- 
lecting materials  of  knowledge  by  observation, 
but  in  working  them  up  by  processes  of  thought 
into  comprehensive  truths  of  science  and  laws  of 
conduct,  than  to  carry  on  his  speculations  in  the 
companionship,  and  under  the  criticism,  of  a really 
superior  woman.  There  is  nothing  comparable 
to  it  for  keeping  his  thoughts  within  the  limits 
of  real  things,  and  the  actual  facts  of  nature. 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


315 


A woman  seldom  runs  wild  after  an  abstraction. 
The  habitual  direction  of  her  mind  to  dealing 
with  things  as  individuals  rather  than  in  groups, 
and  (what  is  closely  connected  with  it)  her  more 
lively  interest  in  the  present  feelings  of  persons, 
which  makes  her  consider  first  of  all,  in  anything 
which  claims  to  be  applied  to  practice,  in  what 
manner  persons  will  be  afiected  by  it — these  two 
things  make  her  extremely  unlikely  to  put  faith 
in  any  speculation  which  loses  sight  of  individuals, 
and  deals  with  things  as  if  they  existed  for  the 
benefit  of  some  imaginary  entity,  some  mere 
creation  of  the  mind,  not  resolvable  into  the 
feelings  of  living  beings.  Women^s  thoughts 
are  thus  as  useful  in  giving  reality  to  those  of 
thinking  men,  as  men'^s  thoughts  in  giving  width 
and  largeness  to  those  of  women.  In  depth,  as 
distinguished  from  breadth,  I greatly  doubt  if 
even  now,  women,  compared  with  men,  are  at 
any  disadvantage. 

If  the  existing  mental  characteristics  of  women 
are  thus  valuable  even  in  aid  of  speculation,  they 
are  still  more  important,  when  speculation  has 
done  its  work,  for  carrying  oufc  the  results  of 
speculation  into  practice.  For  the  reasons  already 
given,  women  are  comparatively  unlikely  to  fall 
into  the  common  error  of  men,  that  of  sticking 
to  their  rules  in  a case  whose  specialities  either 
take  it  out  of  the  class  to  which  the  rules  are 


316 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


applicable^  or  require  a special  adaptation  of 
them.  Let  us  now  consider  another  of  the 
admitted  superiorities  of  clever  women,  greater 
quickness  of  apprehension.  Is  not  this  pre- 

eminently a quality  whieh  fits  a person  for 
praetice  ? In  action,  everything  continually 
depends  upon  deciding  promptly.  In  specula- 
tion, nothing  does.  A mere  thinker  can  wait, 
can  take  time  to  consider,  can  collect  additional 
evidence;  he  is  not  obliged  to  complete  his 
philosophy  at  once,  lest  the  opportunity  should 
go  by.  The  power  of  drawing  the  best  con- 
clusion possible  from  insufficient  data  is  not 
indeed  useless  in  philosophy ; the  construetion 
of  a provisional  hypothesis  consistent  with  all 
known  facts  is  often  the  needful  basis  for  further 
inquiry.  But  this  faculty  is  rather  serviceable 
in  philosophy,  than  the  main  qualification  for  it : 
and,  for  the  auxiliary  as  well  as  for  the  main 
operation,  the  philosopher  can  allow  himself  any 
time  he  pleases.  He  is  in  no  need  of  the  capa- 
city of  doing  rapidly  what  he  does ; what  he  rather 
needs  is  patience,  to  work  on  slowly  until  imper- 
fect lights  have  become  perfect,  and  a conjecture 
has  ripened  into  a theorem.  For  those,  on  the 
contrary,  whose  business  is  with  the  fugitive  and 
perisha!)le — with  individual  facts,  not  kinds  of 
facts — rapidity  of  thought  is  a qualification  next 
only  in  importance  to  the  power  of  thought  itselfi 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


317 


He  wlio  has  not  his  faculties  under  immediate 
command^  in  the  contingencies  of  action^  might 
as  well  not  have  them  at  all.  He  may  he  fit  to 
criticize^  but  he  is  not  fit  to  act.  Now  it  is  in 
this  that  women^  and  the  men  who  are  most  like 
women^  confessedly  excel.  The  other  sort  of  man, 
however  pre-eminent  may  be  his  faculties,  arrives 
slowly  at  complete  command  of  them  : rapidity  of 
judgment  and  promptitude  of  judicious  action, 
even  in  the  things  he  knows  best,  are  the  gradual 
and  late  result  of  strenuous  effort  grown  into 
habit. 

It  will  be  said,  perhaps,  that  the  greater 
nervous  susceptibility  of  women  is  a disqualifica- 
tion for  practice,  in  anything  but  domestic  life, 
by  rendering  them  mobile,  changeable,  too 
vehemently  under  the  infiueace  of  the  moment, 
incapable  of  dogged  perseverance,  unequal  and 
uncertain  in  the  power  of  using  their  faculties. 
I think  that  these  phrases  sum  up  the  greater 
part  of  the  objections  commonly  made  to  the 
fitness  of  women  for  the  higher  class  of  serious 
business.  Much  of  all  this  is  the  mere  overflow 
of  nervous  energy  run  to  waste,  and  would  cease 
when  the  energy  was  directed  to  a definite  end. 
Much  is  also  the  result  of  conscious  or  un- 
conscious cultivation;  as  we  see  by  the  almost 
total  disappearance  of  hysterics^^  and  fainting 
fits,  since  they  have  gone  out  of  fashion.  More* 


318 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


over,  when  people  are  brought  up,  like  many 
women  of  the  higher  classes  (though  less  so  in 
our  own  country  than  in  any  other)  a kind  of  hot- 
house plants,  shielded  from  the  wholesome  vicissi 
tudes  of  air  and  temperature,  and  untrained  in 
any  of  the  occupations  and  exercises  which  give 
stimulus  and  development  to  the  circulatory  and 
muscular  system,  while  their  nervous  system, 
especially  in  its  emotional  department,  is  kept  in 
unnaturally  active  play;  it  is  no  wonder  if  those 
of  them  who  do  not  die  of  consumption,  grow 
up  with  constitutions  liable  to  derangement  from 
slight  causes,  both  internal  and  external,  and 
without  stamina  to  support  any  task,  physical  or 
mental,  requiring  continuity  of  effort.  But 
women  brought  up  to  work  for  their  liveli- 
hood show  none  of  these  morbid  characteristics, 
unless  indeed  they  are  chained  to  an  excess  of 
sedentary  work  in  confined  and  unhealthy  rooms. 
Women  who  in  their  early  years  have  shared  in 
the  healthful  physical  education  and  bodily  free- 
dom of  their  brothers,  and  who  obtain  a suffi- 
ciency of  pure  air  and  exercise  in  after-life,  very 
rarely  have  any  excessive  susceptibility  of  nerves 
which  can  disqualify  them  for  active  pursuits. 
There  is  indeed  a certain  proportion  of  persons, 
in  both  sexes,  in  whom  an  unusual  degree  of 
nervous  sensibility  is  constitutional,  and  of  so 
marked  a character  as  to  be  the  feature  of  their 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


319 


organization  which  exercises  the  greatest  influence 
over  the  whole  character  of  the  vital  phenomena. 
This  constitution^  like  other  physical  conformations^ 
is  hereditary^  and  is  transmitted  to  sons  as  well 
as  daughters ; but  it  is  possible^  and  probable^  that 
the  nervous  temperament  (as  it  is  called)  is  in- 
herited by  a greater  number  of  women  than  of 
men.  We  will  assume  this  as  a fact : and  let  me 
then  ask^  are  men  of  nervous  temperament  found 
to  be  unfit  for  the  duties  and  pursuits  usually 
followed  by  men  ? If  not^  why  should  women  of 
the  same  temperament  be  unfit  for  them  ? The 
peculiarities  of  the  temperament  are^  no  doubt, 
within  certain  limits,  an  obstacle  to  success  in 
some  employments,  though  an  aid  to  it  in 
others.  But  when  the  occupation  is  suitable  to 
the  temperament,  and  sometimes  even  when  it  is 
unsuitable,  the  most  brilliant  examples  of  success 
are  continually  given  by  the  men  of  high  nervous 
sensibility.  They  are  distinguished  in  their  prac- 
tical manifestations  chiefly  by  this,  that  being 
susceptible  of  a higher  degree  of  excitement  than 
those  of  another  physical  constitution,  their  powers 
when  excited  differ  more  than  in  the  case  of  other 
people,  from  those  shown  in  their  ordinary  state  : 
they  are  raised,  as  it  were,  above  themselves, 
and  do  things  with  ease  which  they  are  wholly 
incapable  of  at  other  times.  But  this  lofty  excite- 
ment is  not  , except  in  weak  bodily  constitutionsj 


320 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


a mere  flashy  which  passes  away  immediately, 
leaving  no  permanent  traces,  and  incompatible 
with  persistent  and  steady  pursuit  of  an  object. 
It  is  the  character  of  the  nervous  temperament 
to  be  capable  of  sustained  excitement,  holding 
out  through  long  continued  efforts.  It  is  what 
is  meant  by  spirit.  It  is  what  makes  the  high- 
bred racehorse  run  without  slackening  speed  till 
he  drops  down  dead.  It  is  what  has  enabled  so 
many  delicate  women  to  maintain  the  most  sub- 
lime constancy  not  only  at  the  stake,  but  through 
a long  preliminary  succession  of  mental  and 
bodily  tortures.  It  is  evident  that  people  of  this 
temperament  are  particularly  apt  for  Avhat  may 
be  called  the  executive  department  of  the  leader- 
ship of  mankind.  They  are  the  material  of 
great  orators,  great  preachers,  impressive  diffusers 
of  moral  influences.  Their  constitution  might 
be  deemed  less  favourable  to  the  qualities  re- 
quired from  a statesman  in  the  cabinet,  or  from 
a judge.  It  would  be  so,  if  the  consequence 
necessarily  followed  that  beeause  people  are  ex- 
citable they  must  always  be  in  a state  of  excite- 
ment. But  this  is  wholly  a question  of  training. 
Strong  feeling  is  the  instrument  and  element  of 
strong  self-control : but  it  requires  to  be  cultivated 
in  that  direction.  When  it  is,  it  forms  not  the 
heroes  of  impulse  only,  but  those  also  of  self- 
conquest.  History  and  experience  prove  that 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


321 


the  most  passionate  characters  are  the  most  fana- 
tically rigid  in  their  feelings  of  duty^  when  their 
passion  has  been  trained  to  act  in  that  direction. 
The  judge  who  gives  a just  decision  in  a case 
where  his  feelings  are  intensely  interested  on  the 
other  side^  derives  from  that  same  strength  of 
feeling  the  determined  sense  of  the  obligation  of 
justice^  which  enables  him  to  achieve  this  victory 
over  himself.  The  capability  of  that  lofty  en- 
thusiasm which  takes  the  human  being  out  of 
his  every-day  character^  reacts  upon  the  daily 
character  itself.  His  aspirations  and  powers  when 
he  is  in  this  exceptional  state^  become  the  type 
with  which  he  compares^  and  by  which  he  esti- 
mates^ his  sentiments  and  proceedings  at  other 
times : and  his  habitual  purposes  assume  a cha- 
racter moulded  by  and  assimilated  to  the  mo- 
ments of  lofty  excitement^  although  those,,  from 
the  physical  nature  of  a human  beings  can  only 
be  transient.  Experience  of  races^  as  well  as  of 
individuals^  does  not  show  those  of  excitable  tem- 
perament to  be  less  fit^  on  the  average^  either 
for  speculation  or  practice^  than  the  more  unex- 
citable.  The  French^  and  the  Italians,,  are  un- 
doubtedly by  nature  more  nervously  excitable 
than  the  Teutonic  races^  aiid^  compared  at  least 
with  the  English^  they  have  a much  greater 
habitual  and  daily  emotional  life : but  have  they 
been  less  great  in  science,  in  public  business,  in 
14* 


322 


THE  SUBJECTIOK  OF  WOMEN. 


legal  and  judicial  eminence,  or  in  war  ? There 
is  abundant  evidence  that  the  Greeks  were  of 
old,  as  their  descendants  and  successors  still  are, 
one  of  the  most  excitable  of  the  races  of  man- 
kind. It  is  superfluous  to  ask,  what  among  the 
achievements  of  men  they  did  not  excel  in.  The 
Romans,  probably,  as  an  equally  southern  people, 
had  the  same  original  temperament : but  the 
stern  character  of  their  national  discipline,  like 
that  of  the  Spartans,  made  them  an  example  of 
the  opposite  type  of  national  character ; the 
greater  strength  of  their  natural  feelings  being 
chiefly  apparent  in  the  intensity  which  the  same 
original  temperament  made  it  possible  to  give  to 
the  artificial.  If  these  cases  exemplify  what  a 
naturally  excitable  people  may  be  made,  the  Irish 
Celts  afibrd  one  of  the  aptest  examjfles  of  what 
they  are  when  left  to  themselves ; (if  those  can 
be  said  to  be  left  to  themselves  who  have  been 
for  centuries  under  the  indirect  influence  of  bad 
government,  and  the  direct  training  of  a Catholic 
hierarchy  and  of  a sincere  belief  in  the  Catholic 
religion.)  The  Irish  character  must  be  considered, 
therefore,  as  an  unfavourable  case  : yet,  whenever 
the  circumstances  of  the  individual  have  been  at 
all  favourable,  what  people  have  shown  greater 
capacity  for  the  most  varied  and  multifarious  in- 
dividual eminence  ? Like  the  French  compared 
with  the  English,  the  Irish  with  the  Swiss,  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


323 


Greeks  or  Italians  eompared  with  the  German 
races^  so  women  compared  with  men  may  be 
founds  on  the  average^  to  do  the  same  things 
with  some  variety  in  the  particular  kind  of  ex- 
cellence. Butj  that  they  would  do  them  fully 
as  well  on  the  whole^  if  their  education  and 
cultivation  were  adapted  to  correcting  instead  of 
aggravating  the  infirmities  incident  to  their  tem- 
perament^ I see  not  the  smallest  reason  to  doubt. 

Supposing  it^  however^,  to  be  true  that  wonien^s 
minds  are  by  nature  more  mobile  than  those 
of  men^  less  capable  of  persisting  long  in  the 
same  continuous  effort,  more  fitted  for  dividing 
their  faculties  among  many  things  than  for 
travelling  in  any  one  path  to  the  highest  point 
which  can  be  reached  by  it  : this  may  be 
true  of  women  as  they  now  are  (though  not 
without  great  and  numerous  exce[)tions),  and 
may  account  for  their  having  remained  behind 
the  highest  order  of  men  in  precisely  the  things 
in  which  this  absorption  of  the  whole  mind  in 
one  set  of  ideas  and  occupations  may  seem  to 
be  most  requisite.  Stilly  this  difference  is  one 
which  can  only  affect  the  kind  of  excellence^  not 
the  excellence  itself^  or  its  practical  worth : and 
it  remains  to  be  shown  whether  this  exclusive 
working  of  a part  of  the  mind^  this  absorption  of 
the  whole  thinking  faculty  in  a single  subject, 
and  concentration  of  it  on  a single  work,  is  the 


324 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


normal  and  healthful  condition  of  the  human 
faculties,  even  for  speculative  uses.  I believe 
that  what  is  gained  in  special  development  by 
this  concentration,  is  lost  in  the  capacity  of  the 
mind  for  the  other  purposes  of  life ; and  even  in. 
abstract  thought,  it  is  my  decided  opinion  that 
the  mind  does  more  by  frequently  returning  to 
a difficult  problem,  than  by  sticking  to  it  with- 
out interruption.  For  the  purposes,  at  all  events, 
of  practice,  from  its  highest  to  its  humblest  de- 
partments, the  capacity  of  passing  promptly  from 
one  subject  of  consideration  to  another,  without 
letting  the  active  spring  of  the  intellect  run 
down  between  the  two,  is  a power  far  more 
valuable ; and  this  power  women  pre-eminently 
possess,  by  virtue  of  the  very  mobility  of  which 
they  are  accused.  They  perhaps  have  it  from 
nature,  but  they  certainly  have  it  by  training 
and  education ; for  nearly  the  whole  of  the  occu- 
pations of  women  consist  in  the  management  of 
small  but  multitudinous  details,  on  each  of  which 
the  mind  cannot  dwell  even  for  a minute,  but 
must  pass  on  to  other  things,  and  if  anything 
requires  longer  thought,  must  steal  time  at  odd 
moments  for  thinking  of  it.  The  capacity  indeed 
which  women  show  for  doing  their  thinking  in 
circumstances  and  at  times  which  almost  any 
man  would  make  an  excuse  to  himself  for  not 
attempting  it,  has  often  been  noticed ; and  a 


THE  SUBuECTION  OF  W0:MEN. 


325 


woman’s  mind^  thongli  it  may  be  occupied  only 
with  small  things^  can  hardly  ever  permit  itself 
to  be  vacant^  as  a man^s  so  often  is  when  not 
engaged  in  what  he  chooses  to  consider  the 
business  of  his  life.  The  business  of  a woman^s 
ordinary  life  is  things  in  general^  and  can 
as  little  cease  to  go  on  as  the  world  to  go 
round. 

But  (it  is  said)  there  is  anatomical  evidence 
of  the  superior  mental  capacity  of  men  compared 
with  women  : they  have  a larger  brain.  I reply, 
that  in  the  first  place  the  fact  itself  is  doubtful. 
It  is  by  no  means  established  that  the  brain  of  a 
woman  is  smaller  than  that  of  a man.  If  it  is 
inferred  merely  because  a woman^s  bodily  frame 
generally  is  of  less  dimensions  than  a man^s,  this 
criterion  would  lead  to  strange  consequences. 
A tall  and  large-boned  man  must  on  this  showing 
be  wonderfully  superior  in  intelligence  to  a small 
man,  and  an  elephant  or  a whale  must  prodi- 
giously excel  mankind.  The  size  of  the  brain  in 
human  beings,  anatomists  say,  varies  much  less 
than  the  size  of  the  body,  or  even  of  the  head, 
and  the  one  cannot  be  at  all  inferred  from  the 
other.  It  is  certain  that  some  women  have  as 
large  a brain  as  any  man.  It  is  within  my 
knowledge  that  a man  who  had  weighed  many 
human  brains,  said  that  the  heaviest  he  knew  of, 
heavier  even  than  Cuvier’s  (the  heaviest  pre- 


226 


llIE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


viously  recorded,)  was  that  of  a woman.  Next, 

I must  observe  that  the  precise  relation  which 
exists  between  the  brain  and  the  intellectual 
powers  is  not  yet  well  understood,  but  is  a 
subject  of  great  dispute.  That  there  is  a very 
close  relation  we  cannot  doubt.  The  brain  is 
certainly  the  material  organ  of  thought  and 
feeling : and  (making  abstraction  of  the  great 
unsettled  controversy  respecting  the  appropriation 
of  different  parts  of  the  brain  to  different  mental 
faculties)  I admit  that  it  would  be  an  anomaly, 
and  an  exception  to  all  we  know  of  the  general 
laws  of  life  and  organization,  if  the  size  of  the 
organ  were  wholly  indifferent  to  the  function ; if 
no  accession  of  power  were  derived  from  the 
greater  magnitude  of  the  instrument.  But  the 
exception  and  the  anomaly  would  be  fully  as 
great  if  the  organ  exercised  influence  by  its 
magnitude  only.  In  all  the  more  delicate  opera- 
tions of  nature — of  which  those  of  the  animated 
creation  are  the  most  delicate,  and  those  of  the 
nervous  system  by  far  the  most  delicate  of  these 
— differences  in  the  effect  depend  as  much  on 
differences  of  quality  in  the  physical  agents,  as 
on  their  quantity ; and  if  the  quality  of  an  in- 
strument is  to  be  tested  by  the  nicety  and  deli- 
cacy of  the  work  it  can  do,  the  indications  point 
to  a greater  average  fineness  of  quality  in  the 
brain  and  nervous  system  of  women  than  of  men. 


THE  SHEJECTION  OF  WOIklEN. 


327 


Dismissirig  abstract  difference  of  quality^  a tbiog 
difficult  to  verify^  the  efficiency  of  an  organ  is 
known  to  depend  not  solely  on  its  size  but  on  its 
activity : and  of  this  we  have  an  approximate 
measure  in  the  energy  with  which  the  blood 
circulates  through  it^  both  the  stimulus  and  the 
reparative  force  being  mainly  dependent  on  the 
circulation.  It  would  not  be  surprising — it  is 
indeed  an  hypothesis  which  accords  well  with  the 
differences  actually  observed  between  the  mental 
operations  of  the  two  sexes — if  men  on  the 
average  should  have  the  advantage  in  the  size  of 
the  brain^  and  women  in  activity  of  cerebral  cir- 
culation. The  results  which  coujecture^  founded 
on  analogy^  would  lead  us  to  expect  from  this 
difference  of  organization^  would  correspond  to 
some  of  those  which  we  most  commonly  see.  In 
the  first  place^  the  mental  operations  of  men 
might  be  expected  to  be  slower.  They  would 
neither  be  so  prompt  as  women  in  thinkings  nor 
so  quick  to  feel.  Large  bodies  take  more  time 
to  get  into  full  action.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  once  got  thoroughly  into  play,  men'^s  brain 
would  bear  more  work.  It  would  be  more  per- 
sistent in  the  line  first  taken;  it  would  have 
more  difficulty  in  changing  from  one  mode  of 
action  to  another,  but,  in  the  one  thing  it  was 
doing,  it  could  go  on  longer  without  loss  of 
power  or  sense  of  fatigue.  And  do  we  not  find  that 


328 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


tlie  tilings  in  which  men  most  excel  women  ain 
those  which  require  most  plodding  and  long 
hammering  at  a single  thought^  while  women  do 
best  what  must  be  done  rapidly?  A woman-^s 
brain  is  sooner  fatigued^  sooner  exhausted;  but 
given  the  degree  of  exhaustion^  we  should  expect 
to  find  that  it  would  recover  itself  sooner.  I 
repeat  that  this  speculation  is  entirely  hypo- 
thetical ; it  pretends  to  no  more  than  to  suggest 
a line  of  enquiry.  I have  before  repudiated  the 
notion  of  its  being  yet  certainly  known  that 
there  is  any  natural  difference  at  all  in  the 
average  strength  or  direction  of  the  mental  ca- 
pacities of  the  two  sexes^  much  less  what  that 
difference  is.  Nor  is  it  possible  that  this  should 
be  known^  so  long  as  the  psychological  laws  of  the 
formation  of  character  have  been  so  little  studied^ 
even  in  a general  way,  and  in  the  particular 
case  never  scientifically  applied  at  all;  so  long 
as  the  most  obvious  external  causes  of  difference 
of  character  are  habitually  disregarded — left  un- 
noticed by  the  observer^  and  looked  down  upon 
with  a kind  of  supercilious  contempt  by  the 
prevalent  schools  both  of  natural  history  and  of 
mental  philosophy : who^  whether  they  look  for 
the  source  of  what  mainly  distinguishes  human 
beings  from  one  another,  in  the  world  of  matter 
or  in  that  of  spirit,  agree  in  running  down  those 
who  prefer  to  explain  these  differences  by  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


329 


different  relations  of  human  beings  to  society 
and  life. 

To  so  ridiculous  an  extent  are  the  notions 
formed  of  the  nature  of  women^  mere  empirical 
generalizations^  framed^  without  philosophy  or 
analysis^  upon  the  first  instances  which  present 
themselves^  that  the  popular  idea  of  it  is  different 
in  different  countries^  according  as  the  opinions 
and  social  circumstances  of  the  country  have  given 
to  the  women  living  in  it  any  speciality  of  develop- 
ment or  non-development.  An  Oriental  thinks 
that  women  are  by  nature  peculiarly  voluptuous ; 
see  the  violent  abuse  of  them  on  this  ground  in 
Hindoo  writings.  An  Englishman  usually  thinks 
that  they  are  by  nature  cold.  The  sayings  about 
women'^s  fickleness  are  mostly  of  French  origin ; 
from  the  famous  distich  of  Francis  the  First,,  up- 
ward and  downward.  In  Enghand  it  is  a common 
remark^  how  much  more  constant  women  are  than 
men.  Inconstancy  has  been  longer  reckoned  dis- 
creditable to  a woman^  in  England  than  in  France ; 
and  Englishwomen  are  besides,  in  their  inmost 
nature,  much  more  subdued  to  opinion.  It  may 
be  remarked  by  the  way,  that  Englishmen  are  in 
peculiarly  unfavourable  circumstances  for  attempt- 
ing to  judge  what  is  or  is  not  natural,  not  merely 
to  women,  but  to  men,  or  to  human  beings  alto- 
gether, at  least  if  they  have  only  English  expe- 
rience to  go  upon  : because  there  is  no  place  where 


330 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


human  nature  shows  so  little  of  its  original  linea-' 
ments.  Both  in  a good  and  a bad  sense^  the  Eng- 
lish are  farther  from  a state  of  nature  than  any 
other  modern  people.  They  are^  more  than  any 
other  people,  a product  of  civilization  and  discipline. 
England  is  the  country  in  which  social  discipline 
has  most  succeeded,  not  so  much  in  conquering,  as 
in  suppressing,  whatever  is  liable  to  conflict  with 
it.  The  English,  more  than  any  other  people,  not 
only  act  but  feel  according  to  rule.  In  other 
countries,  the  taught  opinion,  or  the  requirement 
of  society,  may  be  the  stronger  power,  but  the 
promptings  of  the  individual  nature  are  always 
visible  under  it,  and  often  resisting  it : rule  may 
be  stronger  than  nature,  but  nature  is  still  there. 
In  England,  rule  has  to  a great  degree  substituted 
itself  for  nature.  The  greater  part  of  life  is 
carried  on,  not  by  following  inclination  under  the 
control  of  rule,  but  by  having  no  inclination  but 
’that  of  following  a rule.  Now  this  has  its  good 
side  doubtless,  though  it  has  also  a wretchedly 
bad  one ; but  it  must  render  an  Englishman 
peculiarly  ill-qualified  to  pass  a judgment  on  the 
original  tendencies  of  human  nature  from  his  own. 
experience.  The  errors  to  which  observers  else- 
where are  liable  on  the  subject,  are  of  a different 
character.  An  Englishman  is  ignorant  respecting 
human  nature,  a Frenchman  is  prejudiced.  An 
Englishman"^s  errors  are  negative,  a Frenchman's 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


331 


positive.  An  Englisliman  fancies  that  things  do 
not  exist^because  he  never  sees  them;  arrenchman 
thinks  they  must  always  and  necessarily  exist, 
because  he  does  see  them.  An  Englishman  does 
not  know  nature,  because  he  has  had  no  oppor- 
tunity of  observing  it;  a Frenchman  generally 
knows  a great  deal  of  it,  but  often  mistakes  it, 
because  he  has  only  seen  it  sophisticated  and  dis- 
torted. For  the  artificial  state  superinduced  by 
society  disguises  the  natural  tendencies  of  the 
thing  which  is  the  subject  of  observation,  in  two 
difiFerent  ways  : by  extinguishing  the  nature,  or  by 
transforming  it.  In  the  one  case  there  is  but 
a starved  residuum  of  nature  remainiDg  to  be 
studied ; in  the  other  case  there  is  much,  but  it 
may  have  expanded  in  any  direction  rather  than 
that  in  which  it  would  spontaneously  grow. 

I have  said  that  it  cannot  now  be  known  how 
much  of  the  existing  mental  differences  between 
men  and  women  is  natural,  and  how  much  arti- 
ficial ; whether  there  are  any  natural  difierences  at 
all ; or,  supposing  all  artificial  causes  of  difference 
to  be  withdrawn,  w^hat  natural  character  would 
be  revealed.  I am  not  about  to  attempt  what  I 
have  pronounced  impossible : but  doubt  does  not 
forbid  conjecture,  and  where  certainty  is  unat- 
tainable, there  may  yet  be  the  means  of  ar- 
riving at  some  degree  of  probability.  The  first 
point,  the  origin  of  the  differences  actually 


332 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


observed,  is  tbe  one  most  accessible  to  specula- 
tion ; and  I shall  attempt  to  approach  it,  by  the 
only  path  by  which  it  can  be  reached ; by  tracing 
the  mental  consequences  of  external  influences. 
We  cannot  isolate  a human  being  from  the  cir- 
cumstances of  his  condition,  so  as  to  ascertain  ex- 
perimentally what  he  would  have  been  by  nature ; 
but  we  can  consider  what  he  is,  and  what  his  cir- 
cumstances have  been,  and  whether  the  one  would 
have  been  capable  of  producing  the  other. 

Let  us  take,  then,  the  only  marked  case  which 
observation  affords,  of  apparent  inferiority  of 
women  to  men,  if  we  except  the  merely  physical 
one  of  bodily  strength.  No  production  in  philo- 
sophy, science,  or  art,  entitled  to  the  first  rank, 
has  been  the  work  of  a woman.  Is  there  any 
mode  of  accounting  for  this,  without  supposing 
that  women  are  naturally  incapable  of  producing 
them? 

In  the  first  place,  we  may  fairly  question 
whether  experience  has  aflPorded  sufficient  grounds 
for  an  induction.  It  is  scarcely  three  generations 
since  women,  saving  very  rare  exceptions,  have 
begun  to  try  their  capacity  in  philosophy,  science, 
or  art.  It  is  only  in  the  present  generation  that 
their  attempts  have  been  at  all  numerous ; and 
they  are  even  now  extremely  few,  everywhere  but 
in  England  and  France.  It  is  a relevant  ques- 
tion, whether  a mind  possessing  the  requisites  of 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN.  333 

/ 

first-rate  eminence  in  speculation  or  creative  art 
could  have  been  expected^  on  the  mere  calculation 
of  chances^  to  turn  up  during  that  lapse  of  time, 
among  the  women  whose  tastes  and  personal 
position  admitted  of  their  devoting  themselves  to 
these  pursuits.  In  all  things  which  there  has  yet 
been  time  for — in  all  but  the  very  highest  grades 
in  the  scale  of  excellence,  especially  in  the  depart- 
ment in  which  they  have  been  longest  engaged, 
literature  (both  prose  and  poetry) — women  have 
done  quite  as  much,  have  obtained  fully  as  high 
prizes  and  as  many  of  them,  as  could  be  expected 
from  the  length  of  time  and  the  number  of  com- 
petitors. If  we  go  back  to  the  earlier  period 
when  very  few  women  made  the  attempt,  yet  some 
of  those  few  made  it  with  distinguished  success. 
The  Greeks  always  accounted  Sappho  among 
their  great  poets ; and  we  may  well  suppose  that 
Myrtis,  said  to  have  been  the  teacher  of  Pindar, 
and  Corinna,  who  five  times  bore  away  from  liim 
the  prize  of  poetry,  must  at  least  have  had  sufficient 
merit  to  admit  of  being  compared  with  that  great 
name.  Aspasia  did  not  leave  any  philosophical 
writings  ; but  it  is  an  admitted  fact  that  Socrates 
resorted  to  her  for^instruction,  and  avowxd  himself 
to  have  obtained  it. 

If  we  consider  the  works  of  women  in  modern 
times,  and  contrast  them  with  those  of  men, 
either  in  the  literary  or  the  artistic  department, 


334 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


sncli  inferiority  as  may  be  observed  resolves 
itself  essentially  into  one  tiling : but  that  is  a 
most  material  one ; deficiency  of  originality.  Not 
total  deficiency ; for  every  production  of  mind 
which  is  of  any  substantive  value,  has  an  origi- 
nality of  its  own — is  a conception  of  the  mind 
itself,  not  a copy  of  something  else.  Thoughts 
original,  in  the  sense  of  being  unborrowed — of 
being  derived  from  the  thinker^s  own  observations 
or  intellectual  processes — are  abundant  in  the 
writings  of  women.  But  they  have  not  yet 
produced  any  of  those  great  and  luminous  new 
ideas  which  form  an  era  in  thought,  nor  those 
fundamentally  new  conceptions  in  art,  which 
open  a vista  of  possible  effects  not  before  thought 
of,  and  found  a new  school.  Their  compositions 
are  mostly  grounded  on  the  existing  fund  of 
thought,  and  their  creations  do  not  deviate  widely 
from  existing  types.  This  is  the  sort  of  inferiority 
which  their  works  manifest ; for  in  point  of  exe- 
cution, in  the  detailed  application  of  thought, 
and  the  perfection  of  style,  there  is  no  inferiority. 
Our  best  novelists  in  point  of  composition,  and 
of  the  management  of  detail,  have  mostly  been 
women ; and  there  is  not  in  all  modern  literature 
a more  eloquent  vehicle  of  thought  than  the  style 
of  Madame  de  Stael,  nor,  as  a specimen  of  purely 
artistic  excellence,  anything  superior  to  the  prose 
of  Madame  Sand,  whose  style  acts  upon  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  vVOMEN. 


335 


nervous  system  like  a symphony  of  Haydn  or 
Mozart.  High  originality  of  conception  is^  as  I 
have  said^  what  is  chiefly  wanting.  And  now  to 
examine  if  there  is  any  manner  in  which  this 
deficiency  can  be  accounted  for. 

Let  us  remember^  then^  so  far  as  regards 
mere  thought,  that  during  all  that  period  in  the 
world^s  existence,  and  in  the  progress  of  cultiva- 
tion, in  which  great  and  fruitful  new  truths 
could  be  arrived  at  by  mere  force  of  genius, 
with  little  previous  study  and  accumulation  of 
knowledge — during  all  that  time  women  did  not 
concern  themselves  with  speculation  at  all.  From 
the  days  of  Hypatia  to  those  of  the  Reformation, 
the  illustrious  Heloisa  is  almost  the  only  woman 
to  whom  any  such  achievement  might  have  been 
possible ; and  we  know  not  how  great  a capacity 
of  speculation  in  her  may  have  been  lost  to 
mankind  by  the  misfortunes  of  her  life.  Never 
since  any  considerable  number  of  women  have 
began  to  cultivate  serious  thought^  has  origi- 
nality been  possible  on  easy  terms.  Nearly  all 
the  thoughts  which  can  be  reached  by  mere 
strength  of  original  faculties,  have  long  since 
been  arrived  at ; and  originality,  in  any  high 
sense  of  the  word,  is  now  scarcely  ever  attained 
but  by  minds  which  have  undergone  elaborate 
discipline,  and  are  deeply  versed  in  the  results 
of  previous  thinking.  It  is  Mr.  Maurice,  I thinks 


336 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


wlio  tas  remarked  on  tlie  present  age,  that  its 
most  original  thinkers  are  these  who  have  known 
most  thoroughly  what  had  been  thought  by  their 
predecessors : and  this  will  always  henceforth  be 
the  case.  Every  fresh  stone  in  the  edifice  has 
now  to  be  placed  on  the  top  of  so  many  others, 
that  a long  process  of  climbing,  and  of  carrying 
up  materials,  has  to  be  gone  through  by  whoever 
aspires  to  take  a share  in  the  present  stage  of 
the  work.  How  many  women  are  there  who 
have  gone  through  any  such  process  ? Mrs. 
Somerville,  alone  perhaps  of  women,  knows  as 
much  of  mathematics  as  is  now  needful  for 
making  any  considerable  mathematical  discovery: 
is  it  any  proof  of  inferiority  in  women,  that  she 
has  not  happened  to  be  one  of  the  two  or  three 
persons  who  in  her  lifetime  have  associated  their 
names  with  some  striking  advancement  of  the 
science?  Two  women,  since  political  economy 
has  been  made  a science,  have  known  enough  of 
it  to  write  usefully  on  the  subject : of  how  many 
of  the  innumerable  men  who  have  wTitten  on  it 
during  the  same  time,  is  it  possible  with  truth  to 
say  more?  If  no  woman  has  hitherto  been  a 
great  historian,  what  woman  has  had  the  neces- 
sary erudition  ? If  no  woman  is  a great  philo- 
logist, what  w^oman  has  studied  Sanscrit  and 
Slavonic,  the  Gothic  of  Ulphila  and  the  Persic 
of  the  Zendavesta  ? Even  in  practical  matters 


THE  $UIiJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


337 


we  all  know  what  is  the  value  of  the  originality 
of  untaught  geniuses.  It  means^  inventing 
over  again  in  its  rudimentary  form  something 
already  invented  and  improved  upon  by  many 
successive  inventors.  When  women  have  had 
the  preparation  which  all  men  now  require  to  be 
eminently  originab  it  will  be  time  enough  to 
begin  judging  by  experience  of  their  capacity  for 
originality. 

It  no  doubt  often  happens  that  a person^  who 
has  not  widely  and  accurately  studied  the  thoughts 
of  others  on  a subject^  has  by  natural  sagacity  a 
happy  intuition^  which  he  can  suggest^  but  cannot 
prove^  wdiich  yet  when  matured  may  be  an  im- 
portant addition  to  knowledge  ; but  even  then, 
no  justice  can  be  done  to  it  until  some  other 
person,  who  does  possess  the  previous  acquire- 
ments, takes  it  in  hand,  tests  it,  gives  it  a scientific 
or  practical  form,  and  fits  it  into  its  place  among 
the  existing  truths  of  philosophy  or  science.  Is 
it  supposed  that  such  felicitous  thoughts  do  not 
occur  to  women  ? They  occur  by  hundreds  to 
every  woman  of  intellect.  But  they  are.  mostly 
lost,  for  want  of  a husband  or  friend  who  has  the 
other  knowledge  which  can  enable  him  to  estimate 
them  properly  and  bring  them  before  the  world  : 
and  even  when  they  are  brought  before  it,  they 
generally  appear  as  his  ideas,  not  their  real 
author^s.  Who  can  teU  how  many  of  the  most 
15 


338 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


original  thonglits  put  fortli  by  male  writers^ 
belong  to  a woman  by  suggestion,  to  themselves 
only  by  verifying  and  working  out  ? If  I may 
judge  by  my  own  case^  a very  large  proportion 
indeed. 

If  we  turn  from  pure  speculation  to  literature 
in  the  narrow  sense  of  the  term,  and  the  fine  arts, 
there  is  a very  obvious  reason  why  women^s 
literature  is,  in  its  general  conception  and  in  its 
main  features,  an  imitation  of  menu’s.  Why  is  the 
Roman  literature,  as  critics  proclaim  to  satiety, 
not  original,  but  an  imitation  of  the  Greek  ? 
Simply  because  the  Greeks  came  first.  If  women 
lived  in  a different  country  from  men,  and  had 
never  read  any  of  their  writings,  they  would  have 
had  a literature  of  their  own.  As  it  is,  they  have 
not  created  one,  because  they  found  a highly  ad- 
vanced literature  already  created.  If  there  had 
been  no  suspension  of  the  knowledge  of  antiquity, 
or  if  the  Renaissance  had  occurred  before  the 
Gothic  cathedrals  were  built,  they  never  would 
have  been  built.  We  see  that,  in  France  and 
Italy,  imitation  of  the  ancient  literature  stopped 
the  original  development  even  after  it  had  com- 
menced. All  women  who  write  are  pupils  of  the 
great  male  writers.  A painteFs  early  pictures, 
even  if  he  be  a Raffaelle,  are  undistinguishable  in 
style  from  those  of  his  master.  Even  a Mozart 
does  not  display  his  powerful  originality  in  hia 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


339 


earliest  pieces.  What  years  are  to  a gifted  indi- 
vidual^ generations  are  to  a mass.  If  women^s 
literature  is  destined  to  have  a different  collective 
character  from  that  of  men^  depending  on  any 
difference  of  natural  tendencies^  much  longer 
time  is  necessary  than  has  yet  elapsed^  before  it 
can  emancipate  itself  from  the  influence  of  ac- 
cepted models^  and  guide  itself  by  its  own  im- 
pulses. But  if^  as  I believe^  there  will  not  prove 
to  be  any  natural  tendencies  common  to  women^ 
and  distiuguishing  their  genius  from  that  of  men, 
yet  every  individual  writer  among  them  has  her 
individual  tendencies,  which  at  present  are  still 
subdued  by  the  influence  of  precedent  and  ex- 
ample : and  it  will  require  generations  more,  before 
their  individuality  is  sufficiently  developed  to  make 
head  against  that  influence. 

It  is  in  the  flne  arts,  properly  so  called,  that 
the  primd  facie  evidence  of  inferior  original 
powers  in  women  at  first  sight  appears  the 
strongest : since  opinion  (it  may  be  said)  does  not 
exclude  them  from  these,  but  rather  encourages 
them,  and  their  education,  instead  of  passing  over 
this  department,  is  in  the  affluent  classes  mainly 
composed  of  it.  Yet  in  this  line  of  exertion  they 
have  fallen  still  more  short  than  in  many  others, 
of  the  highest  eminence  attained  by  men.  This 
shortcoming,  however,  needs  no  other  explana- 
tion than  the  familiar  fact,  more  universally  true 


340 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


in  tlie  fine  arts  than  in  anything  else ; the  vast 
superiority  of  professional  persons  over  amateurs. 
Vfomen  in  the  educated  classes  are  almost  uni- 
versally taught  more  or  less  of  some  branch  or 
other  of  the  fine  arts^  but  not  that  they  may  gain 
their  living  or  their  social  consequence  by  it. 
Women  artists  are  all  amateurs.  The  exceptions 
are  only  of  the  kind  which  confirm  the  general 
truth.  Women  are  taught  music^  but  not  for 
the  purpose  of  composing^  only  of  executing  it : 
and  accordingly  it  is  only  as  composers,  that 
men,  in  music,  are  superior  to  women.  The  only 
one  of  the  fine  arts  which  women  do  follow,  to 
any  extent,  as  a profession,  and  an  occupation 
for  life,  is  the  histrionic  ; and  in  that  they  are 
confessedly  equal,  if  not  superior,  to  men.  To 
make  the  comparison  fair,  it  should  be  made 
between  the  productions  of  women  in  any  branch 
of  art,  and  those  of  men  not  following  it  as  a 
profession.  In  musical  composition,  for  example, 
women  surely  have  produced  fully  as  good  things 
as  have  ever  been  produced  by  male  amateurs. 
There  are  now  a few  women,  a very  few,  who 
practise  painting  as  a profession,  and  these  are 
already  beginning  to  show  quite  as  much  talent 
as  could  be  expected.  Even  male  painters  {pace 
Mr.  Ruskin)  have  not  made  any  very  remarkable 
figure  these  last  centuries,  and  it  will  be  long 
before  they  do  so.  The  reason  why  the  old  painters 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


341 


were  so  greatly  superior  to  the  modern,  is  that 
a greatly  superior  class  of  men  applied  themselves 
to  the  art.  In  the  fourteenth  and  fifteenth  cen- 
turies the  Italian  painters  were  the  most  accom- 
plished men  of  their  age.  The  greatest  of  them  were 
men  of  encyclopserlical  acquirements  and  powers, 
like  the  great  men  of  Greece.  But  in  their 
times  fine  art  was,  to  men^s  feelings  and  conce])- 
tions,  among  the  grandest  things  in  which  a human 
being  could  excel ; and  by  it  men  were  made,  what 
only  political  or  military  distinction  now  makes 
them,  the  companions  of  sovereigns,  and  the  equals 
of  the  highest  nobility.  In  the  present  age,  men 
of  anything  like  similar  calibre  find  something 
more  important  to  do  for  their  own  fame  and 
the  uses  of  the  modern  world,  than  painting  : 
and  it  is  only  now  and  then  that  a Reynolds  or 
a Turner  (of  whose  relative  rank  among  eminent 
men  I do  not  pretend  to  an  opinion)  applies  himself 
to  that  art.  Music  belongs  to  a different  order 
of  things ; it  does  not  require  the  same  general 
powers  of  mind,  but  seems  more  dependant  on  a 
natural  gift : and  it  may  be  thought  surprising 
that  no  one  of  the  great  musical  composers  has 
been  a woman.  But  even  this  natural  gift,  to  be 
made  available  for  great  creations,  requires  study, 
and  professional  devotion  to  the  pursuit.  The  only 
countries  which  have  produced  first-rate  com  posers, 
even  of  the  male  sex,  are  Germany  and  Italy — ■ 


342 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


countries  in  wtich^  both  in  point  of  special  and 
of  general  cultivation^  women  have  remained  fai 
behind  France  and  England^  being  generally  (it 
may  be  said  without  exaggeration)  very  little  edu- 
cated^ and  having  scarcely  cultivated  at  all  any 
of  the  higher  faculties  of  mind.  • And  in  those 
countries  the  men  who  are  acquainted  with  the 
principles  of  musical  composition  must  be  counted 
by  hundreds^  or  more  probably  by  thousands^  the 
women  barely  by  scores : so  that  here  again^  on 
the  doctrine  of  averages,  we  cannot  reasonably 
expect  to  see  more  than  one  eminent  woman  to 
fifty  eminent  men ; and  the  last  three  centuries 
have  not  produced  fifty  eminent  male  composers 
either  in  Germany  or  in  Italy. 

There  are  other  reasons,  besides  lliose  which  we 
have  now  given,  that  help  to  explain  why  women 
remain  behind  men,  even  in  the  pursuits  which  are 
open  to  both.  For  one  thing,  very  few  women 
have  time  for  them.  This  may  seem  a paradox  ; 
it  is  an  undoubted  social  fact.  The  time  and 
thoughts  of  every  woman  have  to  satisfy  great 
previous  demands  on  them  for  things  practical. 
There  is,  first,  the  superintendence  of  the  family 
and  the  domestic  expenditure,  which  occupies  at 
least  one  woman  in  every  family,  generally  the  one 
of  mature  years  and  acquired  experience ; unless 
the  family  is  so  rich  as  to  admit  of  delegating  that 
task  to  hired  agency,  and  submitting  to  all  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


343 


waste  and  malversation  inseparable  from  that  mode 
of  conducting  it.  The  superintendence  of  a house- 
hold^ even  when  not  in  other  respects  laborious^  is 
extremely  onerous  to  the  thoughts  ; it  requires 
incessant  vigilance^  an  eye  which  no  detail  escapes^ 
and  presents  questions  for  consideration  and  solu- 
tion^ foreseen  and  unforeseen^  at  every  hour  of  the 
day^  from  which  the  person  responsible  for  them 
can  hardly  ever  shake  herself  free.  If  a woman 
is  of  a rank  and  circumstances  which  relieve  her  in 
a measure  from  these  cares^  she  has  still  devolving 
on  her  the  management  for  the  whole  family  of  its 
intercourse  with  others — of  what  is  called  society^ 
and  the  less  the  call  made  on  her  by  the  former 
duty,  the  greater  is  always  the  development  of  the 
latter  : the  dinner  parties,  concerts,  evening  parties, 
morning  visits,  letter  writing,  and  all  that  goes  with 
them.  All  this  is  over  and  above  the  engrossing 
duty  which  society  imposes  exclusively  on  vromen, 
of  making  themselves  charming.  A clever  woman 
of  the  higher  ranks  finds  nearly  a suflicient  em- 
ployment of  her  talents  in  cultivating  the  graces 
of  manner  and  the  arts  of  conversation.  To  look 
only  at  the  outward  side  of  the  subject : the  great 
and  continual  exercise  of  thought  which  all  women 
who  attach  any  value  to  dressing  well  (I  do  not 
mean  expensively,  but  with  taste,  and  perception 
of  natural  and  of  artificial  convenance)  must 
bestow  upon  their  own  dress,  perhaps  also  upon 


344: 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


that  of  their  daughters^  would  alone  go  a great 
way  towards  achieving  respectable  results  in  art, 
or  science^  or  literature^  and  does  actually  exhaust 
much  of  the  time  and  mental  power  they  might 
have  to  spare  for  either."^  If  it  were  possible 
that  all  this  number  of  little  practical  interests 
(which  are  made  great  to  them)  should  leave 
them  either  much  leisure^  or  much  energy  and 
freedom  of  mind,  to  be  devoted  to  art  or  specula- 
tion, they  must  have  a much  greater  original 
supply  of  active  faculty  than  the  vast  majority  of 
men.  But  this  is  not  all.  Independently  of  the 
regular  offices  of  life  which  devolve  upon  a woman, 
she  is  expected  to  have  her  time  and  faculties 
always  at  the  disposal  of  everybody.  If  a man 
has  not  a profession  to  exempt  him  from  such 
demands,  still,  if  he  has  a pursuit,  he  offends 
nobody  by  devoting  his  time  to  it ; occupation  is 

* ‘*It  appears  to  be  the  same  right  turn  of  mind  which  enables 
a man  to  acquire  the  truths  or  the  just  idea  of  what  is  right,  in 
the  ornaments,  as  in  the  more  stable  principles  of  art.  It  hag 
still  the  same  centre  of  perfection,  though  it  is  the  centre  of  a 
smaller  circle. — To  illustrate  this  by  the  fashion  of  dress,  in 
which  there  is  allowed  to  be  a good  or  bad  taste.  The  component 
parts  of  dress  are  continually  changing  from  great  to  little,  from 
short  to  long ; but  the  general  form  still  remains : it  is  still  the 
same  general  dress  which  is  comparatively  fixed,  though  on  a very 
slenderfoundation;  butitison  this  which  fashion  must  rest.  He  who 
invents  with  the  most  success,  or  dresses  in  the  best  taste,  would 
probably,  from  the  same  sagacity  employed  to  greater  purposes, 
have  discovered  equal  skill,  or  have  formed  the  same  correct  taste, 
in  the  highest  labours  of  art.” — Sir  Joshua  Reynolds'  Discourses^ 
Disc.  vii. 


TUE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


345 


received  as  a valid  excuse  for  his  not  answering 
to  every  casual  demand  which  may  be  made  on 
him.  Are  a woman'^s  occupations,  especially  her 
chosen  and  voluntary  ones,  ever  regarded  as  excus- 
ing her  from  any  of  what  are  termed  the  calls  of 
society  ? Scarcely  are  her  most  necessary  and 
recognised  duties  allowed  as  an  exemption.  It 
requires  an  illness  in  the  family,  or  something 
else  out  of  the  common  way,  to  entitle  her  to 
give  her  own  business  the  precedence  over  other 
people^s  amusement.  She  must  always  be  at  the 
beck  and  call  of  somebody,  generally  of  everybody. 
If  she  has  a study  or  a pursuit,  she  must  snatch 
any  short  interval  which  accidentally  occurs  to  be 
eipployed  in  it.  A celebrated  woman,  in  a work 
which  I hope  will  some  day  be  published,  remarks 
truly  that  everything  a woman  does  is  done  at  odd 
times.  Is  it  wonderful,  then,  if  she  does  not  attain 
the  highest  eminence  in  things  which  require  con- 
secutive attention,  and  the  concentration  on  them 
of  the  chief  interest  of  life  ? Such  is  philosophy, 
and  such,  above  all,  is  art,  in  which,  besides  the 
devotion  of  the  thoughts  and  feelings,  the  hand 
also  must  be  kept  in  constant  exercise  to  attain 
high  skill. 

There  is  another  consideration  to  be  added  to 
all  these.  In  the  various  arts  and  intellectual 
occupations,  there  is  a degree  of  proficiency  suffi- 
cient for  living  by  it,  and  there  is  a higliei 
15* 


f)4G  THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 

degree  on  wliich  depend  the  great  productions 
which  immortalize  a name.  To  the  attainment 
of  the  former^  there  are  adequate  motives  in  the 
case  of  all  who  follow  the  pursuit  professionally : 
the  other  is  hardly  ever  attained  where  there  is 
not^  or  where  there  has  not  been  at  some  period 
of  life^  an  ardent  desire  of  celebrity.  Nothing 
less  is  commonly  a sufficient  stimulus  to  undergo 
the  long  and  patient  drudgery,  which,  in  the  case 
even  of  the  greatest  natural  gifts,  is  absolutely 
required  for  great  eminence  in  pursuits  in  which 
we  already  possess  so  many  splendid  memorials 
of  the  highest  genius.  Now,  whether  the  cause 
be  natural  or  artificial,  women  seldom  have  this 
eagerness  for  fame.  Their  ambition  is  generally 
confined  within  narrower  bounds.  The  influence 
they  seek  is  over  those  who  immediately  surround 
them.  Their  desire  is  to  be  liked,  loved,  or  ad- 
mired, by  those  whom  they  see  with  their  eyes : 
and  the  proficiency  in  knowledge,  arts,  and  ac- 
complishments, which  is  sufficient  for  that,  almost 
always  contents  them.  This  is  a trait  of  cha- 
racter which  cannot  be  left  out  of  the  account 
in  judging  of  women  as  they  are.  I do  not  at 
all  believe  that  it  is  inherent  in  women.  It  is 
only  the  natural  result  of  their  circumstances. 
The  love  of  fame  in  men  is  encouraged  by  edu- 
cation and  opinion  : to  scorn  delights  and  live 
laborious  days  for  its  sake,  is  accounted  the  part 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


347 


of  noble  minds/^  even  if  spoken  of  as  their 
^Hast  infirmity/'^  and  is  stimulated  by  the  access 
which  fame  gives  to  all  objects  of  ambition^  in- 
cluding even  the  favour  of  women;  while  to 
women  themselves  all  these  objects  are  closed, 
aud  the  desire  of  fame  itself  considered  daring 
and  unfeminine.  Besides,  how  could  it  be  that 
a woman^s  interests  should  not  be  all  concen- 
trated upon  the  impressions  made  on  those  who 
come  into  her  daily  life,  when  society  has  or- 
dained that  all  her  duties  should  be  to  them,  and 
has  contrived  that  all  her  comforts  should  depend 
on  them  ? The  natural  desire  of  consideration 
from  our  fellow  creatures  is  as  strong  in  a woman 
as  in  a man ; but  society  has  so  ordered  things 
that  public  consideration  is,  in  all  ordinary  cases, 
only  attainable  by  her  through  the  consideration 
of  her  husband  or  of  her  male  relations,  while 
her  private  consideration  is  forfeited  by  making 
herself  individually  prominent,  or  appeariug  in 
any  other  character  than  that  of  an  appendage 
to  men.  Whoever  is  in  the  least  capable  of 
estimating  the  influence  on  the  mind  of  the 
entire  domestic  and  social  position  and  the  whole 
habit  of  a life,  must  easily  recognise  in  that  in- 
fluence a complete  explanation  of  nearly  all  the 
apparent  diff‘erences  between  women  and  men, 
including  the  whole  of  those  which  imply  any 
inferiority. 


348 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


As  for  moral  differences^  considered  as  dis. 
tinguished  from  intellectual^  tlie  distinction  com- 
monly drawn  is  to  the  advantage  of  women. 
They  are  declared  to  be  better  than  men  , an 
empty  compliment^  which  must  provoke  a bitter 
smile  from  every  woman  of  spirit^  since  there  is 
no  other  situation  in  life  in  which  it  is  the  esta- 
blished order,  and  considered  quite  natural  and 
suitable,  that  the  better  should  obey  the  w^orse. 
If  this  piece  of  idle  talk  is  good  for  anything,  it 
is  only  as  an  admission  by  men,  of  the  coiTupting 
influence  of  power ; for  that  is  certainly  the 
only  truth  which  the  fact,  if  it  be  a fact,  either 
proves  or  illustrates.  And  it  is  true  that  servi- 
tude, except  when  it  actually  brutalizes,  though 
corrupting  to  both,  is  less  so  to  the  slaves  than 
to  the  slave-masters.  It  is  wholesomer  for  the 
moral  nature  to  be  restrained,  even  by  arbitrary 
power,  than  to  be  allowed  to  exercise  arbitrary 
power  without  restraint.  Women,  it  is  said, 
seldomer  fall  under  the  penal  law — contribute  a 
much  smaller  number  of  offenders  to  the  criminal 
calendar,  than  men.  I doubt  not  that  the  same 
thing  may  be  said,  with  the  same  truth,  of  negro 
slaves.  Those  who  are  under  the  control  of 
others  cannot  often  commit  crimes,  unless  at  the 
command  and  for  the  purposes  of  their  masters. 
I do  not  know  a more  signal  instance  of  the 
blindness  with  which  the  world,  including  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


84:9 


herd  of  studious  men^  ignore  and  pass  over  all 
the  influences  of  social  circumstances^  than  their 
silly  depreciation  of  the  intellectual^  and  silly 
panegyrics  on  the  morale  nature  of  women. 

The  complimentary  dictum  about  women^s 
superior  moral  goodness  may  be  allowed  to  pair 
off  with  the  disparaging  one  respecting  their 
greater  liability  to  moral  bias.  Women^  we  are 
told^  are  not  capable  of  resisting  their  personal 
partialities  : their  judgment  in  grave  affairs  is 
warped  by  their  sympathies  and  antipathies. 
Assuming  it  to  be  so^  it  is  still  to  be  proved  that 
women  are  oftener  misled  by  their  personal 
feelings  than  men  by  their  personal  interests. 
The  chief  difference  would  seem  in  that  case  to 
be^  that  men  are  led  from  the  course  of  duty 
and  the  public  interest  by  their  regard  for  them- 
selves, women  (not  being  allowed  to  have  private 
interests  of  their  own)  by  their  regard  for  some- 
body else.  It  is  also  to  be  considered,  that  all 
the  education  which  women  receive  from  society 
inculcates  on  them  the  feeling  that  the  individuals 
connected  with  them  are  the  only  ones  to  whom 
they  owe  any  duty — the  only  ones  whose  interest 
they  are  called  upon  to  care  for ; while,  as  far  as 
education  is  concerned,  they  are  left  strangers 
even  to  the  elementary  ideas  which  are  presup- 
posed in  any  intelligent  regard  for  larger  in- 
terests or  higher  moral  objects.  The  complaint 


350 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


agninst  ttem  resolves  itself  merely  into  tliis^ 
that  they  fulfil  only  too  faithfully  the  sole  duty 
which  they  are  taught^  and  almost  the  only  one 
which  they  are  permitted  to  practise. 

The  concessions  of  the  privileged  to  the  un- 
privileged are  so  seldom  brought  about  by  any 
better  motive  than  the  power  of  the  unprivileged 
to  extort  thenij  that  any  arguments  against  the 
prerogative  of  sex  are  likely  to  be  little  attended 
to  by  the  generality,  as  long  as  they  are  able  to 
say  to  themselves  that  women  do  not  complain 
of  it.  That  fact  certainly  enables  men  to  retain 
the  unjust  privilege  some  time  longer ; but  does 
not  render  it  less  unjust.  Exactly  the  same 
thing  may  be  said  of  the  women  in  the  harem  of 
an  Oriental : they  do  not  complain  of  not  being 
allowed  the  freedom  of  European  women.  They 
think  our  women  insufferably  bold  and  unfemi- 
nine. How  rarely  it  is  that  even  men  complain 
of  the  general  order  of  society ; and  how  much 
rarer  still  would  such  complaint  be,  if  they  did 
not  know  of  any  different  order  existing  any- 
where else.  Women  do  not  complain  of  the 
general  lot  of  women;  or  rather  they  do,  for 
plaintive  elegies  on  it  are  very  common  in  the 
writings  of  women,  and  were  still  more  so  as 
long  as  the  lamentations  could  not  be  suspected 
of  having  any  practical  object.  Their  complaints 
are  like  the  complaints  which  men  make  of  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


351 


general  nnsatisfaetoriness  of  haman  life;  they 
are  not  meant  to  imply  blame^  or  to  plead  for 
any  change.  But  though  women  do  not  com- 
plain of  the  power  of  husbands^  each  complains 
of  her  own  husband^  or  of  the  husbands  of  her 
friends.  It  is  the  same  in  all  other  cases  of 
servitude^  at  least  in  the  commencement  of  the 
emancipatory  movement.  The  serfs  did  not  at 
first  complain  of  the  power  of  their  lords^  but 
only  of  their  tyranny.  The  Commons  began  by 
claiming  a few  municipal  privileges;  they  next 
asked  an  exemption  for  themselves  from  being 
taxed  without  their  own  consent ; but  they  would 
at  that  time  have  thought  it  a great  presumption 
to  claim  any  share  in  the  king^s  sovereign  autho- 
rity. The  case  of  women  is  now  the  only  case 
in  which  to  rebel  against  established  rules  is  still 
looked  upon  with  the  same  eyes  as  was  formerly 
a subject’s  claim  to  the  right  of  rebelling  against 
his  king.  A woman  who  joins  in  any  movement 
which  her  husband  disapproves^  makes  herself  a 
martyr^  without  even  being  able  to  be  an  apostle, 
for  the  husband  can  legally  put  a stop  to  her 
apostleship.  Women  cannot  be  expected  to 
devote  themselves  to  the  emancipation  of  women, 
until  men  in  considerable  number  are  prepared 
to  join  with  them  in  the  undertaking. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


HERE  remains  a question^  not  of  less  im- 


portance than  those  already  discussed^  and 
which  will  be  asked  the  most  importunately  by 
those  opponents  whose  conviction  is  somewhat 
shaken  on  the  main  point.  What  good  are  we 
to  expect  from  the  changes  proposed  in  onr 
customs  and  institutions?  "Would  mankind  be 
at  all  better  off  if  women  were  free  ? If  not, 
why  disturb  their  minds,  and  attempt  to  make 
a social  revolution  in  the  name  of  an  abstract 
right  ? 

It  is  hardly  to  be  expected  that  this  question 
will  be  asked  in  respect  to  the  change  proposed 
in  the  condition  of  women  in  marriage.  The 
sufferinj^t^,  immoralities,  evils  of  all  sorts,  produced 
in  innumerable  cases  by  the  subjection  of  indi- 
vidual women  to  individual  men,  are  far  too 
terrible  to  be  overlooked.  Unthinking  or  un- 
candid  persons,  counting  those  cases  alone  which 
are  extreme,  or  which  attain  publicity,  may  say 
that  the  evils  are  exceptional ; but  no  one  can 
be  blind  to  their  existence,  nor,  in  many  cases. 


THE  SUBJECTIOJSr  OF  WOMEN. 


353 


to  tli^ir  intensity.  And  it  is  perfectly  o6vions 
tliat  the  abuse  of  the  power  cannot  be  very  much 
checked  while  the  power  remains.  It  is  a power 
given^  or  offered^  not  to  good  men_,  or  to  decently 
respectable  men^  but  to  all  men  ; the  most  brutal, 
and  the  most  criminal.  There  is  no  check  but 
that  of  opinion,  and  such  men  are  in  general 
within  the  reach  of  no  opinion  but  that  of  men 
like  themselves.  If  such  men  did  not  brutally 
tyrannize  over  the  one  human  being  whom  the 
law  compels  to  bear  everything  from  them,  society 
must  already  have  reached  a paradisiacal  state. 
There  could  be  no  need  any  longer  of  laws  to 
curb  men^s  vicious  propensities.  Astrsea  must 
not  only  have  returned  to  earth,  but  the  heart  of 
the  worst  man  must  have  become  her  temple.  The 
law  of  servitude  in  marriage  is  a monstrous  con- 
tradiction to  all  the  principles  of  the  modern  world, 
and  to  all  the  experience  through  which  those 
principles  have  been  slowly  and  painfully  worked 
out.  It  is  the  sole  case,  now  that  negro  slavery  has 
been  abolished,  in  which  a hum  an  being  in  the  pleni- 
tude of  every  faculty  is  delivered  up  to  the  tender 
mercies  of  another  human  being,  in  the  hope 
forsooth  that  this  other  will  use  the  power  solely 
for  the  good  of  the  person  subjected  to  it. 
Jlarriage  is  the  only  actual  bondage  known  to 
our  law.  There  remain  no  legal  slaves,  except 
the  mist^^'^ss  of  every  house. 


354 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


It  is  not^  therefore,  on  this  part  of  the  subject, 
that  the  question  is  likely  to  be  asked,  Cui  bono  ? 
We  may  be  told  that  the  evil  would  outweigh 
the  good,  but  the  reality  of  the  good  admits  of 
no  dispute.  In  regard,  however,  to  the  larger 
question,  the  removal  of  women^s  disabilities — 
their  recognition  as  the  equals  of  men  in  all  that 
belongs  to  citizenship — the  opening  to  them  of 
all  honourable  employments,  and  of  the  training 
and  education  which  qualifies  for  those  employ- 
ments— there  are  many  persons  for  whom  it  is 
not  enough  that  the  inequality  has  no  just  or 
legitimate  defence ; they  require  to  be  told 
what  express  advantage  would  be  obtained  by 
abolishing  it. 

To  which  let  me  first  answer,  the  advantage  of 
having  the  most  universal  and  pervading  of  all 
human  relations  regulated  by  justice  instead  of 
injustice.  The  vast  amount  of  this  gain  to 
human  nature,  it  is  hardly  possible,  by  any  expla- 
nation or  illustration,  to  place  in  a stronger  light 
than  it  is  placed  by  the  bare  statement,  to  any  one 
who  attaches  a moral  meaning  to  words.  All  the 
selfish  propensities,  the  self-worship, theunjustself- 
preference,  which  exist  among  mankind,  have  their 
source  and  root  in,  and  derive  their  principal 
nourishment  from,  the  present  constitution  of  the 
relation  between  men  ard  women.  Think  what 
it  is  to  a boy,  to  grow  up  to  manhood  in  the 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


355 


belief  that  without  any  merit  or  any  exertion  of 
his  own,  though  he  may  he  the  most  frivolous 
and  empty  or  the  most  ignorant  and  stolid  of 
mankind,  by  the  mere  fact  of  being  born  a male 
he  is  by  right  the  superior  of  all  and  every  one 
of  an  entire  half  of  the  human  race : including 
probably  some  whose  real  superiority  to  himself 
he  has  daily  or  hourly  occasion  to  feel ; but  even 
if  in  his  whole  conduct  he  habitually  follows 
a woman^s  guidance,  still,  if  he  is  a fool,  she 
thinks  that  of  course  she  is  not,  and  cannot  be, 
equal  in  ability  and  judgment  to  himself ; and  if 
he  is  not  a fool,  he  does  worse — ^he  sees  that  she 
is  superior  to  him,  and  believes  that,  notwithstand- 
ing her  superiority,  he  is  entitled  to  command  and 
she  is  bound  to  obey.  "What  must  be  the  efPect 
on  his  character,  of  this  lesson  ? And  men  of  the 
cultivated  classes  are  often  not  aware  how  deeply 
it  sinks  into  the  immense  majority  of  male  minds. 
For,  among  right-feeling  and  well-bred  people,  the 
inequality  is  kept  as  much  as  possible  out  of  sight ; 
above  all,  out  of  sight  of  the  children.  As  much 
obedience  is  required  from  boys  to  their  mother 
as  to  their  father : they  are  not  permitted  to 
domineer  over  their  sisters,  nor  are  they  accus- 
tomed to  see  these  postponed  to  them,  but  the 
contrary;  the  compensations  of  the  chivalrous 
feeling  being  made  prominent,  while  the  servitude 
which  requires  them  is  kept  in  the  background. 


356 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


Well  bronglifc-up  youths  in  the  higher  classes 
thus  often  escape  the  bad  influences  of  the  situa- 
tion in  their  early  years^  and  only  experience  them 
when^  arrived  at  manhood^  they  fall  under  the 
dominion  of  facts  as  they  really  exist.  Such 
people  are  little  aware^  when  a boy  is  differently 
brought  up^  how  early  the  notion  of  his  inherent 
superiority  to  a girl  arises  in  his  mind ; how  it 
grows  with  his  growth  and  strengthens  with  his 
strength ; how  it  is  inoculated  by  one  schoolboy 
upon  another ; how  early  the  youth  thinks  him- 
self superior  to  his  mother^  owing  her  perhaps 
forbearance^  but  no  real  respect ; and  how  sublime 
and  sultan-like  a sense  of  superiority  he  feels^ 
above  all,  over  the  woman  whom  he  honours  by 
admitting  her  to  a partnership  of  his  life.  Is  it 
imagined  that  all  this  does  not  pervert  the  whole 
manner  of  existence  of  the  man^  both  as  an  in- 
dividual and  as  a social  being?  It  is  an  exact 
parallel  to  the  feeling  of  a hereditary  king  that 
he  is  excellent  above  ‘others  by  being  born  a king, 
or  a noble  by  being  born  a noble.  The  relation 
between  husband  and  wife  is  very  like  that 
between  lord  and  vassal,  except  that  the  wife  is 
held  to  more  unlimited  obedience  than  the  vassal 
was.  However  the  vassaks  character  may  have 
been  affected,  for  better  and  for  worse,  by  his 
subordination,  who  can  help  seeing  that  the  lord'^s 
was  affected  greatly  for  the  worse  ? whether  he  was 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN, 


357 


led  to  believe  that  his  vassals  were  really  superior 
to  himself,  or  to  feel  that  he  was  placed  in  com^ 
mand  over  people  as  good  as  himself,  for  no  merits 
or  labours  of  his  own,  but  merely  for  having,  as 
Figaro  says,  taken  the  trouble  to  be  born.  The 
self-worship  of  the  monarch,  or  of  the  feudal  supe- 
rior, is  matched  by  the  self-worship  of  the  male. 
Human  beings  do  not  grow  up  from  childhood  in 
the  possession  of  unearned  distinctions,  without 
pluming  themselves  upon  them.  Those  whom 
privileges  not  acquired  by  their  merit,  and  which 
they  feel  to  be  disproportioned  to  it,  inspire  with 
additional  humility,  are  always  the  few,  and  the 
best  few.  The  rest  are  only  inspired  with  pride, 
and  the  worst  sort  of  pride,  that  which  values 
itself  upon  accidental  advantages,  not  of  its  own 
achieving.  Above  all,  when  the  feeling  of  being 
raised  above  the  whole  of  the  other  sex  is  com- 
bined with  personal  authority  over  one  individual 
among  them ; the  situation,  if  a school  of  con- 
scientious and  affectionate  forbearance  to  those 
whose  strongest  points  of  character  are  conscience 
and  affection,  is  to  men  of  another  quality  a re- 
gularly constituted  Academy  or  Gymnasium  for 
training  them  in  arrogance  and  over! )earingn ess ; 
which  vices,  if  curbed  by  the  certainty  of  resistance 
in  their  intercourse  with  other  men,  their  equals, 
break  out  towards  all  who  are  in  a position  to  be 
obliged  to  tolerate  them,  and  often  revenge  them- 


358 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  AVOMEN. 


selves  upon  the  unfortunate  wife  for  the  involun- 
tary  restraint  which  they  are  obliged  to  submit  to 
elsewhere. 

The  example  afforded^  and  the  education  given 
to  the  sentiments^  by  laying  the  foundation  of 
domestic  existence  upon  a relation  contradictory 
to  the  first  principles  of  social  justice^  must^  from 
the  very  nature  of  man_,  have  a perverting  influ- 
ence of  such  magnitude,  that  it  is  hardly  possible 
with  our  present  experience  to  raise  our  imagi- 
nations to  the  conception  of  so  great  a change 
for  the  better  as  would  be  made  by  its  removal. 
All  that  education  and  civilization  are  doing  to 
efface  the  influences  on  character  of  the  law  of 
force^  and  replace  them  by  those  of  justice;  remains 
merely  on  the  surface,  as  long  as  the  citadel  of 
the  enemy  is  not  attacked.  The  principle  of  the 
modern  movement  in  morals  and  politics,  is  that 
conduct;  and  conduct  alone,  entitles  to  respect : 
that  not  what  men  are,  but  what  they  do,  con- 
stitutes their  claim  to  deference ; that,  above  all, 
merit,  and  not  birth,  is  the  only  rightful  claim  to 
power  and  authority.  If  no  authority,  not  in  its 
nature  temporary,  were  allowed  to  one  human 
being  over  another,  society  would  not  be  em- 
ployed in  building  up  propensities  with  one  hand 
which  it  has  to  curb  with  the  other.  The  child 
would  really,  for  the  first  time  in  man^s  existence 
on  earth,  be  trained  in  the  way  he  should  go,  and 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


359 


when  he  was  old  there  would  be  a chance  that 
he  would  not  depart  from  it.  But  so  long  as  the 
right  of  the  strong  to  power  over  the  weak  rules 
in  the  very  heart  of  society^  the  attempt  to  make 
the  equal  right  of  the  weak  the  principle  of  its 
outward  actions  will  always  be  an  uphill  struggle  ; 
for  the  law  of  justice^  which  is  also  that  of 
Christian ity_,  will  never  get  possession  of  men^s 
inmost  sentiments ; they  will  be  working  against 
it^  even  when  bending  to  it. 

The  second  benefit  to  be  expected  from  giving 
to  women  the  free  use  of  their  faculties^  by  leav- 
ing them  the  free  choice  of  their  employments, 
and  opening  to  them  the  same  field  of  occupation 
and  the  same  prizes  and  encouragements  as  to 
other  human  beings,  would  be  that  of  doubling 
the  mass  of  mental  faculties  available  for  the 
higher  service  of  humanity.  Where  there  is  now 
one  person  qualified  to  benefit  mankind  and 
promote  the  general  improvement,  as  a public 
teacher,  or  an  administrator  of  some  branch  of  pub- 
lic or  social  affairs,  there  would  then  be  a chance  of 
two.  Mental  superiority  of  any  kind  is  at  present 
everywhere  so  much  below  the  demand ; there  is 
such  a deficiency  of  persons  competent  to  do 
excellently  anything  which  it  requires  any  con- 
siderable amount  of  ability  to  do ; that  the  loss 
to  the  world,  by  refusing  to  make  use  of  one-half 
of  tlie  whole  quantity  of  talent  it  possesses,  is 


360 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


extremely  serious.  It  is  true  tliat  this  amount 
of  mental  power  is  not  totally  lost.  Much  of 
it  is  employed^  and  would  in  any  case  be  em- 
ployed^ in  domestic  management,  and  in  the  few 
other  occupations  open  to  women;  and  from  the 
remainder  indirect  benefit  is  in  many  individual 
cases  obtained,  through  the  personal  influence 
of  individual  women  over  individual  men.  But 
these  benefits  are  partial ; their  range  is  extremely 
circumscribed ; and  if  they  must  be  admitted,  on 
the  one  hand,  as  a deduction  from  the  amount 
of  fresh  social  power  that  would  be  acquired  by 
giving  freedom  to  one-half  of  the  Avhole  sum  of 
human  intellect,  there  must  be  added,  on  the 
other,  the  benefit  of  the  stimulus  that  would  be 
given  to  the  intellect  of  men  by  the  competition ; 
or  (to  use  a more  true  expression)  by  the  necessity 
that  would  be  imposed  on  them  of  deserving 
precedency  before  they  could  expect  to  obtain  it. 

This  great  accession  to  the  intellectual  power 
of  the  species,  and  to  the  amount  of  intellect 
avails ble  for  the  good  management  of  its  affairs, 
would  be  obtained,  partly,  through  the  better  and 
more  complete  intellectual  education  of  women, 
which  would  then  improve  pari  passu  with  that 
of  men.  Women  in  general  would  be  brought  up 
equally  capable  of  understanding  business,  public 
aflhirs,  and  the  higher  matters  of  speculation,  with 
men  in  the  same  class  of  society ; and  the  select 


THE  SUBJECTIO^T  OF  WOMEN. 


361 


few  of  the  one  as  well  as  of  the  other  sex^  who 
were  qualified  not  only  to  comprehend  what  is 
done  or  thought  by  others^  but  to  think  or  do 
something  considerable  themselves^  would  meet 
with  the  same  facilities  for  improving  and  training 
their  capacities  in  the  one  sex  as  in  the  other. 
In  this  way^  the  widening  of  the  sphere  of  action 
for  women  would  operate  for  good^  by  raising 
their  education  to  the  level  of  that  of  men^  and 
making  the  one  participate  in  all  improvements 
made  in  the  other.  But  independently  of  this^ 
the  mere  breaking  down  of  the  barrier  would  of 
itself  have  an  educational  virtue  of  the  highest 
worth.  The  mere  getting  rid  of  the  idea  that  all 
the  wider  subjects  of  thought  and  action,  all  the 
things  which  are  of  general  and  not  solely  of 
private  interest,  are  men^s  business,  from  which 
women  are  to  be  warned  oflF — positively  interdicted 
from  most  of  it,  coldly  tolerated  in  the  little 
w^hich  is  allowed  them — the  mere  consciousness  a 
woman  would  then  have  of  being  a human  being 
like  any  other,  entitled  to  choose  her  pursuits^ 
urged  or  invited  by  the  same  inducements  as  any 
one  else  to  interest  herself  in  whatever  is  in- 
teresting to  human  beings,  entitled  to  exert  the 
share  of  influence  on  all  human  concerns  which 
belongs  to  an  individual  opinion,  whether  she 
attempted  actual  participation  in  them  or  not-^ 
tliis  alone  would  effect  an  immense  expansion  of 
16 


562 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


the  faculties  of  women^  as  well  as  enlargement  oi 
the  range  of  their  moral  sentiments. 

Besides  the  addition  to  the  amount  of  indi- 
vidual talent  available  for  the  conduct  of  human 
affairs,  which  certainly  are  not  at  present  so 
abundantly  provided  in  that  respect  that  they 
can  aflPord  to  dispense  with  one-half  of  what 
nature  proffers ; the  opinion  of  women  would  then 
possess  a more  beneficial,  rather  than  a greater, 
influence  upon  the  general  mass  of  human  belief 
and  sentiment.  I say  a more  beneficial,  rather 
than  a greater  influence;  for  the  influence  of 
women  over  the  general  tone  of  opinion  has 
always,  or  at  least  from  the  earliest  known  period, 
been  very  considerable.  The  influence  of  mothers 
on  the  early  character  of  their  sons,  and  the 
desire  of  young  men  to  recommend  themselves  to 
young  women,  have  in  all  recorded  times  been 
important  agencies  in  the  formation  of  cha- 
racter, and  have  determined  some  of  the  chief 
steps  in  the  progress  of  civilization.  Even  in 
the  Homeric  age,  atSwc  towards  the  TpcjaSa^ 
iXKEaiTTtTrXoij^  is  an  acknowledged  and  powerful 
motive  of  action  in  the  great  Hector.  The  moral 
influence  of  women  has  had  two  modes  of  opera- 
tion. First,  it  has  been  a softening  influence. 
Those  who  were  most  liable  to  be  the  victims 
of  violence,  have  naturally  tended  as  much  as  they 
could  towards  limiting  its  sphere  and  mitigating 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


363 


its  excesses.  Those  who  were  not  taught  to  fight, 
have  naturally  inclined  in  favour  of  any  other 
mode  of  settling  differences  rather  than  that  ol 
fighting.  In  general^  those  who  have  been  the 
greatest  sufferers  by  the  indulgence  of  selfish 
passion^  have  been  the  most  earnest  supporters  of 
any  moral  law  which  offered  a means  of  bridling 
passion.  Women  were  powerfully  instrumental 
in  inducing  the  northern  conquerors  to  adopt 
the  creed  of  Christianity^  a creed  so  much  more 
favourable  to  women  than  any  that  preeeded  it. 
The  conversion  of  the  Anglo-Saxons  and  of  the 
Franks  may  be  said  to  have  been  begun  by  the 
wives  of  Ethelbert  and  Clovis.  The  other  mode 
in  which  the  effect  of  women^s  opinion  has  been 
conspicuous^  is  by  giving  a powerful  stimulus  to 
those  qualities  in  men,  which,  not  being  them- 
selves trained  in,  it  was  necessary  for  them  that 
they  should  find  in  their  protectors.  Courage, 
and  the  military  virtues  generally,  have  at  all 
times  been  greatly  indebted  to  the  desire  which 
men  felt  of  being  admired  by  women : and  the 
stimulus  reaches  far  beyond  this  one  class  of 
eminent  qualities,  since,  by  a very  natural  effect 
of  their  position,  the  best  passport  to  the  ad- 
miration and  favour  of  women  has  always  been 
to  be  thought  highly  of  by  men.  From  the 
combination  of  the  two  kinds  of  moral  in- 
fluence thus  exercised  by  women,  arose  the  spirit 


364 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


of  chivalry  : the  peculiarity  of  which  is^  to  aim  at 
combining  the  highest  standard  of  the  warlike 
qualities  with  the  cultivation  of  a totally  different 
class  of  virtues — those  of  gentleness,  generosity, 
and  self-abnegation,  towards  the  non-military  and 
defenceless  classes  generally,  and  a special  sub- 
mission and  worship  directed  towards  women;  who 
were  distinguished  from  the  other  defenceless 
classes  by  the  high  rewards  which  they  had  it 
in  their  power  voluntarily  to  bestow  on  those 
who  endeavoured  to  earn  their  favour,  instead  of 
extorting  their  subjection.  Though  the  practice  of 
chivalry  fell  even  more  sadly  short  of  its  theoretic 
standard  than  practice  generally  falls  below  theory, 
it  remains  one  of  the  most  precious  monuments  of 
the  moral  history  of  our  race  ; as  a remarkable  in- 
stance of  a concerted  and  organized  attempt  by  a 
most  disorganized  and  distracted  society,  to  raise 
up  and  carry  into  practice  a moral  ideal  greatly 
in  advance  of  its  social  condition  and  institutions ; 
so  much  so  as  to  have  been  completely  frustrated 
in  the  main  object,  yet  never  entirely  inefficacious, 
and  which  has  left  a most  sensible,  and  for  the 
most  part  a highly  valuable  impress  on  the  ideas 
and  feelings  of  all  subsequent  times. 

The  chivalrous  ideal  is  the  acme  of  the 
influence  of  women’s  sentiments  on  the  moral 
cultivation  of  mankind  : and  if  women  are  to 
remain  in  their  subordinate  situation,  it  were 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


365 


greatly  to  be  lamented  that  tlie  cliivalrons  stan- 
dard should  have  passed  away^  for  it  is  the  only 
one  at  all  capable  of  mitigating  the  demoralizing 
influences  of  that  position.  But  the  changes  in 
the  general  state  of  the  species  rendered  inevi- 
table the  substitution  of  a totally  different  ideal  of 
morality  for  the  chivalrous  one.  Chivalry  was 
the  attempt  to  infuse  moral  elements  into  a state 
of  society  in  which  everything  depended  for  good 
or  evil  on  individual  prowess^  under  the  softening 
influences  of  individual  delicacy  and  generosity. 
In  modern  societies,  all  things,  even  in  the  military 
department  of  affairs,  are  decided,  not  by  indi- 
vidual efi^ort,  but  by  the  combined  operations  of 
numbers;  while  the  main  occupation  of  society 
has  changed  from  fighting  to  business,  from  mili- 
tary to  industrial  life.  The  exigencies  of  the 
new  life  are  no  more  exclusive  of  the  virtues  of 
generosity  than  those  of  the  old,  but  it  no 
longer  entirely  depends  on  them.  The  main  foun- 
dations of  the  moral  life  of  modern  times  must 
be  justice  and  prudence;  the  respect  of  each 
for  the  rights  of  every  other,  and  the  ability 
of  each  to  take  care  of  himself.  Chivalry  left 
without  legal  check  all  forms  of  wrong  which 
reigned  unpunished  throughout  society ; it  only 
encouraged  a few  to  do  right  in  preference  to 
wrong,  by  the  direction  it  gave  to  the  instruments 
of  praise  and  admiration.  But  the  real  depen- 


366 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


dence  of  morality  must  always  be  upon  its  penal 
sanctions — its  power  to  deter  from  evil.  The 
security  of  society  cannot  rest  on  merely  rendering 
honour  to  rights  a motive  so  comparatively  weak  in 
all  but  a few,  and  which  on  very  many  does  not 
operate  at  all.  Modern  society  is  able  to  repress 
wrong  through  all  departments  of  life,  by  a fit 
exertion  of  the  superior  strength  which  civiliza- 
tion has  given  it,  and  thus  to  render  the  exis- 
tence of  the  weaker  members  of  society  (no 
longer  defenceless  but  protected  by  law)  tole- 
rable to  them,  without  reliance  on  the  chivalrous 
feelings  of  those  who  are  in  a position  to  tyran- 
nize. The  beauties  and  graces  of  the  chivalrous 
character  are  still  what  they  were,  but  the  rights 
of  the  weak,  and  the  general  comfort  of  human 
life,  now  rest  on  a far  surer  and  steadier  support; 
or  rather,  they  do  so  in  every  relation  of  life 
except  the  conjugal. 

At  present  the  moral  influence  of  women  is 
no  less  real,  but  it  is  no  longer  of  so  marked 
and  definite  a character : it  has  more  nearly 
merged  in  the  general  influence  of  public  opinion. 
Both  through  the  contagion  of  sympathy,  and 
through  the  desire  of  men  to  shine  in  the  eyes 
of  women,  their  feelings  have  great  effect  in 
keeping  alive  what  remains  of  the  chivalrous 
ideal — in  fostering  the  sentiments  and  continuing 
the  traditions  of  spirit  and  generosity.  In  these 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN.  367 

points  of  character^  their  standard  is  higher  than 
that  of  men  ; in  the  quality  of  justice,  somewhat 
lower.  As  regards  the  relations  of  private  life 
it  may  be  said  generally,  that  their  influence  is, 
on  the  whole,  encouraging  to  the  softer  virtues, 
discouraging  to  the  sterner : though  the  state- 
ment must  be  taken  with  all  the  modifications 
dependent  on  individual  character.  In  the 
chief  of  the  greater  trials  to  which  virtue  is 
subject  in  the  concerns  of  life — the  conflict  be- 
tween interest  and  principle — the  tendency  of 
women^s  influence  is  of  a very  mixed  character. 
When  the  principle  involved  happens  to  be  one 
of  the  very  few  which  the  course  of  their  reli- 
gious or  moral  education  has  strongly  impressed 
upon  themselves,  they  are  potent  auxiliaries  to 
virtue  : and  their  husbands  and  sons  are  often 
prompted  by  them  to  acts  of  abnegation  which 
they  never  would  have  been  capable  of  without 
that  stimulus.  But,  with  the  present  education 
and  position  of  women,  the  moral  principles 
which  have  been  impressed  on  them  cover  but  a 
comparatively  small  part  of  the  field  of  virtue, 
and  are,  moreover,  principally  negative;  forbid- 
ding particular  acts,  but  having  little  to  do  with 
the  general  direction  of  the  thoughts  and  pur- 
poses. I am  afraid  it  must  be  said,  that  disinte- 
restedness in  the  general  conduct  of  life — the 
devotion  of  the  energies  to  purposes  which  hold 


368 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


out  no  promise  of  private  advantages  to  the 
family — is  very  seldom  encouraged  or  supported 
by  women^s  influence.  It  is  small  blame  to  them 
that  they  discourage  objects  of  which  they  have 
not  learnt  to  see  the  advantage,  and  which  with- 
draw their  men  from  them,  and  from  the  interests 
of  the  family.  But  the  consequence  is  that 
women^s  influence  is  often  anything  but  favour- 
able to  public  virtue. 

Women  have,  however,  some  share  of  influence 
in  giving  the  tone  to  public  moralities  since  their 
sphere  of  action  has  been  a little  widened,  and 
since  a considerable  number  of  them  have  occupied 
themselves  practically  in  the  promotion  of  objects 
reaching  beyond  their  own  family  and  household. 
The  influence  of  women  counts  for  a great  deal 
in  two  of  the  most  marked  features  of  modern 
European  life — its  aversion  to  war,  and  its  addic- 
tion to  philanthropy.  Excellent  characteristics 
both  j but  unhappily,  if  the  influence  of  women 
is  valuable  in  the  encouragement  it  gives  to  these 
feelings  in  general,  in  the  particular  applications 
the  direction  it  gives  to  them  is  at  least  as  often 
mischievous  as  useful.  In  the  philanthropic  de- 
partment more  particularly,  the  two  provinces 
chiefly  cultivated  by  women  are  religious  prose- 
lytism  and  charity.  Beligious  p/oselytism  at 
home,  is  but  another  word  for  embittering  of 
religious  animosities : abroad,  it  is  usually  a 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


369 


blind  running  at  an  object,  Mitbout  either  know- 
ing or  heeding  the  fatal  mischiefs — fatal  to  the 
religions  object  itself  as  well  as  to  all  other 
desirable  objects — ^which  may  be  produced  by  the 
means  employed.  As  for  charity,  it  is  a matter 
in  which  the  immediate  effect  on  the  persons 
directly  concerned,  and  the  ultimate  consequence 
to  the  general  good,  are  apt  to  be  at  complete 
war  with  one  another : while  the  education  given 
to  women — an  education  of  the  sentiments  rather 
than  of  the  understanding — and  the  habit  incul- 
cated by  their  whole  life,  of  looking  to  imme- 
diate effects  on  persons,  and  not  to  remote  effects 
on  classes  of  persons — make  them  both  unable 
to  see,  and  unwilling  to  admit,  the  ultimate  evil 
tendency  of  any  form  of  charity  or  philanthropy 
which  commends  itself  to  their  sympathetic  feel- 
ings. The  great  and  continually  increasing  mass 
of  unenlightened  and  shortsighted  benevolence, 
which,  taking  the  care  of  people^s  lives  out  of 
their  own  hands,  and  relieving  them  from  the 
disagreeable  consequences  of  their  own  acts,  saps 
the  very  foundations  of  the  self-respect,  self-help, 
and  self-control  which  are  the  essential  condi- 
tions both  of  individual  prosperity  and  of  social 
virtue — this  waste  of  resources  and  of  benevolent 
feelings  in  doiug  harm  instead  of  good,  is  im- 
mensely swelled  by  women^s  contributions,  and 
stimulated  by  their  influence.  Not  that  this  is 
16* 


370 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


a mistake  likely  to  be  made  by  women,  where 
they  have  actually  the  practical  management  of 
schemes  of  beneficence.  It  sometimes  happens 
that  women  who  administer  public  charities — with 
that  insight  into  present  fact,  and  especially  into 
the  minds  and  feelings  of  those  with  whom  they 
are  in  immediate  contact,  in  which  women  gene- 
rally excel  men — recognise  in  the  clearest  manner 
the  demoralizing  infiuence  of  the  alms  given  or 
the  help  afforded,  and  could  give  lessons  on  the 
subject  to  many  a male  political  economist.  But 
women  who  only  give  their  money,  and  are  not 
brought  face  to  face  with  the  effects  it  produces, 
how  can  they  be  expected  to  foresee  them  ? A 
woman  born  to  the  present  lot  of  women,  and 
content  with  it,  how  should  she  appreciate  the 
value  of  self-dependence?  She  is  not  self-de- 
pendent; she  is  not  taught  self-dependence ; her 
destiny  is  to  receive  everything  from  others,  and 
why  should  what  is  good  enough  for  her  be  bad 
for  the  poor  ? Her  familiar  notions  of  good  are 
of  blessings  descending  from  a superior.  She 
forgets  that  she  is  not  free,  and  that  the  poor 
are ; that  if  what  they  need  is  given  to  them  un- 
earned, they  cannot  be  compelled  to  earn  it : that 
everybody  cannot  be  taken  care  of  by  everybody, 
but  there  must  be  some  motive  to  induce  people 
to  take  care  of  themselves ; and  that  to  be  helped 
to  help  themselves,  if  they  are  physically  capable 


THE  SUBJEOTIOK  OF  WOMEN*. 


371 


of  it^  is  the  only  charity  which  proves  to  be 
charity  in  the  end. 

These  considerations  shew  how  nsefully  the 
part  which  women  take  in  the  formation  of 
general  opinion^  would  be  modified  for  the  better 
by  that  more  enlarged  instruction^  and  practical 
conversancy  with  the  things  which  their  opinions 
influence^  that  would  necessarily  arise  from  their 
social  and  political  emancipation.  But  the  im- 
provement it  would  work  through  the  influence 
they  exercise^  each  in  her  own  family,  would  be 
still  more,  remarkable. 

It  is  often  said  that  in  the  classes  most  ex- 
posed to  temptation,  a man^s  wife  and  children 
tend  to  keep  him  honest  and  respectable,  both  by 
the  wife^s  direct  influence,  and  by  the  concern  he 
feels  for  their  future  welfare.  This  may  be  so, 
and  no  doubt  often  is  so,  with  those  who  are 
more  weak  than  wicked;  and  this  beneficial  in- 
fluence would  be  preserved  and  strengthened 
under  equal  laws ; it  does  not  depend  on  the 
woman'^s  servitude,  but  is,  on  the  contrary,  dimi- 
nished by  the  disrespect  which  the  inferior  class 
of  men  always  at  heart  feel  towards  those  who 
are  subject  to  their  power.  But  when  we  ascend 
higher  in  the  scale,  we  come  among  a totally 
different  set  of  moving  forces.  The  wife^s  in- 
fluence tends,  as  far  as  it  goes,  to  prevent  the 
husband  from  falling  below  the  common  standard 


372 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


of  approbation  of  tbe  country.  It  tends  quite  as 
strongly  to  hinder  him  from  rising  above  it. 
The  wife  is  the  auxiliary  of  the  common  public 
opinion.  A man  who  is  married  to  a woman 
his  inferior  in  intelligence^  finds  her  a perpetual 
dead  weighty  or^  worse  than  a dead  weighty  a 
drag^  upon  every  aspiration  of  his  to  be  better 
than  public  opinion  requires  him  to  be.  It  is 
hardly  possible  for  one  who  is  in  these  bonds^  to 
attain  exalted  virtue.  If  he  differs  in  his  opinion 
from  the  mass — if  he  sees  truths  which  have  not 
yet  dawned  upon  them^  or  if,  feeling  in  his  heart 
truths  which  they  nominally  recognise^  he  would 
like  to  act  up  to  those  truths  more  conscien- 
tiously than  the  generality  of  mankind — to  all 
such  thoughts  and  desires^  marriage  is  the  heaviest 
of  drawbacks^  unless  he  be  so  fortunate  as  to 
have  a wife  as  much  above  the  common  level  as 
he  himself  is. 

Foi%  in  the  first  place^  there  is  always  some 
sacrifice  of  personal  interest  required ; either  of 
social  consequence^  or  of  pecuniary  means ; per- 
haps the  risk  of  even  the  means  of  subsistence. 
These  sacrifices  and  risks  he  may  be  willing  to 
encounter  for  himself;  but  he  will  pause  before 
he  imposes  them  on  his  family.  And  his  family 
in  this  case  means  his  wife  and  daughters ; for 
he  always  hopes  that  his  sons  will  feel  as  he  feels 
himself^  and  that  what  he  can  do  without,  they 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


373 


will  do  without,  willingly,  in  the  same  cause. 
But  his  daughters — their  marriage  may  depend 
upon  it:  and  his  wife,  who  is  unable  to  enter 
into  or  understand  the  objects  for  which  these 
sacrifices  are  made — who,  if  she  thought  them 
worth  any  sacrifice,  would  think  so  on  trust,  and 
solely  for  his  sake — ^who  can  participate  in  none 
of  the  enthusiasm  or  the  self- approbation  he 
himself  may  feel,  while  the  things  which  he  is 
disposed  to  sacrifice  are  all  in  all  to  her;  will 
not  the  best  and  most  unselfish  man  hesitate 
the  longest  before  bringing  on  her  this  conse- 
quence ? If  it  be  not  the  comforts  of  life,  but 
only  social  consideration,  that  is  at  stake,  the 
burthen  upon  his  conscience  and  feelings  is  still 
very  severe.  Whoever  has  a wife  and  children 
has  given  hostages  to  Mrs.  Grundy.  The  appro- 
bation of  that  potentate  may  be  a matter  of  in- 
diflFerence  to  him,  but  it  is  of  great  importance 
to  his  wife.  The  man  himself  may  be  above 
opinion,  or  may  find  sufficient  compensation  in 
the  opinion  of  those  of  his  own  way  of  thinking. 
But  to  the  women  connected  with  him,  he  can 
ofier  no  compensation.  The  almost  invariable 
tendency  of  the  wife  to  place  her  infiuence  in  the 
same  scale  with  social  consideration,  is  sometimes 
made  a reproach  to  women,  and  represented  as 
a peculiar  trait  of  feebleness  and  childishness  of 
character  in  them : surely  with  great  injustice. 


374 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


Society  makes  the  whole  life  of  a woman^  in  the 
easy  classes,  a continued  self-sacrifice;  it  exacts 
from  her  an  unremitting  restraint  of  the  whole 
of  her  natural  inclinations,  and  the  sole  return  it 
makes  to  her  for  what  often  'deserves  the  name 
of  a martyrdom,  is  consideration.  Her  conside- 
ration is  inseparably  connected  with  that  of  her 
husband,  and  after  paying  the  full  price  for  it,  she 
finds  that  she  is  to  lose  it,  for  no  reason  of  which 
she  can  feel  the  cogency.  She  has  sacrificed  her 
whole  life  to  it,  and  her  husband  will  not  sacri- 
fice to  it  a whim,  a freak,  an  eccentricity ; some- 
thing not  recognised  or  allowed  for  by  the  world, 
and  which  the  world  will  agree  with  her  in 
thinking  a folly,  if  it  thinks  no  worse ! The 
dilemma  is  hardest  upon  that  very  meritorious 
class  of  men,  who,  without  possessing  talents 
which  qualify  them  to  make  a figure  among  those 
with  whom  they  agree  in  opinion,  hold  their 
opinion  from  conviction,  and  feel  bound  in 
honour  and  conscience  to  serve  it,  by  making 
profession  of  their  belief,  and  giving  their  time, 
labour,  and  means,  to  anything  undertaken  in  its 
behalf.  The  worst  case  of  all  is  when  such  men 
happen  to  be  of  a rank  and  position  which  of 
itself  neither  gives  them,  nor  excludes  them 
from,  what  is  considered  the  best  society ; when 
their  admission  to  it  depends  mainly  on  what  is 
thought  of  them  personally — and  however  unex- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


375 


ceptionable  their  breeding  and  habits^  tbeir  being 
identified  with  opinions  and  public  conduct  un- 
acceptable to  those  wlio  give  the  tone  to  society 
would  operate  as  an  effectual  exclusion.  Many 
a woman  flatters  herself  (nine  times  out  of  ten 
quite  erroneously)  that  nothing  prevents  her  and 
her  husband  from  moving  in  the  highest  society 
of  her  neighbourhood — society  in  which  others 
well  known  to  her^  and  in  the  same  class  of  life^ 
mix  freely — except  that  her  husband  is  unfortu- 
nately a Dissenter^  or  has  the  reputation  of 
mingling  in  low  radical  politics.  That  it  is,  she 
thinks,  which  hinders  George  from  getting  a 
commission  or  a place,  Caroline  from  making  an 
advantageous  match,  and  prevents  her  and  her  hus- 
band from  obtaining  invitations,  perhaps  honours, 
which,  for  aught  she  sees,  they  are  as  well  entitled 
to  as  some  folks.  With  such  an  influence  in 
every  house,  either  exerted  actively,  or  operating 
all  the  more  powerfully  for  not  being  asserted,  is 
it  any  wonder  that  people  in  general  are  kept 
down  in  that  mediocrity  of  respectability  which 
is  becoming  a marked  characteristic  of  modern 
times  ? 

There  is  another  very  injurious  aspect  in  which 
the  effect,  not  of  women^s  disabilities  directly,  but 
of  the  broad  line  of  difference  which  those  dis- 
abilities create  between  the  education  and  cha- 
racter of  a woman  and  that  of  a man,  requires  to 


376 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


be  considered.  Nothing  can  be  more  unfavour^ 
able  to  that  union  of  thoughts  and  inclinations 
which  is  the  ideal  of  married  life.  Intimate 
society  between  people  radically  dissimilar  to  one 
another^  is  an  idle  dream.  Unlikeness  may  attract^ 
but  it  is  likeness  which  retains  ; and  in  proportion 
to  the  likeness  is  the  suitability  of  the  individuals 
to  give  each  other  a happy  life.  While  women 
are  so  unlike  men^  it  is  not  wonderful  that  selfish 
men  should  feel  the  need  of  arbitrary  power  in 
their  own  hands^  to  arrest  in  limine  the  life-long 
conflict  of  inclinations^  by  deciding  every  question 
on  the  side  of  their  own  preference.  When  people 
are  extremely  unlike^  there  can  be  no  real  identity 
of  interest.  Very  often  there  is  conscientious 
difference  of  opinion  between  married  people^  on 
the  highest  points  of  duty.  Is  there  any  reality 
in  the  marriage  union  where  this  takes  place? 
Yet  it  is  not  uncommon  anywhere^  when  the 
woman  has  any  earnestness  of  character ; and  it 
is  a very  general  case  indeed  in  Catholic  countries, 
when  she  is  supported  in  her  dissent  by  the  only 
other  authority  to  which  she  is  taught  to  bow,  the 
priest.  With  the  usual  barefacedness  of  power 
not  accustomed  to  find  itself  disputed,  the  in- 
fluence of  priests  over  women  is  attacked  by  Pro- 
testant and  Liberal  writers,  less  for  being  bad  in 
itself,  than  because  it  is  a rival  authority  to  the 
husband,  and  raises  up  a revolt  against  his  infal- 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN.  377 

fibility.  In  England^  similar  differences  occa* 
sionally  exist  when  an  Evangelical  wife  has  allied 
herself  with  a husband  of  a diflPerent  quality  ; but 
in  general  this  source  at  least  of  dissension  is  got 
rid  of,  by  reducing  the  minds  of  women  to  such  a 
nullity^  that  they  have  no  opinions  but  those  of 
Mrs.  Grundy,  or  those  which  the  husband  tells 
them  to  have.  When  there  is  no  difference  of 
opinion,  differences  merely  of  taste  may  be  suffi- 
cient to  detract  greatly  from  the  happiness  of 
married  life.  And  though  it  may  stimulate  the 
amatory  propensities  of  men,  it  does  not  conduce 
to  married  happiness,  to  exaggerate  by  differences 
of  education  whatever  may  be  the  native  diffe- 
rences of  the  sexes.  If  the  married  pair  are 
well-bred  and  well-behaved  people,  they  tolerate 
each  other^s  tastes  ; but  is  mutual  toleration  what 
people  look  forward  to,  when  they  enter  into 
marriage  ? These  differences  of  inclination  will 
naturally  make  their  wishes  different,  if  not 
restrained  by  affection  or  duty,  as  to  almost  all 
domestic  questions  which  arise.  What  a diffe- 
rence there  must  be  in  the  society  which  the  two 
persons  will  wish  to  frequent,  or  be  frequented 
by  ! Each  will  desire  associates  who  share  their 
own  tastes : the  persons  agreeable  to  one,  will  be 
indifferent  or  positively  disagreeable  to  the  other  ; 
yet  there  can  be  none  who  are  not  common  to 
both,  for  married  people  do  not  now  live  in  dif- 


378 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


ferent  parts  of  the  house  and  have  totally  diffe* 
rent  visiting  lists^  as  in  the  reign  of  Louis  XV. 
They  cannot  help  having  different  wishes  as  to 
the  bringing  up  of  the  children  : each  will  wish  to 
see  reproduced  in  them  their  own  tastes  and  senti- 
ments : and  there  is  either  a compromise,  and  only 
a half-satisfaction  to  either,  or  the  wife  has  to 
yield — often  with  bitter  suffering ; and,  with  or 
without  intention,  her  occult  influence  continues 
to  counterwork  the  husband^s  purposes. 

It  would  of  course  be  extreme  folly  to  suppose 
that  these  differences  of  feeling  and  inclination 
only  exist  because  women  are  brought  up  diffe- 
rently from  men,  and  that  there  would  not  be 
differences  of  taste  under  any  imaginable  circum- 
stances. But  there  is  nothing  beyond  the  mark 
in  saying  that  the  distinction  in  bringing-up 
immensely  aggravates  those  differences,  and 
renders  them  wholly  inevitable.  While  women 
are  brought  up  as  they  are,  a man  and  a woman 
will  but  rarely  find  i""  one  another  real  agree- 
ment of  tastes  and  wishes  as  to  daily  life.  They 
will  generally  have  to  give  it  up  as  hopeless,  and 
renounce  the  attempt  to  have,  in  the  intimate 
associate  of  their  daily  life,  that  idem  velle,  idem 
nolle,  which  is  the  recognised  bond  of  any  society 
that  is  really  such : or  if  the  man  succeeds  in 
obtaining  it,  he  does  so  by  choosing  a woman 
who  is  so  complete  a nullity  that  she  has  no 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


379 


vielle  or  nolle  at  all^  and  is  as  ready  to  comply 
with  one  thing  as  another  if  anybody  tells  her  to 
do  so.  Even  this  calculation  is  apt  to  fail ; dul- 
ness  and  want  of  spirit  are  not  always  a guarantee 
of  the  submission  which  is  so  confidently  expected 
from  them.  But  if  they  were^  is  this  the  ideal 
of  marriage?  What^  in  this  case^  does  the  man 
obtain  by  it^  except  an  upper  servant^  a nurse^ 
or  a mistress?  On  the  contrary^  when  each 
of  two  persons^  instead  of  being  a nothings  is 
a something;  when  they  are  attached  to  one 
another^  and  are  not  too  much  unlike  to  begin 
with ; the  constant  partaking  in  the  same  things, 
assisted  by  their  sympathy^  draws  out  the  latent 
capacities  of  each  for  being  interested  in  the 
things  which  were  at  first  interesting  only  to  the 
other;  and  works  a gradual  assimilation  of  the 
tastes  and  characters  to  one.  another^  partly  by 
the  insensible  modification  of  each^  but  more  by 
a real  enriching  of  the  two  natures,  each  ac- 
quiring the  tastes  and  capacities  of  the  other  in 
addition  to  its  own.  This  often  happens  between 
two  friends  of  the  same  sex^  who  are  much  asso- 
ciated in  their  daily  life  : and  it  would  be  a 
common^  if  not  the  commonest,  case  in  marriage, 
did  not  the  totally  diflferent  bringing-up  of  the 
two  sexes  make  it  next  to  an  impossibility  to 
form  a really  well- assorted  union.  Were  this 
remedied,  whatever  differences  there  might  still 


380 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


be  in  individual  tastes^  there  would  at  least  be, 
as  a general  rule,  complete  unity  and  unanimity  as 
to  the  great  objects  of  life.  When  the  two  per- 
sons both  care  for  great  objects,  and  are  a help 
and  encouragement  to  each  other  in  whatever 
regards  these,  the  minor  matters  on  which  their 
tastes  may  differ  are  not  all-important  to  them ; 
and  there  is  a foundation  for  solid  friendship,  of 
an  enduring  character,  more  likely  than  anything 
else  to  make  it,  through  the  whole  of  life,  a greater 
pleasure  to  each  to  give  pleasure  to  the  other, 
than  to  receive  it. 

I have  considered,  thus  far,  the  effects  on  the 
pleasures  and  benefits  of  the  marriage  union  which 
depend  on  the  mere  unlikeness  between  the  wife 
and  the  husband  : but  the  evil  tendency  is  pro- 
digiously aggravated  when  the  unlikeness  is  in- 
feriority. Mere  unlikeness,  when  it  only  means 
difference  of  good  qualities,  may  be  more  a 
benefit  in  the  way  of  mutual  improvement,  than 
a drawback  from  comfort.  When  each  emulates, 
and  desires  and  endeavours  to  acquire,  the  other^’s 
peculiar  qualities,  the  difference  does  not  produce 
diversity  of  interest,  but  increased  identity  of  it, 
and  makes  each  still  more  valuable  to  the  other. 
But  when  one  is  much  the  inferior  of  the  two  in 
mental  ability  and  cultivation,  and  is  not  actively 
attempting  by  the  other^s  aid  to  rise  to  the  other^s 
level,  the  whole  influence  of  the  connexion  upon 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


381 


the  development  of  the  superior  of  the  two  u 
deteriorating : and  still  more  so  in  a tolerably 
happy  marriage  than  in  an  unhappy  one.  It  is 
not  with  impunity  that  the  superior  in  intelleet 
shuts  himself  up  with  an  inferior^  and  elects 
that  inferior  for  his  chosen^  and  sole  completely 
intimate^  associate.  Any  society  which  is  not  im- 
proving^ is  deteriorating : and  the  more  so^  the 
closer  and  more  familiar  it  is.  Even  ^ really 
superior  man  almost  always  begins  to  deteriorate 
when  he  is  habitually  (as  the  phrase  is)  king  of  his 
company  : and  in  his  most  habitual  company  the 
husband  who  has  a wife  inferior  to  him  is  always  so. 
While  his  self-satisfaction  is  incessantly  ministered 
to  on  the  one  hand^  on  the  other  he  insensibly 
imbibes  the  modes  of  feelings  and  of  looking  at 
things^  which  belong  to  a more  vulgar  or  a more 
limited  mind  than  his  own.  This  evil  difiers 
from  many  of  those  which  have  hitherto  been 
dwelt  on,  by  being  an  increasing  one.  The 
association  of  men  with  women  in  daily  life  is 
much  closer  and  more  complete  than  it  ever  was 
before.  Men’s  life  is  more  domestic.  Formerly, 
their  pleasures  and  chosen  occupations  were 
among  men,  and  in  mefos  company  : their  wives 
had  but  a fragment  of  their  lives.  At  the  present 
time,  the  progress  of  civilization,  and  the  turn  of 
opinion  against  the  rough  amusements  and  con- 
vivial excesses  which  formerly  occupied  most  men 


382 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


in  their  hours  of  relaxation — together  with  (it 
must  be  said)  the  improved  tone  of  modern  feel- 
ing as  to  the  reciprocity  of  duty  which  binds 
the  husband  towards  the  wife — have  thrown  the 
man  very  much  more  upon  home  and  its  inmates, 
for  his  personal  and  social  pleasures  : while  the 
kind  and  degree  of  improvement  which  has  been 
made  in  women^s  education,  has  made  them  in 
some  degree  capable  of  being  his  companions  in 
ideas  and  mental  tastes,  while  leaving  them,  in 
most  cases,  still  hopelessly  inferior  to  him.  His 
desire  of  mental  communion  is  thus  in  general 
satisfied  by  a communion  from  which  he  learns 
nothing.  An  unimproving  and  unstimulating 
companionship  is  substituted  for  (what  he  might 
otherwise  have  been  obliged  to  seek)  the  society 
of  his  equals  in  powers  and  his  fellows  in  the 
higher  pursuits.  We  see,  accordingly,  that  young 
men  of  the  greatest  promise  generally  cease  to 
improve  as  soon  as  they  marry,  and,  not  im- 
proving, inevitably  degenerate.  If  the  wife  does 
not  push  the  husband  forward,  she  always  holds 
him  back.  He  ceases  to  care  for  what  she  does 
not  care  for;  he  no  longer  desires,  and  ends  by 
disliking  and  shunning,  society  congenial  to  his 
former  aspirations,  and  which  would  now  shame 
his  falling-oft‘  from  them  ; his  higher  faculties 
both  of  mind  and  heart  cease  to  be  called  into  acti- 
vity. And  this  change  coinciding  with  the  new  and 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


383 


tselfish  interests  wtich  are  created  by  the  family, 
after  a few  years  he  differs  in  no  material  respect 
from  those  who  have  never  had  wishes  for  any. 
thing  but  the  common  vanities  and  the  common 
pecuniary  objects. 

What  marriage  may  be  in  the  case  of  two 
persons  of  cultivated  faculties^  identical  in  opi- 
nions and  purposes^  between  whom  there  exists 
that  best  kind  of  equality^  similarity  of  powers 
and  capacities  with  reciprocal  superiority  in  them 
— so  that  each  can  enjoy  the  luxury  of  looking  up 
to  the  other^  and  can  have  alternately  the  pleasure 
of  leading  and  of  being  led  in  the  path  of  develop- 
ment— I will  not  attempt  to  describe.  To  those 
who  can  conceive  it,  there  is  no  need  ; to  those 
who  cannot,  it  would  appear  the  dream  of  an 
enthusiast.  But  I maintain,  with  the  profoundest 
conviction,  that  this,  and  this  only,  is  the  ideal  of 
marriage ; and  that  all  opinions,  customs,  and  in- 
stitutions which  favour  any  other  notion  of  it,  or 
turn  the  conceptions  and  aspirations  connected 
with  it  into  any  other  direction,  by  whatever  pre- 
tences they  may  be  coloured,  are  relics  of  primitive 
barbarism.  The  moral  regeneration  of  mankind 
will  only  really  commence,  when  the  most  funda- 
mental of  the  social  relations  is  placed  under  the 
rule  of  equal  justice,  and  when  human  beings 
learn  to  cultivate  their  strongest  sympathy  with 
an  equal  in  rights  and  in  cultivation. 


384 


TilE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


Tims  far^  the  benefits  which  it  has  appeared 
that  the  world  would  gain  by  ceasing  to  mak® 
sex  a disqualification  for  privileges  and  a badge 
of  subjection^  are  social  rather  than  individual ; 
consisting  in  an  increase  of  the  general  fund  of 
thinking  and  acting  power^  and  an  improvement 
in  the  general  conditions  of  the  association  of 
men  with  women.  But  it  would  be  a grievous 
understatement  of  the  case  to  omit  the  most 
direct  benefit  of  all^  the  unspeakable  gain  in 
private  happiness  to  the  liberated  half  of  the 
species ; the  difference  to  them  between  a life  of 
subjection  to  the  will  of  others^  and  a life  of 
rational  freedom.  After  the  primary  necessities 
of  food  and  raiment^  freedom  is  the  first  and 
strongest  want  of  human  nature.  While  man- 
kind are  lawless^  their  desire  is  for  lawless  free- 
dom. When  they  have  learnt  to  understand  the 
meaning  of  duty  and  the  value  of  reason^  they 
incline  more  and  more  to  be  guided  and  restrained 
by  these  in  the  exercise  of  their  freedom ; but 
they  do  not  therefore  desire  freedom  less ; they 
do  not  become  disposed  to  accept  the  will  of 
other  people  as  the  representative  and  inter- 
preter of  those  guiding  principles.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  communities  in  which  the  reason  has 
been  most  cultivated,  and  in  which  the  idea  of 
social  duty  has  been  most  powerfid,  are  those 
which  have  most  strongly  asserted  the  freedom 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


385 


of  action  of  the  individual — the  liberty  of  each  to 
govern  his  conduct  by  his  own  feelings  of  duty, 
and  by  such  laws  and  social  restraints  as  his  own 
conscience  can  subscribe  to. 

He  who  would  rightly  appreciate  the  worth  of 
personal  independence  as  an  element  of  happi- 
ness, should  consider  the  value  he  himself  puts 
upon  it  as  an  ingredient  of  his  own.  There  is  no 
subject  on  which  there  is  a greater  habitual  diffe- 
rence of  judgment  between  a man  judging  for 
himself,  and  the  same  man  judging  for  other 
people.  When  he  hears  others  complaining  that 
they  are  not  allowed  freedom  of  action — that  their 
own  will  has  not  sufficient  influence  in  the  regu- 
lation of  their  affairs — his  inclination  is,  to  ask, 
what  are  their  grievances  ? what  positive  damage 
they  sustain?  and  in  what  respect  they  consider 
their  affairs  to  be  mismanaged  ? and  if  they  fail 
to  make  out,  in  answer  to  these  questions,  what 
appears  to  him  a sufficient  case,  he  turns  a deaf 
ear,  and  regards  their  complaint  as  the  fanciful 
querulousness  of  people  whom  nothing  reasonable 
will  satisfy.  But  he  has  a quite  different  standard 
of  judgment  when  he  is  deciding  for  himself. 
Then,  the  most  unexceptionable  administration  of 
his  interests  by  a tutor  set  over  him,  does  not 
satisfy  his  feelings  : his  personal  exclusion  from 
the  deciding  authority  appears  itself  the  greatest 
grievance  of  all,  rendering  it  superfluous  even  to 
17 


380 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


enter  into  the  question  of  mismanagement.  It  is 
the  same  with  nations.  What  citizen  of  a free 
country  would  listen  to  any  offers  of  good  and 
slulful  administration^  in  return  for  the  abdica- 
tion of  freedom  ? Even  if  he  cculd  believe  that 
good  and  skilful  administration  can  exist  among 
a people  ruled  by  a Avill  not  their  own,  would 
not  the  consciousness  of  working  out  their 
own  destiny  under  their  own  moral  respon- 
sibility be  a compensation  to  his  feelings  for 
great  rudeness  and  imperfection  in  the  details  of 
public  affairs?  Let  him  rest  assured  that  what- 
ever he  feels  on  this  point,  women  feel  in  a fully 
equal  degree.  Whatever  has  been  said  or  written, 
from  the  time  of  Herodotus  to  the  present,  of  the 
ennobling  influence  of  free  government — the  nerve 
and  spring  which  it  gives  to  all  the  faculties,  the 
larger  and  higher  objects  which  it  presents  to  the 
intellect  and  feelings,  the  more  unselfish  public 
spirit,  and  calmer  and  broader  views  of  duty, 
that  it  engenders,  and  the  generally  loftier  plat- 
form on  which  it  elevates  the  individual  as  a moral, 
spiritual,  and  social  being  — is  every  particle 
as  true  of  women  as  of  men.  Are  these  things 
no  important  part  of  individual  happiness  ? Let 
any  man  call  to  mind  what  he  himself  felt  on 
emerging  from  boyhood — from  the  tutelage  and 
control  of  even  loved  and  aflectionate  elders — and 
entering  upon  the  responsibihties  of  manhood# 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


387 


Was  it  not  like  the  physical  effect  of  taking  off  a 
heavy  weighty  or  releasing  him  from  obstmetive^ 
even  if  not  otherwise  painful,  bonds  ? Did  he 
not  feel  twice  as  much  alive,  twice  as  much  a 
human  being,  as  before  ? And  does  he  imagine 
that  women  have  none  of  these  feelings  ? But  it 
is  a striking  fact,  that  the  satisfactions  and 
mortifications  of  personal  pride,  though  all  in  all 
to  most  men  when  the  case  is  their  own,  have 
less  allowance  made  for  them  in  the  case  of  other 
people,  and  are  less  listened  to  as  a ground  or  a 
justification  of  conduct,  than  any  other  natural 
human  feelings ; perhaps  because  men  compliment 
them  in  their  own  case  with  the  names  of  so 
many  other  qualities,  that  they  are  seldom 
coTiscious  how  mighty  an  influence  these  feelings 
exercise  in  their  own  lives.  No  less  large  and 
powerful  is  their  part,  we  may  assure  ourselves,  in 
the  lives  and  feelii-gs  of  women.  Women  are 
schooled  into  suppressing  them  in  their  most 
natural  and  most  healthy  direction,  but  the  in- 
ternal principle  remains,  in  a different  outward 
form.  An  active  and  energetic  mind,  if  denied 
liberty,  will  seek  for  power : refused  the  com- 
mand of  itself,  it  will  assert  its  personality  by 
attempting  to  control  others.  To  allow  to  any 
human  beings  no  existence  of  their  own  but 
what  depends  on  others,  is  giving  far  too 
high  a premium  on  bending  others  to  their  pur- 


3SS 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


poses.  Where  liberty  cannot  be  hoped  for,  and 
power  can^  power  becomes  the  grand  object  of 
human  desire ; those  to  whom  others  will  not 
leave  the  undisturbed  management  of  their  own 
affairs^  will  compensate  themselves^  if  they  can^  by 
meddling  for  their  own  purposes  with  the  affairs 
of  others.  Hence  also  women^s  passion  for  per- 
sonal beauty,,  and  dress  and  display ; and  all  the 
evils  that  flow  from  it^  in  the  way  of  mischievous 
luxury  and  social  immorality.  The  love  of  power 
and  the  love  of  liberty  are  in  eternal  antagonism. 
Where  there  is  least  liberty^  the  passion  for  power 
is  the  most  ardent  and  unscrupulous.  The  desire 
of  power  over  others  can  only  cease  to  be  a de- 
praving agency  among  mankind,,  when  each  of 
them  individually  is  able  to  do  without  it ; which 
can  only  be  w^here  respect  for  liberty  in  the  per- 
sonal concerns  of  each  is  an  established  principle. 

But  it  is  not  only  through  the  sentiment  of 
personal  dignity^  that  the  free  direction  and  dis- 
posal of  their  own  faculties  is  a source  of  indi- 
vidual happiness,  and  tobe  fettered  and  restricted  in 
it,,  a source  of  unhappiness^  to  human  beings^  and 
not  least  to  women.  There  is  nothing,  after  disease, 
indigence,  and  guilt,  so  fatal  to  the  pleasurable 
enjoyment  of  life  as  the  want  of  a worthy  outlet 
for  the  active  faculties.  Women  who  have  the 
cares  of  a family,  and  while  they  have  the  cares 
of  a family,  have  this  outlet,  and  it  generally 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


389 


suffices  for  them  : but  what  of  the  greatly  in- 
creasing number  of  women,  who  have  had  no 
opportunity  of  exercising  the  vocation  which 
they  are  mocked  by  telling  them  is  their  proper 
one  ? What  of  the  women  whose  children  have 
been  lost  to  them  by  death  or  distance^  or  have 
grown  up,  married,  and  formed  homes  of  their 
own?  There  are  abundant  examples  of  men 
who,  after  a life  engrossed  by  business,  retire  with 
a competency  to  the  enjoyment,  as  they  hope,  of 
rest,  but  to  whom,  as  they  are  unable  to  acquire 
new  interests  and  excitements  that  can  replace 
the  old,  the  change  to  a life  of  inactivity  brings 
ennui,  melancholy,  and  premature  death.  Yet 
no  one  thinks  of  the  parallel  case  of  so  many 
worthy  and  devoted  women,  who,  having  paid  what 
they  are  told  is  their  debt  to  society — having 
brought  up  a family  blamelessly  to  manhood  and 
womanhood — having  kept  a house  as  long  as  they 
had  a house  needing  to  be  kept — are  deserted  by 
the  sole  occupation  for  which  they  have  fitted 
themselves ; and  remain  with  undiminished  activity 
but  with  no  employment  for  it,  unless  perhaps  a 
daughter  or  daughter-in-law  is  willing  to  abdicate 
in  their  favour  the  discharge  of  the  same  func- 
tions in  her  younger  household.  Surely  a hard 
lot  for  the  old  age  of  those  who  have  worthily 
discharged,  as  long  as  it  was  given  to  them  to 
discharge,  what  the  world  accounts  their  only 


390 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


social  duty.  Of  such  women,  and  of  those  others 
to  whom  this  duty  has  not  been  committed  at 
all — many  of  whom  pine  through  life  with  the 
consciousness  of  thwarted  vocations,  and  acti- 
vities which  are  not  suffered  to  expand — the 
only  resources,  speaking  generally,  are  religion 
and  charity.  But  their  religion,  though  it  may 
be  one  of  feeling,  and  of  ceremonial  observance, 
cannot  be  a religion  of  action,  unless  in  the 
form  of  charity.  For  charity  many  of  them  are 
by  nature  admirably  fitted ; but  to  practise  it 
usefully,  or  even  without  doing  mischief,  requires 
the  education,  the  manifold  preparation,  the  know- 
ledge and  the  thinking  powers,  of  a skilful  ad- 
ministrator. There  are  few  of  the  administrative 
funetions  of  government  for  whieh  a person  would 
not  be  fit,  who  is  fit  to  bestow  charity  usefully. 
In  this  as  in  other  cases  (pre-eminently  in  that 
of  the  education  of  children),  the  duties  per- 
mitted to  women  cannot  be  performed  properly, 
without  their  being  trained  for  duties  whieh,  to 
the  great  loss  of  society,  are  not  permitted  to 
them.  And  here  let  me  notice  the  singular  way 
in  which  the  question  of  women’s  disabilities  is 
frequently  presented  to  view,  by  those  who  find 
it  easier  to  draw  a ludicrous  picture  of  what  they 
do  not  like,  than  to  answer  the  arguments  for  it. 
When  it  is  suggested  that  womeu^s  executive 
capacities  and  prudent  counsels  might  sometimes 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


391 


be  found  valuable  in  affairs  of  state,  these  lovers 
of  fun  hold  up  to  the  ridicule  of  the  world,  as 
sitting  in  parliament  or  in  the  cabinet,  girls  in 
their  teens,  or  young  wives  of  two  or  three  and 
twenty,  transported  bodily,  exactly  as  they  are, 
from  the  drawing-room  to  the  House  of  Com- 
mons. They  forget  that  males  are  not  usually 
selected  at  this  early  age  for  a seat  in  Par- 
liament, or  for  responsible  political  functions. 
Common  sense  would  tell  them  that  if  such 
trusts  were  confided  to  women,  it  would  be 
to  such  as  having  no  special  vocation  for  mar- 
ried life,  or  preferring  another  employment  of 
their  faculties  (as  many  women  even  now  prefer 
to  marriage  some  of  the  few  honourable  occupa- 
tions within  their  reach),  have  spent  the  best 
years  of  their  youth  in  attempting  to  qualify 
themselves  for  the  pursuits  in  which  they  desire 
to  engage;  or  still  more  frequently  perhaps, 
widows  or  wives  of  forty  or  fifty,  by  whom  the 
knowledge  of  life  and  faculty  of  government 
which  they  have  acquired  in  their  families,  could 
by  the  aid  of  appropriate  studies  be  made  avail- 
able on  a less  contracted  scale.  There  is  no 
country  of  Europe  in  which  the  ablest  men  have 
not  frequently  experienced,  and  keenly  appreciated, 
the  value  of  the  advice  and  help  of  clever  and 
experienced  women  of  the  world,  in  the  attain- 
ment both  of  private  and  of  public  objects ; and 


392 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


there  are  important  matters  of  public  administra* 
tion  to  which  few  men  are  equally  competent 
with  such  women ; among  others^  the  detailed 
control  of  expenditure.  But  what  we  are  now 
discussing  is  not  the  need  which  society  has  of 
the  services  of  women  in  public  business,  but  the 
dull  and  hopeless  life  to  which  it  so  often  con- 
demns them,  by  forbidding  them  to  exercise  the 
practical  abilities  which  many  of  them  are  con- 
scious of,  in  any  wider  field  than  one  which  to 
some  of  them  never  was,  and  to  others  is  no 
longer,  open.  If  there  is  anything  vitally  im- 
portant to  the  happiness  of  human  beings,  it  is 
that  they  should  relish  their  habitual  pursuit. 
This  requisite  of  an  enjoyable  life  is  very  imper- 
fectly granted,  or  altogether  denied,  to  a large 
part  of  mankind ; and  by  its  absence  many  a life 
is  a failure,  which  is  provided,  in  appearance,  with 
every  requisite  of  success.  But  if  circumstances 
which  society  is  not  yet  skilful  enough  to  over- 
come, render  such  failures  often  for  the  present 
inevitable,  society  need  not  itself  inflict  them. 
The  injudiciousness  of  parents,  a youtVs  own 
inexperience,  or  the  absence  of  external  oppor- 
tunities for  the  congenial  vocation,  and  their 
presence  for  an  uncongenial,  condemn  numbers 
of  men  to  pass  their  lives  in  doing  one  thing  reluc- 
tantly and  ill,  when  there  are  other  things  which 
they  could  have  done  well  and  happily.  But  on 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


393 


women  tliis  sentence  is  imposed  by  actual  law, 
and  by  customs  equivalent  to  law.  Wliat,  in 
unenlightened  societies,  colour,  race,  religion,  or 
in  the  case  of  a conquered  country,  nationality, 
are  to  some  men,  sex  is  to  all  women ; a 
peremptory  exclusion  from  almost  all  honourable 
occupations,  but  either  such  as  cannot  be  fulfilled 
by  others,  or  such  as  those  others  do  not  think 
worthy  of  their  acceptance.  Sufferings  arising 
from  causes  of  this  nature  usually  meet  with  so 
little  sympathy,  that  few  persons  are  aware  of  the 
great  amount  of  unhappiness  even  noY/  pro- 
duced by  the  feeling  of  a wasted  life.  The  case 
will  be  even  more  frequent,  as  increased  cultiva- 
tion creates  a greater  and  greater  disproportion 
between  the  ideas  and  faculties  of  women,  and 
the  scope  which  society  allows  to  their  activity. 

When  we  consider  the  positive  evil  caused  to 
the  disqualified  half  of  the  human  race  by  their 
disqualification — first  in  the  loss  of  the  most  in- 
spiriting and  elevating  kind  of  personal  enjoy- 
ment, and  next  in  the  weariness,  disappointment, 
and  profound  dissatisfaction  with  life,  which  are 
so  often  the  substitute  for  it ; one  feels  that 
among  all  the  lessons  which  men  require  for 
carrying  on  the  struggle  against  the  inevitable 
imperfections  of  their  lot  on  earth,  there  is  no 
lesson  which  they  more  need,  than  not  to  add  to 
the  evils  which  nature  inflicts,  by  their  jealous 
17* 


394 


THE  SUBJECTION  OF  WOMEN. 


and  prejudiced  restrictions  on  one  another. 
Their  vain  fears  only  substitute  other  and  worse 
evils  for  those  which  they  are  idly  apprehensive 
of:  while  every  restraint  on  the  freedom  of 
conduct  of  any  of  their  human  fellow  creatures, 
(otherwise  than  by  making  them  responsible  for 
any  evil  actually  caused  by  it),  dries  up  pro  tanto 
the  principal  fountain  of  human  happiness,  and 
leaves  the  species  less  rich,  to  an  inappreciable 
degree,  in  all  that  makes  life  valuable  to  the 
individual  human  being. 


THE  END, 


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than  perhaps  any  other  book  in  existence.” — A^.  Y.  Evening  Post. 

STILLMAN’S  (W.  J.)  CRETAN  INSURRECTION  OF 
1866-7-3.  By  W.  J.  Stillman,  late  U.  S.  Consul  in  Crete.  i2mo. 
$1.50. 

WHIST  (SHORT  WHIST).  Edited  by  J.  L.  Baldwin.  The 
Standard  adopted  by  the  London  Chibs.  And  a Treatise  on  the 
Game,  by  J.  C.  i8mo,  appropriately  decorated,  $i.oo. 

“ Having  been  for  thirty-six  years  a player  and  lover  of  the  game,  we 
commend  the  book  to  a beginner  desirous  of  playing  well.” — Boston 
Commomuealth. 


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